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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the conflict of laws surrounding marriage validity, with a 
particular focus on essential validity. At present in England, there is a multitude of 
choice of law rules available to the courts when determining the applicable law, and 
no way of knowing which will be applied. Consequently, it is difficult for a couple to 
know whether their marriage is valid, and complications eschew from this. In addition 
to any emotional impact a finding of invalidity might have, there is the potential for 
significant legal consequences. 
With these embryonic legal ramifications in mind, this thesis seeks to create optimal 
choice of law rules that are both appropriate, and provide certainty. In doing so, 
support is drawn from various literary sources to promulgate a dépeçage based 
interest analysis approach. This means that rules are selected for each of the 
incapacities, taking into account the relevant policy objectives they raise, making the 
optimal choice of law rules policy sensitive in nature. Furthermore, a new and original 
choice of law rule; the continued recognised relationship theory is proposed.  
With much of the literature pre-dating the legal developments surrounding same-sex 
relationships in England, this thesis goes on to seminally include the determination of 
the applicable law in same-sex relationships. This is particularly important given the 
inconsistencies surrounding same-sex relationships; it is an area ripe for conflict 
disputes, making a set choice of law rule vital if certainty is to be achieved across the 
marriage validity spectrum. 
Finally, as a result of increased migration, this thesis extends beyond the borders of 
England, and encompasses the EU and the US, with the aim of evaluating how 
certainty might be continued as couples cross state borders. To this end, 
harmonisation of the choice of law rules proposed herein are propounded across 
these jurisdictions.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In England and Wales, over half of the population aged 16 or over are married or in 
a civil partnership1, demonstrating just how prevalent marriage is within our society. 
This level of importance is also apparent across the European Union (EU), where like 
England, over half of the population aged 20 or over are married or in a civil 
partnership2. In a similar vein, in the United States3, as of 2016, just under half of the 
population aged 18 and over were married4. Evidently, it is a status that many couples 
find attractive and wish to enter into across these societies and, as a result, is an 
aspect of the law that impacts many people. Aside from the sheer volume of people 
it effects, the importance of such a status to those who have entered into it must not 
be forgotten. Marriage, for some people, represents the ultimate commitment, or the 
‘gold standard’5 in relationships, and, may have religious meaning, therefore it is an 
area of law many will feel heavily invested in.  The status of marriage brings with it 
various rights as well as also creating legal obligations which can only be rescinded 
upon the formal legal process of divorce.  
To further understand the importance of the marital status, it is helpful to consider 
why people marry. Historically, marriage was primarily about economics and politics, 
it was a way in which people could ensure a favourable financial position for 
                                                          
1 These figures were up to date in 2015 as identified in Office for National Statistics – ‘Population by 
Legal Marital Status and Cohabitate Status by Age and Sex for England and Wales’ available at 
www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/population/estimates/bulletin
s/populationestimatesbymaritalstatusandlivingarrangements/2002to2015 last accessed 9/12/16.  
2 These figures were accurate in 2011 of the 28 Member States in the union at the time. See Louise 
Corselli-Nordblad and Andrea Geoffrey,  ‘Marriage and Birth Statistics – New Ways of Living Together 
in the EU’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Marriage_and_birth_statistics_-_new_ways_of_living_together_in_the_EU last 
accessed 9/12/16. 
3 Hereafter referred to as the US. 
4 The figure is about 48%, which is based on a figure of 60.25 million married couples in accordance 
with the statistics set out  at www.statista.com/statistics/183663/number-of-married-couples-in-the-us/ 
last accessed 24/07/17 and the statistics at www.census.gov/quickfacts/ last accessed 24/07/2017, 
that state that the population of the US in 2016 was around 323.1 million of which 22.8% were aged 
under 18. 
5 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295 [6]. 
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themselves and their family6. In what was a patriarchal society, the financial security 
and societal position for women, was advanced through marrying a man that had a 
good job and was financially stable7. Likewise, for wealthy men, marriage was still a 
means of increasing their assets, as a wife would come with a dowry, and upon 
marriage a woman’s personal property would become her husband’s to do with as he 
pleased8. Thus, marriage was of vital importance and was something families were 
heavily invested in to ensure future financial and economic security. This, however, 
is something that has changed over modern times. In modern society marriage is 
usually associated with love and is less about economics: “By the end of the 
nineteenth century love had won its battle along the whole line in the upper middle 
class. It has since been regarded as the most important prerequisite to marriage.”9 
Cherlin, in exploring this shift in attitude, describes a two-stage process10. The first 
step, he states, was a transformation from marriage as an economic institution to a 
companionship, in which the relationship was about being each others partners and 
lovers, with emotion playing a more central role. However, at this stage, much 
satisfaction is still emanated from being part of the nuclear family, and playing the 
role of the spouse. Stage two, was the move from the companionship model, to what 
Cherlin called the “individualized marriage”11, in which marriage was about self-
development and emotional fulfilment rather than playing the role of the spouse. This 
idea of love, romance and sexual attraction now playing a more central role, is also 
echoed by other authors:  
“If marriage was once a means for economic stability and the production of society 
that had a latent function of providing personal fulfilment for the individuals involved, 
the personal fulfilment is now seen as the main purpose of marriage and economic 
stability and raising a family may be seen as latent functions.”12 
 
                                                          
6 Ana Carolina Fowler, ‘Love and Marriage Through the Lens of Sociological Theories’ [2007] Human 
Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 61. 
7 Ibid 68. 
8 Diana Gittins, The Family in Question Changing Households & Familiar Ideology (2nd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan 1993) 76. 
9 Hugo G Beigel, ‘Romantic Love’ (1951) 16(3) American Sociological Review 326, 330. See also 
Diana Gittins, The Family in Question Changing Households & Familiar Ideology (2nd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan 1993) 84 and Liz Steel, Warren Kidd & Anne Brown, The Family (2nd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012) 116-118. 
10 Andrew J Cherlin, ‘The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage’ (2004) 66(4) Journal of Marriage 
and Family 848.  
11 Ibid 852. 
12 Ana Carolina Fowler, ‘Love and Marriage Through the Lens of Sociological Theories’ [2007] Human 
Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 61, 69. 
3 
 
In supporting his theory Cherlin also looked at a study conducted by Whitehead and 
Popenoe in 200113, in which, the attitudes of 20-29 year olds towards marriage was 
explored. In the study it was found that most participants were of the view that 
marriage was based on love and intimacy, more so than practicalities like finances14. 
Interestingly, what was also found in the study by Whitehead and Popenoe was that 
marriage, and its focus on romantic love and emotional connections, had become 
somewhat of a relationship goal for couples: “while marriage is losing much of its 
broad public and institutional character, it is gaining popularity as a Super-
Relationship, an intensely private spiritualized union, combining sexual fidelity, 
romantic love, emotional intimacy and togetherness.”15 With terminology like “Super-
Relationship” marriage appears to have gained a symbolic status, “it has evolved from 
a marker of conformity to a marker of prestige.”16 This idea of symbolism is explored 
by Fowler, and she asserts that since marriage has become centred around personal 
satisfaction and emotional needs, in marrying, couples are making a public 
declaration of their ability to maintain a romantic and emotionally fulfilling relationship, 
in turn, “elevating them to a privileged status.”17 This perceived symbolic status and 
hierarchical position of marriage amongst relationships, appears to stem from the 
change to marriage being based on love, as marriage appears to represent the 
ultimate demonstration and commitment of love, and could, explain Wilkinson and 
Kitzinger’s reference to marriage as the ‘gold standard’ in relationships.  
With such a significant impact, it is important that the applicable law is clear and easy 
to understand18. A couple should be able to ascertain for themselves whether they 
have entered into a valid marriage, and whether the country in which they live will 
recognise the marriage: “Marriage is the very foundation of civil society, and no part 
of the laws and institutions of a country can be of more vital importance to its subjects 
than those which regulate the manner and conditions of forming, and if necessary of 
dissolving the marriage contract.”19 For many, this may be entirely straight-forward, if 
                                                          
13 David Whitehead & Barbara Popenoe, ‘Who Wants to Marry a Soul Mate? In The State of Our 
Unions, 2001 (National Marriage Project) as discussed by Andrew J Cherlin, ‘The Deinstitutionalization 
of American Marriage’ (2004) 66(4) Journal of Marriage and Family 848. 
14 Ibid 856. 
15 David Whitehead & Barbara Popenoe, ‘Who Wants to Marry a Soul Mate? In The State of Our 
Unions, 2001 (National Marriage Project) 13, as discussed by Andrew J Cherlin, ‘The 
Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage’ (2004) 66(4) Journal of Marriage and Family 848, 856. 
16 Andrew J Cherlin, ‘The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage’ (2004) 66(4) Journal of Marriage 
and Family 848, 855. 
17 Ana Carolina Fowler, ‘Love and Marriage Through the Lens of Sociological Theories’ [2007] Human 
Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 61, 70. 
18 A point that was recognised by Lincoln J in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam 106, 112. 
19 Shaw v Gould (1868) LR 3 HL 55, 82 (Lord Westbury). 
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a couple marry in the country they were both born in and continue to live in, the likely 
outcome is that they would simply need to comply with the laws of that country, and 
problems and issues would be unlikely. This, however, may not always be the case, 
as a marriage may have an international aspect to it, and may, therefore, require 
greater consideration. When marrying, there are various rules that must be complied 
with in order for the marriage to be valid, and where more than one country is involved 
in that marriage it needs to be determined which law applies.  
Within the EU alone, of the 2.2 million marriages every year, 350,000 of these involve 
an international couple20. As a consequence of such high figures, it appears likely that 
there will be occasions where the law surrounding the marriage, and its validity in the 
involved countries, conflict with one another, and require a determination of which law 
applies. The rules could conflict on a whole host of matters, such as how old the 
parties must be to enter into a marriage, or whether couples of the same-sex can 
marry, and without clarity in the law setting out which country’s law applies, couples 
are left uncertain of whether their marriage is valid. Furthermore, couples may fall 
victim of limping marriages, whereby their marital status is recognised in one country 
but not in another. 
The applicable law is determined through the application of choice of law rules. These 
rules are designed to do exactly as they suggest, choose which law will apply, and 
are subject matter specific21. Their purpose is to provide “predictability, 
administrability, rationality and uniformity of decisions.”22 However, despite academic 
assertions as to the applicable choice of law rule23, this is not a settled area from 
which definitive conclusions can currently be drawn. Marriage validity is broken down 
into two aspects; formal validity and essential validity, and though formal validity is 
largely agreed upon, there are various choice of law rules that could be applied to the 
essential validity of marriage, and it is this aspect where this thesis will focus it’s 
consideration. 
Essential validity covers important issues such as whether the parties had the 
capacity to marry. This looks at matters such as age, consanguinity and affinity, 
                                                          
20 The Centre for Social Justice, ‘European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law’ (2009) 5, 
available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UsterStorage/pdf/pdf%20reports/CSJEuropeanFamilyLaw.pdf 
last accessed 9/12/16. 
21 Maebh Harding, Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Routledge 2014) 3. 
22 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Choice of Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An End and a 
Beginning’ (2015) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1847, 1921. 
23 Jonathan Hill & Marie Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 20 suggests that essential validity is generally governed by the dual domicile theory. 
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polygamy, consent and re-marriage after divorce, and despite assertions that the dual 
domicile theory is the applicable choice of law rule24, further analysis is required.  The 
dual domicile theory applies the law of the domicile of each party prior to the 
marriage25, and while its prevalence as the preferred choice of law rule may be as a 
result of it being endorsed by the Law Commission26, this is far from the sole potential 
choice of law rule, and other options will be explored herein. 
This analysis will include evaluation of alternative choice of law rules such as the 
intended matrimonial home theory27, the most real and substantial connection test28 
and interest analysis29. With the potential for any of these to be applied, and a level 
of judicial and academic support for each of them, the applicable law remains 
uncertain. Academics have recognised the state of the law as being problematic30, 
however, no resolution has ever been achieved. Though other matters within the 
conflict of laws, such as contract and tort precepts31, have been the subject of 
extensive review, with the hope of achieving greater certainty, marriage validity 
appears to have been left behind. This wane in actual legal development does not, 
however, mean that we are in the same position as we were in when the Law 
Commission produced its reports back in 1985, or when academics such as Reed32 
and Davie33 analysed the area. In reality, since then, society has continued to develop 
and so too has the requirement for legal reform, and what we are now confronted with 
are laws that are uncertain and outdated. Such developments that have since 
                                                          
24 Jonathan Hill & Marie Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 20. 
25 John Morris, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (8th edn, London: Stevens 1967) Rule 31 at 
254-255. 
26 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36. 
27 GC Cheshire, Private International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 1965) 227-228. 
28 As discussed by CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 359. 
29 The theory was established by Brainerd Currie in Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of 
Laws (Duke University Press 1863), but has since been further developed. 
30 See for instance Richard Fentiman, ‘Activity in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law 
Commission’ (1986) 6(3) Oxford Law Journal 353, AJE Jaffey, ‘The Essential Validity of Marriage in 
the English Conflict of Laws’ [1978]  Modern Law Review 38 and Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of 
Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rues’ 
(2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 387. 
31 For instance; in contract Rome I was established in a bid to achieve certainty regarding choice of law 
rules, Rome II was established in relation to tort, and whilst many Member States failed to ratify it, 
Rome III was at least proposed in a bid to achieve certainty within divorce, and while England is not 
one of them, some Member States did enter into an enhanced cooperation.  
32 Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rues’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387. 
33 Michael Davie, ‘The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English 
Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 32. 
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occurred include the creation of laws allowing for Civil Partnerships34, and marriage 
between same-sex couples in England35. Across the world this is an area of law that 
has proved to be contentious within some countries, and, thus, it is possible to see 
how conflict of laws issues might arise. In the EU alone there are a variety of legal 
relationships offering various legal rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples36, 
and with the right to free movement it is apparent how different legal systems with 
different relationship types could come into conflict. This thesis will, therefore, not only 
address the matters of uncertainty and unpredictability essential validity is permeated 
by, but will also bring the law in line with the modern day.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
At present, there are multiple choice of law rules that could be applied when 
assessing the essential validity of a marriage, and determining which one a couple 
might be assessed against seems virtually impossible. The aim of this research is to 
correct this, by establishing the optimal choice of law rules under a dépeçage37 based 
system. Under dépeçage, the laws of different countries may be applied to the 
different issues within a case38, to ensure that the most appropriate law is applied in 
relation to the specific issue raised, whilst providing couples with certainty regarding 
their marital status. As a consequence of the high levels of migration in the modern 
day, this aim expands beyond the borders of England and Wales39 by considering 
how harmonisation of choice of law rules could be accomplished in the EU, and the 
US, to continue to provide couples with this certainty when they cross state borders. 
In order to achieve these aims, the thesis is compartmentalised into a series of 
objectives, which will, if satisfied, lead to the end goal of optimal choice of law rules 
that provide certainty within marriage validity.  These objectives are as follows: 
                                                          
34 Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
35 Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
36 For instance countries such as England and Belgium allow same-sex marriage, Germany and 
Switzerland have relationships analogous to a civil partnership, and France and Germany in addition to 
allowing same-sex marriage, offer an alternative to civil partnership that carries less legal 
responsibilities. 
37 “Dépeçage is the application of the substantive laws of different states to different issues of the 
same cause of action” (Symeon C Syemonides, ‘Issue-by-Issue Analysis and Dépeçage in Choice of 
Law: Cause and Effect’ (2013-2014) 45 University of Toledo Law Review 751, 755). 
38 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘Issue-by-Issue Analysis and Dépeçage in Choice of Law: Choice and 
Effect’ (2013-2014) 45 University of Toledo Law Review 751, 755. 
39 Hereafter referred to as England. 
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1) To analyse and suggest reforms to the law on domicile, to ensure the 
connecting factor is developed to make it more reflective of modern society. 
2) To evaluate and analyse the various choice of law rules and policy objectives 
within essential validity, to begin working towards a reformulation of the law. 
Within this reformulation, a new and original choice of law rule will be created 
that will be instrumental in establishing a policy sensitive selection, within a 
dépeçage based system, that looks at the incapacities of; age, consanguinity 
and affinity, polygamy, consent and re-marriage after divorce as separate 
issues to allow for a tailored, and therefore more flexible approach, whilst also 
achieving the certainty desired.  
3) To tackle essential validity as a whole by considering same-sex couples and 
the choice of law rule that should govern their relationships. 
4) Critically evaluate the concept of harmonisation to see how the certainty 
sought in England could, through the application of unified choice of law rules, 
be replicated at an EU level.  
5) Reflect on the rules proposed for England and the EU, and assess whether 
they could be of assistance, or an example to the US on how certainty and 
unification of optimal solutions could be achieved across the states, to 
alleviate the problems caused by high levels of state migration and various 
substantive laws. Of course, whilst looking at the US, it will also be considered 
what England and the EU is able to learn from the US approach to marriage 
recognition, particularly same-sex marriage.  
Each chapter will primarily focus on one of these objectives whist also acting as a 
springboard for the proceeding one, to ensure that collectively this research achieves 
the aims set out above. 
1.3 Original Contribution 
Issues with the law on domicile and marriage validity have been confronted by some 
scholars over the years, and indeed some have proposed ways in which the law on 
these areas could be reformed40. The approach of any previous works have tended 
                                                          
40 For instance when looking at the law on domicile the following scholars have all suggested how the 
area might be reformed; PB Carter, ‘Domicile: The Case For Radical reform in The United Kingdom’ 
(1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 713, Richard Fentiman, ‘Domicile Revisited’ 
(1991) 50(3) Cambridge Law Journal 445. Likewise scholars have focused on the need for Reform 
Within Marriage Validity, Michael Davie, ‘The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of 
Law Rules in English Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 32 and  Alan Reed, 
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to analyse certain focused aspects of the law in isolation. For example, a particular 
piece of research has tended to focus on domicile or marriage validity, and sometimes 
a particular choice of law rule within marriage validity41. This research, on the other 
hand, recognises the interlocutory nature of domicile and marriage validity, and offers 
a holistic analysis of the law in order to demonstrate how the law could be 
reformulated. In commencing this holistic reform, attention is first turned to domicile 
and how this area could be reconceptualised. This reformulation inevitably includes 
reforms suggested in previous literature, however, as a consequence of the time that 
has lapsed since domicile was last considered, and the significant legal developments 
around same-sex relationships that have occurred in that time, this thesis offers an 
up-to-date and complete recast of the law not offered in previous literature. 
In developing the reformulation of essential validity of marriage, the prevalent choice 
of law rules on the area are critically analysed, and thus, the existing literature is 
critically reviewed and discussed. It is, therefore accepted, that in building the optimal 
choice of law rules for the essential validity of marriage, aspects of the approach will 
have already been analysed and proposed, however, the proposal established herein 
also includes a new and original choice of law rule. This choice of law rule, devised 
by this author, not only brings originality to the literature in this area, but also provides 
a degree of certainty and equality arguably not established in other recommendations 
for a capacity specific choice of law rule approach. 
This research adds to existing knowledge in this area, in that it also considers same-
sex relationships. The literature that informs the debate on choice of law within 
marriage validity pre-dates both the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA), and, the 
Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 (M(SSC)A), and, therefore, this thesis 
contributes to the literature on the area by analysing how choice of law rules effect 
the status of same-sex relationships, and, thus, what choice of law rules should 
govern them. Unlike in previous literature, same-sex is considered as an incapacity 
just as age and polygamy, and the relevant policy concerns and objectives are 
evaluated in order to determine the most appropriate choice of law rule. 
                                                          
‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to Anglo-American 
Choice of Law Rues’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 
387. 
41 Such as; Richard Fentiman, ‘The Validity of Marriage and the Proper Law’ (1985) 44(2) Cambridge 
Law Journal 256 in which he focuses on the most real and substantial connection test or CMV 
Clarkson, ‘Marriage in England: Favouring the Lex Fori; (1990) 10 Legal Studies 80. However Richard 
Fentiman, ‘Activity in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law Commission’ (1986) 6(3) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353 looks at the need for reform within both domicile and marriage 
validity. 
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Finally, this study differs from other contributions in that it considers how this certainty 
could be achieved outside of the confines of England. Other commentators have 
explored other jurisdictions, albeit, there has been a tendency for this to be in relation 
to a specific issue, such as same-sex relationships42, or has been for analysis 
purposes as opposed to proposing harmonisation43. Therefore, while a comparative 
approach in itself, is not unique within this area, the originality stems from 
encompassing other jurisdictions within the actual reformulation of the area as a 
whole. This author recognises that if certainty for couples when they cross state 
borders is the primary aim, research must not be limited to those in England, and so 
offers proposals as to how unity could be achieved on an EU level. This concept of 
unity between states is then analysed to suggest how this might also be feasible in 
the US. Consequently, the thesis is original in its consideration of how such optimal 
choice of law rules can continue to provide couples with certainty when they cross 
state borders. Such movement is particularly frequent across the EU as a result of 
the right to free movement, and throughout the US as a consequence of the ease of 
moving from one state to another, emphasising the relevance and importance of 
creating such certainty across these jurisdictions. This research takes the various 
extant laws from the different legal territories, and determines how they as legal 
systems can learn from one another to create the optimal choice of law rules for the 
essential validity of marriage at a national, supranational and federal level. 
1.4 Striving for Certainty 
It is apparent that, in aiming to provide the optimal choice of law rules for the essential 
validity of marriage, this research aims to create rules that will provide couples with 
certainty regarding their marital status. Although this is an area that requires a level 
                                                          
42 For instance Silberman looked at what choice of law rules should be in place for same-sex marriage 
across the US prior to the recognition of same-sex marriages across all states, in; Linda Silberman, 
‘Same-Sex Marriage Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis’ (2004-2005) 153 University of 
Pennslyvania Law Review, 2195 and in, Ian Curry-Sumner ‘Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex 
Relationships in Europe’ (2009-2010) 13 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 59, Curry-Sumner 
looks at three European countries and how each would recognise the relationships, before discussing 
the need for unification. 
43 Such as Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and 
Dépeçage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rues’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 387, in which Reed explored both England and the US in relation 
to marriage validity as a whole and comparisons were made between the jurisdictions, but the creation 
of federal choice of law rules was not discussed. Similarly, in Michael Davie, ‘The Breaking-Up of 
Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 23 Anglo-
American Law Review 32, parallels were drawn between England and America in terms of interest 
analysis, but imitation of a set systems of choice of law rules was not proposed. 
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of flexibility so as to account for the various familial relationships, it is submitted that 
certainty must still be accomplished: “the search for certainty in the law is an essential 
function of the law as such, and therefore cannot be supressed for any length of 
time.”44 The juxtaposition between certainty and flexibility was recognised and 
explored by Neuhaus when he provided the following explanation: 
“The struggle between legal certainty and equity is as old as the law itself. Only the 
labels have changed … Whatever terms are used, they refer to two different aspects 
of the law. One is the public interest in clear, equal and foreseeable rules of law which 
enable those who are subject to them to order their behaviour in such a manner as to 
avoid legal conflict or to make clear predictions of their chances in litigation. The other 
is the need for deciding current, concrete disputes adequately, by giving due weight 
to the special and perhaps unique circumstances of each case. The former aspect 
calls for legislation, the latter for judicial decision.”45 
While Neuhaus sets out that both aims require a different legal approach, this 
research whilst aiming for certainty, also seeks a degree of flexibility, and plans to 
achieve this by breaking the capacity element of essential validity down into various 
components, and providing a rule for each, as opposed to an inflexible one rule fits 
all approach. Though the same level of flexibility may not be achieved as a case-by-
case approach, this author concludes that flexibility cannot be gained at the cost of 
certainty. Certainty for couples is vital for various reasons; primarily as a result of the 
subsequent legal consequences of finding a marriage valid or invalid, but also 
because of the emotional impact of the decision on the couple, the rule of law, and 
the Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) right to respect for one’s 
private and family life. In addition, it is also noted that in a time of uncertainty for 
England as a consequence of Brexit and the triggering of Art. 50 of Treaty of the 
European Union, any certainty that can be established for people in respect of their 
personal lives is to be pursued.  
Firstly, when exploring the legal consequences of a couples’ marital status it is 
possible to see how important the determination might be. The status of marriage 
brings with it various rights, such as succession where a person dies intestate, tax 
and rights to free movement that they might not otherwise have46, amongst other 
things. It is, thus, possible to see how determining a marriage to be invalid could have 
                                                          
44 Paul Henrich Neuhaus, ‘Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws’ (1963) 28 Law and 
Contemporary problems 795, 802. 
45 Ibid 795. 
46 As provided under Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending 
Regulation EEC No 1612/68 OJ L158/77, (Citizenship Directive) art 2(2)(a).  
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a dramatic impact on the parties involved47. For instance, in a succession matter the 
surviving party may not discover that the marriage was not valid until after the death 
of their partner, by which point it is too late to deal with the fact that they are no longer 
entitled to the inheritance they were expecting. Alternatively, a married couple may 
plan on relocating and one of the spouses may be reliant upon the other for their 
ability to reside in the intended host state48. If they are then not considered to be 
married by that state, such ability to relocate may be lost49, and the couple may be 
forced to make some difficult decisions depending on the reason for the relocation. 
Both of these examples show how important it is that a couple are able to understand 
and predict the validity of their marriage, it allows them to plan their lives and act 
accordingly.  
Second, is the emotional, and for some, religious connections that come with the 
status of marriage. For those that enter into the union, it is something that they hold 
dearly and cherish, and so to strip them of their status could be deeply upsetting. This 
emotional impact is evident in the case of Wilkinson v Kitzinger50. The couple had 
validly entered into a same-sex marriage, but were labelled as being in a civil 
partnership in England. This upset the couple as they felt that their marital status had 
been demoted, and that they were being offered a “consolation prize”51. Surely such 
emotion would only be exacerbated if a couple were to discover their relationship was 
not going to be recognised at all. Likewise, for some couples’ whose faith and religion 
plays a central role within their marriage, religious consequences may eschew from 
such a change in status.  
Thirdly, certainty is an important element of the rule of law. The rule of law is the idea 
that people should obey the law and be ruled by it, in order to do this though, people 
must be guided by the law. Raz states that one way in which the rule of law may be 
violated is by uncertainty. He sets out that if people are unable to foresee future 
developments, or to form definite expectations, the rule of law is violated52. 
Essentially, it could be suggested that in not providing couples with certainty 
                                                          
47 Maebh Harding, Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Routledge 2014) 212. 
48 For instance, utilising their marital status to accompany their EU spouse to an alternative Member 
State under Citizenship Directive art 2(2)(a). 
49 Such risks could be particularly likely in instances of same-sex marriage around the EU, since not all 
member states recognise same-sex marriages. 
50 [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295. 
51 Ibid [5]. 
52 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979). 
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regarding their marital status the rule of law is violated53: “[A]bsence of clarity is 
destructive of the rule of law, it is unfair.”54 
Futhermore, one’s right to respect for his private and family life under Art 8 must not 
be forgotten. The European Court of Human Rights case of Oliari and others v Italy55, 
that will be discussed further in chapter 4, reinforces the argument that people’s family 
lives need to be respected. However, the shortcomings of the case were that it did 
not extend to include protection of marriage but stopped at ensuring and permitting 
civil partnerships. Thus, while Art 8 offers some protection of family life it does not 
ensure marriage recognition. In fact, in the case of Vallianatos and others v Greece56, 
it was made clear that the ability to determine the validity of a marriage rests with the 
states themselves as a consequence of the margin of appreciation, thus while Art 8 
offers some protection of family life, a more radical uniform solution is needed to 
provide this certainty for couples.  
When reflecting upon these collective points it is evident that there is a need for 
certainty surrounding the essential validity of marriage. This has also been recognised 
in scholarly comment specifically focused on marriage validity. Symeonides, in 
discussing the American revolution on the conflict of laws, and the various 
approaches that were introduced to bring an element of flexibility to the area, stated 
that, “A correction is needed, and a new equilibrium should be sought between these 
two perpetually competing needs.”57It is time for certainty to step back in to the 
forefront of the conflicts agenda.  
1.5 Methodology 
This thesis adopts a ‘black letter’ doctrinal methodology in that it analyses statute and 
common law to determine the relevant choice of law rules, and uses academic 
comment in support58.  A doctrinal approach, “involves rigorous analysis and creative 
                                                          
53 This idea was also discussed by Trevor Allan, ‘The Rule of Law’ in David Dyzenhaus and Malcom 
Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2016). 
54 Mirkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 WLR 778, 790. 
55 Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015. 
56 (2014) 59 EHRR 12. 
57  Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Choice of Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An End and a 
Beginning’ (2015) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1847, 1906. This same need for certainty was 
also expressed by Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and 
Dépeçage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rues’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 387. 
58 See Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh 2007) 4. 
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synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands, 
and the challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass of primary 
materials.”59 This methodology was chosen as extant choice of law rules across the 
jurisdictions will be explored in order to  establish the optimal choice of law rules, and 
in turn provide the certainty needed. 
Van Gestel and Micklitz set out what they assert as being the three core features to 
doctrinal research: 
Firstly, “In doctrinal work, arguments are derived from authoritative sources such as 
existing rules, principles, precedents and scholarly publication.” Secondly, “the law 
somehow represents a system. Through the production of general defeasible 
theories, legal doctrine aims to present the law as a coherent net of principles, rules, 
meta-rules and exceptions, at different levels of abstraction” and thirdly, “decisions in 
individual cases are supposed to exceed arbitrariness because they have to (be) fit 
into the system. Deciding in hard cases implies that existing rules will be stretched or 
even replaced but always in such a way that in the end the system is coherent 
again.”60  
When considering each of these in turn, it is apparent that they resonate with the 
method and aims of this research; this author explores the existing choice of law rules 
and analyses them in order to create a coherent system of choice of law rules, to 
determine the essential validity of a marriage in a way that provides couples with 
certainty, as opposed to the arbitrariness of the current position. With the intention of 
reformulating the law, a doctrinal methodology is well suited for these works as, “it 
provides a pathway to explore the way forward through the plethora of common law 
cases.”61 
While a doctrinal methodology is common within the legal paradigm to the extent that 
it is often not discussed within the research itself, but is considered to be implicit62, 
this author recognises that there are other methodological approaches that might 
have been taken. One such option that is particularly prevalent in modern research is 
                                                          
59 Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement of the Nature of Legal Research (May and October 
2005, 2005); cited at Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What we Do: 
Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 105. 
60 Rob VanGestel and Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Revitalising Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About 
Methodology?’ (2011) European University Institute of Working Papers Department of Law 2011/05, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1824237 last accessed 26/01/17. 
61 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ 1, 28 in Dawn Watkins and Mandy 
Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013).  
62 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What we Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 99. 
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a socio-legal approach. In making the decision as to what methodology would be 
selected, it was necessary to consider the aim of the research. If it were about the 
emotional impact on couples whose marriages are deemed invalid, and therefore 
striving for validity of marriages; a socio-legal approach might have been appropriate. 
This is not the aim of this study. Rather, the thesis aims to provide certainty within the 
law on marriage validity so that a couple can make an informed choice. This quest for 
certainty has of course been inspired by an awareness of the social implications, in 
addition to the legal consequences of the current position of the law, and these have 
been contributory factors in the determination of the approach proposed by this 
research. For example, throughout the research the importance of upholding the 
validity of marriages is recognised, but this is recognised as running parallel to other 
policy objectives, such as the policy concerns of the most effected state and the 
protection of the parties to the marriage.  The emotional impact of invalidating a 
marriage, at best, only has a small impact upon such decisions, and if one accepts 
that there are set choice of law rules, it has no impact at all, and so a socio-legal 
approach would be inapposite in achieving the aim particularised within this research.  
In selecting the most appropriate choice of law rules, policy factors such as upholding 
the validity of marriage, party expectations and societal cultural norms are 
considered. However, in addition to the aforementioned policy factors recognising the 
social inculcations of the determination of marriage validity, they have been identified 
as relevant policy objectives in the Law Commission reports63, and are contributory 
factors to the judicial decisions, and therefore are not taken from a strictly socio-legal 
standpoint. Likewise, there are various reasons why achieving certainty is important, 
but this research focuses on the need due to the potential legal consequences that 
might arise, whilst recognising the emotional impact as a secondary motive, as the 
emotion is linked with the marriage being held valid, which this work does not 
guarantee64. Therefore, despite other methodologies that might be adopted, and the 
clear reference to external factors, this is not to the degree of socio-legal research. 
Instead, a doctrinal approach informed by sociological implications is adopted. Such 
a method allows for a primary focus on black letter law and the need for certainty as 
a result of the legal consequence, but recognises the emotional consequences 
                                                          
63 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 2.35. 
64 This focus on the legal implication again demonstrates that a doctrinal approach was the appropriate 
methodological stance for this research; “’Black-letter law’ focuses heavily, if not exclusively, upon the 
law itself as an internal self-sustaining set of principles which can be accessed through reading court 
judgments and statutes with little or no reference to the world outside the law.” (Mike McConville & 
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 1). 
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associated with this area. In considering why people marry and the symbolic status 
of marriage this author acknowledges that for some individuals the need for certainty 
will not be about anything other than the importance of their marital status.  
With a clear aim of reforming the law in England, and other jurisdictions, it was 
apparent that a comparative method should be adopted, as “’comparative law’ is the 
comparison of the different legal systems of the world.” 65 It is argued that such an 
approach is vital for both establishing the optimal choice of law rules, and the 
suggestion of harmonisation. Wilson recognises that quite often comparative 
research is undertaken for national benefit66, but also notes that in other instances it 
has a more international dimension, and may be used where a common solution is 
desired, or where there is a want to reduce choice of law problems within the conflict 
of laws67. Comparative law, “offers the scholar of critical capacity the opportunity of 
finding the ‘better solution’ for his time and place.”68 In evaluating the laws, or 
specifically the choice of law rules within different legal systems, it is possible to 
identify what works and what does not, in order to establish a pathway to reform: 
“[T]he method of comparative law can provide a much richer range of model solutions 
than a legal science devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems 
of the world can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a 
lifetime by even the most imaginative juris who was corralled in his own system.”69 
Therefore, in this study, the choice of law rules on the essential validity of marriage 
will be explored and critiqued within England, the EU and the US, with the aim of 
establishing the optimal choice of law rules for England, before exploring to what 
extent they could be proposed at an EU and US level. Alongside England, the EU 
and the US were selected for the proposal of harmonisation, and thereby as 
comparative jurisdictions for a variety of reasons. Primarily, both jurisdictions are 
subject to a high volume of movement of persons, meaning the need for reform is 
more pressing. In respect of the EU this was heightened by England’s membership 
of the EU at the time of proposal, as it would be in the best interests for English 
domicilaries moving around the EU to be able to determine the validity of their 
                                                          
65 K Zweigert & H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Translated by Tony Weir, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011) 2. 
66 Geoffrey Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ 87-88 in Mike McConville & Wing Hong Chui 
(eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007). 
67 Geoffrey Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ 87-88 in M. McConville & W. Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007). 
68 K Zweigert & H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Translated by Tony weir, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011) 15. 
69 Ibid. 
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marriage, and for the English courts to have clear rules for cases involving EU 
citizens.  Whilst Art 50 of the Treaty of the European Union was triggered during the 
research, and Brexit is expected by March 2019, it is still felt that the EU and the 
associated right to free movement across Member States is too important to ignore; 
it is an area that would benefit dramatically  from harmonisation, and so, to cast it 
aside on the basis that England may no longer be a part of it was not an option. 
Similarly, in the US with the ease at which people can move from one state to another, 
or even live and work in different states, it was considered that harmonisation would 
have a significant impact. Furthermore, the US, like England, is a common law 
jurisdiction at a state level, making comparisons easier to make, and finally, as will be 
seen in later chapters, some of the approaches to essential validity that are utilised 
stem from American theorists and case law development across the US, and thus, it 
appeared, like the EU, to be a natural selection.  
While comparative law will play an essential role throughout this thesis, it is 
considered to be of particular importance in the suggestion of harmonisation of choice 
of law rules within the EU and the US. It has been suggested that while a comparative 
approach may be desired for various reasons, when seeking harmonisation, it is said 
to be predetermined70. Zweigert and Kotz state that in order to determine the best 
solution between multiple interested states, it is necessary to know the points of 
agreement and contention in order to work through them71. When aiming to achieve 
harmonisation of the law on a particular matter, “preparatory studies in comparative 
law are absolutely essential … without them one cannot discover the points of 
agreement or disagreement in the different legal systems of the world, let alone 
decide which solution is the best.”72 This point was recognised by this author, and 
thus, with the aim of achieving certainty through establishing the optimal choice of 
law rules in England, but also seeking to extend this certainty across the EU and the 
US through harmonisation of these choice of law rules, a comparative approach is 
considered essential in order to determine how this could be achieved.  
Finally, it has also been recognised that comparative law might be helpful when 
foreign legal models are imitated73. When proposing that harmonisation could be 
achieved at a federal level across the US, it is argued that though there are obvious 
                                                          
70 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ [2015] Law and Method 1, 2-3.  
71 K Zweigert & H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Translated by Tony Weir, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 1998) 24-25. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 1, 3-4. 
17 
 
differences between the two legal systems, if it can be achieved at an EU level, it can 
also be done at a federal level. In essence, a form of imitation is promulgated, 
however, this is only possible as a result of the comparative method adopted 
throughout, it allows the author to draw the relevant comparisons that are necessary 
for such a proposal.  
It is for all these reasons combined that a comparative method within a doctrinal 
approach is argued to be essential for the accomplishment of the aims of this 
research. In looking at the extant choice of law rules, and the recognised policy 
objectives, it is possible to analyse a reform that can achieve the certainty desired 
through an optimal choice of law system. The ability to create this system of rules is 
aided further through the comparisons with other legal systems, and it is then this 
comparative approach that allows this certainty to be continued when couples cross 
state borders, as it provides the platform for suggesting how harmonisation could be 
achieved across the EU and the US. 
1.6 Methodological Limitations  
As with any method there are limitations to the comparative approach taken. When 
examining choice of law rules within the EU, it is choice of law rules and connecting 
factors on an EU level that the research particularly focuses on, as opposed to each 
of the Member states. Although some Member States and their rules are addressed, 
this is limited as accessing such information from outside the legal systems 
themselves is challenging. Likewise, when examining the law in the US, it is the 
general choice of law rules that are used that are discussed rather than setting out 
each individual state’s preferred choice of law rule. This approach reflects not only 
the number of states that would have to be addressed, but also the fact that the 
preferred choice of law rule, particularly within marriage validity, is not always 
apparent. Instead, case law of various states, along with the substantive law 
surrounding the incapacities, is propitiously analysed and deconstructed to determine 
the use and justification of the choice of law rules, to then compare them with their 
counterparts in England. 
Despite such limitations, the analysis gained from these comparisons provides vital 
information in the establishment of the optimal choice of law rules, whilst also opening 
the gateway to harmonisation. 
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1.7 Architecture of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is guided by the aims set out above. The primary focus is 
to produce choice of law rules that will provide certainty within the essential validity of 
marriage, by comparing and contrasting the choice of law rules alongside the 
academic commentary that both advocates and opposes the various rules. Following 
from the general research parameters established in this chapter, chapter 2 analyses 
the law on domicile. In doing so it identifies the problems with the law on domicile as 
a whole, and how it should be reformed. This is an important advancement within the 
law on domicile itself to bring the law in line with the modern day, whilst also being 
central to the thesis in light of the important role domicile plays within the essential 
validity of marriage. It is a connecting factor heavily relied upon under the current 
system, and will maintain some of its importance in the reforms predicated in this 
study. For that reason it is vital that any issues are dealt with to ensure that the 
overarching aims of certainty can be achieved. If domicile itself is left uncertain it will 
have a ripple effect throughout the research.  
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of the law on marriage validity, with a 
specific focus on essential validity. This entails a detailed examination of the various 
choice of law rules and the arguments raised for and against their application. In this 
chapter it is vital that the various choice of law rules, and the literature surrounding 
them, are analysed, as it provides the context needed for the suggested reform, and 
the original choice of law rule established later in the chapter. This analysis, and the 
reform promulgated as a result of it, ultimately provides an original model of  the 
‘continued recognised relationship theory’ that can be utilised in the remaining 
chapters to determine whether the same certainty can be achieved for same-sex 
couples and for couples in the EU and the US. This new theory will be drawn upon 
extensively throughout the thesis in order to evaluate alternative choice of law rules 
across the other jurisdictions, to ensure the optimal choice of law rules are 
propounded across all three legal systems.  
Having critically discussed the essential validity of marriage and the incapacities 
therein, it becomes apparent that the literature does not treat same-sex as an 
incapacity, despite it being a capacity based issue that prevents some couples from 
marrying across the world, and did so, until recently, in England.  The result of this is 
that there is no consideration of what choice of law rule should be applicable in cases 
involving same-sex relationships. Chapter 4, therefore, critically analyses civil 
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partnerships and same-sex marriages, and aims to identify the most appropriate 
choice of law rule for these relationships. In order to make this determination, the 
chapter considers the relevant policy concerns prevalent when dealing with same-
sex relationships, and draws comparisons with the EU and the US to finally set down 
the most appropriate choice of law rule for same-sex relationships in England.  
With marriage validity explored within England, chapter 5 assesses the position within 
the EU. The chapter initially considers the concept of harmonisation within the 
essential validity of marriage and why this might be desirable, before looking at what 
choice of law rules should be put in place if it were to be achieved. In addition to 
considering the framework established for England, choice of law rules in place in 
some of the Member States and connecting factors used by the EU are put under the 
microscope, to ensure that the optimal choice of law rules are selected. Regardless 
of Brexit, this is still an important aspect of the reformulation because, whether 
England remains a part of the EU or not, it should be addressed for the sake of the 
many couples that do move around the EU. 
Chapter 6 then examines the US jurisdiction. The key choice of law rules are first 
explored before analysing to what extent they can be compared with those selected 
for the reform in England and the EU. The concept of interest analysis74 was first 
established in the US, and so this is examined in detail to determine to what extent 
the theory has developed, and is able to be used within the area of marriage. Upon 
exploring some of the more controversial incapacities it is established that the reform 
suggested for England and the EU could also be utilised at a federal level in the US 
to provide the much needed certainty for couples as they move between states. 
Despite the fact that family matters are traditionally dealt with at a state level, the 
decision in Obergefell v Hodges75, surrounding the requirement to recognise and 
allow same-sex marriages across all states, is, amongst other legal developments, a 
sign that unification in aspects of family law can be achieved through federal rules. 
With this in mind, and given the uncertainty that currently reigns as a result of the 
various choice of law rules adopted across the states76, chapter 6 of this research 
                                                          
74 This is a theory based on the applicable law being the most interested state in the matter and was 
established by Brainerd Currie in, Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke 
University Press 1963) and will be explained in greater detail in chapter 3, before further discussion in 
chapter 6. 
75 135 S Ct 2071 (2015). 
76 Walter Wadlington & Raymond C. O’Brien, Family Law in Perspective (2nd edn, The Foundation 
Press 2007) 19. 
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asserts that the reformulation of the choice of law rules for the essential validity should 
be done on a federal level.  
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion for this work. It reviews the analysis undertaken 
throughout the research, and the proposals for reformulation across England, the EU 
and the US. In doing this, the chapter demonstrates how the thesis achieves its aim 
of providing certainty for couples surrounding the validity of their marriage when they 
cross these state borders, before acknowledging potential areas for further research.  
1.8 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter has been to broadly introduce the field of research this thesis 
will focus on, and to set out the aims and objectives of the study, and the methodology 
adopted to achieve these prioritisations. The material aim of this research is to create 
optimal choice of law rules for the essential validity of marriage, so as to provide 
couples with certainty regarding their marital status when they cross state borders. 
While this cannot be achieved on a worldwide scale at this stage, it is hoped that in 
addressing the choice of law rules in England, the EU and the US, this study goes a 
long way towards achieving this harmonisation. Beyond analysing the existing choice 
of law rules across the particularised jurisdictions, this piece will also set out an 
original choice of law rule, that it is hoped will play an important role in the optimal 
choice of law rules for the essential validity of marriage. Though criticism of the 
approaches selected is anticipated and discussed, this author accepts that a ‘perfect’ 
solution can never be achieved, but strongly asserts that the reforms promulgated in 
this research will provide the optimal reformulation of the law in this area, and attain 
the aim of providing couples with the certainty they need and deserve.
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Chapter 2 
Wherefore Art Thou Domiciled? 
Reformulating The Law On 
Domicile: A New 
Conceptualisation For The 
Modern Day 
2.1 Introduction 
Domicile is what is known as a connecting factor. Connecting factors are designed to 
assess the extent to which a person is connected to a particular country or countries, 
so as to decide whether the law of that country should apply to them, and be 
considered as the applicable law. This is of particular importance in the modern day 
given people have become “more internationally mobile”1, as it is essential that 
regardless of mobility, the law applicable to an individual is able to be ascertained. 
Domicile, by way of loose translation, refers to where a person has his permanent 
home, as “people are deemed to ‘belong’ to the community in which they have made 
their home.”2 Evidently, this suggests quite a personal connection, and therefore 
domicile is a connecting factor which is used primarily in personal affairs, and allows 
a person to carry that law with them around the world so that it governs their status 
and personal relationships3. Other connecting factors that can be utilised include: 
habitual residence; and nationality, and these will be explored later in the chapter. 
It is accepted that within English law domicile is the preferred connecting factor when 
dealing with matters of personal status4. As a result, domicile is an important aspect 
in various areas of law such as; succession, taxation, jurisdiction in divorce 
proceedings, and marriage validity. Of particular significance for this research is the 
latter reference to marriage validity. Domicile is a crucial constituent of essential 
                                                          
1 Maebh Harding, Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Routledge 2014) 15. 
2 Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 317. 
3 Ibid 316. 
4 James Fawcett, Janeen M. Carruther and Sir Peter North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private 
International Law (14th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 154. 
22 
 
validity as the pre-nuptial domiciliary law of each of the parties’ is often applied to 
assess the essential validity of a marriage, as a result of the dual domicile theory. 
With an intention to create optimal choice of law rules within marriage validity, and, in 
turn, provide couples with certainty, it is vital that domicile, or indeed any other choice 
of law rule selected, is capable of being applied with cohesion. For that reason it is 
important that any problems within the law on domicile are addressed. In confronting 
the uncertainties or complications in ascertaining a person’s domicile, this chapter is 
a necessary adjunct before attention is able to be turned to marriage validity itself.  
This chapter will, therefore, set out the law on domicile as it currently stands before 
highlighting some of the potential problems with this connecting factorisation. In 
discussing these problems, the chapter will focus on how the law could be reformed 
so as to ensure that the most appropriate place is selected as a person’s domicile, 
whilst also achieving a greater level of certainty. In accordance with the common law 
rules on domicile there are three distinct types of domicile: domicile of origin; domicile 
of choice; and domicile of dependency5. However, under the current provisions there 
is a heavy reliance on a person’s domicile of origin through primordial importance 
attached to the doctrine of revival, and also the difficulties in assessing if, and at what 
point, a domicile of choice is achieved. This chapter will analyse these issues in 
greater detail in order to propose solutions. In doing so, the need for the doctrine of 
revival will be assessed to see if it could be replaced by the rule of continuance. This 
could potentially be an important step in the law on domicile, to ensure it reflects a 
modern, more migratory society. It will also become apparent that this is not the only 
aspect of domicile in need of modernisation. In recent years, laws in England have 
developed, and the law on domicile has failed to keep up. What were already outdated 
laws reflecting colonial inculcations, appear to be falling even further behind extant 
times, failing to keep up to date with the developments surrounding same-sex couples 
and their ability to marry. The gender specific roles that the determination of the 
domicile of origin and the domicile of dependency are couched in, fail to provide for 
children of same-sex couples, and are discriminatory. Therefore, the objective herein 
will be to analyse the law in order to propose a holistic reformulation of the law on 
domicile. This analysis will involve the examination of other jurisdictions, and other 
connecting factors, such as habitual residence and nationality to act as comparators 
to ensure the reforms promulgated provide the optimal solutions. Such reforms will 
play a vital role in achieving the aims of certainty and predictability within marriage 
                                                          
5 All of which will be set out in greater detail in the succeeding section. 
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validity, but, as domicile is generally the preferred connecting factor for matters of 
personal status, the reforms suggested in this chapter are an important development 
for the law of domicile itself, and, would  have a significant impact on other areas, in 
addition to marriage validity. 
The law on domicile is far from problem free. With the previously recognised, yet 
unaltered, problems surrounding the doctrine of revival, and ascertaining a domicile 
of choice, combined with the more recent issues around the rules for determining a 
domicile of origin, it is apparent that the law on domicile is ripe for a fresh 
reconsideration. This chapter will, therefore, scrutinise the law, to evaluate how to 
achieve the best possible reformulation. This reform will be focused on providing rules 
that are: inclusive of all family types, transparent; and provide certainty, to ensure that 
domicile is an appropriate connecting factor, both for marriage validity purposes, and 
any other area of law.  
2.2  Determining One’s Domicile 
As developments have occurred within the conflict of laws, domicile has come to have 
a variable meaning both within English law, and within the conflict of laws more 
specifically. Throughout this thesis the concept of domicile that will be referred to is 
the traditional common law precept, that is utilised as a connecting factor to determine 
which state has an interest in regulating a person’s affairs and, is used for the 
selection of choice of law6. This is not to be confused with the partial statutory 
definitions we see for compartmentalised jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments, 
such as that under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001. These rules 
provide that a person is domiciled in the UK if he is a resident in the UK, and the 
nature and circumstances of this residence indicate a substantial connection with the 
UK, which, will be presumed to be the case if he has been resident in the UK for the 
last 3 months, unless evidence to the contrary is proved7. This definition is for the 
purpose of the Brussels I Regulations8 which, deal with jurisdiction and the 
recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters. This definition was thought 
necessary for the purposes of Brussels I because of the permanency required to 
                                                          
6 See generally David McClean & Kisch Beevers, Morris: The Conflict of Laws (7th edn, Thomson 
Reuters (Legal) Limited 2009) & James Fawcett, Janeen M. Carruthers & Sir Peter North, Cheshire, 
North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th edn, Oxford University Press 2008).  
7 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgement Order 2001, SI 2001/3929, sch 1, para 9. 
8 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L12/1 (Brussels I). 
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establish a domicile of choice under the traditional approach; a long-term association 
not needed when merely determining a state’s jurisdiction for a breach of contract9. 
The definition provided under statute is also much closer to the mainland European 
concept of domicile as “the Brussels I Regulation, dealing with civil and commercial 
matters, utilises the continental concept of ‘domicile’ which is markedly different from 
the traditional English one.” 10 Consequently, when determining one’s domicile it is 
first important to ensure that it is the English common law rules on domicile that are 
being employed. 
Secondly, as alluded to within the previous section, in English common law the 
meaning of domicile is multi-faceted as there is the domicile of origin, domicile of 
choice and domicile of dependency. While a propositus can never be without a 
domicile, nor can they have more than one, and so it is important that it can be 
established what type, and hence where, a propositus was domiciled at any given 
time. The domicile of origin is acquired at birth and if the child is legitimate it will take 
the domicile the father has at that date, alternatively if the child is illegitimate it will 
take the domicile that the mother has on that date11.  Domicile of dependency is 
designed for children under the age of sixteen and those suffering a mental 
impairment, as a consequence of their inability to form the necessary intent for a 
domicile of choice, as set out below.  A child’s domicile follows that of the parent up 
until the child attains the age of sixteen or marries12.  Those suffering a mental 
impairment will, on the other hand, have a domicile of dependency in the country they 
had it in immediately before becoming impaired13. Finally, a domicile of choice is 
acquired Animo et Facto; by taking up residence in a country with the intention of 
permanently or indefinitely remaining there14. 
2.3 Domicile of Origin and the Doctrine of Revival 
When analysing the law on the domicile of origin, its tenacity and its ability to revive 
are of crucial significance when considering the need for reform, however, the rules 
                                                          
9 David McClean & Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Morris: The Conflict of Laws (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2016) 101. 
10 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 305. 
11 Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, 457. 
12 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s 3(1). 
13 Urquhart v Butterfield (1887) 37 Ch D 357 (CA). 
14 Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 328. 
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surrounding the determination of a person’s domicile of origin are not without their 
problems. As highlighted in the previous section, a child’s domicile of origin is 
dependent upon the marital status of their parents. If at the time of birth the parents 
are married, the child’s domicile of origin will match that of it’s father’s domicile at that 
time, and if unmarried, will take on its mother’s domicile at that time. The first problem 
with this is its apparent contrast to the way in which a child’s domicile of dependency 
may be assigned. If the parents are living apart, the rules on the domicile of 
dependency shift from a basis on marital status, to instead reflect that of the parent 
they live with15. This rule equally applies when the parents are married, but are living 
apart, therefore if the child is living with the mother the domicile of origin could be 
immediately replaced by a domicile of dependency16. This makes little sense, it 
creates a situation whereby a domicile of origin may be placed on a child in a state 
they have no real connection to, and appears to only be in place to lay in abeyance 
for the purpose of the doctrine of revival, which is a doctrine, that is in itself open to 
criticism, for being archaic and producing artificial results17. Secondly, the rules 
assume that the couple are of opposite sex and makes no provision for the 
determination of the domicile of origin in instances where, for example a same-sex 
couple have adopted a child, or where a child is born to a woman who is either party 
to a same-sex marriage or a civil partnership18. In both of these situations, the child 
is regarded as a legitimate child of that couple19, but the outdated rules surrounding 
the domicile of origin provide no answers on how the domicile of origin would be 
determined. 
As a consequence, further to needing to reformulate the law for the purpose of 
updating it and ensuring there are no loopholes which could result in no domicile 
being assigned, it could also be argued that at present, the law discriminates against 
children of same-sex couples, making reform essential for human rights purposes. 
Art. 14 of the European Convention of Human Right (ECHR) prohibits discrimination 
in the application of human rights on various grounds, and whilst not explicitly 
                                                          
15 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s.4(2). 
16 Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 321. 
17 These criticisms will be explored in more detail later in this section. 
18 Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 321. 
19 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s, 67(2) provides that an adopted person is the legitimate child of 
the adopters if they are adopted by a couple. Likewise the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008, s. 42 sets out that a civil partner or female spouse of a woman giving birth to a child is deemed 
to be the child’s parent, provided they were married or in the civil partnership at the time of 
insemination. Under s.48(b) such child ‘is the legitimate child of a child’s parents.’ 
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provided within the Article itself, this has been held to include discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation20. As Art. 14 does not provide a free standing right to 
non-discrimination, it is necessary for the facts of  the case to at least fall within the 
ambit of one of the Convention rights. When looking at the failure to provide rules so 
as to ascertain a child’s domicile of origin, it is argued that this could fall within the 
‘private life’ aspect of Art 8. The importance domicile plays in England in various 
aspects of law, as have already been mentioned, means that like citizenship in other 
countries, it plays an important role in the social identity of a person, and subsequently 
impacts upon their ‘private life’, and is therefore argued to fall within the scope and 
ambit of Art. 8, just as citizenship did in Genovese v Malta21. Accordingly, it would 
appear that in addition to being outdated, the rules on the provision of a domicile of 
origin are not Convention compliant22. 
This problem surrounding same-sex couples is exacerbated when considering the 
tenacity of the domicile of origin and the doctrine of revival. As the doctrine of revival 
means that the domicile of origin is utilised for the period between abandoning one 
domicile of choice and gaining a new one, under the current provisions, the domicile 
of origin may continue to raise its head throughout the life of a propositus. With the 
failure to provide rules on how the domicile of origin is to be determined for children 
of same-sex couples this is particularly problematic; it not only highlights how out of 
touch the law on domicile is, but also leads onto the question of why the domicile of 
origin is given the special treatment it receives by way of tenacity and revival.  
The tenacity is a consequence of its ability to revive, and as a result of the importance 
the judiciary appear to give it when attempting to set it aside and ascertain a domicile 
of choice23. With the doctrine of revival meaning that, having abandoned a domicile 
of choice, the domicile of origin comes back into effect until a new domicile is 
acquired24, the criteria that nobody be without a domicile is satisfied. Regardless, the 
doctrine of revival is a concept that has been criticised and recommended for reform. 
It has been stated that: “The doctrine of revival of the domicile of origin can, however, 
operate crudely, and is difficult to defend in modern times.”25 The doctrine can create 
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results that seem highly artificial as it may mean that a person is domiciled in a place 
they left many years ago, or worse, a place they have never been to.26 It is archaic, 
and was written primarily for British Colonists who “rather like elephants ... return to 
their birthplace to die.”27 It is a rule designed for another time, and no longer reflects 
the connections people have with countries in a more migratory world. A scenario 
demonstrating this exact concern is provided in the Law Commission Report: 
“A is born in India to English domiciled parents, and thus receives at birth a domicile 
in England. He remains in India after reaching the age of 16 and acquires a domicile 
of choice there. Later, in middle life, he leaves India intending to settle in the USA. At 
that point, A’s domicile of choice in India ceases and his English domicile revives, 
although he has never even visited, let alone lived in England. If A dies intestate 
before acquiring a domicile in one of the States of the Union, the succession to his 
moveable estate would be governed by English law.”28 
Likewise, case law such as Winans v A-G29 and Henwood v Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd30 highlight the adhesive nature of the domicile of origin, despite a 
propositus having left it many years prior. In Winans, the propositus was born in the 
US, and had a domicile of origin in either Maryland or New Jersey. Having died in 
England it was necessary to determine where he was domiciled at the time of his 
death. Despite a hatred for England, Mr Winans had lived here for the majority of the 
last thirty seven years of his life for health reasons, and had not visited the US since 
his departure forty seven years previously. However, during his time in England his 
dislike for English people remained, and he continued to fantasise about his return to 
the US to embark upon plans to build a fleet of vessels to reign naval supremacy over 
England. When considering these facts, despite the length of time that had passed, 
the House of Lords held that he remained domiciled in his domicile of origin. In 
Henwood, the propositus was born in England and had his domicile of origin there. 
As a result of a dislike of the country he moved to the Isle of Man, where he set up a 
business and gained a domicile of choice. However, upon the collapse of his business 
he was ostracised, and felt it necessary to move. He then spent most of his time split 
between a house he owned in France, and a villa he rented is Mauritius. In 
abandoning the Isle of Man, his domicile of choice therein was lost, and without 
evidence to support a domicile of choice in either France of Mauritius, the court held 
that his domicile of origin in England had revived; the one country which he had no 
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intentions of living in, and had abandoned many years previously, demonstrating just 
how artificial the results may be. 
Further support for the idea that the doctrine of revival is in need of reform can be 
seen in both The First Report of the Private International Law Committee31, and the 
Law Commission Working Paper No.8832. In the former it was suggested that a 
domicile should continue until another domicile is acquired33; in essence replacing the 
doctrine of revival with a continuance rule. The idea of continuance was then, further 
explored by the Law Commission. The Law Commission first expressed concern that 
the committee had not considered the artificiality behind prolonging a connection 
between a person, and a country which they have abandoned. Regardless, the 
Commission go on to recognise that this is at least the place with the most recent 
connection, and that imposing the domicile of origin runs the same, if not greater risks, 
of producing results which are artificial: “it can be argued that a person is more likely 
to remain connected to the country of his most recent domicile than to his country of 
birth”34. It may be that a person has never lived in or visited the place they were 
assigned as their domicile of origin and the Commission, upon weighing-up the 
competing options, appeared to recognise this inculcation. It was their 
recommendation, on the basis of simplicity and that there was clearly a connection to 
the country for a period of time, that the doctrine of revival be replaced by the 
continuance rule35. Additional support for the continuance rule can also be seen when 
exploring other jurisdictions. In the quest to achieve the optimal choice of law rules 
this research compares the laws of England, the EU and the US when considering 
the essential validity of marriage, and thus it  is also interesting to note that the rule 
of continuance is adopted in the US36.  
The leading American case on this is Re Jones’ Estate37. Mr Jones was born in Wales, 
and had a domicile of origin in England. Later in life having borne a child, he fled 
Wales to escape affiliation proceedings and emigrated to the US where he gained a 
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domicile of choice in Iowa. He set up his life in Iowa, became a naturalised American 
citizen and married an American. After the death of his wife the propositus decided to 
return to Wales for good to live with his sister and set sail from New York. The boat 
never made it to England as it was sunk by a German submarine off the South Coast 
of Ireland and the propositus was killed. As he died intestate it was necessary to 
determine where he was domiciled upon his death as different rules of intestacy 
applied in England and Iowa. Following the continuance rule the Supreme Court of 
Iowa held that he died domiciled in Iowa, and his estate under the laws of Iowa went 
to his illegitimate daughter whom he had fled from thirty years prior, and had had no 
contact with in the meantime, instead of passing to his brothers and sisters as it would 
have under English law. Given the facts of the case, this outcome appears artificial 
and the continuance rule is open to the very criticism levelled at the doctrine of 
revival38. Despite this iteration, it is argued that the rule of continuance is to be 
preferred. Such an argument is supported by the Law Commission, in their 
recognition that a person is more likely to be connected to their most recent domicile, 
rather than a domicile dating back to their birth39, and O’Brien’s acknowledgment of 
the argument that the rule of continuance “is more likely to lead to a decision that is 
founded upon recent conduct.” 40  Furthermore, it is an option that is backed by other 
jurisdictions, such as New Zealand where s.11 of the Domicile Act 1976 states that a 
domicile of choice continues until a further new domicile is acquired and abolishes 
the doctrine of revival. Likewise s.7 of the Domicile Act 1982 in Australia, which is in 
force in all Australian jurisdictions, provides that the doctrine of revival is to be 
abolished and replaced by the continuance rule. Finally, s.3(1) of the Domicile Act 
1992 in South Africa states that no person is to lose his domicile until a new one is 
acquired, and the doctrine of revival is not part of South African law41. The 
consideration of other jurisdictions can always act as a persuasive authority , however 
additionally, the Law Commission also recognised that it may be important that 
England follow suit “for the sake of International uniformity.”42 
Amidst this support for the replacement of the doctrine of revival by the continuance 
rule, Fentiman, although recognising some of the artificiality caused by the doctrine 
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of revival, maintains that it has its place within the law43. He considers the ‘footloose 
propositus’44, who has no connection to any particular state or country and how the 
doctrine of revival is able to assign them a domicile, to ensure that no person is left 
without one. As opposed to abolition, Fentiman asserts that, “what the domicile of 
origin and the revival doctrine need is careful handling”45. This careful handling would 
fall on the judiciary to ensure that the domicile of origin and the doctrine of revival are 
not unduly used in cases where, without them, they are uncertain of where a person 
is domiciled, or to achieve what the judiciary consider to be a desirable outcome. 
However, in the examination of previous cases it is evident that that the courts have 
been willing to use the doctrine of revival in such a way, and therefore the idea of 
careful handling by the judiciary does not appear to be an appropriate safeguard 
against its inappropriate use. For instance, in the case of Ramsay v Liverpool Royal 
Infirmary46 it is difficult to come to any other conclusion other than that applying the 
domicile of origin produced the preferred outcome as part of ad hoc judicial 
determinativeness.  
In Ramsay, the propositus had lived in England for 36 years having left Scotland. In 
that time he had never set foot back in Scotland and had made arrangements to be 
buried in England, yet on his death he was held to be domiciled in Scotland. The issue 
before the court was the validity of his will produced in Scotland, and in holding him 
domiciled in Scotland the will was valid, which would not have been the case had he 
have been domiciled in England. Though this may have been the ‘correct’ outcome 
for the case, with what appears to be a clear abandonment of Scotland, it is difficult 
to argue against the view that the nature of the issue influenced the court’s decision47. 
With this in mind, it is difficult to see how ‘careful handling’ could provide an 
appropriate solution. Fentiman could argue that this is not a problem with the rules 
themselves, but with the judiciary failing to apply them correctly. Nevertheless, the 
tenacity of the domicile of origin combined with the doctrine of revival is evidently 
susceptible to use in this way. 
Aside from these risks, Fentiman in his argument arguably fails to address the fact 
that the imposition of the domicile of origin under the doctrine of revival could lead to 
a person being assigned a domicile in a country to which they have never had a 
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connection, or, whereby the connection was broken many years earlier, as opposed 
to a country they abandoned only a few months previously. Irrespective of judicial 
application, revival over continuance, therefore, has the potential to create the most 
out of touch results48, and support for the continuance rule has clearly been evidenced 
in the consideration of other jurisdictions.  
2.4 Domicile of Choice 
The tenacity of the domicile of origin needs to be contextualised and set in contrast 
with the domicile of choice, and the precepts that determine ascertainment of the 
latter. As stated earlier, a domicile of choice is acquired Animo et Facto49. The factum 
element is the residence within the place and the animus is the intention element that 
is required50. The residence element is for the most part undisputed. It is not about 
the length of time one is resident, but the quality of that residence51. It was even 
suggested by Lord Chelmsford in Bell v Kennedy that if the animus exists before 
arrival in the country, that “any residence, however slight or temporary in its character 
following upon that intention, and in pursuance of it, will be sufficient to establish the 
domicile.”52 This would, in turn, suggest that what is actually needed is presence in 
that country and if a reform were to be achieved it may be more appropriate to replace 
residence for presence. This may appear a minor point based on little more than 
semantics, but there is evidence to support that staying with friends53 or in a hotel54 
is sufficient to satisfy the factum. The word ‘residence’ has connotations of a period 
of time that must be satisfied, and arguably home ownership, or at least renting a 
property, and given case law demonstrates that this is not necessary to ascertain a 
domicile of choice, the law should be amended accordingly. This amendment would 
greater resemble what the law requires, whilst also updating the law to reflect modern 
judicial narrative55. 
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2.4.1 Satisfying the Requirement of Intention 
When looking at the animus element of the domicile of choice the issue is more 
contentious.  There is dispute over what the propositus must intend. Common law 
varies on what is required from an intention to remain permanently56 to one to remain 
indefinitely57.  In Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary, it was made clear that no length 
of time in itself would be sufficient to prove intention. It was said that the time in the 
country must be “accompanied by an intention on the part of the deceased to choose 
England as his permanent home."58 In contrast, in the Estate of  Fuld (No 3), Scarman 
J stated, “a domicile of choice is acquired only if it be affirmatively shown that the 
propositus is resident within a territory subject to a distinctive legal system with the 
intention, formed independently of external pressures of residency there 
indefinitely.”59 Here we can see a shift from ‘permanent’ to ‘indefinite’ which appears 
to be a slight relaxation on the requisite intention. An intention to remain permanently 
was strictly construed, and if there was a chance that the person would leave, the 
intention element would not be satisfied60, whereas the requirement to remain 
indefinitely appears more relaxed. Scarman J in his judgment in Estate of Fuld No.3 
continued to state:  
“If a man intends to return to the land of his birth upon a clearly foreseen and 
anticipated  contingency, e.g. the end of his job, the intention required by law is 
lacking; but, if he has in his mind only a vague possibility, such as making a fortune 
(a modern example might be winning a football pool), or some sentiment about dying 
in the land of his fathers, such a state of mind is consistent with the intention 
required.”61  
 
When considering the above statement, it is evident that, a vague chance of leaving 
will not prevent a domicile from being acquired, instead the contingency must be 
assessed. A contingency which is vague or uncertain, and could be described as a 
“pipe dream”62, is unlikely to prevent a domicile from being acquired. Whilst one that 
is based on a definite event that the person has clearly in their mind may do so. In 
the Estate of Re Fuld (No 3), it was considered that the way this is determined is 
                                                          
56 Winans v Attorney-General [1904] A.C. 287 (HL) and Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] 
A.C. 588 (HL). 
57 In the Estate of Fuld (No 3) [1966] 2 WLR 717, [1968] P. 675, Re Flyn [1968] 1 All ER 49 and Brown 
v Brown (1982) 3 FLR 212 (CA). 
58 [1930] A.C. 588 (HL) 598. 
59 In the Estate of Fuld (No 3) [1966] 2 WLR 717, [1968] P. 675, 684. 
60 Quereshi v Quereshi [1972] Fam. 173. 
61 In the Estate of Fuld (No 3) [1966] 2 WLR 717, [1968] P. 675, 684-685. 
62 Sekhri v Ray [2013] EWHC 2290 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 612 [29] 
33 
 
whether the contingency is “clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated”63. Yet, in 
IRC V Bullock64, the court held that the propositus had not gained a domicile of choice 
in England as he intended to return to Canada if his wife died before him, and they 
held that there was a “sufficiently substantial possibility of the contingency 
happening.”65 In turn, the courts have provided two different tests. A sufficiently 
substantial possibility of something happening is different to it being reasonably 
anticipated. Whilst there may be a sufficiently substantial possibility that in Bullock his 
wife would die before him, it seems unlikely that he would reasonably anticipate or 
expect his wife who was three years his junior to die before him66. Therefore, it is 
likely that had the test from Fuld’s Estate (No 3) been applied in Bullock, that the 
propositus would have been deemed to have gained a domicile of choice in 
England67. Again, this shows a lack of clarity in the area, and despite the test of 
‘clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated’ from Fuld’s Estate being affirmed 
recently68, there is still no real certainty in the area. The fact that there could be a 
contingency, and the propositus still gains a domicile of choice, would suggest a 
relaxation in the law from a strict approach of absolute permanency being required, 
but there remains uncertainty surrounding whether contingencies would prevent a 
change in domicile. The law, as it stands, is determined by personal perception, 
providing the judiciary with broadened discretion and enhanced flexibility, and the 
public with uncertainty and a lack of predictability.  
Interestingly, Fawcett69 argues that the rule selection that is able to occur under the 
present law allows the courts to select the domicile that will provide the desired result. 
He admits that, “this could be read as an admission of the preparedness to manipulate 
the facts in order to reach the desired result.”70 He states that such discretion and 
flexibility allows the courts to achieve policy aims. Fawcett looks at the contrasting 
case law as a result of rule selection, but states that while they may be criticised they 
achieve the correct results. Essentially, what the judiciary believe to be the correct 
results are achieved at the cost of certainty and predictability. A judge’s thoughts on 
what the correct outcome is may not necessarily coincide with what others would 
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deem the correct result. The judiciary are there to apply the relevant rules in a way 
that is consistent, and it is this inconsistency that attracts support for reform in the 
area. 
Further support for the need for certainty was also identified in the First Report of the 
Law Committee71 and the Law Commission Working Paper No 8872, as both 
recommended reform within the area. The Committee made the point that they are 
aware that the courts have had a tendency to apply a more modern and less strict 
approach to the cases, but asserts that the law is in need of amendment. They 
suggest a proposal in which presumptions of intent form part of the suggested 
legislation. The key presumption suggested is that, ‘Where a person has his home in 
a country, he shall be presumed to live there permanently.’73 The Law Commission, 
on the other hand, suggested that when a person has been habitually resident for 
seven continuous years since reaching the age of sixteen, they will be presumed to 
be intending to make it their home indefinitely, unless evidence is shown to the 
contrary74.  Despite the  differences in the proposals, it is of great significance to this 
research that both the Committee and the Commission identified the area as being in 
need of reform, and these suggested reforms will now be analysed to determine 
whether they are to feature within the reformulations propounded by this author.  
As stated, the Law Committee suggested presumptions of intent, the key one being 
that ‘where a person has his home in a country, he shall be presumed to live there 
permanently’.75 The Law Commission took issue with this as a presumption of intent 
on the basis that ‘home’ would be no easier to resolve than an investigation into where 
a person is domiciled76. This statement is contentious. Admittedly, an investigation 
would have to be undertaken to determine where a person had his ‘home’ however, 
‘home’ is a concept that is understood by the layman, lawyers and society as a whole 
and has in fact been utilised successfully in others areas of law. Article 8 of the ECHR 
refers to ‘home’ and has been recognised and understood within case law dealing 
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with Convention matters77. There is also domestic support for the use of the term 
‘home’ in housing legislation78 which has again been interpreted and understood even 
where there has been multiple homes79.  It is for that reason submitted the use of the 
term ‘home’ by the Law Committee is not as problematic as has been suggested.  
As a result of the perceived problems with the aforementioned proposal, the 
Commission instead suggested a presumption of intent where there has been 
habitual residence for seven continuous years. This can also be criticised. Like 
‘home’, a person’s place of ‘habitual residence’ would have to be investigated, and it 
is a term that is not used as widely by laymen, as ‘home’ is popular everyday 
terminology. When considering habitual residence as an alternative to domicile, it is 
an underdeveloped concept “and has proved to be a source of uncertainty”80. With 
the requirement to have habitual residence in the said place for seven continuous 
years, it is unclear how long, and often, people are able to leave for without breaching 
the continuous element of the presumption81. The requirement for this residence to 
persist for seven years, having attained the age of sixteen, before the presumption 
takes effect, could also be criticised. Firstly, when analysing the reason behind the 
seven years it would seem there is little justification for this figure and could be said 
to be onerous. It is significantly higher than the three month requirement under the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Order 200182, which is used when determining 
domicile under the Brussels I Regulations, for jurisdictional purposes. However, the 
Commission believed it to be about the right balance but has admitted that there is 
“no magic in seven years”83.   The presumption proposal by the Commission lacks 
thorough forethought and proper consideration. These particular problems are 
highlighted by Carter, who criticises the proposal for the time scale not commencing 
until the propositus attains the age of sixteen, as this could mean that whilst a person 
has been living in a particular country since they were twelve, they will not be 
presumed to have the intention to live their indefinitely until they reach the age of 
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twenty three, an onerous hurdle to jump84. Finally, Carter states that there is a lack of 
clarity in what is meant by ‘subject to evidence to the contrary’. He questions the 
amount of evidence required and whether the presumption is one of fact or law85.   
The fact that neither of the suggested reforms above were ever put into action in 
England, does not reflect on their potential to clarify the law. The Commission made 
several recommendations in this report that, whilst not actioned upon in England, are 
supported by similar measures being utilised in other jurisdictions, suggesting that it 
was not about the report lacking potential, but about other matters being more 
prominent, and domicile fading into the background. For instance, when looking at 
other jurisdictions it is possible to see that they have legislated on what intention is 
required to attain a domicile of choice.  S.10 of The Domicile Act 1982 in Australia 
states: ‘The intention that a person must have in order to acquire a domicile of choice 
in a country is the intention to make his home indefinitely in that country.’ Other 
jurisdictions provide similar sections to their legislation86, and there is no reason why 
a similar position could not be achieved in England. While the proposals by both the 
Committee and the Commission go further than stating the level of intention required, 
such an approach would address the issues around judicial flexibility discussed 
above, and the inherent problems discussed below regarding ascertaining a person’s 
intentions, and will for that reason be a consideration when proposing reform. The 
important point to elicit from s.10 Domicile Act 1982 is that certainty surrounding what 
a person must intend is possible as opposed to the current position of judicial 
discretion.  
As indicated, in addition to the need to address the ambiguity around what intent is 
needed and what is meant by ‘permanently’ and ‘indefinitely’, reform would also need 
to  address the issue inherent within intention, thus being that “the ascertainment of 
a person’s intentions are fraught with difficulty”87. When considering whether a 
domicile of choice has been ascertained the propositus may provide a declaration of 
intention, however these are often treated with suspicion88: 
“They may be interested statements designed to flatter or deceive the hearer; they 
may represent nothing more than vein expectations unlikely to be fulfilled; and the 
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very facility with which they can be made requires their sincerity to be manifested by 
some active step taken in furtherance of the expressed intention.”89  
 
Where no such declaration is provided the court must solely determine what the 
intention was. It has long been established that in order to do this, “the court must 
look back at the whole of the deceased’s life … to decide whether he had acquired a 
domicile of choice.”90 It has been stressed how essential it is that no act or 
circumstance in a person’s life should be ignored when determining whether they 
intended to change their domicile91, and that a chronological examination of the life 
should be completed. This is something that is heavily criticised and is suggested to 
be in need of reform by Carter92. He states that it produces absurd results and 
suggests that instead the focus should be on “the situation as it existed at the very 
moment in time to which the enquiry relates, and asking directly what was then his 
home, which was the community with which he was then most closely connected, 
which is the community to which it would be most reasonable to say that he then 
belonged.”93  This, in itself, could prevent historical examinations of a person’s life 
which can lead to lengthy and expensive court cases. It must be recognised that 
certain cases will require this chronological analysis. Even though it is apparent that 
intention is a necessary element to the domicile of choice, it is an area that needs 
considering in respect of reform to decipher if there is the potential to make the 
intention element clearer and easier to determine. 
2.4.2 Changing One’s Domicile: the Standard of Proof 
Any assertions of a change in domicile burdens the person making such assertions 
to prove the change. The standard of proof which must be met is contentious. The 
general rule is that it must be proved on a balance of probabilities; the civil burden of 
proof, yet cases such as Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary94, and Winans v A-G95, 
as discussed earlier, suggest much more is needed. It has, in fact, in some cases, 
been alleged that a much higher standard of proof is required, something “beyond a 
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mere balance of probabilities” 96. In Estate of Fuld (No 3)97, it was suggested that a 
change from a domicile of origin to one of choice, required a standard of proof 
approaching that of the criminal standard, highlighting the tenacity of the domicile of 
origin discussed earlier in the chapter. In more recent times judges have stated that 
the burden is no higher than the usual civil standard of proof98, but doubt still remains: 
“Tradition dies hard, and there are relatively modern cases which are apparently 
explicable only on the basis that a fairly rigorous standard of proof is being applied”99, 
as can be evidenced by the decision in IRC v Bullock100 and the more recent case of 
R v R (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Domicile)101. In R v R, the claimant had lived in France 
for ten years and stated she thought she would remain there, however, having initially 
moved for the purposes of putting their children through education with the plan to 
thereafter return to England, the court were not satisfied that a domicile of choice in 
France had been acquired, in turn entrenching the tenacity of the domicile of origin 
proposition.  
Although recent case law suggests that the law is becoming more relaxed on finding 
that a domicile of choice has been acquired102, it was only in 2006 that the court 
reminded us of the importance of the tenacity of the domicile of origin in the case of 
Cyganik v Agulian103. It involved the death of a Cypriot national and the determination 
of whether he died domiciled in Cyprus, as this was his domicile of origin, or whether 
he had obtained a domicile of choice in England. The deceased had lived in England 
for the majority of his life, and it was accepted that for the majority of this period of 
time he had maintained his domicile in Cyprus, but having agreed to marry Miss 
Cyganik, who lived in England, the High Court held that he then became domiciled in 
England. The Court of Appeal felt that the judge had erred in making this decision, 
and allowed the appeal, stating that “the deputy judge underestimated the enduring 
strength of Andreas’s Cypriot domicile of origin.”104 In agreeing with the success of 
the appeal it was then stated by Longmore LJ, that “it is easier to show a change from 
one domicile of choice to another domicile of choice than it is to show a change to a 
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domicile of choice from a domicile of origin.”105 This undeniably shows a recent 
decision in which the court deemed there was a distinction between what is required 
to replace a domicile of origin compared to when replacing a domicile of choice, 
further emphasising the tenacity of the domicile of origin, and its more likely 
application by the courts. It remains unclear whether the court in Cyganik were 
suggesting a standard of proof more similar to the criminal standard, but in Henwood 
v Barlow Clowes International Ltd106 the case was disapproved and the normal civil 
standard was held to apply. Whilst this may appear to bring some clarity, it must be 
stressed that when considering Henwood, it was stated that acquiring a new domicile 
should “in general always be treated as a serious allegation”107 and the case itself 
could be said to show how cumbersome obtaining a domicile of choice is in practice. 
Reform of the law on domicile would provide the opportunity to state what standard 
of proof is required in order to finalise the matter and alleviate any doubt. This is 
supported by the Law Commission who in their suggestion for reform provided that, 
the normal civil standard of proof; the balance of probabilities should apply to all 
domicile disputes108. This research will, therefore, in its suggestion for reform, 
propose a fixed rule be put in place that will finally provide certainty and consistency 
in respect of the standard of proof that must be met when alleging a change of 
domicile. 
2.5 Domicile of Dependency  
When examining the domicile of dependency both children under the age of sixteen 
and those suffering mental disability must be considered. Under the general rules a 
child’s domicile follows that of the father if legitimate, or the mother if illegitimate as 
with domicile of origin. In an attempt to create greater flexibility s.4 of the Domicile 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 states that where the parents are living apart 
and the child has a home with the mother and not with the father, he will take the 
mother’s domicile. The use of ‘living apart’ means that the parents need not be 
separated, they may be living apart for other reasons such as work. While this 
provides a step in the right direction it still appears artificial109. The Act does not 
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consider the position when the father is dead, nor does it apply equally to the domicile 
of origin. Therefore, a child may still have a domicile of origin in a country with which 
they have no connection, and may immediately have their domicile of origin replaced 
by a domicile of dependency. It is for these reasons that the Law Commission 
recommended reform in the area110.  The suggested reform was that where a child’s 
parents have the same domicile it will change with them, but where they have different 
domiciles, but live together, that the child’s should change with that of the mother. 
Then when considering when the child has a home with one of the parents the 
domicile is the same as, and changes with that parent. As with the domicile of origin, 
there is again no provision for a child of a same-sex couple. However, these 
recommendations were altered in the Law Commission’s final report111. The 
Commission introduced the idea of the child’s domicile being determined by looking 
at the place they are most closely connected with. This is then aided by presumptions 
based on the parent or parents the child lives with, and their domiciles: so for instance 
where the child lives with both parents, and they both have the same domicile, there 
will be a rebuttable presumption that the child is most closely connected to that place, 
and therefore domiciled there112. Alternatively, where the child lives with both parents, 
but they have different domiciles, no presumption should be applied, and instead the 
test of closest connection should be applied solely113. Though the report never 
materialised within the law in England, as it was rejected by the UK Government114, it 
is possible to see how such recommendations in their avoidance of stipulating the 
mother or father’s domicile, could offer the versatility needed in the modern day, and 
was in fact introduced within Scottish law115. 
S.22 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 sets out the law on domicile for those 
under the age of sixteen, and like the final Law Commission report, provides that: 
where the parents of the child are domiciled in the same country as each other and 
the child has a home or homes with one, or both of them, the child will be domiciled 
in the same country as them. Alternatively, where these conditions do not apply, the 
child is domiciled in the country with which the child has, for the time being the closest 
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connection116. This, therefore, further demonstrates how the law on the domicile of 
dependency could be reformed, and Scotland could, in this regard, act as a 
comparator demonstrating how the acquisition of domicile of dependency could be 
reformulated. S.22 in its avoidance of the use of the gender based roles of ‘mother’ 
and ‘father’ appoints the domicile of dependency in an inclusive manner; respecting 
the diversity of modern families, and is to be considered an exemplar for England. 
However, s.22 is not faultless. In its use of the heading ‘domicile of person’s under 
16’, and its failure to reference the ‘domicile of origin’ or the ‘domicile of dependency’, 
it is unclear whether  the rule is applied to ascertain both the domicile of origin and 
the domicile of dependency117. While there is no room for doubt that the statute 
replaces the common law rules on the domicile of dependency, or the derivative 
domicile as it is known in Scotland, the same assertions cannot be made in respect 
of the domicile of origin118. 
The explanatory notes to the Act state that “there will no longer be a link between a 
child’s domicile and that of his or her parent’s marital status in relation to both the 
domcile of origin and dependent domcile”, and thus suggests that s.22 applies equally 
to both types of domicile. This sits uncomfortably within the law when considering the 
title of the section. While the doctrine of revival is still in operation, a person’s domicile 
of origin could be the applicable law at any given age, and therefore contradicts the 
heading ‘domicile of persons under 16’119. Harder, instead propounds that there is no 
real certainty as to whether s.22 applies to both domiciles, and offers four different 
approaches that could be taken when interpreting s.22.  The first approach would be 
to apply s.22 to all types of domicile children can have, but only to children, and 
thereafter the domicile of origin would be determined in accordance with the common 
law rules. The second option would be to state that s.22 only applies to the derivative 
domicile of children. The third approach Harder discusses is that s.22 applies to both 
the domicile of origin, and the derivative domicile of children, even when the domicile 
of origin is in relation to an adult as a consequence of the doctrine of revival. Finally, 
the fourth approach offered, is that the revival rule be replaced by the continuance 
rule, and that s.22 would apply to all children from birth until the age of sixteen120. 
Much of this uncertainty derives from the fact that s.22 was brought into effect after a 
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Scottish Law Commission Report on Family Law121, in which, the domicile of children 
had been copied from the 1987 Law Commission report, without acknowledging that, 
in the original report, the proposal for the domicile of children had been complemented 
by a recommendation that the doctrine of revival be replaced by the rule of 
continuance122. For that reason, it is important that any reforms put into place on the 
law of domicile are clear in their scope.   
Aside from the rules as to which parent determines the domicile of dependency, this 
category of domicile has been criticised for governing until a child reaches the age of 
sixteen123. Carter’s basis for such criticism comes from the fact that other countries 
allow a domicile of choice from a younger age, and the other responsibilities we place 
on younger members of society in England. In support of his argument, Carter 
highlights the fact that we will not allow a person under the age of sixteen to form the 
necessary intent to ascertain a domicile of choice, yet we are willing to state a child 
can satisfy the intention to attract having criminal responsibility from the age of ten. 
The fact that a person under the age of sixteen may be unable to carry out his 
intentions regarding domicile is, in Carter’s eyes irrelevant124. 
When looking at domicile of dependency as a result of a mental disorder, the current 
law provides that the propositus would retain the domicile they had immediately 
before becoming incapable of forming the necessary intention to acquire a domicile 
of choice125. The Law Commission recommended reform on the basis that the 
domicile be based on the country which they are most closely connected to126. This 
could mean that a propositus was deemed to be domiciled in a country they never 
intended to live in, but may have been moved there by a carer. It is, for that reason, 
submitted  that, the law as it stands is the best provision that can be in place for those 
not able to form the necessary intention, as at least a connection to that country or 
state can be seen prior to the mental impairment.  As a result, no reform is suggested 
to domicile of dependency as a result of mental disorder, and instead reform to this 
area will focus on domicile of dependency for those under 16. Particular attention will 
be paid to the rules in place for determining a child’s domicile, and ensuring that they 
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are the most appropriate, and are capable of application to the various families that 
exist within modern society.  
2.6 The Need for Reform of the Law on Domicile  
2.6.1 Habitual Residence 
In addition to looking at ways in which the law on domicile could be reformed, 
alternative connecting factors may be more appropriate, and must be considered. 
Habitual residence is a connecting factor that was initially developed by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law as a compromise of domicile and 
nationality127. It is now used within domestic legislation128 in addition to being the main 
connecting factor within the Brussels II Regulations129.  As it is used as a connecting 
factor in multiple areas of law, it is accepted that the meaning of habitual residence 
will vary according to the context. It has an autonomous meaning when used within 
domestic law but also within EU law. This in itself could provide some confusion when 
attempting to understand its meaning in a particular context130. 
Unlike domicile there are no rules surrounding categories of habitual residence, there 
is no habitual residence of origin, or a doctrine of revival and a person can have more 
than one habitual residence at a time. In order to prove habitual residence in a 
particular place it must be shown that there is concurrent physical residence and a 
mental state of having a ‘settled purpose’ of remaining there131. It is the objective fact 
of residence that is of great significance in the decision of habitual residence, and a 
person’s intentions are of little importance132. When ascertaining whether a person is 
habitually resident in a particular place it is the length of time that they must have 
been resident in that place that is difficult to determine. In Re J (Abduction: Custody 
Rights)133 it was stated that habitual residence could not be achieved within a day, 
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but that it takes an “appreciable period of time”. It has been suggested that a month 
could be deemed an appreciable period of time134, and in Marinos v Marinos135 it was 
recognised that it could be “measured in weeks rather than months and in an 
appropriate case it can probably be measured in nothing more than days”. Shorter 
periods of time can still result in a determination that there is habitual residence where 
there is an evident settled purpose, thus showing the intention to remain136. Where 
there is doubt over settled intention larger periods of time may still be insufficient for 
habitual residence. In A v A (Child Abduction)137 eight months was considered 
insufficient when determining whether the propositus was habitually resident in 
Australia, highlighting how the courts turn on the individual facts which, in turn creates 
an element of uncertainty. This shows that if habitual residence were to completely 
replace domicile it could result in the almost certain need for litigation where habitual 
residence is in doubt. “The subjective element tends to lead to unpredictability”138. 
When examining the element of intention required it is evident that it is markedly 
different to that of domicile.  Habitual residence can still be achieved where the 
residence is for a fixed period of time such as a fixed term contract139 or a period of 
study140:  “All the law requires is that there is a settled purpose. This does not mean 
that the person must intend to stay where he is indefinitely, his purpose, while settled, 
may be for a limited period.”141  It is, therefore evident, that less is required in respect 
of intention when considering habitual residence. This may seem a positive step in 
the right direction, as one of the main problems with domicile, is satisfying the 
requisite intention. On the other hand, because habitual residence focuses less on 
what the individual wants in the long term, it could mean that people who did not wish 
to be connected to a particular country by habitual residence may not be able to avoid 
it: “The subjective arguments of lack of connection with the country or a wish to leave 
will not prevent habitual residence from being acquired”142. This was a criticism that 
was recognised by the Law Commission in their Working Paper No. 88143. The 
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Commission recognised that the intention required is legally under-developed, with 
no judicial consensus as to the degree of importance given to it144, and that those 
working abroad for extended periods of time or expatriates could be cut off from the 
courts of their homeland despite them remaining closely connected to it145.  
Notwithstanding the appeal of sidestepping the problems surrounding intention within 
domicile, habitual residence is not a viable alternative, “The concept is ... unsuitable 
for general choice of law purpose as it generates a link with a country that may be 
tenuous.”146  
It is for these reasons that the Commission set aside habitual residence as a 
replacement for domicile, stating “domicile, especially if amended in the ways  we 
propose later in the consultation paper, is better suited and more likely to achieve that 
end in many circumstances than is habitual residence.”147 This too could be said for 
the definition of domicile under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Order 2001, 
designed for the purposes of the Brussels I Regulations. Under the definition there is 
no requirement of future intentions to remain in the country, but rather a substantial 
connection with the UK, which will be presumed after a residence of 3 months. 
Consequently, it would appear to be open to the same tenuous links as the English 
notion of habitual residence, and should equally not be considered as a potential way 
of reforming this area of law. For this reason it would appear that habitual residence 
would not be a suitable replacement for domicile, people would be governed by the 
laws of a country they may have no connection to and intend leaving in the near 
future, and with no means of preventing this, artificial results would be inevitable.  
2.6.2 Nationality 
Nationality is often used as a connecting factor in civil law systems but has minimal 
use in England. One of the key advantages of the use of nationality as a connecting 
factor is that it is easily ascertained and proved, in turn providing certainty148. The Law 
Commission also state that because consent is needed by both the party and the 
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state for the change in nationality, its consequences are less susceptible to criticism 
when a person’s rights are changed by the change in nationality149. On the other hand, 
the Commission also recognise the problems with using nationality as the main 
connecting factor. There would need to be special rules for those who are stateless 
or those with more than one nationality.  Special rules would also be required in 
federal or composite states, including the UK where, nationality would not indicate 
with which of the countries the person would be connected. Finally, because 
nationality is not dependant on residence its use would increase the situation where 
a person is connected with a country which he may never have lived in or only lived 
in for a short period of time150. It is for these reasons, that despite the certainty 
nationality would provide, the Law Commission held that it would not work as a 
replacement for domicile. The Commission stated that nationality has its place as a 
supplementary connecting factor to domicile, but is not sufficient to substitute it. 
After exploring both habitual residence and nationality the Commission concluded the 
matter by stating that domicile should continue to be used as the connecting factor in 
the UK151.  Therefore, with the issues with the law on domicile set out above, attention 
will now turn to the reforms suggested by this author. 
2.7 Domicile and the Plan for Reform 
Amidst the discussions of the need for reform, it has been suggested that the most 
appropriate way would be way of common law developments152. However, this need 
for reform was recognised decades ago and no such reform has occurred. As a 
consequence of this impasse, it is instead suggested that it is time for a legislative 
cathartic panacea to cure current ills. The areas of main concern surround the 
domicile of origin and its ability to revive, the rules around the allocation of the domicile 
of origin and dependency, and the intention element of the domicile of choice. 
In respect of the domicile of origin and its ability to revive, it is suggested that the most 
appropriate reform would be the abolition of the doctrine of revival.  The rule should 
be replaced by the continuance rule, meaning that a propositus’ most recent domicile 
would continue until it has been replaced. This is a reform that was wholly supported 
                                                          
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid para 2.7. 
151 Ibid para 2.9. 
152 Richard Fentiman, ‘Domicile Revisited’ (1991) 50(3) Cambridge Law Journal 445. 
47 
 
by the Law Commission153, and is still necessary and appropriate today given the 
artificial results discussed in section 2.3, and its outdated justification based on British 
colonists: “In the modern world, where people are much more ready to cut all ties to 
their country of birth, it is no longer justified to resort to the domicile of origin to fill a 
gap between the two domiciles of choice.”154 It is also important to note that such a 
reform would lead to the submission of further reform. If the doctrine of revival was 
abolished, the domicile of origin would cease to be needed as a separate type of 
domicile. Under the current provisions the main distinction between the domicile of 
origin and the domicile of dependency, is that the former is the one that revives. The 
way in which the domicile is selected is broadly based on the same principles. Thus, 
upon the abolition of revival, the domicile of origin, as a distinct type of domicile, 
becomes surplus to requirements155. What becomes important then is that the rules 
used to determine the selection of a child’s domicile are appropriate. As discussed 
earlier, those under the current law are outdated and cannot be applied to children of 
parents in same-sex relationships. It may be that the rules suggested in the final 
report of the Law Commission, and indeed adopted in s.22 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006,  could be applied, but this will require careful consideration. 
When looking at the domicile of choice the requisite intention should be to remain 
indefinitely as opposed to permanently. However, even with this clarification, 
problems with the domicile of choice remain. A person may still have in their mind, a 
particular event that would cause them to leave the country, and so the assessment 
of this contingency, and its impact upon satisfying the element of intention still creates 
judicial discretion, and uncertainty within the law. Likewise, the inherent problems with 
ascertaining a person’s intentions remain. For these reasons, it is propounded that 
the law should be reformulated so as to include rebuttable presumptions of intent. It 
is proposed that such presumptions should be based on where a person has their 
home, and so legislation would provide that where a person has his home in a country, 
they will be presumed to live their indefinitely. The legislation would also provide that 
this could then be rebutted by providing  evidence to the contrary which, would have 
to be proved to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. This solution would 
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undoubtedly bring certainty to the area, in addition to removing the difficult task of the 
judiciary having to decipher a person’s intentions. Also, by legislating on the standard 
of proof required when seeking to rebut the presumption, it is clear that it is the civil 
standard of proof required, regardless of the domicile being replaced; preventing a 
heavier burden being applied to the domicile of origin in the event that it is not 
abolished as a separate domicile.   Finally, having examined how long a person must 
be in the country to satisfy the residency element, ‘residence’ should be replaced by 
‘presence’. ‘Residence’ and the connotations of such a word does not accurately 
reflect what is needed to satisfy the factum. 
Finally, in order to provide the holistic reformulation of the law on domicile that this 
chapter set out to achieve, the domicile of dependency must also be considered. As 
stated above, in the event that the domicile of origin be removed entirely, it would be 
important that any rules laid down regarding the determination of a child’s domicile 
could be applied in all familial relationships. They would need to be sensitive to 
situations such as one parent families due to the death or absence of one of the 
parents, primary custody being with one parent, and children of same-sex 
relationships156. It may be that rules based on the place which the child is most closely 
connected with, supported by rebuttable presumptions based on the parent or parents 
they live with and their domicile157, as previously discussed, would be the most 
appropriate. 
These suggested reforms would provide certainty and predictability within the law of 
domicile, and would allow legal professionals to better advise their clients. This advice 
would not only be for clients protesting about the validity of a marriage, but could be 
in relation to the validity of a will, or succession rights under the laws of intestacy. As 
domicile is used as the connecting factor in various matters pertaining to personal 
status, the impact of this proposed reformulation stems beyond its role in reforming 
marriage validity; it could mean cases like Ramsay V Liverpool Royal Infirmary158, 
where it is necessary to determine where a propositus was domiciled for the purpose 
of his will, are much simpler. Lastly, the reformulation addresses the largely 
                                                          
156 This need for domicile to catch up with modern family law has also been discussed in relation to the 
law in the US; see Susan Frelich Appleton, ‘Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender’ (2013-
2014) 47(5) UC Davis Law Review 1453. In this article, Appelton discusses how due to the 
developments that have occurred domicile is in need of reform or replacement in the US, and given it 
operates in much the same way as it does in England, this could be seen as further support of the 
need for reform. 
157 As was suggested at Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International La: The 
Law of Domicile (Law Com No 168, 1987) paras 4.14 - 4.16. 
158 [1930] AC 588 (HL). 
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undiscussed inadequacies of the law since the introduction of civil partnerships and 
same-sex marriages, and recommends how this might be tailored to ensure the law 
is fit for purpose, and Convention compliant.  
2.8 Conclusion 
It is clear that the law on domicile in England has its problems and is in need of reform. 
With the levels of migration we now have across the world, the concept seems 
outdated and unfit for purpose. Regardless of being based on what were more than 
likely very typical behaviours of the time, gone are the days of people returning to 
their homeland to die159. Putting such sentiment aside, the doctrine of revival appears 
counterproductive, and must be addressed. The ease at which people are now able 
to move from one country to another, and the increased desire to do so for reasons 
such as quality of life, education and employment opportunities also makes the 
assessment of domicile of choice important. In addition to problems caused by the 
tenacity of the domicile of origin, satisfying the intention element of the domicile of 
choice has not been without its problems, and so dealing with this is also vital.  
The proposed reforms around replacing the doctrine of revival with the continuance 
rule, and creating presumptions of intention would go a long way in addressing these 
problems. Removing the ability of the domicile of origin to revive will, by default, 
remove some of its tenacity. This could then be furthered by removing it as a distinct 
category of domicile altogether. Without its ability to revive there would be little logic 
in distinguishing between one’s domicile acquired at birth and one of dependency. As 
a consequence, what we would be left with is a domicile of dependency which should 
continue to carry no greater status than one of choice. Thus, having tackled what may 
be seen as a favouritism, or an inherent desire to revert to the application of the 
domicile of origin160, domicile of choice can assume its rightful place. The remaining 
difficulties associated with determining a person’s intention can then be addressed 
by way of rules of presumption as suggested.  
Alongside these issues, it is also apparent that the rules regarding acquiring a 
domicile of origin and the general rules for obtaining a domicile of dependency are at 
                                                          
159 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 311. 
160 As has been suggested in CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011) 307 and indeed James Fawcett, ‘Result Selection in Domicile Cases’ (1985) 
5(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 378, 380 where they discuss the court’s desire to produce the 
‘right’ outcome for the case, rather than necessarily following the rules in a certain manner. 
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odds with the current law. The general rule is that legitimate children are assigned 
the domicile of their father and illegitimate, that of their mother. Such rules fail to 
reflect not only the developments within society, but the unquestionable 
developments in law. Same-sex couples are able to enter into either a civil 
partnership161 or a marriage162 and therefore may, as discussed, have a legitimate 
child, yet the rules simply do not cater for such families. This clearly highlights how 
out of touch and discriminatory the law on domicile is under extant law. Not only are 
we faced with laws based on historic sentiments of the upper class, but we also have 
rules that simply do not reflect subsequent legal developments, and therefore when 
read together, appear to sit at odds with one another, and violate human rights 
principles of non-discrimination. 
The developments surrounding same-sex couples and the problems they face are 
relatively new, on the other hand the other issues have been known and discussed 
for a long time and yet nothing has been done163. When looking at domicile in isolation 
it is clear how problematic the law is and therefore the importance of dealing with it 
ab initio. This becomes particularly apparent when considering the many areas of law 
in which domicile features. As a prevalent connecting factor in England, domicile, and 
the problems and uncertainties that come with it, has the potential to cause 
uncertainty and unpredictability in many a legal area. One such area is the essential 
validity of marriage, and it is suggested that if there is to be an investment of time and 
research into how marriage validity can be improved upon, and made more certain 
for couples, domicile must be addressed as a first point of reference, and as a central 
definitional constructive element. As a key concept within marriage validity, domicile 
in many instances must be assessed in order to determine validity; it forms part of the 
equation. Naturally, if that first part of the equation cannot be determined it 
jeopardises the final result. For that reason it is submitted that only when all of the 
elements of this research are synchronised can the aims be achieved. A person 
cannot run without first learning to walk, similarly certainty within the essential validity 
of a marriage cannot be achieved without certainty within one of the key connecting 
                                                          
161 Under the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
162 Under the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
163 Some of the issues were raised as long ago as 1954 in the Private International Law Committee 
First Report of the Private International Law Committee, 1954 (Cmd 9068) and then again in 1963 in 
the Private International Law Committee Seventh Report of the Private International Law Committee, 
1963 (Cmnd 1955) and then in the most recent, and highly discussed final report of the Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: The Law of Domicile (Law Com 
No 168, 1987). 
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factors. It is finding this piece of the jigsaw puzzle that allows the puzzle to continue, 
and when the remaining chapters are all pieced together, to eventually be completed.    
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Chapter 3 
Happily Ever After? Creating 
Certainty In England On The 
Choice Of Law Rules Within 
Marriage Validity 
3.1 Introduction 
The validity of one’s marriage is something that rarely crosses many couples’ minds; 
it is something often taken for granted. However, in reality, as a result of the differing 
rules around the world surrounding the requirements for a valid marriage, where more 
than one country is involved, these rules may come into conflict. The involvement of 
more than one country could be as a result of: a couple marrying abroad; because 
they themselves are from different countries; a consequence of a subsequent move; 
or indeed, a combination of these factors. With migration becoming more accessible, 
the potential for such conflict increases1, and, thus, so does the need for this area to 
be addressed. Like domicile, it is an area that suffers from uncertainty, and though 
some of this is as a result of domicile being used as a connecting factor, which raises 
some the issues discussed in the previous chapter, the extent of the problems is much 
greater. This chapter will, therefore, evaluate marriage validity and the problems 
therein, before setting out how the law on this area could be reformulated to produce 
the optimal choice of law rules. 
Marriage validity is broken down into two aspects: formal validity; and essential 
validity. Formal validity is concerned with the ceremony itself, and the formalities that 
must be complied with to conduct a valid ceremony2, such as the vows that must be 
said, or the witnesses that must be present. Essential validity, in essence, covers all 
aspects not associated with the formalities, the primary example, and the one of 
concern in this research, being the capacity to marry. It is then within these two 
aspects of validity that various rules emerge as to what choice of law rule should apply 
                                                          
1 Commission, on applicable law and jurisdiction in divorce matters (Green paper COM (2005) 82). 
2 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 348. 
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in order to select the country’s law that will be applicable. It is, in turn, these choice of 
law rules that cause uncertainty within the area. For all that there is a general 
consensus in England as to the applicable law within formal validity, no such 
consensus exists within essential validity. Consequently, it is in relation to essential 
validity, and the capacity of a couple to marry, that much of the uncertainty exists.  
Amidst the uncertainty within the essential validity of marriage, there are two main 
competing theories: the dual domicile theory; and the intended matrimonial home 
theory. The dual domicile theory, as introduced by Dicey3, looks at the law of each 
party’s pre-nuptial domicile, while the intended matrimonial home theory, introduced 
by Cheshire4, turns to the law of the husband’s domicile, or where the couple intend 
to live. While these opposing theories have continued to battle for recognition as the 
applicable choice of law rule, alternative theories have also continued to develop. As 
a result, despite the Law Commission stating that they believe the dual domicile 
theory to be the most appropriate choice of law rule for all issues of essential validity5, 
any of the theories that will be  outlined in this chapter could be applied. This is further 
highlighted by the support the various theories receive6, in addition to the fact that 
even after the Law Commission report, the judiciary have continued to apply choice 
of law rules other than the dual domicile theory7. As a consequence, couples are 
uncertain on personal status, and unable to predict the choice of law rule that will be 
applied when assessing their marital status, and could as a result, be unsure whether 
their marriage is valid.  
This lack of certainty leads to a shortfall within the law on marriage validity that must 
be addressed: “one thing that people are entitled to know from the law is whether they 
are formally married.”8 This is important for a whole host of reasons, some of which 
are emotional in nature, and others as a result of the legal consequences that might 
arise. Firstly, for many their marital status is one that they hold dearly, and so any 
potential invalidity should be apparent and capable of being understood by the couple 
                                                          
3 John Morris, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (8th edn, London: Stevens 1967) Rule 31 at 
254-255. 
4 GC Cheshire, Cheshire’s Private International Law, (7th edn, Butterworth & Co 1965) 227-228. 
5 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36. 
6 For instance, Radwan v Radwan (No2) [1973] Fam 35 provides support for the intended matrimonial 
theory, while Westminster City Council v C [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [2009] Fam 11 supports the use of 
the most real and substantial connection test, and AJE Jaffey, ‘The Essential Validity of Marriage in the 
English Conflict of Laws’ [1978] Modern Law Review 38 offers support for the alternative reference 
test. 
7 Examples include Westminster City Council v C [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [2009] Fam 11 and Minister 
of Employment and Immigration v Norwal [1990] 2 FC 385. 
8 Estin v Estin, 344 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Robert Jackson J). 
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involved. Secondly, as outlined in the introductory chapter, certainty is important 
within marriage validity because of the importance of certainty within the rule of law. 
The rule of law requires there to be a level of transparency within the law, so that it is 
capable of being understood and used by society, to allow individuals to plan their 
lives9. Thirdly, as important as marriage is on a sentimental and emotive level, the 
legal ramifications of a couple’s marital status span much wider10. For instance, 
declaring a couple married will impact upon inheritance rights where one of the parties 
dies intestate, or rights on free movement or immigration where one of them is a non-
UK or non-EU national. It is these rights, or indeed obligations that arise from 
marriage, that may lead to it being questioned, and, thus, the outcome of such cases 
can run much deeper than the feelings they invoke; it could be the decision that 
determines a person’s right to inheritance or their right to reside in a particular 
country11. Finally, certainty is important within marriage validity for policy reasons. As 
will be discussed later in the chapter, there are certain policy objectives that any 
choice of law rules on marriage validity should seek to achieve, and one such 
objective is certainty and predictability for couples12. Whatever the reason in each 
individual case, what these points highlight is the need for certainty and predictability, 
and therefore this chapter will critique the law on the area before suggesting a 
recategorisation that achieves optimal policy solutions. 
An approach that may begin to address the issue of uncertainty is interest analysis. 
Interest analysis is a theory based on the idea that the applicable law should be that 
of the state most interested in the matter13. This theory was originally propounded by 
Currie14 in the United States, but has undergone much development, and has, as a 
result, moved away from the case by case approach initially advocated, in favour of 
                                                          
9 Joseph Raz, ‘Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979). 
10 This was discussed by Maebh Harding, Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Routledge 2014) 211 when she 
raises the financial duty of support that arises as a result of marital status, tax exemptions and gaining 
residency in the UK. 
11 This problem was explored by Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013) 
para 4.4.1-5.3 in relation to same-sex couples who fail to recognition of their marital status, but also 
could equally apply to a heterosexual couple who believe they are married but are deemed not to be 
due to the choice of law rule applied. 
12 These policy objectives were set out by the Law Commission in, Law Commission and Scottish Law 
Commission, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules in Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 
2.35, and have also been discussed in  Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of 
Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law 
School Journal of International and Comparative Law 387. 
13 See, Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage 
to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387, 408-409 for a general discussion of interest analysis. 
14 Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press 1963). 
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a more rules based framework15. A rules based contextualisation of interest analysis 
would break down essential validity into the various incapacities. Each incapacity 
would then need to be assigned a policy sensitive choice of law rule that considers 
what the incapacity seeks to achieve. Such an approach offers a tailor made body of 
choice of law rules that are certain in nature, but flexible towards the policies behind 
each of the incapacities. In exploring this framework, this research will analyse the 
incapacities and the various choice of law rules to design and create a bespoke 
reformulation of the law. This reformulation will feature the new and original choice of 
law rule of the “continued recognised relationship theory”. This theory applies the law 
of the country where the couple intend to live, or, the law of the country where they 
have lived if their relationship has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time.  In 
exploring this new theory, along with all of the other analysis to reform the law, this 
chapter will extrapolate what is needed to reformulate the law, and provide the 
certainty and predictability that has long been sought.  
3.2 Formal Validity 
It is generally accepted that the lex loci celebrationis16  governs all questions of formal 
validity. This mutual recognition is as a result of the elements that shape formal 
validity including: giving notice of getting married; the vows that must be said; and the 
requirement of witnesses. All such prerequisites are best regulated by the lex loci due 
to advantages including: knowledge held by the officials involved; party 
expectations17; and respect for tradition: when in Rome do as the Romans do. This 
commonality in approach has led to the understanding that a marriage that is formally 
valid in the lex loci is formally valid the world over. 
To counter the general rule of the lex loci there are statutory and common law 
exceptions18. Common law provides instances where it is permissible for the parties 
                                                          
15 This can be seen generally in the US by Caver’s introduction of a set of choice of law rules in certain 
areas of Tort as discussed by Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th Edn, West 
Publishing Co. 2014) 229, but then also here in England in relation to marriage validity in Michael 
Davie, ‘The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Conflict of 
Laws’ (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 32, 46 and Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: 
The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 
New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 387, 412. 
16 The law of the place of the celebration, and will from this point be referred to as the lex loci. 
17 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 2.36. 
18 Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 361. 
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to disregard the requirements laid down by the lex loci, and instead enter into a 
‘common law marriage’19. Common law marriages may be deemed valid if: English 
common law applies20; there is insuperable difficulty in complying with the local law21; 
or marriages in countries under belligerent control22. Upon satisfying one of the above 
conditions, the only remaining criteria is that the parties take each other as husband 
and wife in the presence of one another. 
The validity of common law marriages, where English common law applies, is as a 
result of the fact that the country of celebration is still governed by English common 
law23. The extent to which this can really be categorised as an exception is debatable, 
as was highlighted in Taczanowska v Tackzanowska24 . Essentially in these cases 
the lex loci is still the applicable law, as English common law is the law of the place 
of celebration. The exception where there is insuperable difficulty in complying with 
local law permits common law marriage where it is impossible to comply with the 
formalities of local law25, or there is no form available. Any inconvenience caused by 
the application of local law would not in itself amount to insuperability26.  Finally, the 
last common law exception allows members of the armed forces to marry without 
submitting to the laws of the conquered country to which they occupy27. This was a 
particularly helpful exception at the end of the Second World War, and remains valid 
today should the need to use it arise as a result of modern conflicts. 
In addition to the common law exceptions, there are two further exceptions provided 
by statute. Firstly, the Foreign Marriage Act 1892, as amended28, makes provisions 
for the recognition of consular marriages, where at least one of the parties to the 
marriage is a British citizen. In order for the marriage to be valid it must have been 
conducted in the manner required by the Act. The second statutory exception 
provided under the Foreign Marriage Act 1946, as amended29, allows a valid marriage 
to occur in any foreign territory by a chaplain serving with the forces. Should the 
                                                          
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid 362. 
21 David McClean & Kisch Beevers, Morris: The Conflict of Laws (7th Edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2009) 
205. 
22 Ibid 207. 
23 Wolfenden v Wolfenden [1946] P 61. 
24 [1957] P 301. 
25 Preston v Preston [1963] P 411. 
26 Kent v Burgess (1840) 11 Sim 361. 
27 Tachzanowska v Tachzanowska [1957] P 301. 
28 The Foreign Marriage Act 1892 was amended by the Foreign Marriage Act 1947 and the Foreign 
Marriage (Amendment) Act 1988. 
29 Foreign Marriage Act 1947 as amended by the Foreign Marriage Act 1988 and The Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 (Overseas Relationships and Consequential, etc. Amendments Order 2005, SI 2005/3129. 
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situation arise, a marriage entered into through these means, is valid as if it had been 
solemnised in the UK, whether the services are on active service in the foreign 
country or merely stationed there. 
Regardless of the exceptions to the rule of the lex loci, formal validity is, on the whole 
a settled aspect of marriage validity and appears incontrovertible. This is further 
supported by the Law Commission’s recognition and approval  of the lex loci as the 
most appropriate choice of law rule. It is the preferred choice of law rule as “certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of result are achieved by the application of that law.”30 It 
is that same achievement of certainty which now must be sought in essential validity. 
At present, essential validity is plagued by various choice of law rules and 
contradictory case law and, therefore, requires exploration to determine how reform 
can achieve the much needed certainty and predictability evident in formal validity. 
3.3 Essential Validity 
Essential validity moves away from the focus on formalities and turns it’s attention to 
issues surrounding whether the parties had the capacity to marry. Determining 
whether there was capacity to marry requires the consideration of factors like age, 
consanguinity, affinity, polygamy, consent and ability to remarry after divorce.  As 
indicated, this is the element of marriage validity that is less settled, and is replete 
with ambiguity and uncertainty. This uncertainty stems from the competing theories 
on the applicable law. Although there are various theories including, the dual domicile 
theory31, the intended matrimonial home theory32  and the most real and substantial 
connection test, it is accepted that the two main theories fighting for dominance are 
the dual domicile theory and the intended matrimonial home theory. The outcome of 
this fight is highly unpredictable. With support for both theories coming from different 
sources it is possible that either could be championed at any time. It also must not be 
forgotten that, while the dual domicile theory and the intended matrimonial home 
theory may be the most likely option, it would not be out of the realms of possibility 
for an alternative choice of law rule to be deemed applicable. It is, as a result of this 
uncertainty and unpredictability, vital that each theory is explored in order to 
                                                          
30 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 2.36. 
31 John Morris, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (8th edn, London: Stevens 1967) Rule 31 at 
254-255. 
32 GC Cheshire, Cheshire’s Private International Law, (7th edn, Butterworth & Co 1965) 227-228. 
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determine which offers the most practical solution, and therefore should be used 
consistently as the applicable choice of law rule. This is not the first attempt at 
exploring the area of marriage validity in a bid to find the most appropriate choice of 
law rule, and indeed the Law Commission’s suggestion for reform will be considered 
throughout.  
3.4 Dual Domicile v Intended Matrimonial Home 
The application of the dual domicile theory requires consideration of both parties’ 
domiciliary law to determine whether essential validity is satisfied. If, under the law of 
either parties, the marriage would be invalid, the dual domicile theory would deem the 
marriage to be invalid.  Essentially, the theory requires that both parties have the 
capacity to marry under their own domiciliary laws to create a valid marriage. This is 
the theory that is considered the most orthodox, and has the support of the Law 
Commission: “our provisional view is that this test is preferable to the intended 
matrimonial home test and that it should be adopted as the test for all issues of legal 
capacity.”33  This support has been further echoed in cases throughout the years.  
Brook v Brook34 demonstrates historic endorsement of the dual domicile theory, while 
in more recent times Re Paine35 and Szechter v Szechter36 could be identified as 
supportive to this conceptualisation. This diverse and continued validation may be 
attributed to the benefits behind the dual domicile theory. Advantages of the theory 
include the fact that it is relatively easy to apply in the prospective, it makes evading 
the restrictions set down by the domiciliary law difficult, and it allows each parties’ 
country to be heard in terms of validity, which, given a persons’ status is a matter of 
public concern, may be deemed to be of significant importance.  These are 
advantages that were recognised by the Law Commission, which in turn led them to 
the conclusion that, logically, the dual domicile theory was the most appropriate 
choice of law rule: 
“The main rationale of the dual domicile rule is that a persons’ status is a matter of 
public concern to the country to which he belongs at the time of the marriage; and 
therefore the domiciliary law of each party has an equal right to be heard. The issue 
of whether a valid marriage has been or may be contracted should, in principle and 
                                                          
33 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36. 
34 (1861) 9 HL Cas 193. 
35 [1940] Ch 46. 
36 [1971] P 286. 
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in logic, depend on the conditions existing at the time of the marriage rather than 
subsequently.”37 
Advantages of this nature have also been recognised by academicians, however they 
also consider the limitations of the theory. Reed38 acknowledges the advantages of 
the dual domicile theory as outlined above, but goes on to state that it “suffers from a 
number of substantial disadvantages.”39 In exploring the disadvantages Reed 
elaborates by setting out that the theory does not uphold the policy objective of the 
validity of marriage and that it fails to consider the law of the country to which the 
marriage belongs. These are points of criticism that are further explored by other 
commentators40. Taintor41 provides that the application of the dual domicile theory 
shows a lack of respect for the laws of the country where the parties intend to live: 
“No domicile at the time of the ceremony has, as such, a sufficiently strong interest to 
justify the application of its laws to determine whether or not the parties are of such 
qualities, or in such relationship, that their marriage should be declared void, nor to 
determine that their marriage should be declared valid if the status is one which 
offends a strong public policy of the intended family domicile.”42 
 
This highlights the problem with a strict dual domicile approach as it fails to consider 
the impact the marriage would have upon the intended matrimonial home, a problem 
which the Law Commission failed to recognise when recommending that the dual 
domicile theory be the applicable rule in marriage validity. In expanding on the 
aforementioned problems commentators vividly identify the problems with the use of 
domicile in the area of marriage validity. Regardless of chapter two’s attempts to 
address the problems within domicile, at present, valid criticism does exist: “English 
law of domicile is distorted in certain respects and does not always indicate the 
country to which the parties really “belong”.”43 Take for instance the current law of the 
domicile of origin which may mean a person is domiciled in a country to which they 
have no connection, this country then being used as the decision maker of the validity 
of that persons’ marriage is absurd. Whilst attempts have been made to reform the 
                                                          
37 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36. 
38 Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387. 
39 Ibid 395. 
40 TC Hartley, ‘The Policy Basis of the English Conflict of Laws of Marriage’ (1972) 53 Modern Law 
review 571, Richard Fentiman, ‘Activity in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law 
Commission’ (1986) 6(3) Oxford Law Journal 353 and Charles W. Taintor, ‘Marriage in the Conflict of 
Laws’ (1955-1956) 9 Vanderbilt Law Review 607. 
41 Charles W Taintor, ‘Marriage in the Conflict of Laws’ (1955-1956) 9 Vanderbilt Law review 607. 
42 Ibid 611-612. 
43 TC Hartley, ‘The Policy Basis of the English Conflict of Laws of Marriage’ (1972) 53 Modern Law 
Review 571, 576. 
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law on domicile, and indeed this work itself suggests reform, as it stands this is a  
valid criticism of the use of the dual domicile theory, and cannot be allowed to continue 
on the ‘hope’ that the necessary reforms on the law of domicile will occur. 
The intended matrimonial home theory is the dual domicile theory’s primary 
competing choice of law rule, and has garnered support from various sources. Unlike 
the dual domicile theory, it lacks the support of the Law Commission. The intended 
matrimonial home theory looks to the laws of the husband’s domicile, unless it can be 
shown that at the time of the marriage the parties intended to establish a matrimonial 
home in a different country, and did in fact follow through with that intention in a 
‘reasonable time’. Therefore, if the parties intend to have their matrimonial home in a 
particular country, and move there in pursuance of that intention, it is the laws of that 
country that will determine whether the marriage is valid. It is a theory which, like the 
dual domicile theory, has received both praise and criticism. Despite the Law 
Commission deeming the dual domicile theory to be the most appropriate law, they 
did recognise some of the advantages of the intended matrimonial home theory44, 
which will be discussed later, and the theory also receives support from academics45 
and the common law. 
Support for the intended matrimonial home theory can be seen in cases such as De 
Reneville v De Reneville46 and Kenwood v Kenwood47, in which remarks were made, 
albeit obiter, in support of the doctrine. In Kenwood v Kenwood, Denning LJ uses the 
example of polygamous marriages, and states that if they intend to live in the parties’ 
domicile that allows polygamy then the marriage should be deemed valid48. This 
support goes further in Radwan v Radwan (No2)49. The case involved an English 
domiciliary, Mary, who married an Egyptian domiciliary in the Egypitian consulate 
general in Paris. The husband was already party to a polygamous marriage, which 
was still in existence when the couple married, and upon marrying they intended to 
set up their matrimonial home in Egypt. Years later, having divorced his first wife, the 
couple moved to England, where the husband obtained a talak divorce from Mary, 
                                                          
44 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.34. 
45 For example Reed recognises many of the advantages discussed by the Law Commission, and 
explicitly states that “it does have a role to play as an appropriate doctrine to selective issues of 
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who then went on to petition the English courts for a divorce. Having established that 
the talak divorce was not valid, it first had to be determined whether the marriage was 
valid. The court held that it was in fact a valid marriage because, although Mary was 
incapable of entering into a polygamous marriage in English law, they recognised that 
the intended matrimonial home was Egypt, and so applied Egyptian law to the aspects 
of essential validity. In reaching his decision Cumming-Bruce J concluded that Mary: 
“had the capacity to enter into a polygamous union by virtue of her prenuptial decision 
to separate herself from the land of her domicile and to make her life with her husband 
in his country where the Mohammedan law of polygamous marriage was the normal 
institution of marriage.”50  
 
The extent of this support was limited, Cumming-Bruce J went on to state that his 
decision was not intended to import upon other aspects of law: “Nothing in this 
judgment bears upon the capacity of minors, the law of affinity, or the effect of bigamy 
upon capacity to enter into a monogamous marriage.”51 Essentially, Cumming-Bruce 
J was not attempting to make the intended matrimonial home theory a universal test, 
but felt it was the correct test in individuated polygamous cases. 
Despite the clear limitations set out in Radwan v Radwan (No2), it is evident that there 
are advantages in the application of the intended matrimonial home 
conceptualisation. Whilst selecting the dual domicile theory as the most appropriate 
rule selection template, the Law Commission recognised the advantages of the 
intended matrimonial home theory: it reflects the society the marriage will have an 
impact upon, it upholds the parties’ expectations, and as a result of only one 
applicable law, more marriages will be held valid52. These advantages are echoed by 
scholars53, however, they also go on to consider the disadvantages of the theory in 
broadened terms. 
One of the most striking criticisms of the intended matrimonial home theory is its 
discriminatory inculcations with a male/female recognition dichotomy. Unless it is 
shown that the parties intended to establish a matrimonial home in a different country, 
and followed through with the intention, it is the husband’s domiciliary law alone that 
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is applied.  This approach “is totally out of touch with modern etymologies of gender 
equality.”54  It sits in stark contrast to the tone suggested by the abolition of the married 
women’s domicile rule, and the stance of the Law Commission55. It is for those 
reasons suggested that the element regarding a presumption towards the husband’s 
domicile should be eliminated from the conceptualisation. An adaptation of the theory 
may be appropriate rather than denying the use of the theory, thus allowing an 
updated and reformed version to be more reflective of modern day equality and due 
process. This modernised intended matrimonial home theory could then be used to 
displace the dual domicile rule if the parties intended to live in a particular country 
before marriage, and moved there within a reasonable time after the marriage56. This 
would in turn offer the balance of the advantages of the dual domicile rule for some 
marriages, whilst also upholding the idea that where relevant, the country most 
affected by the marriage will determine the validity. In addition to more marriages 
being upheld, it would also provide the desired protection in cases such as Radwan 
v Radwan (No2), and the idea of combining the dual domicile theory with a new 
version of the intended matrimonial home theory will be returned to later in the thesis. 
Aside from the discriminatory nature of the intended matrimonial home theory, there 
are other problems with the approach. One such remaining problem is the reference 
to moving to the selected country within a “reasonable time”. There is no definition of 
reasonable time, it is subjective, in turn providing uncertainty within the theory. The 
test is also difficult to apply in the prospective as it would be unknown whether any 
intention to move to a particular country had been implemented in a reasonable time. 
Instead it may be necessary to wait and see if the matrimonial home is established, 
“meanwhile the validity of the marriage cannot properly be decided and it appears, 
must be held in abeyance.”57 Secondly, having set up home in the intended country 
what if the couple subsequently decide to move? Is the new country then the most 
interested, and able to apply its laws? This has been raised by Hill and Shuilleabhain 
who, in raising this concern, point out that the validity of the marriage cannot be 
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reassessed every time a couple move58. This is not a scenario that the intended 
matrimonial home caters for; how such a situation is to be handled is unclear and is 
an undeniable weakness of the approach. Finally, it will not always be the case that 
the country where the parties set up the matrimonial home is the most appropriate 
law to apply. In instances such as those involving polygamy it is reasonable to see 
why the law of the matrimonial home should be applied; laws on polygamy are 
designed to protect the impacted society, and if polygamy is accepted within that 
country it is not offensive to that society, and, the marriage should not be invalidated 
purely because domiciliary law prohibits it. Conversely, in other instances, the 
domiciliary law may have an interest in being applied, and, the intended matrimonial 
home theory is “vulnerable to criticism on the ground that it frustrates the interests of 
the states which have a legitimate concern in the parties”59. An example of such a 
case may be where the capacity concerned is age. A minimum age requirement is 
designed to protect the individual from marrying at an age where they are considered 
to be vulnerable, and the domiciliary law has an interest in protecting that party. 
Simply because a couple have set up their matrimonial home in an alternative country 
within a reasonable time, does not always mean that the dual domicile rule should be 
dispensed with, and the intended matrimonial home theory applied universally, 
instead, it is necessary to consider the relevant policy objectives, as will be discussed 
further later.  
What is evident, having explored the two main competing theories, is that neither work 
as a universal choice of law rule. It is clear that the Law Commission believe the dual 
domicile theory to be the most appropriate test and that it, “should be adopted as the 
test for all issues of legal capacity”60, nonetheless, they still recognise that is has 
disadvantages. Neither theory operates perfectly, both have elements which are 
advantageous, but equally, both can be criticised. Therefore, rather than weighing up 
and determining one to be less problematic than the other, and applying it universally, 
alternatives must be explored. 
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3.6 Alternative Theories 
There are various alternative theories that have been suggested over time. They too 
have received support, and were considered by the Law Commission in their Working 
Paper. One such theory that has received considerable support is, the ‘most real and 
substantial connection’ test. As with the intended matrimonial home theory, this test 
is focused on which country the marriage belongs to, as opposed to where the people 
themselves might belong61. Often when considering which country the marriage has 
the most real and substantial connection to, it will be the country where the couple 
have their matrimonial home. However, unlike the intended matrimonial home theory, 
this is not the only factor when determining where the most real and substantial 
connection is, as things such as domicile and nationality can be taken into 
consideration, which  may be helpful when the matrimonial home has not yet been 
determined. This is a theory that has received support from the common law as well 
as academicians. Common law support can be seen in cases such as Vervaeke v 
Smith62, in which Lord Simon stated that the most real and substantial connection test 
should be applied, “if not to all questions of essential validity at least to the question 
of the sort of quintessential validity in issue in this appeal”63. This was further 
supported in Lawrence v Lawrence64 at first instance, but not in the appeal cases, 
and more recently, in Westminster City Council V C65, in which the court recognised 
the existence of the ‘most real and substantial connection’ test as an alternative 
theory to allow for recognition of a marriage where appropriate, if, the dual domicile 
rule would result in non-recognition66. 
Academic support can also be seen for the most real and substantial connection 
test67. Fentiman68 argues forcefully that the law that should be applied is that of the 
country with the most real and substantial connection. He believes that the Law 
Commission were wrong to select the dual domicile theory, and that “certainty in the 
                                                          
61 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 359. 
62 [1983] 1 AC 145. 
63 Ibid 166. 
64 [1985] Fam. 106. 
65 [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [2009] Fam 11. 
66 Westminster City Council v C [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [2009] Fam 11 [74] (Wall LJ). It is important to 
note that despite such discussions the test was not considered appropriate in this case. 
67 Richard Fentiman, ‘Activity in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law Commission’ 
(1986) 6(3) Oxford Law Journal 353 and Richard Fentiman, ‘The Validity of Marriage and the Proper 
Law’ (1985) 44(2) Cambridge Law Journal 256. 
68 Richard Fentiman, ‘The Validity of Marriage and the Proper Law’ (1985) 44(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 256. 
65 
 
law is bought at the expense of flexibility.”69 He later states in support of the most real 
and substantial connection test that, “Justice lies not in the certainty of one true test 
for the validity of marriage, but in having a test which is flexible enough to respond to 
the needs of particular cases.”70 Much of Fentiman’s support comes from his criticism 
of the dual domicile theory and the intended matrimonial home theory. He also 
attempts to show that many of the cases which are understood to support and 
evidence the application of the dual domicile theory, or the intended matrimonial 
home theory, actually support the most real and substantial connection test. One such 
example is when Fentiman articulates that Radwan v Radwan(No2) and De Reneville 
v De Reneville provide support for the most real and substantial connection test. In 
reference to De Reneville he states, “The matrimonial home matters not because of 
any intended matrimonial home test but because it discloses the legal system best 
connected with a marriage.”71 This analysis is unsubstantiated. De Reneville does not 
provide support for the most real and substantial connection test, but, as previously 
discussed, the intended matrimonial home theory. In looking for support for the most 
real and substantial connection test, Fentiman arguably overstates the extant 
precepts to suit a preferred framework. Even in cases where Fentiman cannot rule 
out that the intended matrimonial home theory was applied, he explains how this does 
not damage the proper law approach of the most real and substantial connection test. 
For example, he provides that in Radwan the integrity of the proper law approach is 
upheld as a result of the forceful questioning and rejection of the dual domicile 
theory72. Therefore, whilst Fentiman  provides support for the most real and 
substantial connection test, the shewed analysis of the law on the area, provides 
limited persuasion that it is a more appropriate choice of law rule. 
The limited evidence to show that the most real and substantial connection test is the 
most appropriate theory carries even less weight when the criticisms of the test are 
explored. Davie73 states that the test is uncertain, and this opinion is shared by the 
Law Commission. The Commission determined it to be, “inherently vague and 
unpredictable”74, stating that it is “a test which is difficult to apply other than through 
the courtroom process and it is therefore unsuitable in an area where the law’s 
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function is essentially prospective, i.e. a yardstick for future planning.”75 For these 
reasons, whilst there is merit in applying the law of the country to which the marriage 
is most closely connected, it is not practical. Reform on this area requires certainty 
and predictability, and it should be ruled out as an appropriate universal test for 
essential validity.  
The alternative reference test is another theory which has been proposed to provide 
the best way of determining the applicable law. The test provides that if the marriage 
would be regarded as valid by either the dual domicile theory or the intended 
matrimonial home theory, then it should be held to be valid. The test, however, only 
carries limited support76. The common law offers little assistance in that it has been 
recognised that in some cases the courts have set aside the dual domicile rule  
because it would invalidate a marriage that could be upheld by applying alternative 
tests77. On the other hand the justices did not go on to apply the test, and it is a test 
that has received criticism on the basis that: 
“it would be wrong to elevate the general policy in favour of upholding the validity of 
marriage into a governing rule; and it would be contrary to principle to adopt the dual 
domicile (or the intended matrimonial home) test and then to refuse to give effect to 
it if it results in the invalidity of the marriage.”78 
 
Whilst it is public policy that marriages should be upheld, this does not apply 
irrespective of other considerations, and to create a rule to that effect would fail to 
recognise other matters which are relevant and significant: “choice of law rules should 
be based on sound policy grounds.”79 It is also a test that would add to the uncertainty 
in the area, as it is only applied when it is deemed appropriate, which is again 
subjective.  The test also means that various laws may have to be considered which 
would be time consuming for the courts, in turn meaning lengthier and more 
expensive cases. For all these reasons the alternative reference test does not appear 
to be the most appropriate test to be put into place, despite the flexibility in upholding 
marriages it would provide. 
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Finally, a further proposal that has been put forward is that, if there is essential validity 
according to the domiciliary laws of either party, the marriage will be valid80. This was 
also considered by the Law Commission, who decided that the test should not be 
adopted on the premise that:  
“If it is accepted that a persons’ status is a matter of public concern to the country in 
which he or she is domiciled at the time of the marriage, then the rules of that country 
which are designed to protect its public interest (such as rules laying down prohibited 
degrees of relationship or requiring monogamy) should be given effect. The proposed 
rule would enable a party to evade the requirements of his domiciliary law and would 
also lead to limping marriages.”81 
 
Essentially the rule does not provide equality: it accepts and promotes the importance 
of the law of the domiciliary being the applicable choice of law rule, but then casts the 
inconvenient law aside. For obvious reasons this test would fail to be appropriate as 
the universal test for choice of law in essential validity. 
The consideration of all these alternative theories, alongside the dominant theories of 
the dual domicile theory and the intended matrimonial home theory, further highlights 
that no single approach can, or ought to be used, as a universal choice of law rule. 
Each theory comes with its own list of drawbacks and disadvantages that mean that 
instead of applying any of them universally, the courts take a ‘pick and mix’ approach 
to their application, in a bid to avoid the problems within each of them. It is for exactly 
these reasons that the area lacks consistency, despite the Law Commission 
determining that the dual domicile theory was the most appropriate choice of law rule. 
The judiciary are, in deciding the cases, making it clear that a universal choice of law 
rule does not work within marriage validity. This is then exacerbated by the exceptions 
that operate within the area, that allow the judiciary to avoid the application of the dual 
domicile theory, or whatever theory is put in its place. However, it could be argued 
that if the rules were entirely appropriate in the first place, there would be no need to 
avoid them82, and, thus, these exceptions, and the need for them, will be explored in 
greater detail. 
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3.7 The Exceptions 
There are exceptions to the dual domicile rule, or indeed any of the other theories 
that may be adopted. These exceptions include the rule in Sottmayer v De Barros 
(No2)83, the exception that may be invoked where England is the lex loci, and under 
supervening public policy grounds. All of these exceptions allow the general rules 
surrounding validity to be departed from, whether it is to find a marriage valid or 
invalid.  
The rule in Sottomayer v De Barros (No2) allows the marriage to be deemed valid 
even if it is invalid by one of the parties’ domiciliary laws, so long as one of the parties 
has an English domiciliary and the marriage takes place in England. Essentially, it 
allows English law to solely govern the marriage. Despite criticism for it being a 
xenophobic rule that is “unworthy of a place in a respectable system of the conflict of 
laws”84, it is an exception that has been applied in other cases85. It has also received 
other support, Clarkson and Hill explain the exceptions under the concept of the 
differential approach, setting out why it is justifiable to step away from the general 
approach. They state that: 
“The court is justified in ignoring the foreign incapacity on the ground that the English 
domiciliary has not stepped into the international arena by marrying abroad, such a 
person does not deserve to forfeit the right to rely on the law of the country to which 
he belongs and with which the marriage is more closely connected”86.  
 
This is not an approach we would expect a foreign court to take when determining 
whether a marriage is valid, if it involved an English domiciliary that had married there. 
If the party for instance, was under the legal age to have the capacity to marry, as 
this is an element of essential validity, England would expect the marriage to be 
deemed invalid as English laws on age are designed to protect English domicilaries. 
In expecting this outcome determination it seems only logical that equal respect 
should be shown to foreign laws, England should not be seen to ‘cherry pick’ when it 
chooses to apply the rules, and when it does not. Whilst the Marriage (Enabling) Act 
196087 has limited the effect of the exception when dealing with cases involving 
affinity, its impact is minimal as it only applies to degrees of affinity and would not 
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prevent, for instance, cousins from marrying. Therefore, the criticisms of the exception 
still largely apply. The exception goes against uniformity and comity as it is a “blatant 
‘favouring of one’s own’ by the English courts88”, and has also been criticised by the 
Law Commission. The Commission state that, “The rule seems hard to justify in 
principle since it shows a unilateral preference for the English (or Scots) law of the 
forum89”, and later in the paper determines that the exception should be abolished90. 
The differential approach when looking at England as the lex loci, and the parties are 
domiciled elsewhere, is that England cannot be expected to sanction a marriage that 
our courts would not recognise, even if valid in accordance with domiciliary laws. 
Clarkson justifies the differential approach that is adopted by stating that when a 
marriage takes place abroad, “the lex loci celebrationis does not have sufficient 
interest in the essentials of the marriage for us to impose the extra hurdle of 
compliance therewith “91. Whereas, when the marriage is in England, and there is a 
clear link to England, greater caution is needed, and such compliance can be insisted 
upon92.  Essentially, both Clarkson and Hill are stating that if the marriage is abroad 
we do not have to make it comply with the lex loci, but if the marriage is in England it 
is expected that English laws will be upheld. If every country insisted on this it could 
make the hurdles when marrying abroad very high, given that prospectively essential 
validity may have to be satisfied in up to three countries. 
The Law Commission provide some support for the exception in that they agree that: 
“it is reasonable that, if the parties (even if one or both are foreign domicilaries) chose 
to use English or Scottish marriage procedures, they must comply with the 
substantive requirements of English or Scots law as the case may be, and our courts 
can hardly be expected to uphold the validity of marriages which their own law does 
not countenance.”93 
 
The Commission does not draw the same distinction as Clarkson and Hill between 
English and foreign marriages. The Commission provide that: “we should recognise 
the legitimate interest of a foreign country in the application of its substantive rules to 
marriages celebrated within its borders, particularly if we ourselves claim such an 
interest when a marriage is celebrated in the United Kingdom.”94 The Commission 
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would rather have a one rule for all approach, promoting communitarianism and 
harmonisation. 
It is evident why such a rule may be desirable, and it is agreeable that a registrar 
should not have to conduct a marriage our courts would not recognise, however, 
potentially having to satisfy the laws on essential validity in three countries is a heavy 
burden. For this reason it is suggested that a better alternative would be to have the 
exception in the prospective for England and foreign countries so as to adhere to 
comity, whilst not working retrospectively. If the parties have already married in the 
country and complied with the formal validity requirements, the marriage should 
remain valid as long as it is essentially valid in accordance with the applicable choice 
of law, whether this be the domiciliary law or that of the matrimonial home. The 
marriage is not offending the lex loci if the invalidity was not known at the time of the 
marriage. For instance, if the parties were in fact cousins but the lex loci were not 
aware of this relationship. The exception should only act as a bar to the marriage 
ceremony being conducted if the invalidity is known, to prevent registrars from being 
forced to conduct a marriage their own courts would not recognise. This standpoint 
appears to be supported by Hartley as he states that there is no policy justification to 
apply the lex loci in assessing validity as it would, “create an additional obstacle to 
the validity of the marriage.”95 However, Hartley goes on to state, “It might be justified 
… where the question arises before the celebration of the marriage, e.g. on an 
application for mandamus against a registrar of marriages who refuses to allow a 
couple to marry.”96 
Finally, the doctrine of public policy may be invoked to ensure that the law of the lex 
fori is applied; “which when all else fails, can be relied on to ensure the application of 
the lex fori.” 97  Characteristically, the public policy doctrine provides the courts with 
an escape clause in circumstances where applying the normal choice of law rule, they 
would be left with a marriage that is contrary to English public policy. Public policy 
should rarely be used, as it should only be invoked if the foreign law is “grossly 
offensive or repugnant to English standards of justice, decency or morality.”98 While 
a particular marriage may not be permitted within England on one of the incapacity 
grounds, it is expected that the courts will show tolerance to such marriages, as stated 
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by Simon J  in Cheni v Cheni99; “the court will seek to exercise common sense, good 
manners and a reasonable tolerance.”100 This, however, provides limited 
reassurance. The potential for a court to invoke a public policy exception brings with 
it a degree of uncertainty. The desire to create a universal choice of law rule stemmed 
from a quest for certainty, however, even if this were to be achieved, the ability of the 
courts to invalidate the marriage on grounds of public policy removes any potential 
certainty established. In fact, considering the legal analysis that has already been 
undertaken, it is submitted that a universal choice of law rule would mean an increase 
in the use of the public policy exception. It has been shown that despite the Law 
Commission’s preference for the dual domicile theory, the judiciary have continued to 
use alternative approaches so as to provide just and fair outcomes101. Thus, if this 
ability to deviate away from the norm was taken away, and replaced by a universal 
choice of law rule, the public policy exception may at times appear the only legitimate 
option available to the courts to achieve what they believe to be the correct outcome. 
In essence, the invocation of public policy comes as a result of the choice of law rule 
not producing the desired outcome, therefore, rather than increasing its use, the 
problem should be addressed at the source102. In respect of marriage validity, this 
would be by way of stepping away from a universal choice of law rule, and moving 
towards a system that better caters for the different incapacities and the issues they 
raise. On that premise the thesis will now explore the idea of interest analysis, in a 
bid to create an approach which negates the need for the public policy exception by 
formulating optimal rules that are policy sensitive. 
3.8 Formulating A New Approach 
3.8.1 Interest Analysis  
Throughout the exploration of the choice of law rules that have developed it has 
become apparent that all have received criticism, and that using any one of them as 
a universal choice of law rule in marriage validity may not be appropriate. The “all 
important failing of both theories is the attempt to apply one basic rule to every 
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case.”103 What Smart goes on to suggest is, “the introduction of a choice of law rule 
which eschews a mechanical approach in favour of a degree of flexibility; just as in 
the laws of contract and tort.”104 One such approach that seeks to achieve this 
flexibility, and in fact originates from the approach the United States developed in the 
realm of choice of law in contractual and tortious disputes, is interest analysis.  
Interest analysis was a theory established by Brainerd Currie105, and is based on the 
application of the law of the state most interested in the matter. Interest would be as 
a consequence of a policy on the area concerned, combined with the state holding 
such a policy, having a relationship with either of the parties, the location of the 
wedding, or the litigation itself106. In any of these instances it would be accepted that 
the state may have an interest, and it would need to be determined whether there 
was a true conflict between multiple interested states, or a false conflict. In the event 
of a false conflict, whereby upon assessment only one state has a reasonable interest 
in its laws being applied, the law of that state will be the applicable law. Where there 
remains a true conflict, under Currie’s original form of interest analysis the law of the 
lex fori107 is applied. It is this application of the lex fori without further consideration of 
the most interested state that has been criticised, as it permits and encourages the 
parties to forum shop108. If the parties are aware that there are multiple interested 
states, Currie’s approach rewards the party who strikes first, by commencing 
proceedings in the state that will potentially produce the most favourable outcome for 
them. In addition, the approach under Currie can also be criticised for its case-by-
case approach. Currie does not provide any rules on which States would have a 
reasonable interest for a given area, meaning the assessment of whether there is a 
true conflict, and if so, which states it is between, must be carried out for every case, 
which is time consuming for the courts, costly and lacks certainty and predictability 
for the parties involved109. 
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It is these very problems that limited the success of Currie’s interest analysis within 
the courtroom. While in Dym v Gordon110, Judge Fuld appeared to endorse interest 
analysis by stating that it  provides “a method, a conceptual framework, for the 
disposition of tort cases having contact with more than one jurisdiction.”111 The 
approach seems to have been tired of only four years later when in Tooker v Lopez112, 
Judge Fuld states, “the time has come … to endeavour to minimize what some have 
characterized as an ad hoc case-by-case  approach by laying down guidelines as well 
as we can.”113 These concerns were echoed by academics in England when they 
began exploring the concept of interest analysis114 particularly in relation to marriage 
validity; Davie asserted “Marriage is an area where stability and certainty are essential 
requirements. These needs are quite inconsistent with the approach to choice of law 
which interest analysis entails.”115 It is apparent that, like Judge Fuld in Tooker, what 
is desired within the law on marriage validity are rules that can be used to help 
determine the applicable law. These rules could then be used by judges and indeed, 
the parties themselves for predictability and certainty purposes. It is important to note 
that having criticised the rule scepticism within interest analysis, Davie did recognise 
how certain aspects of interest analysis could be used to help develop English conflict 
of law rules within the essential validity of marriage116. He considered how the 
assessment of state interests could be used to formulate rules to reflect the competing 
interests within marriage validity, so as to provide rules on an issue by issue basis117. 
It is this rules based version of interest analysis that has received attention from 
domestic commentators in relation to marriage validity118, and thus it is this embryonic 
perspective that will be considered further. 
Issue by issue analysis is a move which steps away from a universal choice of law 
rule that covers all of that area of law, whether that be contract, tort, or indeed 
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marriage validity, and instead breaks down these areas of law into separate issues. 
It, as a concept, recognises that states may be interested in different issues within a 
matter, and that the states may not have an interest in all of the issues119. It is also 
about recognising that a particular case may only raise one issue, and therefore it is 
the state most interested in that particular issue that should have its law applied. Issue 
by issue analysis therefore promotes the dissection of a case so as to determine what 
is really at issue, and subsequently what law should apply: “rather than seeking to 
choose a law as if all aspects of the case are contested, one should focus on the 
narrow issues with regard to which a conflict actually exists and proceed 
accordingly.”120 
Dépeçage is a possible consequence of issue by issue analysis in that “dépeçage is 
the application of the substantive laws of different states to different issues of the 
same cause of action.”121 As a consequence, it is a dépeçage inspired rules based 
system of interest analysis that this research propounds. Moving away from Currie’s 
initial theories of interest analysis, this research seeks to utilise dépeçage to suggest 
that each of the incapacities should be considered as a separate issue, and should 
have the substantive laws of the most interested state on that particular matter 
applied. Aspects of this particularised and individuated approach were promulgated 
by Reed122, and builds on the ideas of Davie as previously discussed. In setting out 
dépeçage based interest analysis as the proposed approach, it is necessary to 
consider each of the incapacities in detail, in order to determine the most appropriate 
choice of law rule. This will require the consideration of the relevant policy concerns 
and objectives behind each of them, in order to assess which state would have the 
most interest in any given issue. Some incapacities are about protecting the parties 
to the marriage, whilst others are about the society that will be effected by it. It is, 
therefore, important that the policy objectives within marriage validity are analysed, 
before exploring the incapacities in more detail. 
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3.8.2 Policy Considerations 
Within the essential validity of marriage there are various policy objectives at play. 
The Law Commission in their Working Paper set out some of these objectives, and 
stated that they need to be considered when assessing whether choice of law rules 
are satisfactory123. These objectives included: certainty and predictability; upholding 
the validity of marriage; international uniformity of decisions; and protecting party 
expectations. These objectives highlight what must be taken into consideration when 
determining the appropriate choice of law rule for each of the incapacities and have 
been further discussed and expanded on by academicians124. The objectives listed 
above appear to be applicable to all of the incapacities, however, this is not so when 
looking at some of the other policy factors. Reed recognises factors such as eugenic 
concerns as well as moral, religious and cultural infrastructures125. These factors are, 
by their very nature, more relevant to certain incapacities. Eugenics is clearly 
applicable when dealing with consanguineous marriages, whereas moral, religious 
and cultural infrastructure appears relevant for multiple incapacities. It, as a factor, is 
about protecting the society that will be most affected by the marriage, as it is that 
society’s religious, moral and cultural beliefs that will be impacted. On the other side 
of the coin, we can see the policy objective of protection. This objective is to protect 
the parties to the marriage, and can be evidenced by a country setting a minimum 
age requirement to marry, and rules surrounding where there has been a lack of 
consent due to the likes of fraud or duress126. It is these more specific policy factors 
that will assist in the determination of the appropriate choice of law rule for each of 
the incapacities under dépeçage based interest analysis. Some incapacities are 
clearly about protecting the parties to the marriage, while others are designed around 
societal beliefs. This point was recognised by Jaffey, who acknowledged that the 
domestic rules could be divided into rules that are designed to protect or advance the 
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public interest of the country concerned, and rules whose purpose is to do justice for 
the parties127. To demonstrate this, in relation to marriage, he asserted that the rules 
on essential validity pertaining to consanguinity and polygamy are designed to  
invalidate marriages that are considered to be “harmful to the moral, religious, social 
and perhaps even physical well-being of the community”128, thereby an example of 
rules that are designed to protect and advance the interests of society. In respect of 
protection of the parties, he identified age as a demonstrable capacity, as the rules 
are designed to protect young persons against their own immaturity129. Therefore, 
when selecting the individual choice of law rule for each of the incapacities, the policy 
objective behind it must be considered; it is necessary to question why the rule on 
that incapacity was created.  
Running parallel to these more specific objectives, it is of course important that the 
more general policy objectives are not forgotten. Although the more specific policy 
concerns will be analysed in making the rule selection, the more general objectives 
are core tenets throughout the thesis. The very aim of this research, and proposed 
reform, is to achieve certainty and predictability within marriage validity, and so this 
policy objective will, as a consequence, be advanced. It also seeks to prevent forum 
shopping by suggesting set choice of law rules, rules that will go on to be argued 
could be applied internationally, and so is certainly conscious of the desire to achieve 
uniformity of decision. It is with these policy objectives in mind, that we now turn to 
the introduction of a new choice of law rule, before dealing with each of the 
incapacities in turn. 
3.8.3 The Continued Recognised Relationship Theory 
The policy objectives outlined above demonstrate that at times it is important to 
consider where the couple intend to live for the purpose of choice of law rules. This 
is particularly apparent when considering the policy objectives of moral, religious and 
cultural infrastructures. These policy factors are only relevant in the country that is 
going to play host to the marriage, as this is the society that will witness the 
relationship, and will, therefore, form opinions on its place within the community. It is 
important that for those incapacities that are designed to uphold certain societal 
norms and religious beliefs, that there is a choice of law rule that is able to do this. 
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Whilst there is the intended matrimonial home theory which was set out earlier in the 
chapter, it is a choice of law rule that has its problems, and it is argued that unlike the 
dual domicile theory, these problems run deeper than it being used as a universal 
choice of law rule. Both the discriminatory nature, and the uncertainty caused if the 
couple later decide to relocate need to be addressed. In order to tackle this, a new 
approach is proposed which keeps the sentiment of the matrimonial home, but is 
more reflective both of modern times and the policy objectives within marriage validity.  
This proposed original approach is the “continued recognised relationship theory”. 
The continued recognised relationship theory is the application of the law of the 
country where the couple intend to live, or the law of the country where they have 
lived if their relationship has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time. Such a 
choice of law rule not only pays homage to the importance of the laws of the country 
where the couple intend to live, and the society that will be impacted by the presence 
of that marriage, but it also satisfies the need for certainty, and the objective of 
upholding the validity of marriage. In not requiring the couple’s status to be 
reassessed if they move country, they are provided with certainty regarding their 
relationship. Many would expect that if they were to move, their status would simply 
follow them, and so in providing this, the continued recognised relationship theory 
also upholds party expectations. Importantly, the approach also moves away from an 
initial starting point based on the domiciliary law of the husband, and instead starts 
from a position of equality. This is more reflective of the modern day, both in respect 
of removing any gender stereotypes that once may have been, but also by moving 
away from gender based rules that assume all marriages involve parties of the 
opposite sex. Thus, it is argued that the continued recognised relationship theory 
offers a new and original approach that provides a choice of law rule that does what 
is required of it, in addition to meeting the demands of policy objectives and modern 
developments within law and society. 
Despite achieving the demands needed of a contemporary choice of law rule, it is to 
be anticipated that there will be criticism of such an approach130. Firstly, in relation to 
applying the laws of the country where the couple have lived when the relationship 
has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time, it could be questioned what is a 
reasonable period of time? Secondly, by allowing a couple to carry their status with 
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them when they have been in the relationship for a reasonable period of time, the 
approach may require a subsequent country to recognise a relationship it usually 
would not, and may be criticised for such expectations. Turning first to what is a 
reasonable period of time? In answering this, a definitive period quantified in years 
cannot be given. Instead, it is submitted that this is something that should be 
determined by considering a series of factors including; duration of the marriage, 
duration of the relationship prior to marrying, whether there are children involved and 
other commitments entered into together, such as property and other financial joint 
ventures. This approach allows for the differences that naturally occur between 
familial relationships rather than prescribing a certain number of years, which could 
only be decided by selecting a random number which, could be criticised for being 
too long or too short. The approach suggested offers greater flexibility and recognises 
the many ways couples start their futures together. Furthermore, it is submitted that 
in many cases it will be obvious whether the relationship is one of a stable and durable 
nature that should be given its recognition, and that in those few cases where it is not, 
there is a yardstick against which the courts will be able to make such a determination. 
Turning to the second point, and the potential for England under such a choice of law 
rule to be required to recognise a marriage it normally would not permit, it is stated 
that, in reality, such validation already occurs. The approach does not require England 
to allow a marriage to take place in it’s borders it would not permit its own domicilairies 
to enter into, but instead asks for tolerance where couples have been in a relationship 
for a reasonable period of time, who had no intention of moving to England when they 
entered into the marriage, and who complied with all of the relevant and foreseeable 
laws at the time. This is, in fact, a tolerance already shown under extant law. As will 
be discussed in greater detail later, polygamous marriages are not permitted in 
England, however a marriage conducted outside of England will not be denied validity 
purely on the grounds that it is polygamous131. In Cheni v Cheni132, it was stated that 
“reasonable tolerance”133 has its part to play in the determination of validity. Likewise, 
this same tolerance has been required under the dual domicile approach within the 
incapacity of age, where in Mohamed v Knott134 a 26 year old Nigerian married a 13 
year old Nigerian in Nigeria, before moving to England some few months later. Given 
the marriage was valid in accordance with their domicile, the courts held the marriage 
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valid despite the female party being far too young in accordance with the laws of 
England. Therefore, what is being asked is no different to what in reality, already 
occurs. Therefore, despite these potential criticisms it is argued that the continued 
recognised relationship theory offers a suitable choice of law rule, and will, under the 
system of dépeçage based interest analysis, provide the most appropriate applicable 
law for some of the incapacities, each of which will now be considered in turn. 
3.8.4 The Incapacities:  
3.8.4.1 Age 
In order to enter into a valid marriage in England, the parties to the marriage must be 
a minimum of 16 years old in accordance with s.2 of the Marriage Act 1949. The 
uncertainty within the area comes from determining who must meet this requirement, 
which is only decided when the relevant choice of law rule is applied. To determine 
the correct rule it is important to understand the purpose of the minimum age. A 
minimum age to marry is designed to protect those who are immature and vulnerable 
from the concerns of a premature marriage, thus, to protect the individual. It is, 
therefore, suggested that the dual domicile rule is the most fitting choice of law theory 
here, as all countries have their own age requirements, and the protection of the 
young and vulnerable is best achieved by the law of their pre-nuptial domicile135. The 
application of the pre-nuptial domiciliary law is further supported by Jaffey when he 
states: 
“since children may develop socially and emotionally, and even physically, at different 
rates in different environments, it seems sensible for English law to rely on the 
judgment of the law of the country to which a person belongs for the decision whether 
he or she is mature enough to marry.”136 
 
It would, therefore, seem that the law that should be applied is that of the parties’ own 
domicile, and this argument, and indeed the assertions of Jaffey are strengthened if 
the reforms predicated in chapter 2 occur, as they help ensure that there is a 
connection between a person and the country in which they are deemed to be 
domiciled; making them better able to determine maturity. 
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The case of Pugh v Pugh137 highlights that this does not always seem to be the case. 
In Pugh v Pugh, an English domiciliary married an Austrian girl domiciled in Hungary 
when she was 15 years of age. Regardless of the girl having capacity to marry under 
Hungarian law, the marriage was deemed invalid. The reason for the invalidity being 
that s.2 of the Marriage Act 1949 provides that ‘A marriage solemnised between 
persons either of whom is under the age of sixteen shall be void.’ The English law 
was used to protect a party domiciled in Hungary which has in turn been heavily 
scrutinized; “was it really the object of the statute to protect middle-aged English 
colonels from the wiles of designing Hungarian teenagers?”138 It has been argued that 
it “seems inconceivable that English policy concerns ought to extend to foreigners 
from other states, whose own peculiar law deem them as lacking any requirement of 
protection.”139 In essence arguing that it was not the intention of s.2 of the Enabling 
Act to parent and protect those who their own country do not deem it necessary to 
protect. For that reason it is suggested by many that Pugh v Pugh was wrongly 
decided. Smart argued that this is an example of where an interest analysis approach 
would have provided a better result, submitting “that there can be little justification for 
imposing even minimum English standards in a case where there are no policy 
reasons requiring English law to be applied.”140 In furtherance it has been stated that, 
“the issue of maturity is best left to be determined by the pre-nuptial domiciliary law 
of whichever country the individual belongs”141, and this is the rule that was followed 
in Mohammed v Knott142. In Mohammed v Knott, “[T]he court allowed the lex domicilli 
to determine whether the foreign propositus was sufficiently mature for marriage, and 
it is submitted, there was no reason why the same liberal attitude should not have 
prevailed in the earlier case of Pugh v Pugh.”143 The conflict that presented itself in 
Pugh v Pugh was a false conflict and, had an interest analysis approach been applied, 
as it was in Mohammed v Knott, the marriage would have been deemed valid. 
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There must, however, be consideration of whether this is the only policy consideration 
when looking at age. Clarkson and Hill suggest that there is a second interest, and 
that is to prevent our domicilaries from sexually exploiting children, which would in 
turn make the decision in Pugh v Pugh justifiable144. It has also been suggested that 
the minimum age requirement is designed to protect society against unstable 
marriages. For this reason it is argued that: “The matrimonial domicile will be 
interested if either party falls short of its age requirement because the youth of either 
party renders such a marriage distasteful to that state and enhances the prospect of 
an unstable union.”145 These arguments suggest that the intended matrimonial home 
may have an interest in applying its law, and that Pugh was correctly decided. 
However, when considering whether England has an interest in preventing its 
domcilaries from ‘sexually exploiting children’, it must be remembered that their 
personal law does not find it necessary to protect them, and the argument that people 
from different societies and cultures mature and develop at different rates. It is not 
the place of English law to determine whether a domiciliary of another state is ready 
for marriage. Other countries have higher minimum age requirements than England, 
and we would not expect an English domiciliary to be prevented from marrying, or 
have their marriage declared void because the law of their spouse deemed them too 
immature. When considering what interest the intended matrimonial home has in the 
age of the parties, case law shows that no such interest is afforded146. If the intended 
matrimonial home was deemed to have an interest in the validity of the marriage due 
to a party being below the age of 16, it would mean that a real intolerance would be 
shown to many foreign marriages where the parties are able to marry, and in fact their 
society encourages young marriages. This would in turn go against the policy aim of 
comity and unity and cannot be accepted. Therefore, despite the above arguments 
against it, it is propounded that the choice of law rule that should be in place for age 
is the application of the party’s own domiciliary law. 
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3.8.4.2  Consanguinity and Affinity 
In most countries there are certain degrees of relationships that are prohibited, 
whether this be as a result of consanguinity147 or affinity148. Case law in England 
seems to suggest that the appropriate choice of law rule for both types of relationships 
should be the dual domicile theory149. However, when considering academic 
comment, and public policy concerns relevant specifically to the issues, such an 
approach can be contested. 
Firstly, when exploring consanguineous relationships, there appears to be some 
common ground amongst scholars, with a shared view that it should be about where 
the couple live150. This commonality of approach is as a result of the relevant policy 
concerns. Consanguineous relationships are often prohibited for reasons associated 
with societal, religious and moral beliefs, whereby in some societies relationships 
within a certain degree of connection are viewed with abhorrence. The other main 
policy concern relates to eugenics, due to concerns surrounding the increased 
potential for children of such relationships to be born with disabilities. In relation to 
both of these public policy factors, it is the society where the couple intend to live that 
will be most impacted, and thus Davie legitimately comes to the conclusion that the 
intended matrimonial home theory is the most appropriate choice of law rule151. As 
stated, this is a view that is shared by other academics, but one that this research 
seeks to amend in an important stratification. This amendment comes not from a 
disagreement regarding the society best placed to have its law applied; undoubtedly, 
where the couple intend to live will need to protect its society from relationships it 
would find repulsive, and any future genetic problems. Instead, it is simply to change 
it from the application of the intended matrimonial home theory, to that of the 
continued recognised relationship theory, given the earlier analysis surrounding the 
need for this original choice of law theory, that builds on and updates the concept 
behind the intended matrimonial home theory. This would mean that, as with the 
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intended matrimonial home theory, the society most effected by the marriage will have 
it’s policy concerns taken into consideration, but will not require a reassessment of 
validity if the parties subsequently move to an alternative country, nor does it start 
from a position of favouring the law of the husband’s domicile. 
When moving on to explore affinity, a move away from the dual domicile theory does 
not appear as easy. Despite views that the intended matrimonial home theory was 
more appropriate when dealing with cases involving consanguinity, Reed maintains 
that the dual domicile theory is the most appropriate rule in cases of affinity; “for 
affinity rules, the threatened abuse of family enclaves is best left to be determined by 
each party’s domiciliary law that governs their personal status.”152 This is as a result 
of the potential tensions between family members that the focus is on the personal 
interests of the party involved in the marriage, and therefore points towards the dual 
domicile theory being more appropriate, as it is designed to protect the parties 
themselves. Further support of the dual domicile theory in cases of affinity, appears 
to come from s.1(3) of the Marriage (Enabling Act) 1960. The Act distinguishes 
between consanguinity and affinity in that, in the case of affinity the dual domicile rule 
applies and prevents the use of the exception created by Sottomayer v De Barros 
(No2), but no such rule applies for cases of consanguinity. Meaning that an English 
man could marry his cousin even if her domiciliary law did not allow it by applying the 
exception in Sottomayer v De Barros (No2),  but if an English man married his former 
wife’s sister, who’s domiciliary law did not allow it the marriage would be invalid153. 
Whilst Reed and the Marriage Enabling Act both appear to point towards the dual 
domicile theory as the most appropriate rule, the matter does not end there. 
Firstly, though the Marriage Enabling Act does appear to draw a distinction between 
consanguinity and affinity, it has been submitted that “[T]here is no sense in this 
distinction, the point must have been overlooked in the drafting of the statute.”154 
Secondly, when considering Reed’s justification for the application of the dual 
domicile theory, this could also be countered. Both Davie and Jaffey argue that the 
incapacity of affinity impacts upon the society where the couple will live and should 
be governed by the intended matrimonial home theory155. Davie states his reasons 
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as to why he believes the intended matrimonial home theory is interested in regulating 
the relationship, and one such reason is the “desire to ensure stability within the family 
unit”156. This correlates with Reed’s justification for applying the dual domicile theory, 
and it would seem that both societies could be argued to have an interest in such a 
concern. It is argued that where the couple live in fact has the greatest interest. When 
considering how the family will view the marriage there has actually been a move 
away from the parties themselves which, the dual domicile theory seeks to protect, 
and a focus on other members of the society. Whether family members or not, it is 
other people that the applicable law is concerned with, along with how that family will 
sit in the society as a result of any fractures that may occur as a consequence of the 
relationship. On that basis it is submitted that it is the society where the couple intend 
to, or do indeed live, that is most interested in the relationship157. On that basis the 
continued recognised relationship theory is the most appropriate choice of law rule 
when dealing with both consanguinity and affinity.  
3.8.4.3 Polygamy 
In England it is understood and accepted that a marriage is the union of two people 
to the exclusion of all others; a monogamous relationship. This is legally the position 
of relationships in England but is also supported in religion and society as whole. This 
is not the case the world over. In many Eastern countries following Islamic law and a 
number of African countries polygamy is accepted and celebrated. Polygamy allows 
there to be multiple parties to a marriage, rarely a woman is able to take more than 
one husband, but more common place, a man is able to have multiple wives. In 
England, we would not allow a polygamous marriage to take place, regardless of the 
fact that the law has developed from the initial understanding that marriage is “the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”158 
England will now recognise valid polygamous relationships unless there are strong 
reasons against doing so159. It is, therefore, essential that England is able to 
determine what constitutes a valid polygamous marriage. 
For there to be a valid polygamous marriage the parties to the marriage must have 
capacity to enter into a polygamous relationship. As evidenced throughout this 
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chapter, there is academic support, and support from the Law Commission, that the 
dual domicile theory should be applied to all elements of essential validity, and thus 
would suggest that an English domiciliary is unable to enter into a polygamous 
marriage. In fact, in accordance with s.11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
before it was amended, a potentially polygamous marriage conducted outside of 
England involving an English domiciliary would be held to be void. A potentially 
polygamous marriage is one whereby it is monogamous at its outset, but in 
accordance with the law of one of the parties could become polygamous; for instance 
if in accordance with the husband’s law he is able to have multiple wives. This was 
explored in the case of Hussain v Hussain160, and led to the abolishment of potentially 
polygamous marriages where at least one of the parties was domiciled in England at 
the time of the marriage161. A marriage of this nature would now be treated as 
monogamous. This was a small step in the area of polygamy for English domicilaries 
in terms of recognising their relationships. Of greater significance was the decision in 
Radwan v Radwan (No2)162, in which it was held that when looking at polygamy the 
correct choice of law rule is the intended matrimonial home theory. 
In Radwan v Radwan (No2), despite the longstanding understanding of the 
universality of the dual domicile theory, Cumming-Bruce J explored whether the same 
test should be applied to all capacities. He stated: 
“It is arguable that it is an oversimplification of the common law to assume that the 
same test for the purposes of choice of law applies to every kind of capacity – non-
age, affinity, prohibition of a monogamous contract by virtue of an existing spouse, 
and capacity for polygamy. Different public and social factors are relevant to each of 
these types of incapacity.”163   
 
This evidences that Cumming-Bruce J is doubting the application of the dual domicile 
theory, and also provides support for interest analysis. He highlights that different 
incapacities are designed for different reasons and should be individually considered. 
Rather than applying the dual domicile test, Cumming-Bruce J determines that the 
most applicable law is the law of the intended matrimonial home. He justifies this 
decision by stating that the propositus: 
“had capacity to enter into a polygamous union by virtue of her pre-nuptial decision 
to separate herself from the law of her domicile and make her life with her husband 
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in his country, where the Mohammedan law of polygamous marriage was the normal 
institution of marriage.”164 
 
While Cumming-Bruce J then went on to limit the application of the intended 
matrimonial home theory165 by stating that he was not seeking to provide that the 
intended matrimonial home theory should apply to other capacities, it still provides 
support for its application in cases involving polygamy. 
As was to be expected, and was in fact anticipated by Cumming-Bruce J166, this 
decision came under attack167. The premise of the attack was that Cumming-Bruce J 
relied upon incorrect authorities, and Karsten’s belief that migration to England of 
persons domiciled in countries allowing polygamy, meant that the intended 
matrimonial home theory  could lead to an increase in marriages being declared 
invalid168, it was argued that: “his decision cannot be regarded as a safe guide to the 
law governing capacity to contract a polygamous marriage.”169 However, it is a 
decision that has also received support from academics170. Davie recognises that the 
intended matrimonial home theory is the correct choice of law rule, stating “After all it 
is this community that will be confronted with the marital relationship and which may 
therefore have to cope with a marriage out of step with prevalent social mores.”171 
It would appear that s.11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act would prevent English 
domicilaries from contracting a polygamous marriage and thus go against the 
decision in Radwan, however, s.14(1) of the Act must also be considered. S.14(1) of 
the Act provides that s.11 does not apply if the validity of the marriage is to be 
determined by a foreign law. Therefore, if Radwan is followed, so long as England is 
not the intended matrimonial home, s.11(d) will not be effective, and if polygamy is an 
accepted form of marriage in the intended matrimonial home then an English 
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domiciliary will be able to contract a valid polygamous marriage. This is undoubtedly 
a stride forward in the tolerance of, and recognition of, polygamous marriages. 
As seen, the use of the intended matrimonial home theory can mean that the English 
domicilaries are able to enjoy valid polygamous marriages. However, a disadvantage 
of the use of the theory is that it may lead to the invalidity of polygamous marriages 
that would be valid under the dual domicile approach. If, for instance, two foreign 
domciliaries enter into a valid polygamous marriage with the intention of setting up 
their marital home in England, and do so in a reasonable time the marriage would be 
void under s.11 of the Act, as English law would be the applicable law. Admittedly, 
this goes against the underlying policy concern of validating marriages but, it furthers 
other policy factors and is still the correct approach172. The policy objective of 
upholding moral, religious and cultural infrastructures of a society must not be 
forgotten, and if “[P]olygamy is contrary to the religious beliefs and customs of the 
community which they have voluntarily infiltrated; no injustice is done to the respective 
parties in applying that system of law to determine their status.”173 This does not mean 
that where a couple have come to England later in life having had a valid polygamous 
marriage for many years it will be invalidated. The marriage will only be invalid if the 
parties intended to move to England to set up their matrimonial home and did so in a 
reasonable time. All the previously mentioned rules about tolerance and comity exist, 
and therefore English law is not able to invalidate a marriage simply because they 
disagree with it. Therefore, what we see coming into play is an extension of the 
intended matrimonial home theory. It is the law of where the couple intend to live that 
applies, but because of the need to be tolerant it is submitted that what we actually 
had was something much closer to the continued recognised relationship theory174. 
Consequently, it is proposed that this is the approach that should be adopted as the 
official choice of law rule for the incapacity of polygamy within this system of 
dépeçage based interest analysis.   
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3.8.4.4 Consent 
Lack of consent as an impediment focuses on where the party did not consent to the 
marriage, or the consent was as a result of some fraud, duress or mistake175. This is 
the general understanding of lack of consent, however the term can be broader and 
encompass other impediments that the party was not aware of, and did not consent 
to, which lead to an imperfect marriage. These impediments include; impotence, wilful 
refusal, venereal disease and pregnancy per alium176. Where such lack of consent 
has occurred it will make the marriage voidable as opposed to void177. Alternatively, 
in instances where there has been a complete absence of consent, the marriage may 
be denied all recognition178. 
In the case of Westminster City Council v C179, a Muslim marriage ceremony was 
conducted over the telephone between a woman domiciled in Bangladesh and a man 
domiciled in England. The man suffered from a severe learning disability, and though 
aged in his twenties his functionality was no higher than that of a three year old, and 
was, thus, unable to consent to the marriage. For this reason the court determined 
that the marriage should be denied all recognition. This decision was made for the 
protection of the English domiciliary, and this gives us an insight into what the 
applicable choice of law rule should be. In all issues of consent the purpose behind 
the incapacity is to protect the innocent party, therefore it is the ante-nuptial 
domiciliary law that should be applied180. 
It is asserted that in all cases of consent, including those regarding wilful refusal, the 
dual domicile theory should apply. Whilst there has been some suggestion of the lex 
loci being the applicable law181, this is confused by an overlap in the law whereby the 
application of either law would have produced the same result, and has, in fact, been 
challenged in later cases182. In Ponticelli v Ponticelli, the lex loci was not followed, but 
instead English law was applied, as England was both the lex fori and the husband’s 
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domicile, and the court stated that if it needed to choose between the lex fori and the 
domiciliary law, the latter would be preferred183. This is also the position favoured 
amongst experts within the field184, and is proposed as the most appropriate choice 
of law rule. This is not the end of the matter, there has been some debate over 
whether a party is able to rely upon the law of the other party’s domicile, or only that 
of their own.  
It was previously suggested by Dicey and Morris185 that either party could rely upon 
either law, and is the position that is advocated to be correct by Simon P in Szechter 
v Szechter186. This was, however, disputed by the Law Commission who stated that 
it is, “difficult to say why, if a party’s own law considers that he has validly consented 
to the marriage, he should nevertheless be entitled to avoid the marriage on the basis 
of his lack of consent under the other party’s domiciliary law”187. It has also recently 
become evident in later editions of the leading work, that the contrary view of that 
previously expressed by Dicey and Morris is now preferred, and instead, correlates 
with the stance of the Law Commission188. This is certainly the most sensible 
approach, if the party’s own law would not provide them protection against what they 
complain of not to have consented to, they should not be able to benefit from the law 
of their spouse. The purpose behind the dual domicile theory is to allow a country and 
it’s laws to protect their domicilaries, therefore if they feel that no protection is 
necessary then this should be the outcome. The other party’s law is not interested in 
protecting a non-domiciliary. This is further supported by Jaffey who states that “if the 
marriage is not defective by the law of his own community, it is hard to see why he 
should be entitled to a protection conferred by the law of the other party’s domicile, 
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or some other law.”189 This argument has been recognised by other academicians190, 
and for these reasons it is assessed that the most appropriate choice of law rule to 
govern all elements of consent is the parties own ante-nuptial domiciliary law. 
3.8.4.5 Re-Marriage After Divorce 
This capacity comes into play when a propositus has married, divorced from that 
marriage, and then married for a second time, and all potentially applicable laws only 
recognise monogamous marriages. For the second marriage to be valid the divorce 
or annulment must be recognised as valid. It is in determining the validity of that 
divorce that a conflict of laws situation may arise. It may be that one potentially 
applicable law would recognise the divorce, and the other would not, making it  
necessary to determine which applicable choice of law rule is to be adopted on policy 
grounds. Despite the general favouring of the dual domicile rule for all incapacitates, 
this element has been treated differently. In all countries requiring a marriage to be 
monogamous, one of the requirements to enter into a marriage is that each of the 
parties are single. In instances of re-marriage after divorce, this raises a secondary 
question of whether upon entering into the second marriage the party in question was 
still married to their first spouse, in essence is the divorce recognised? This is known 
as the incidental question, it arises when “one country’s conflicts rules lead to a 
foreign law, but under that law an incidental or subsidiary question arises which can 
only be resolved by the application of further conflicts rules governing that incidental 
question.”191 Whilst the dual domicile rule may be used for the capacity element, so, 
providing that the propositus must be single, what must be determined is what law 
applies to the incidental question. 
It was at one time believed that the domicilary law also applied to the incidental 
question, meaning that if the law of the domicile did not recognise the divorce the 
second marriage would be invalid192. However, this was departed from in Lawrence v 
Lawrence193. In this case the wife was domiciled in Brazil and obtained a divorce from 
her first marriage in Nevada before marrying her second husband, who was domiciled 
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in England in Nevada the following day. England was also the intended matrimonial 
home and the parties set up home in England soon after the wedding. The wife’s 
divorce was recognised by English law, but not by Brazilian law, who deemed her to 
be still married to the first husband. The wife petitioned for an annulment in England 
on the grounds that the second marriage was bigamous. English and Brazilian law 
were in concurrence that for a valid marriage the wife had to be single when she 
entered into it, however they disagreed on whether the divorce from the first marriage 
was valid, and therefore whether the wife was single. The wife argued that the dual 
domicile theory should be applicable making the second marriage void. The trial 
judge, however, decided that English law was applicable as the intended matrimonial 
home, and the country with the most real and substantial connection, thus the 
marriage was valid. In the Court of Appeal the same outcome was reached, but with 
an alternate reasoning. English law was applied as it was the law of the forum, on the 
basis that for the incidental question the lex fori should not have to give way to 
Brazilian, or any other law on the recognition of divorces. 
The position in Lawrence v Lawrence was then confirmed as the applicable law by 
s.50 of the Family Law Act 1986. The Act provides that where the divorce or 
annulment has been granted by an English court, or elsewhere, and is recognised by 
an English court, the fact that it would not be recognised in another country will not 
prevent either party from remarrying. Essentially providing that the lex fori is the 
applicable law, as opposed to the dual domicile theory.  This is the most appropriate 
choice of law rule, as applying the dual domicile theory would mean that England 
would be prevented from allowing a person they deem to be single from marrying. It 
is, therefore, submitted that applying the lex fori as a result of interest analysis 
provides the most appropriate solution, which in turn provides further support for 
interest analysis as opposed to a universal choice of law rule, such as the dual 
domicile theory194 
The only remaining doubt in the area of re-marriage after divorce is when the divorce 
would be recognised by the domiciliary law, but not by English law. S.50 of the Family 
Law Act 1986 does not deal with this situation, and nor does it fall within Lawrence. 
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In a Canadian case that presented such a problem it was held that the law of the 
domicile was applicable, in turn deeming the marriage to be valid195. Despite the 
general policy of validating marriages it has been stated that, “In a case such as 
Schwebel, the lex fori should be used to avoid the even more startling result that a 
person is validly and monogamously married to two spouses at the same time.”196 
This could in turn provide problems in relation to matrimonial relief and succession, 
and therefore it is suggested that the lex fori should remain the applicable choice of 
law rule and apply to all cases involving marriage after divorce. As a final point, the 
policy considerations that have been taken into account when dealing with this 
incapacity, and the consequential departure from the application of the dual domicile 
theory within this incapacity, is yet further support for the overarching framework 
adopted within this thesis, of a policy sensitive dépeçage based interest analysis 
reconceptualisation of the law.  
3.9 Conclusion 
The determination of the validity of a couple’s marriage is broken down into two key 
components; formal validity and essential validity. Formal validity is a settled area of 
law in that it is accepted that it is the law of the lex loci that is applied. This was 
reiterated by the Law Commission in their report, who admitted that their preference 
for this approach is because of the certainty and predictability that comes with it197. 
Notwithstanding this clear aspiration for achieving certainty and predictability across 
marriage validity, this was not achieved within the essential validity of marriage, and 
is, on this account, where the attention of this chapter has focused. 
Under the present law, there are two primary competing theories; the dual domicile 
theory and the intended matrimonial home theory. Regardless of them each gaining 
common law and academic support, there are problems within both. In requiring both 
parties’ domiciliary laws to be consulted, the dual domicile theory does not uphold the 
policy objective of the validity of marriage, it equally does not consider the law of the 
country that the marriage belongs to. The intended matrimonial home theory on the 
other hand is discriminatory in terms of gender, may require the validity of a marriage 
to be reassessed if a couple subsequently move away from their intended matrimonial 
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home, and as discussed, is not always the appropriate law to apply.  What is, 
therefore, apparent is that neither theory can be applied universally to the essential 
validity of marriage. Although the dual domicile theory was promulgated by the Law 
Commission198, and would provide couples with certainty and predictability, it would 
do so at a high cost. It, as a universal approach, would prevent any flexibility in the 
area, and relevant policy considerations may not be considered. While certainty may 
be achieved, the application of the most appropriate law might not. 
The problems with a universal choice of law rule for the essential validity of marriage 
are further highlighted by the alternative theories. Like the dual domicile theory and 
the intended matrimonial home theory, they too have their weaknesses, and fail to be 
appropriate for a one rule fits all approach. Aside from the alternative theories which 
have been used and discussed by the judiciary199, there is also another tool at the 
court’s disposal which allows them to avoid the application of a choice of law rule they 
consider inappropriate, and that is the exceptions. Even if a universal choice of law 
rule was selected, at present, the courts would still be able to avoid it under certain 
circumstances. This could be considered advantageous as it brings a degree of 
flexibility back into the picture, but, it is instead argued that it destroys the certainty 
discussed above. An exception waiting in the wings to be applied at any time, will 
have parties questioning whether it might happen to them, and thus removes the core 
objective of the universal choice of law rule. In addition, it might also be suggested 
that in relying on exceptions to step in, there is an admittance that the approach itself 
does not work200. This view, along with the criticisms already outlined in respect of a 
universal approach, suggests that it is time to address the problem properly by looking 
at what choice of law rules would be appropriate, rather than simply papering over 
the cracks with escape clauses. 
In assessing what choice of law rules would be appropriate, this chapter explored the 
concept of interest analysis and how it has developed over time. Currie’s original 
version of interest analysis has been heavily criticised for its forum favouritism, but it 
is a modern dépeçage based interest analysis approach that this research identifies 
as the optimal solution. This categorisation of interest analysis has received some 
support from the academic community201, as a result of the policy sensitive rules that 
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are able to be created. Each incapacity is explored in order to determine what policy 
objectives or concerns are at the heart of the incapacity so as to ensure that the 
selected rule reflects this optimisation. Dépeçage based interest analysis allows for a 
tailor made set of choice of law rules, which then provides the much desired 
combination of certainty and flexibility; it recognises the differences within the 
incapacities, whilst also providing a clear and certain rule that couples, and indeed, 
the legal profession can consult: 
“Marriage validity is an eminently apposite subject for the application of a modified 
interest analysis theory, on dépeçage principles, to delineate between identifiable 
community interest in regulating parties who establish a matrimonial residence within 
their state borders, as opposed to the countervailing personal interests of the 
respective parties.”202  
 
It is this policy sensitive mechanism when determining the appropriate choice of law 
rule that enhances the approach by creating rules that lead to the most appropriate 
law being applied, and thereby meaning that the invocation of exceptions will become 
a thing of the past. 
Upon reflection of the policy objectives and the current choice of law rules it was felt 
that the dual domicile theory could be the most workable solution when dealing with 
certain incapacities as a result of it being the choice of law rule best paced to protect 
parties. This argument would also become stronger if the reforms suggested in 
chapter 2 were actioned, to ensure that one’s domicile is both easier to ascertain and 
more reflective of a propositus’ ties to a country. On the other hand, it was determined  
that the intended matrimonial home theory required some updating. Through 
consideration of the most important aspects of the intended matrimonial home theory, 
the continued recognised relationship theory was established. Like the intended 
matrimonial home theory, it focuses on the country where the couple intend to live, or 
the law of the country where they have lived if their relationship has been subsisting 
for a reasonable period of time. Prevalent within this approach is the same desire to 
protect the cultural, moral and religious views of the impacted society. Importantly, 
however, the continued recognised relationship theory achieves this without 
preferring either parties’ domiciliary law, and whilst making it clear that a subsequent 
move need not mean a couple’s status is reassessed. It is as a result of these 
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improvements that the continued recognised relationship theory is selected as the 
most appropriate choice of law rule for some incapacities. This thesis recognises that 
some criticisms may be levelled at the new theory, but these are addressed head on, 
demonstrating that though perfection may not have been achieved, or be achievable, 
the theory offers a sound and robust formula for applying the most appropriate law. 
It was with this formula for the continued recognised relationship theory, combined 
with the dual domicile theory, that this research was able to focus on assessing each 
of the incapacities and the policy issues entailed. Following the plan of an approach 
of dépeçage based interest analysis, each incapacity was considered in order to 
assess the most appropriate choice of law rule. Age and consent were both deemed 
to be primarily concerned with the protection of the parties to the marriage, and so 
the dual domicile theory was selected as the most appropriate choice of law rule. 
Whereas, consanguinity and affinity, and polygamy were held to raise concerns that 
involved the society within which they planned to live, and their acceptance of their 
marriage, and therefore the continued recognised relationship theory was considered 
to be the most appropriate choice of law rule. Finally, the incidental question within 
re-marriage after divorce, was thought to raise entirely different concerns, 
surrounding how their status was viewed in the country they were then seeking to 
marry in, and so the lex fori was of key importance. 
It is with this approach that couples in England will be able to determine whether their 
marital status will be recognised. It offers couples the certainty and predictability they 
deserve when dealing with their marital status, whilst not being so rigid and inflexible 
that it fails to consider any relevant policy concerns. Marriage validity is an area within 
the conflict of laws that has been very much neglected. In spite of the attention it 
received from the Law Commission and academics alike, years have passed by and 
any hopes of change appears to have faded. Reed stated that, “the parlous state of 
our law ... needs to be reformulated for the next millennium”203 and this is exactly what 
this research aims to achieve. This chapter makes significant in-roads to achieving 
the overarching aims of this thesis, and indeed hits the objective of demonstrating 
how certainty might be achieved within essential validity in England however, with the 
modern developments within the law, the reformulation must not stop here. Important 
though such changes may be, they fail to consider the ability of same-sex couples to 
marry, and the increasing levels of migration. With differing laws around the world 
                                                          
203 Ibid 450. 
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regarding the ability of same-sex couples to marry or enter into civil partnership type 
relationships, it is an area ripe for conflicts disputes. Likewise, with increased 
migration, providing certainty within our English borders provides only limited 
certainty for couples. Therefore the analysis iterated herein, and suggested reforms 
promulgated in this chapter, will  hopefully act as a catalyst towards a beneficial 
recategorisation and optimisation of policy sensitive choice of law rules appurtenant 
to essential validity, in order to truly overhaul the law in this area, in a manner that 
has never been pervasively considered before, and provide the much needed holistic 
reform. 
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Chapter 4 
Are We Still Married? 
Establishing A Choice Of Law 
Rule To Allow Same-Sex 
Couples To Assess The Validity 
Of Their Relationship 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The recognition of same-sex relationships is an area that has undergone, and 
continues to be subject to, development and debate. In England, there are now two 
forms of recognised same-sex relationships: civil partnerships as a result of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004; and same-sex marriage as a result of the Marriage (Same-Sex 
Couples) Act 2013. Getting to this stage has however been a lengthy process. For 
many years in England homosexual activity was a criminal matter and at its worst 
resulted in capital punishment1. This criminalisation finally ended in 1967 when the 
Sexual Offences Act decriminalised homosexuality in England and Wales. As the fight 
for equality continued, a landmark step forward involved the introduction of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004. This allowed same-sex couples to register their relationship, 
providing them with almost identical rights to that of a married couple. The introduction 
of such rights, but under a different status, led to questions surrounding the denial of 
the term “married” or “marriage” to same-sex couples, with many arguing that a civil 
partnership could be seen as a somewhat lesser status2. As discussed in chapter 1, 
for some, marriage is about status, with marriage being considered the highest 
relationship status that can be accomplished: “Marriage is understood internationally 
                                                          
1 In 1726 three men were hung under the Sodomy Enactment of 1583. 
2 Kerry Abrams, ‘Citizen Spouse’ (2013) 101(2) California Law Review, 407 and  Michael C Dorf, 
‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ (2011) 97 Virginia Law 
Review, 1267. 
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and represents the highest form of recognition for a committed relationship, 
(described by many as the gold standard).”3  
In creating an alternative status for same-sex couples, as opposed to allowing them 
to marry, the  “gold standard” associated with the status was actively denied: 
“Because many rights and benefits are tied to the words “marriage”, “married”, or 
“spouse” it is impossible to create a perfectly parallel institution that has a different 
name.”4 What appeared to be a final breakthrough then occurred in 2013 when the 
Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act was created, providing same-sex couples in 
England the opportunity to marry. Nevertheless, if we step outside of England, same-
sex marriage is not available in every country, and there is a whole host of recognised 
relationships. Within the EU alone there are countries that allow same-sex marriage5, 
countries that allow a relationship analogous to civil partnerships6, countries that 
recognise a form of relationship that carries less legal responsibilities than a civil 
partnership7, and until the recent decision in Oliari v Italy8 that required at least some 
recognition of same-sex relationships, there were countries that failed to offer any 
legal recognition to same-sex relationships at all9. Disparity to this level in the EU 
demonstrates how significant of a conflict of law issue this is worldwide. If a 
community that comes together on many issues and tends to follow one another’s 
legal progress has such incongruent rules on the area, one can only begin to imagine 
the scale of the problem worldwide when considering the many countries with 
completely different legal, political and societal views. Not only is there inconsistency 
in the types of relationships recognised, but also the choice of law rules within them, 
highlighting that rather than a final breakthrough, the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) 
Act was more of a stepping stone within the law, and that work is still needed 
surrounding recognition.  
It is with the ever increasing levels of migration that recognition becomes problematic. 
Currently, as a same-sex couple move around Europe, their relationship status is 
likely to change as a result of the choice of law rules within the varying relationship 
statuses.  As with the capacity issues dealt with in the previous chapter, the choice of 
                                                          
3 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295 [6] (which is a reference to para of 
Kitzinger’s affadavit). 
4 Nancy G Maxwell, ‘Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands-United States 
Comparison’ (2001) 28 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 141, 192-193. 
5 Belgium, France and Spain. 
6 Germany and Switzerland. 
7 France and Belgium as alternatives to same-sex marriage.  
8 (Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015). 
9 Italy and Cyprus. 
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law rules applied to determine the capacity of the parties to enter and remain in that 
same-sex relationship varies. In England, there is a minimum of two different choice 
of law rules in place between the two potential relationship statuses. This, in itself, 
proves problematic when determining the validity of a foreign same-sex relationship, 
which is made more difficult by the realisation that the choice of law rules surrounding 
same-sex marriage are vague, and left open to the argument of many different choice 
of law rules being applicable. This subsequently leads to the fundamental question of 
what law will be applied when assessing a foreign same-sex relationship and will the 
relationship be considered valid? Under the present law these questions are difficult 
to determine. The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act provides no definitive answer 
and thus it would appear that currently such questions have only one direction in 
which they can be sent, and this is directly to the courtroom. 
This chapter will explore the problems faced by same-sex couples in England, before 
looking at how the law could be improved. It is asserted that the way in which this is 
achieved is through the creation of a choice of law rule specifically for same-sex 
relationships, as its own incapacity under the system of dépeçage. It is, therefore, the 
aim of this chapter to determine the most appropriate choice of law rule for same-sex 
relationships in order to conclude that it should be treated in the same manner as any 
of the other incapacities. Consequently, having explored the problems faced by the 
couples in civil partnership type relationships and same-sex marriages in greater 
detail, the next step will be to examine the law in more depth to determine the most 
appropriate choice of law rule. This will be conducted by considering the choice of 
law rules adopted by other incapacities  and why they were selected, exactly what 
the aim of the choice of law rule is for same-sex relationships in respect of policy 
objectives,  and finally, a comparative analysis of the approaches adopted throughout 
the EU and the US to ensure the most appropriate choice of law rule is selected. The 
promulgation of this optimal pathway also sets the scene vis-à-vis the reformed 
choice of law rules in same-sex relationships more broadly, in order to achieve the 
fine balance of flexibility and certainty so desperately needed. Parliament aimed to 
achieve equality in the passing of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act, but it failed 
to provide the much needed certainty that must accompany it, therefore, this chapter 
will identify how this can be rectified.  
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4.2 The Civil Partnership Act 2004 
The Civil Partnership Act10 was enacted in 2004, and created a recognised 
relationship for same-sex couples for the first time in England. The Act provided rights 
for those entering into the partnership which are almost identical to those involved in 
a marriage11. In addition to recognising civil partnerships that are registered in 
England, the Act also provided recognition for ‘overseas relationships’12. S.212(1)(a) 
states that an overseas relationship is either a specified relationship13 or a relationship 
that meets the general conditions14. Upon meeting this criteria they are then treated 
as having formed a civil partnership, provided that the individual had capacity to enter 
into the relationship, and met all the requirements necessary to ensure the formal 
validity of the relationship under the relevant law15. 
In congruence with a heterosexual marriage, s.215(1) sets out that formal validity and 
essential validity must still be satisfied in accordance with the relevant law. The 
distinction between the requirements comes from the definition of ‘relevant law’, which 
is defined in s.212(2) as, ‘the law of the country or territory where the relationship is 
registered (including its rules of private international law)’, and this is the applicable 
rule for both formal and essential validity. In effect, the Act is stating that for both 
formal and essential validity, the lex loci registrationis is the applicable choice of law 
rule, which, can be likened to the lex loci celebrationis.  This is in contrast to marriage 
validity, where it is often deemed that the domiciliary law plays a key part in the 
determination of capacity, and the lex loci celebrationis16 applies only to formal 
validity. Whilst there are arguments over whether an alternative choice of law rule is 
more appropriate for essential validity, the lex loci is not a popular argument amongst 
English academicians or the judiciary: “We ought not to turn the forensic clock back 
some 120 years and revert to the lex loci as the applicable law for issues of 
capacity.”17 It is a rule that is highly criticised, primarily as a result of the fact that it 
                                                          
10 Thereafter referred to as the CPA. 
11 For instance the Civil Partnership Act sets out that a civil partner will have the same rights as a 
spouse in relation to; giving evidence, parental responsibility, applying for residence, wills and 
administration of estates. 
12 S. 212. 
13 S. 213 sets out that that a specified relationship for the purposes of s.212 are those in Schedule 20 
of the Act. 
14 The general conditions are set out in s.214. 
15 S.215(1). 
16 Hereafter referred to as the lex loci. 
17 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.23. 
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allows parties to evade restrictions imposed on them by their domicilairy law, and 
effectively forum shop18. 
Upon recognising overseas relationships the CPA converted all relationships into civil 
partnerships, irrespective of whether it was a same-sex marriage, something 
equivalent to a civil partnership, or indeed a relationship which had less significant 
legal rights and responsibilities attached19. This meant that relationships were both 
upgraded and downgraded by the CPA20. This has now been changed by the 
introduction of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 201321 in respect of 
downgrading relationships, and marriages are no longer regarded as overseas 
relationships. Prior to this change, and historically, marriages were downgraded to be 
recognised as civil partnerships and the couple were stripped of the title of marriage. 
When considering the impact this may have on a person it is crucial to consider the 
importance and symbolic nature of marriage as a status: it brings with it a body of 
rights, and a sense of acceptance much like a person’s citizenship status22. Taking 
away that marital status from a couple who are in a same-sex marriage could, 
therefore, be likened to removal of their status of citizenship23. Dorf asserts that in 
failing to allow a same-sex couple to marry the government is labelling them as a 
‘second class citizen’, which they then have to reassert every time they are asked 
their marital status: “Every time the members of a same-sex couple that wish to be 
married are denied that opportunity under the state law answer “no” to the question 
of whether they are married, they participate in their own oppression.”24 
This then must surely be true of any couple who have been stripped of their status, 
and essentially excluded from a individuated group. Dorf explains this further by 
asking the reader to consider the idea of forcing all homosexuals to wear a pink 
triangle badge, and how this would force them to “out themselves”, as it stamps them 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 See s.215. 
20 For instance a French pacte civil de solidarité (PACS) would be upgraded and a Belgium same-sex 
marriage would be downgraded. 
21 Thereafter referred to as the M(SSC)A. 
22 The notion of citizenship and how it can be compared with marriage will be explored in greater detail 
in section 4.4. 
23 It is argued by many that in denying a person the right to marry the person of their choosing, whether 
this involves a same-sex marriage, is a denial of full citizenship. See for instance; Angela P Harris, 
‘Loving Before and After the Law’ (2007-2008) 76 Fordham International Law Review, 2821, Nicholas 
Bamforth, ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument’. (20012) 10(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 477 and Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and 
Moral Choices of States: Gays and European Federalism’ (2009) 33(1) Fordham International Law 
Review, 156. 
24 Michael C Dorf, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ (2011) 
97 Virginia Law Review, 1267, 1308. 
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with a badge of inferiority25. This analogy may seem to exaggerate the matter, but, is 
it really that dissimilar to being branded with the term civil partner? Aside from there 
being no badge that must be worn, the status of “civil union” or “civil partnership” is 
how such couples would be forced to refer to their relationships when filling out 
governmental forms, and how society would refer to their relationship. This was the 
problem faced by the couple in the case of Wilkinson v Kitzinger26. This case 
concerned Susan Jane Wilkinson and Celia Clare Kitzinger who, having been in a 
stable and committed relationship for a substantial period of time, decided to marry. 
As same-sex marriage was at the time not permitted in England they went to British 
Columbia to marry in accordance with Canadian law before returning back to 
England. As both women were English domicilaries, and returned immediately to 
England, the marriage was not recognised, and upon the coming into force of the 
CPA was deemed a civil partnership. This status was not one that the couple were 
happy with, despite it carrying the tangible benefits of marriage, and they believed 
that “while marriage remains open to heterosexual couples only, offering the 
‘consolation prize’ of a civil partnership to lesbians and gay men is offensive and 
demeaning.”27 For this reason the couple took the matter to the courts arguing that 
the lack of recognition of their marriage was a violation of their rights, and that it should 
be duly recognised. 
The couple submitted that not allowing same-sex couples to marry was a violation of 
Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights28. They wished 
the court to determine as such, and in turn read the rights in a way that would allow 
their marriage to be recognised, or failing that to make a declaration of incompatibility 
under s.4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Regardless of  recognising how the 
couple felt about the status of civil partners, the court held that the Articles could not 
be read in a way that would mean that the marriage was declared valid, and nor did 
they believe that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or the CPA was incompatible with 
Articles 8, 12 and 14. The court accepted that the couple felt hurt and humiliated by 
what they perceived to be a downgrading of their relationship, however, they felt these 
were not emotions, “shared by a substantial number of same-sex couples content 
with the status of same-sex partnership.”29  They also held that marriage has a 
longstanding definition and acceptance of being between a man and a woman, and 
                                                          
25 Ibid 1299-1304. 
26 [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295. 
27 Ibid [5] (which is a reference to para 18 of Wilkinson’s affidavit).  
28 Ibid [38]. 
29 Ibid [116]. 
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that is what Article 12 was designed to safeguard, stating that “to accord a same-sex 
relationship the title and status of marriage would be to fly in the face of the 
convention”30. Finally, they determined that the CPA was in no way intended to create 
a relationship that was inferior to marriage, but was designed to remove any legal and 
social disadvantages suffered by homosexuals in long-term relationships31. 
What is evident in exploring this case is the hurt felt by Wilkinson and Kitzinger. Much 
like Dorf anticipated in his article32, the couple felt they were being treated as inferior, 
the status of marriage was of considerable importance to them despite being 
presented with an alternative, as discussed in chapter 1 marriage, has an important 
symbolic status: 
“This symbolic status of marriage as a fundamental social institution is, in many ways, 
as important as its formal legal status. It provides for social recognition of key 
relationships, and to have our relationship denied that symbolic status devalues it 
relative to the relationships of heterosexual couples.”33   
 
As a result of the M(SSC)A, the law has now changed on this matter and the 
downgrading of marriages to civil partnerships will no longer occur, all of which will 
be discussed at a later point. 
Regardless of the change in law surrounding the downgrading of marriages, there is 
still a very clear problem where relationships are upgraded. It still may be that a 
relationship is upgraded to a civil partnership from something far less onerous such 
as a French Civil Pact of Solidarity (PACS), which gives only limited rights on 
breakdown of the relationship34. Upon the upgrade many more rights and 
responsibilities than were ever intended, or even potentially known, arise. It was 
pointed out by Harper and Landells that such upgrades may be problematic when 
couples in relationships similar to a French PACS move to England and then 
separate: “they will have imposed upon them a whole series of obligations and 
procedures to dissolve their partnership which would not have applied in their home 
country.”35  
                                                          
30 Ibid [120]. 
31 Ibid [121]. 
32 Michael C Dorf, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ (2011) 
97 Virginia Law Review, 1267. 
33 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295 [5] (which is a reference to para 
21 of Wilkinson’s affidavit). 
34 For instance, there is no right to maintenance; see Joanna Miles, ‘Unmarried Cohabitation in a 
European Perspective’, 105  in Jens M Scherpe (ed) Family Law Volume III: Family Law in Perspective 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2016). 
35 Mark Harper & Katharine Landells, ‘The Civil Partnership Act 2004 in Force’ [2005] Family Law, 963. 
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What these points highlight is that the lack of universality attached to civil partnerships 
makes them difficult to apply throughout the EU, never mind the world over36. Unlike 
marriage, it is not a status that is universally recognised37, which in turn leads to 
confusion for couples involved in such relationships, upgrades and downgrades in 
relationship status, and, of course, a lack of any recognition at all depending on what 
state borders are crossed: “[T]he major international difference between marriage and 
civil partnership is the territorial limitations of the latter.”38 This could in turn provide 
further support for arguments regarding a form of second class citizenship. Those in 
an alternative relationship face greater levels of uncertainty when crossing state 
borders. 
4.3 Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 and the Loophole 
Within 
In 2013, the M(SSC)A was introduced which meant that same-sex marriages could 
take place in England, and those which have taken place abroad may also be 
recognised in similar vein, as opposed to being reduced to a civil partnership. The 
ability to recognise foreign same-sex marriages arises from s.10(1)(b) which provides 
that a marriage under the law of any other country outside the UK is not prevented 
from being recognised under the law of England and Wales only because it is the 
marriage of a same-sex couple. ‘Does not prevent’ means that recognition is not 
forced under the process of the English legal system per se, but rather the courts are 
provided with a degree of discretion when determining validity. This discretion may 
have been designed by Parliament to ensure that the requirements of formal validity 
and essential validity are still satisfied. 
Unlike the CPA, the M(SSC)A makes no reference to the choice of law rules that are 
to be applied, and it has, therefore, been presumed that when considering formal 
validity the lex loci would be applied as with all previous examples. Determining the 
choice of law rule for essential validity could, however, be more ambiguous. It has 
                                                          
36 Richard Frimston, ‘Marriage and Non-Marital Registered Partnerships: Gold, Silver and Bronze in 
Private International Law’ (2006) 6 Private Client Business 352. 
37 “Heterosexual marriage still attracts the highest form of legal and social recognition in the UK, most 
of Europe and Commonwealth jurisdictions” (Kate Spencer, ‘Same Sex Couples and the Right to Marry 
– European Perspectives’ (2010) 6 Cambridge Student Law Review 155, 157. 
38 Kenneth Mck Norrie, ‘Recognition of Foreign Relationships Under the Civil Partnership Act 2004’ 
(2006) 2(1) Journal of Private International Law, 137, 166. 
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been suggested by Davis39 that, given that the Law Commission considered the 
matter in 1987, and felt no need to legislate on the matter, the traditional stance of 
referring to the law of each party’s ante-nuptial domicile stands: “Hence the absence 
of specific provisions in the Bill simply has the result that capacity will continue to be 
assessed by reference to the law of the ante-nuptial domicile.”40 This is a rather bold 
assertion to make. Although Davis recognises problems with the parameters of the 
M(SSC)A, nonetheless it is somewhat premature to ‘assume’ that the law of the pre-
nuptial domicile will apply. Davis acknowledges the complexity surrounding essential 
validity arising from the various rules throughout the EU, but appears to be confident 
from the outset that the applicable law in England is that of the parties’ ante-nuptial 
domicile41. For this assertion, reliance is placed on Dicey and the Law Commission 
Working Paper in support42. However, this is only a fraction of the picture, the Law 
Commission may have indicated the dual domicile theory as the most applicable rule 
in the latest relevant paper43, but case law provides contradictory evidence. Despite 
the Law Commission’s stance on the applicable choice of law rule, the courts have 
continued to consider and make reference to alternative choice of law rules44. In 
addition, it has also been suggested that it can be inferred from Schedule 4 of the 
M(SSC)A that where the same-sex marriage is to take place in England, and involves 
a person domiciled in a country that does not permit same-sex marriage, that it will 
not affect the validity of the marriage45. In essence, this implies that, indeed, the dual 
domicile rule is not necessarily the applicable choice of law rule. On that premise, it 
could be suggested that to assume that reference will always be made to the dual 
domicile theory seems rudimentary, and unsubstantiated, and further reference to this 
important hypothecate will be made later in the chapter. 
The consideration of extant law under the CPA and the M(SSC)A reveals that the 
applicable choice of law rule when determining capacity appears different between 
the two legislative enactments. This may appear an insignificant observation, 
                                                          
39 Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013). 
40 Ibid para 2. 
41 Ibid para 3.2. 
42 This is evident not only in the passage quoted above from para 3.2 which, gains its support from the 
Law Commission, but also in para 3.2 where Davis states: “English law assesses capacity according to 
the law of the domicile of the parties immediately before the time of marriage.” In which he refers to 
rule 74 of Dicey for support (Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013) . 
43 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36. 
44 Westminster City Council v C [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [2009] Fam 11 provides support for the most 
real and substantial connection test, while Minister of Employment and Immigration v Narwal (1990) 26 
RFL (3d) 95 provides support for the alternative reference test. 
45 Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 392. 
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however, this factorisation, combined with the amendment to the CPA preventing 
marriages being deemed an overseas relationship, has the potential to cause 
devastating effects on the validity of some same-sex marriages. 
Under s.213 of the CPA, in its original format, it was simply stated that a specified 
relationship for the purposes of s.212 was those set out in schedule 20. Schedule 20 
contained a whole host of countries and their recognised same-sex relationships, 
including marriage46. In accordance with the CPA all of the listed relationships were 
then recognised as civil partnerships in England, whether it meant an upgrade or 
downgrade in the relationship status. Schedule 2, part 3 s.5(2) of the M(SSC)A 
however, amends the CPA in that after s.213(1), s.213(1A) is inserted which states: 
“But, for the purposes of the application of this Act to England and Wales, marriage 
is not an overseas relationship.” The concomitant is that a foreign same-sex marriage 
can no longer be downgraded to a civil partnership, and it must be considered a valid 
marriage. 
While on the surface this may appear a victory for those in a same-sex marriage, this 
may not always be the case. It must be remembered that when initially recognising 
any such foreign same-sex marriages they were assessed by applying the lex loci 
registrationis rules on essential validity as required under the CPA47. In order to apply 
the M(SSC)A it would appear in accordance with Davis that the dual domicile theory 
would have to be applied to ensure that both parties had capacity under the laws of 
their ante-nuptial domiciles. This distinction may, in some cases, be the difference 
between having a recognised relationship or not. If the parties had no such capacity 
under their ante-nuptial domiciliary law it could mean that their relationship is not 
recognised at all. Any such invalidity may mean that the relationship falls into the 
loophole in the law. It would not be a valid same-sex marriage, and due to the change 
in the definition of overseas relationships brought about by Schedule 2, part 3 s.5(2) 
of the M(SSC)A, , it is equally unable to be classified as a civil partnership. The 
potential for this problem to arise was also considered by Davis in his Memorandum 
on the Bill48. He postulated a fictional scenario that could undoubtedly occur in 
England to demonstrate this point49. The scenario involved Harry, a UK domiciliary 
and his Italian boyfriend Luca. They had lived together in London and Paris but had 
not entered into a civil partnership as they instead wished to marry when the 
                                                          
46 Some examples include the French PACS, Canadian Marriage and Belgium Cohabitation Legale. 
47 S.215(1). 
48 Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013) para 3-4. 
49 Ibid para 4.4.1-5.3. 
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opportunity arose. Luca’s career took them to Belgium where they lived for a few 
years and entered into a valid marriage in accordance with Belgium law. Upon the 
termination of Luca’s temporary employment contract the couple returned to England. 
Davis then discusses the validity of the marriage under both the CPA and the Bill 
(now the M(SSC)A). Historically, under the CPA their marriage would have been 
considered a valid overseas relationship as both parties would have had capacity to 
marry in accordance with the relevant law; Belgium law, as the law of the lex loci, and 
their relationship would therefore be treated as a civil partnership. However the 
position under the M(SSC)A could potentially be quite different. If the applicable law 
is, as suggested, that of both parties’ prenuptial domiciles, Luca is likely to have 
lacked capacity to enter into the marriage, as he would plausibly be deemed to be 
domiciled in Italy or France at the time of the marriage, neither of which permitted 
marriage between couples of the same-sex. In addition, as a consequence of the 
M(SSC)A, the marriage could no longer be recognised as a civil partnership as a 
result of the newly amended s.213(1A) of the CPA, preventing marriages from being 
recognised as civil partnerships. As Davis recognises, the marriage could simply be 
declared void, and could as he suggests all occur without the couple realising there 
is a problem, until years later when something such as Harry’s death raises the 
question of validity for succession purposes, by which point it would be too late.   
The above example shows how serious the consequences may be for impacted 
individuals, and the potentially capricious nature of choice of law iteration. Even 
stepping aside from the prospect of the couple being unaware that they have lost the 
likes of succession rights without particularised knowledge, there are, of course, other 
problems that present themselves. There may be a real lack of certainty and 
predictability surrounding their relationship: whether this is because they have moved 
from one country to England after the enforcement of the M(SSC)A, or because they 
moved here prior to the Act, but had their relationship downgraded to a civil 
partnership, and are now left wondering if it is back to a marriage or nothing at all. 
There is also hurt and anger that may be caused by the fact that having once had 
their relationship downgraded, they are now told their relationship would not be 
recognised at all. One need only consider cases like Wilkinson v Kitzinger50 where 
the couples felt that their rights had been violated by the demotion of their status to 
civil partnership; how would such a couple feel if they were then told their relationship 
gains no recognition in England at all? Without wishing to trivialise the arguments 
                                                          
50 [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295. 
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made by the likes of Wilkinson and Kitzinger it clearly highlights how big of an issue 
this problem is, and, therefore, the urgency required in rectifying it in the best way 
possible to avoid injustice and deleterious unforeseen consequences as a by product 
of the conflict of laws. 
As previously mentioned, s.10(1)(b) of the M(SSC)A seems to supply an element of 
discretion by stating a marriage celebrated outside of England is not prevented from 
being recognised. Davis considers whether this could mean that, regardless of 
capacity issues, English courts could still deem the marriage valid51. However, he 
then goes on to state that, “At most the provisions seem to leave a discretion to the 
court to decide whether or not to apply the rules of capacity, but arguably they do not 
even go that far.”52 In essence, it is all in the interpretation of s.10(1)(b), and at best 
the courts have a discretion to declare the marriage valid, regardless of any 
incapacity53. Given the seriousness of any such interpretations, and the 
consequences it could have, this precarious position is simply not good enough, and 
a cathartic panacea is needed to cure currents ills. In an attempt to provide a solution 
to this, Davis goes on to suggest that s.10(1)(b) should be revised and extended54. 
Having set out that the marriage will not be prevented from being recognised only 
because it is a marriage of a same-sex couple, he recommends that is should also 
provide that it will not be prevented from being recognised, “because one of the 
couple has been or is domiciled in, or is a national of, a country or territory which does 
not permit or recognise same sex marriage.”55 Such an idea is based on laws from 
France and Belgium, but holds little merit in England. In assessing Davis’ 
recommendation it is evident that the ambiguity still remains from the wording of ‘not 
prevented’. Rather than something being imposed upon the courts it is yet another 
exception to add to an area littered with them, when what is actually needed is 
certainty and predictability. It may also encourage forum shopping if it is apparent that 
ante-nuptial prohibitions will be put to one side, and finally it also appears to place the 
problems faced by same-sex couples above those faced in heterosexual marriages. 
The application of the ante-nuptial domicile does not only cause problems for those 
in a same-sex marriage56, and therefore an exception specifically designed to 
                                                          
51 Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013) para 5.3. 
52 Ibid para  4. 
53 A dilemma also recognised in Jonathan Hill & Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of 
Laws (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 393, in their discussion of s.10(1) and the result under 
both a narrow and broad interpretation. 
54 Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013) para 7. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See for instance Pugh v Pugh [1951] P 482. 
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alleviate the problem for same-sex marriages could open the door to a whole host of 
potential future problems. 
Instead, a choice of law rule must be created for same-sex relationships in order to 
provide the much needed certainty discussed for all the other incapacities in the 
previous chapter. There is enough uncertainty caused by the differing rules on 
recognition of same-sex relationships throughout the world, and, thus, the minimum 
that can be expected is some consistency in the choice of law rules in determining 
the validity.  This choice of law rule should be applied to every same-sex relationship 
dispute in England, whether it involves a civil partnership, or a marriage, to ensure 
there is consistency, certainty and most importantly no loophole for a previously 
recognised relationship to fall victim of. In creating the M(SSC)A, Parliament was 
seeking to ensure that same-sex couples received equal treatment as heterosexual 
couples, and, therefore, it is vital that they are not, “subjected to any more complicated 
regulation of their family lives than opposite-sex couples in analogous 
circumstances.”57 To break down this hurdle, this chapter will go on to determine a 
choice of law rule that could be applied to any case involving a civil partnership or 
marriage that comes before the English judiciary. 
4.4 Discovering the Best Choice of Law Rule 
As with the previous chapter, it is necessary to consider what choice of law rule would 
present the optimal reform pathway when dealing with same-sex relationships. It is 
argued that it should be treated as any other incapacity, like age, polygamy or 
consent, and, thus, have a rule that can be applied by the courts using the dépeçage 
version of interest analysis. It has been argued that in adopting the dépeçage version 
of interest analysis some of the many policy objectives58 that the choice of law rules 
in the area of marriage validity seek to achieve are advanced59. For that reason a 
choice of law rule was discussed and determined for each of the incapacities and has 
been outlined in the previous chapter. The appropriate choice of law rule for same-
sex relationships did not feature in the previous chapter, as historically it was not 
                                                          
57 Kenneth Mck Norrie, ‘Recognition of Foreign Relationships Under the Civil Partnership Act 2004’ 
(2006) 2(1) Journal of Private International Law, 137, 167. 
58 Such as certainty and predictability, upholding the validity of marriage, and international uniformity of 
decisions as discussed at section 3.7.2. 
59 Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387. 
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discussed within the literature. When dépeçage was discussed by academicians such 
as Reed and Davie60 civil partnerships had not been introduced in England never 
mind same-sex marriage, and therefore was not something that would have featured 
on the agenda of incapacities. However, times have moved on since then and the law 
has developed significantly. In England, and indeed many other countries, same-sex 
relationships have become extremely relevant, and so it is essential that the public 
policy objectives such as certainty, predictability and uniformity of international 
decisions are sought as they are within all other incapacities. The way this is achieved 
is by bringing it in line with the other incapacities explored, and providing it with its 
own choice of law rule that can be consistently applied by the courts. 
In addition to the policy objectives outlined, it is submitted that further objectives come 
into play when dealing with same-sex relationships. These include equality, 
citizenship and the symbolic status of marriage. These additional policy objectives 
are of importance because of the inconsistency of rights still evident today throughout 
the world. The ability for same-sex couples to marry and have that marriage 
recognised could certainly be termed as the latest battle for equality. Discrimination 
in the marriage arena is not a new problem, but has simply turned its attention from 
women and black people to same-sex couples61. Looking particularly at the US, it is 
evident that there was a time when it was common place in many states for interracial 
marriages to be banned. This was not true of every state and, therefore, cases 
concerning the validity of interracial marriages arose. As with same-sex marriages 
today, those cases showed the many factors that the judiciary took into consideration. 
In State v Ross62, despite multiple passionate dissents in which allowing interracial 
marriage was likened to allowing small pox and pet rattlesnakes into the country63 the 
marriage was still deemed valid on the basis that, “the law of nations is a part of the 
law of North Carolina. We are under obligations of comity to our sister states.”64 
Although comity is still a policy consideration, it does not guarantee every same-sex 
                                                          
60 Michael Davie, ‘The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English 
Conflict of Laws (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 32 and Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of 
Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ 
(2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 387. 
61 See Michael C Dorf, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ 
(2011) 97 Virginia Law Review, 1267, Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-
Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, (Yale University Press 2006) and Frances Hamilton & Lauren 
Clayton-Helm, ‘Same-Sex Relationships, Choice of Law and the Continued Recognised Relationship 
Theory’ (2016) 3(1) Journal of International and Comparative Law 1. 
62 76 N.C. 242 (1877). 
63 Ibid 250. 
64 Ibid 243. 
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couple recognition owing to the many countries and states who still heavily oppose 
same-sex marriage65. 
Koppelman however, recognised that amidst the prejudice and bias opinion there 
came a method which the judiciary began to apply to the interracial marriage cases. 
The cases were broken down and categorised as either; evasion cases66, 
extraterritorial cases67 or migratory cases68. Evasion cases were always invalidated, 
extraterritorial cases were always recognised and migratory cases remained divided. 
Whilst recognising the obscurity of almost promoting the laws of such a despicable 
time, Koppelman states that: 
“the Southern judges did have something intelligent to say about how to deal with 
deep moral disagreement. The question for us today is whether we can manage at 
least the minimal level of decency and mutual respect that existed in the awful years 
of legalized racism.”69  
This minimal level of decency, would, it is proposed, in the current day, come from 
the establishment of a choice of law rule that is applicable by the courts consistently, 
to offer a level of certainty for couples entering into same-sex marriages, and while 
the US may have gone further with its accomplishments in relation to same-sex 
marriage, not every country or indeed Member State has, and so this point maintains 
its importance. 
Eventually the case of Loving v Virginia70 was heard and laws banning interracial 
marriages were declared unconstitutional. Though this may seem irrelevant when 
considering the policy objective of equality for same-sex couples it indeed sparked 
further discussion. The first of which is the Loving analogy where academics 
attempted to argue that, on the basis of Loving, it was unconstitutional to prevent a 
person marrying their proposed spouse on the basis of sex71. However, a more 
interesting argument was that put forward by Dorf72.  He explored the idea that the 
                                                          
65 Such as Russia, Poland and Bulgaria. 
66 Whereby the parties have travelled outside their home state or country to evade the laws prohibiting 
them from marrying, and plan to return to that home state immediately after marrying.  
67 This is where the parties have never lived in the state but the marriage is relevant to the litigation 
conducted there. For instance, where a spouse dies intestate and their partner is seeking to inherit 
property located in the forum state.  
68 This is where there was no intention to evade the law of any state and the marriage was valid at the 
time and location, but the couple later move to a country where the marriage is prohibited.  
69 Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, 
(Yale University Press  2006) 49. 
70 388 U.S 1 (1967). 
71 Andrew Koppelman, ‘Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination’ 
(1994) 69 New York University Law Review 197 and Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: 
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale University Press 2006) 49. 
72 Michael C Dorf, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ (2011) 
97 Virginia Law Review, 1267, 1272. 
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denial of the term ‘marriage’ to couples who are permitted to enter into civil unions 
does not constitute any state-imposed harm73. He questioned this theory by arguing 
that the same would have applied to interracial couples: “if that were true, then it 
would be equally true that the denial of the term marriage to interracial couples would 
also amount to no state-imposed harm.”74 Dorf goes on to concede that, whilst it could 
be submitted that both situations result in state-imposed harm, it may still be deemed 
that whilst this is unconstitutional in cases of interracial marriages, that is not the case 
for same-sex marriages75. 
Instead, the equality argument must be considered in tandem with the purpose behind 
the denial of the term marriage. Though the US appeared to be able to justify the 
inequality experienced by same-sex couples on the basis of the level of scrutiny that 
must be applied to sexual orientation discrimination76, their case law suggests that a 
law designed to relegate a group of people to a second class citizenship is not 
permitted77. Thereby, raising the idea of citizenship and the symbolic status of 
marriage as relevant policy concerns.  
As discussed in chapter 1, marriage has a symbolic status, and it has been argued 
that  this status can be likened to that of citizenship78. In order to explore this argument 
and the need to consider it as a public policy concern when determining the most 
appropriate choice of law rule, it is necessary to first define what is meant by 
citizenship in this context. While citizenship can have a strict legal definition 
surrounding the imposition of legal, political, and welfare rights, most notably the right 
to an abode79,  and, may be understood narrowly by many as a right to carry a 
particular passport80, sociologically the meaning is much broader as it is considered 
to confer: “membership, identity, values and rights of participation”81, it is more than 
a ‘bundle of rights’, and is something we participate in82. Though it is recognised that 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid.  
75 “An opponent of same-sex marriage could lose this battle yet win the war; she could concede that 
there is state-imposed harm in both circumstances but contend that the harm is unconstitutional in the 
case of the interracial union while it is constitutional in the case of  the same-sex union.” (Michael C 
Dorf, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ (2011) 97 Virginia 
Law Review, 1267, 1272). 
76 As discussed by Michael C Dorf, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social 
Meanings’ (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review, 1267, 1271-1272. 
77 Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954) and Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896). 
78 Kerry Abrams, ‘Citizen Spouse’ (2013) 101(2) California Law Review 407. 
79 Keith Faulks, Citizenship in Modern Britain (Edinburgh University Press 1998) 2-4. 
80 Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Women, Citizenship and Difference’ (1997) 57 Feminist Review 4, 4. 
81 Kathleen Knight Abowitz & Jason Harnish, ‘Contemporary Discourses of Citizenship’ (2006) 76(4) 
Review of Educational Research 653, 653.  
82 Ruth Lister, ‘Why Citizenship: Where, How and Why Children’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquires in Law 
693.  
113 
 
citizenship is a concept that is never purely legal or sociological, as the two are 
intertwined83, much of the focus when considering it as a policy concern within 
marriage will be sociologically informed.  
As is the nature within sociology, there is no constant and definitive definition of 
citizenship, however “Membership – or the idea that a citizen derives her rights and 
obligations from the social contract of the nation-state – is an idea central to most 
notions of citizenship.”84 As recognised by Lister, citizenship has implications on 
belonging and identity formation as citizenship is about more than legal rights85. As 
discussed by Brubaker, there is a “distinction between citizens and foreigners.”86 
Citizenship is an in-group, and as noted by Abrams in her discussion of Brubaker: “It 
is this distinction that makes citizenship not only an instrument but also an object of 
closure – not everyone can get it, so the status itself becomes something to desire.”87 
It is this aspect of citizenship, of providing restricted access to a desired group or 
status which, in turn provides rights, that can be likened to  the status of marriage. As 
was demonstrated in chapter 1, marriage has become somewhat of a desired legal 
status, but is not available to all. In failing to allow a same-sex couple to marry, or 
refusing to recognise a pre-existing marriage as a marriage, same-sex couples, like 
foreigners, are refused membership. It is this refusal of membership to the status of 
marriage that can be assimilated with the denial of citizenship as the same ideas of 
identity and access to a much desired, prestigious status are being denied, along with 
the rights that come with it88. Though civil partnerships and civil unions, have been 
introduced in many countries it is argued that they are not an adequate substitute for 
marriage, regardless of the equal rights that such statuses bestow89, and this is a 
consequence of the symbolic status of marriage. In denying access to the status of 
marriage, same-sex couples are denied the prestige associated with it, and are 
                                                          
83 Engin F Isin & Patricia K Wood, Citizenship & Identity (Sage Publications 1999) 4.  
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86 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University press 
1992) 21.  
87 Kerry Abrams, ‘Citizen Spouse’ (2013) 101(2) California Law Review, 407, 409. 
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instead provided with a form of second class citizenship90. Like citizenship, marriage 
is able to be used as an object of closure91, and is therefore something that must be 
considered when attempting to determine the best choice of law rule for same-sex 
relationships, as to deny a same-sex couple the continued recognition of their 
marriage could result in much deeper feelings of rejection and inferiority.  
To determine what choice of law rule should be put in place, a process of elimination 
might be helpful. It is unlikely that the rules that were dismissed in the previous 
chapter for dépeçage purposes will be most appropriate for use in same-sex 
relationships, and so it might be helpful to begin with them, to narrow down the 
potential choices. The most real and substantial connection test, the alternative 
reference test and satisfying the laws of either domiciliary were all ruled out in the 
previous chapter as viable options based on rationales relating to concerns such as 
cherry picking, certainty and public policy. Though it may be predicted that they are, 
for the same reasons, unlikely to be adopted for same-sex relationship purposes, it is 
important to briefly consider each of them. The most real and substantial connection 
test was ruled out in the previous chapter owing to its lack of certainty, and the 
difficulty that the courts face in applying the rule in the prospective, and should, for 
the same reasons be rejected for same-sex relationships. The alternative reference 
test was also considered, but this standardisation has received criticism in the 
purviews of contextualisation of inappropriate public policy considerations, and, it is 
essentially a rule that promotes cherry picking, and consequently, it should, as 
asserted in the previous chapter, be ruled out of the options for same-sex 
relationships. The concept of satisfying the domiciliary laws of either party must also 
be considered, however, this too is problematic as it recognises the importance of 
domiciliary law, and the protective role it plays, but then fails to treat both domiciles 
equally. Again, this is a form of cherry picking and will not be a prospective choice of 
law rule for same-sex relationships. Finally, application of the lex loci should be 
considered, given it was the applicable choice of law rule for civil partnerships, and is 
also an adduced connecting factorisation within marriage, primordially attached to 
formal validity. It has been stated that, in order to achieve legal certainty and 
continuity of the relationship, the lex loci is the most appropriate rule92. However, the 
application of the lex loci could lead to forum shopping, whereby a same-sex couple 
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simply look for the most convenient place for them to marry before returning home to 
potentially discover that their domiciliary law will still not recognise the marriage on 
public policy grounds, leading to the problem of limping marriages. Regardless of 
advocating the lex loci as the most appropriate rule formulation, Melcher also 
recognised this as a potential problem93, and therefore it is necessary to consider 
whether a more appropriate choice of law rule exists. 
Prospectively, having rejected the alternative options considered in the previous 
chapter as an optimal reform pathway, it would appear that the best two options are 
those that have been selected for the other capacities: the dual domicile theory; and 
the continued recognised relationship theory. If we begin by exploring which 
capacities the dual domicile theory was deemed the most appropriate choice of law 
rule for, it may be possible to determine whether it would be the most suitable for 
same-sex relationships.  It was determined in the previous chapter that the dual 
domicile theory should be applied in cases dealing with age and consent 
incapacities94.  The justifications when dealing with age and consent are that an age 
limit is put in place in order to protect the parties from an under age marriage, that 
they are not mature enough to handle, or, in cases of consent, to prevent parties 
being involved in a marriage they never wished to be a part of, or would not have 
been involved with had they have known the full picture. Thus, the reasoning  and 
policy concern behind applying the dual domicile theory is very protective in ambit. 
Conversely, the continued recognised relationship theory was deemed the most 
suitable for the capacities of consanguinity and affinity, and polygamy95. The 
reasoning behind the application of the continued recognised relationship theory 
being, that these incapacities are concerned with society, and how acceptable such 
marriages are within the impacted society, where the parties reside. The law is 
concerned with ensuring the marriage will be accepted within the society per se rather 
than protecting the individuals involved.  
It is fundamental, when dealing with same-sex relationships, to consider the apposite 
and overarching public policy effectuations that are relevant. Is the law seeking to 
protect the individual’s rights and best interests, or societal values? A same-sex 
relationship is not something we would fear somebody falling victim to, or being 
vulnerable within, like we would fear a fourteen year old girl marrying. It would be 
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94 See sections 3.7.4.1 and 3.7.4.4. 
95 See sections 3.7.4.2 and 3.7.4.3.  
116 
 
difficult to state when preventing such relationships, that it was for the good of the 
parties. Instead, it is something society expresses an opinion on, and develops in time 
with social mores. As attitudes to same-sex relationships develop, the law evolves in 
its footsteps; this is the nature of the English legal system. An alternative example of 
this shadowing of societal values can be seen when considering the capacity of 
polygamy. In England, marriage is understood and defined as a monogamous 
relationship, meaning, unlike certain other countries a man is not able to have multiple 
wives96. In not allowing polygamous relationships in England, and only showing 
tolerance to polygamous marriages under certain circumstances, the law is simply 
protecting the traditions of our societal cultural norms. Until very recently, we only 
allowed marriage between a man and a woman, but England as a society has now 
changed it’s attitude towards same-sex relationships, so much so, that the law has 
recognised this change and followed along the same path by creating the M(SSC)A.   
Prior to the Act, the lawmaker was protecting what was once the general consensus 
in society, it was protecting the views and beliefs of society which is reflective of the 
purpose of the continued recognised relationship theory. It would, therefore, seem 
that for the purposes of dépeçage the continued recognised relationship theory would 
present the best choice of law rule from the aforementioned options for all same-sex 
relationships in England. It would mean that same-sex relationships would not be 
denied recognition simply because one of the parties did not have capacity under 
their domiciliary law if they intended, for instance, to remain in England, making it their 
matrimonial home97.  
The use of the continued recognised relationship theory may come under criticism 
from those who consider that in not stating the applicable choice of law rule, 
Parliament were indicating the orthodox position of the application of the dual domicile 
theory, as laid out by the Law Commission in their Working Paper98. This, as 
previously explored, was Davis’ position on the law, and he justified his standpoint by 
stating, “This will at least be consistent with the treatment of overseas heterosexual 
marriages.”99 Although the logic behind this assumption is understandable, simply 
utilising the dual domicile theory on the basis of assumption is highly problematic. It 
may be that, in omitting choice of law rules, Parliament did intend for the dual domicile 
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theory to be applied, as the Law Commission had stated it was the most applicable 
rule; however, times have moved on along with developing substantive theories. The 
Law Commission paper is outdated, and as identified in the previous chapter, the dual 
domicile theory should not be blanketly applied, without reflective consideration and 
more enlightened analysis. Rather, the most appropriate rule should be identified and 
applied: assuming Parliament simply wanted the dual domicile theory to be applied 
will lead to inefficacious and egregious outcomes. It is also apparent from suggestions 
previously mentioned by Hill and Shuilleabhain, that there are conflicting opinions 
surrounding what the applicable law is when the marriage takes place in England. 
Finally, this need for further exploration into the best choice of law rule for same-sex 
marriage is further supported by the inaccuracy of Davis’ quote about conjoining 
together principles predicated upon assumptions related retrospectively to 
heterosexual marriages. The Law Commission may have provided that the dual 
domicile theory was the best option, but Davis has failed to consider the many cases 
discussed in the previous chapter where the dual domicile theory was not applied100. 
In practice, the courts have not unilaterally applied the dual domicile theory to every 
marriage validity case. Wall LJ stated in Westminster City Council v C101, that, 
“departures from the dual domicile rule designed to uphold the principle of marriage 
may be appropriate when the marriage in question is one which, on grounds of public 
policy, the courts will think it right to uphold.”102 Thus, it is wrong to presume such 
instances would not occur in same-sex marriage cases that come before the courts. 
Marriage validity is not, and cannot be, a one size fits all approach. Instead, as with 
all of the other incapacities set out in the previous chapter, a rule should be created 
for all instances of same-sex relationships to ensure the courts correctly determine 
the validity of a same-sex relationship celebrated outside of England. 
4.5 Choice of Law Rules in the EU 
The next iteration, subsequent to the above discussion on extant English law judicial 
precepts, is to examine how same-sex relationships are dealt with around the EU, in 
a bid to ensure the most appropriate choice of law rule is applied. Taking a 
comparative approach allows possible choice of law rules to be investigated in a wider 
ambit, in order to determine the extent to which they would be suitable as a choice of 
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law rule for same-sex relationships in England103. Indeed, it has been stated that 
simply looking at one's own national laws is not enough in order to find the best legal 
solutions: 
“it is clear that the method of comparative law can provide a much richer range of 
model solutions than a legal science devoted to a single nation, simply because the 
different systems of the world can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be 
thought up in a lifetime by even the most imaginative juris who was corralled in his 
own  system.”104 . 
  
The European Court of Human Rights has made it clear so far that it is not willing to 
provide a general rule on same-sex marriage, but rather provides the contracting 
states with a margin of appreciation to determine for themselves whether to declare 
the marriage as valid105.  A more recent case has led to the finding that excluding 
same-sex couples from civil partnerships violated Article 14 of the ECHR in 
conjunction with Article 8, nevertheless, the court declared this was not them 
considering whether there was a general positive obligation on the respondent state 
to provide legal recognition of same-sex relationships106. This has however, been 
altered yet again as a result of the decision in Oliari v Italy107. In the case of Vallianatos 
and others v Greece108, the applicants were seeking to have law 3179/2008 declared 
incompatible with their rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. The law had 
created a new relationship in Greece which would be known as a civil union. This was 
a relationship that provided rights and obligations on the parties involved without 
having to get married. The relationship was not to include same-sex couples, but was, 
like marriage, only to be open to opposite sex couples. The applicants alleged that 
this law infringed their rights as same-sex couples to respect for their private and 
family life, and amounted to unjustified discrimination between different-sex and 
same-sex couples, to the detriment of the latter.  
The Greek government stated that there was a legitimate aim behind the law, that 
being “a set of provisions allowing parents to raise their biological children in such a 
way that the father had an equitable share of parental responsibility without the couple 
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being obliged to marry.”109 Essentially arguing that the logic behind the law was to 
prevent couples with children or planning children seeing marriage as a necessity to 
obtain adequate rights and protection. The difference in treatment between opposite-
sex and same-sex couples was then justified by stating: 
“the biological difference between different-sex and same-sex couples, in so far as 
the latter could not have biological children together, justified limiting civil unions to 
different-sex couples  .… In their view, same-sex couples were not in a similar or 
comparable situation to different-sex couples since they could not in any 
circumstances have biological children together.”110 
 
The government also argued that the other benefits that would come from the status 
of a civil union, such as property and financial rights, could be obtained through 
private contracts and so were not entirely excluded from the reach of same-sex 
couples. 
The European Court of Human Rights held that in relation to the ability to privately 
contract to many of the same rights, this in itself may be accurate, but it would not 
provide same-sex couple’s relationships with any official recognition. Aside from the 
court’s acceptance of the argument regarding biological children, they stressed the 
need for the government to be able to show that there was a legitimate aim, and that 
the actions were proportionate in achieving that aim. The court went on to recognise 
the legitimacy behind enacting legislation to regulate children born outside of 
marriage, and indeed promoting the institution of marriage, however, they did not 
consider the measures taken under law 3719/2008 to be proportionate, and 
necessary in achieving that aim. The court was of the opinion that the primary aim of 
the law was to introduce a form of civil partnership, “which excluded same-sex 
couples while allowing different-sex couples, whether or not they had children, to 
regulate numerous aspects of their relationship.”111 The court concluded that it would 
have been possible for the legislature to extend the rights to same-sex couples whilst 
also providing for children born outside of marriage, and accordingly held that there 
had been a violation of Article 14 when read in conjunction with Article 8. 
It is, however, important to note the limits the court placed on the scope of the case. 
The European Court of Human Rights provided that the application did not relate to 
a general obligation on the Greek State to provide for a form of legal recognition in 
domestic law for same-sex couples. The case was not about providing a new right for 
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same-sex couples, it was about the denial of a right given to others, from which same-
sex couples were excluded, and determining whether that was a breach of Article 14 
when read in conjunction with Article 8.  
Olairi v Italy on the other hand, made more significant steps forward. The case 
involved combined cases where applicants in Italy were claiming that Italian 
legislation was discriminatory as it did not allow them to marry or enter into any other 
type of civil union, and thus breached Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the ECHR. In the case 
it was held that there had been a breach of Article 8, and that allowing homosexual 
couples to enter into civil unions or registered partnerships was the most appropriate 
way in which their relationship could be recognised112. This was an important 
development within the law in respect of same-sex couples, however, the European 
Court of Human Rights were not prepared to conclude that Article 12 had been 
violated. Consequently, they did not set a requirement that same-sex couples be able 
to marry, as they were of the opinion that the ability for same-sex couples to marry 
was still better determined by the individual states. 
Regardless of Oliari, there remains various standpoints on same-sex relationships, 
“as Member States … determine what form of same-sex relationship they 
introduce.”113 Some countries recognise same-sex marriages and others recognise 
civil partnership type relationships with varying degrees of responsibility. In addition, 
the choice of law rules that each of the countries within the EU use to determine 
essential validity of a marriage also vary considerably. Some countries apply the law 
based on the parties’ nationality, others on domicile, and it may even involve a 
reference to habitual residence. Therefore, to extract from this an ideal choice of law 
rule for essential validity is no easy task. It has been recognised that within European 
states it is more usual to follow the pattern of personal law of nationality or pre-nuptial 
domicile114, nevertheless, this is still not a definitive answer and does not reflect that 
in England, for civil partnership, essential validity is governed by the lex loci 
regisrationis. 
Instead, it may be helpful to consider the 2004/38 EU Directive on the rights of citizens 
of the EU and their family to move and reside freely around the union. The directive 
allows the family members of EU citizens to move with them even when they 
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themselves, are not EU citizens. ‘Family Members’ is defined in Article 2. Article 
2(2)(a) recognises the spouse, and Article 2(2)(b) provides some recognition for 
partners within a registered partnership. Unlike spouse, a registered partner comes 
with certain conditions. They may only be treated as family members if the registered 
partnership is treated as equivalent to a marriage in the host member state. If the 
relationship would not be deemed as such in the host member state the only option 
would be to argue that they are beneficiaries under article 3(2)(b), as they are ‘the 
partner with whom the union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested.’ This is 
a relationship which is examined by the host member state and, if justified, they may 
deny entry or residence115. It would seem that an alternative approach emerges here, 
however, it is first important to notice the hierarchy of personal relationships that is 
encapsulated in this approach. A spouse automatically achieves recognition as a 
family member as a result of its so-called ‘gold standard’. On the other hand, a 
registered partner must still jump through hoops in order to achieve validation; 
showing yet again how, “we have placed marriage on a  pedestal, both socially and 
legally, using it to dispense important social welfare benefits and to signal maturity 
and belonging to the community.”116 If the host member state would not treat their 
registered partnership as equivalent to marriage their only hope would be to argue 
that they are beneficiaries under article 3(2)(b); further highlighting the rights and 
benefits that are often attached to marriage, as opposed to citizenship, and the impact 
this can have on those made to accept an alternative status117. Regardless of the fact 
that the couple may have wished to enter into a same-sex marriage, but were unable 
to do so, their registered partnership may be treated in a second class manner by 
other member states.  
A critique of the established approach under the directive is also revealing. As 
opposed to looking at the relationship under the law of the parties domiciliary or 
nationality, it considers how the host member state would define the relationship. It 
could be argued that it does this because it is the state that will be most effected by 
the relationship as this is where the couple intend to live. It will, therefore, be that 
society that must accept and welcome the relationship. This is essentially the 
justification behind the continued recognised relationship theory: the country that will 
house the couple is the one that must be able to recognise the relationship. This may 
be the reason behind the inequality for same-sex relationships. A spouse is not 
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required to qualify their marriage, and spouse in an accepted status throughout the 
EU, unlike a registered partner, or a same-sex spouse who would pass through 
various levels of acceptance, and also outright invalidity. It is opined that the directive 
reflects this by allowing the host member state to determine validity upon movement 
of such couples regardless of the uncertainty this creates, and the obvious problem 
of limping marriages. 
The one distinction between the continued recognised relationship theory and 
applying the law of the host member state is the stability provided by the continued 
recognised relationship theory.  The animus (intention) to live in a particular country, 
and effectuation within a reasonable time, implicates this is the law that controls the 
essential validity of the marriage, even if some years later the couple move away from 
the particularised legal system. The idea behind the theory is that the marriage will 
not require reassessment every time the couple move, thereby satisfying the much 
needed certainty proviso. This stability is not provided under the directive idea of 
turning to the law of the host member state. In applying this test every time a couple 
crossed state borders the validity of their relationship would be brought back into 
question. Notwithstanding this difference, what can be taken away from this 
comparison is the process of referring to the law of the most effected country, the one 
where the couple intend to live.  
Whilst at present it is apparent that the Member States adopt various choice of law 
rules when determining the validity of same-sex relationships, there is an element of 
consistency in the area from the directive and its reference to the laws of the host 
member state. It is this consistency that could be considered alongside the 
examination of the choice of law rules in England to assist in the determination of the 
best possible choice of law rule for the incapacity of same-sex relationships.  
4.6 Choice of Law Rules in the US 
Beyond the review of the choice of law rules in England and the EU, it is important to 
also consider choice of law rules in the US. In addition to the US being considered in 
greater detail in chapter 6, it is essential to consider it now within this contextualisation 
as a comparator reform pathway. In the American style legal system, each State has 
its own governing law and therefore crossing State borders could, until recently, mean 
a same-sex couple crosses from a State which allows same-sex marriage to one that 
123 
 
does not. Multiple choice of law rules were adopted by the states, and like England, 
any of them could have been applied118. These choice of law rules will be considered 
briefly, before moving on to see how the law has developed. 
The US operates an entirely different legal system to that of England as there are 
both federal and state laws. The federal laws may set out a basic set of rights or laws, 
and then it may be that a state expands on this to create a more comprehensive set 
of rights and laws for its citizens.  As a result of the Tenth Amendment, certain powers 
are reserved to the states, and one such power is the right to control family law 
legislation. Therefore, when dealing with family matters, it is generally state law that 
is of importance, and it is the state Supreme Court that would have final say on the 
matter, though this does not entirely prevent federal intervention. 
Although there are certain laws in the US regarding recognition of other states 
judgments119, the federal government passed the Defence of Marriage Act120, which 
restricted the federal definition of marriage to members of the opposite sex, and 
prevented married same-sex couples from accessing federal economic funds. DOMA 
was introduced as a reaction to the consideration of the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage in Baehr v Lewin121. While the Act did not forbid states from enacting 
legislation permitting same-sex marriage, it did prevent states from having to 
recognise marriages entered into in other states122. S.3 defined how the terms 
“marriage” and “spouse” were to be interpreted for all federal statutes:  
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife.” 
 
The law began to develop and move away from this position when in 2013, s.3 was 
declared unconstitutional in the majority decision in United States v Windsor123. The 
case involved two female residents of New York who had entered into a valid same-
sex marriage in Ontario, Canada, and returned to New York where the marriage was 
recognised. Notwithstanding this recognition, upon the death of her wife, Windsor was 
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required to pay estate tax as she did not qualify for spousal exemption, because under 
DOMA a same-sex partner is excluded from the definition of ‘spouse’. The United 
States District Court, and the court of appeals, ruled that s.3 was unconstitutional and 
ordered the United States to pay Windsor a refund. This decision was then upheld in 
the Supreme Court, and it was recognised that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class 
New York seeks to protect.”124 The majority opinion was that s.3 violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as it failed to provide liberty and equality to 
all citizens: “[T]he avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are 
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into 
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the states.”125 
This was the start of a drive towards change: “[T]he decision[s] will only intensify the 
fast moving debate over same-sex marriage, and the clash in the Supreme Court 
reflected the one around the nation.”126 United States v Windsor was a “civil rights 
landmark”127, which started a chain reaction, and lead Federal District Courts in other 
states to invalidate state prohibitions on same-sex marriage128. Although the case did 
not legalise same-sex marriage, which remained “highly contested in the United 
States”129, it was an important incremental step that has a clear impact on the area. 
States were, at this point, still able to determine the validity of a same-sex marriage 
as a result of s.2 DOMA130. It was perfectly possible for a marriage to be deemed 
valid by a judge in one state, and then invalid in another state131. In order to establish 
the required strong public policy against same-sex marriage many states introduced 
what were termed mini-DOMA’s132 These mini-Doma’s allowed the states to declare 
that a marriage in that State is one between a man and a woman and, accordingly, 
same-sex marriages to be invalid. These mini-DOMA’s provided that in addition to the 
State in question not allowing same-sex marriages to take place, they could also fail 
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to recognise any such relationships from an alternative State. As Silberman 
recognised: 
“Unless and until the Supreme Court determines that a prohibition on same-sex 
marriage is unconscionable as a matter of federal law, it is within the prerogative of 
each individual state to determine what status to accord to same-sex couples who 
want to formalize their relationship and/or what rights should attach to such 
relationships.”133  
 
Regardless of such bans on same-sex marriage, each State still had to determine the 
applicable choice of law rule when assessing validity. As will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 6, there are various choice of law rules that can be considered when 
assessing the essential validity of a marriage in the US. Prior to the recent 
amendments as a result of Obergefell v Hodges, any one of these could have been 
applied by the states when determining the validity of a same-sex marriage. The first 
option was the First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws134, which provided that the 
applicable law is where the marriage occurred135 and, thus, is the same as the English 
rule of the lex loci celebrationis. However, s.132 of the Restatement First provides 
exceptions to the lex loci in that regardless of complying with local law the marriage 
would still be deemed invalid if one of the domiciliaries had married contrary to a 
statute in their domicile, or if it was polygamous or incestuous. Therefore, while the 
premise of the Restatement  is that the law of the place of celebration is the applicable 
law, it could be argued that this rule is consumed by what appears to be a wide 
scoping exception136. Alternatively, the courts could have applied interest analysis 
whereby, the state which has the most interest in having its law applied is applied137. 
Amongst others, there is also the Second Restatement138, in which the law with the 
most significant relationship was deemed to be the most applicable law139. So many 
choices, not to mention how some of these have further developed into other theories, 
highlights the uncertainty same-sex couples faced in the US when crossing state 
borders.  
In an attempt to unravel some of this uncertainty Koppelman explored the choice of 
law rules and suggested that there are three main contenders: firstly, the option to 
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follow the Second Restatement, where the most interested state at the time of the 
marriage determines validity, and if valid then it is valid thereafter even if the couple 
move; secondly by reference to the parties’ common domicile from time to time; or 
finally by the application of interest analysis on case by case basis140.  
The initial option set out by Koppelman, of following the Second Restatement, has 
many similarities to the continued recognised relationship theory that has been 
suggested as the most appropriate choice of law rule for same-sex marriages in 
England. The most notable difference being how open and flexible the Second 
Restatement appears, contextualised by  the term, ‘most interested state’. This 
element, it is suggested, needs further development as it leaves a degree of 
uncertainty as to how the ‘most interested state’ is determined; however, Koppelman 
still deems it to be the best option141. In developing and addressing the problems with 
the rule, the concept of ‘most significant relationship’ would need to be unpicked. How 
is the most significant relationship defined? Is it where the parties were domiciled, 
where they intend to live, or somewhere else? It is this uncertainty that must be 
considered and carefully developed to create a more stable and consistent choice of 
law rule. The Second Restatement itself also requires further investigation as the 
relationship between s.283(1) and s.283(2) is somewhat confusing142. In addressing 
the two remaining options, Koppelman states that domicile based rules are difficult 
as they do not deal with people moving very well, and he recognises that a case by 
case approach is uncertain. Thus, Koppelman is clearly aiming to provide certainty in 
the law by suggesting one rule that will apply, and states that validity need not be 
continuously assessed. 
It is, therefore, evident, that like England, the academicians within the US were 
striving for certainty. While there are some key issues and differences between the 
suggestion made by Koppelman and the choice of law rule recommended in this 
research for England, it is possible to see the similarities. Like the suggestion made 
for England, Koppelman identified one choice of law rule which he believed should 
be applied to all same-sex marriages, and set out that if valid according to the relevant 
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law at the time of the marriage, it should be valid everywhere. This is further supported 
by Silberman who stated: “with respect to the United States as a whole, there is an 
argument that the entire question of marriage and divorce regulation should be 
subject to a uniform standard, perhaps best achieved at the federal level.”143 
This all effectively provides support for the continued recognised relationship theory 
as the most appropriate choice of law rule for same-sex relationships in England. The 
recent decision in Obergefell has taken the developments within same-sex marriage 
much further in the US. Rather than establishing a federal choice of law rule for the 
assessment of validity, it instead set out the requirement that all states recognise and 
permit same-sex marriage, invalidating s.2 of DOMA, which allowed states not to 
recognise same-sex marriages conducted in other states. Whilst this is not something 
necessarily of concern in England, given same-sex marriage is permitted, and there 
is no federal/state structure, it may highlight what could be achieved as a starting 
point in the EU given what has been accomplished in the US, all of which will be 
discussed in the remaining chapters. The important elements to be drawn out of this 
for the purposes of the law in England, is that academics in the US also saw merit in 
creating a rule for assessing the essential validity of same-sex marriages, and indeed 
recognised that same-sex marriages should not be re-assessed every time state 
borders were crossed. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The exploration of the current position on choice of law rules for same-sex 
relationships in England, highlights the need for it to be treated like the other 
incapacities and therefore appointed a definitive choice of law rule. The 
implementation of such a rule would allow those coming into England to assess the 
validity of their same-sex relationship no matter where it was performed, and whether 
it was a same-sex marriage, or something akin to a civil partnership. This assessment 
will in turn provide these couples with certainty regarding the validity and recognition 
of their relationship in England, just as has been sought for all other incapacities.  
Currently the essential validity of civil partnerships is governed by the lex loci, while 
there is much dispute over the choice of law rule for same-sex marriage, with some 
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suggestion that it is the dual domicile theory144. As discovered, this can lead to a 
loophole in the law whereby the relationship is offered no recognition at all, given that 
same-sex marriages can no longer be considered as civil partnerships. This 
exacerbates the need for a unified choice of law rule for same-sex relationships in 
England, as the current stance leads to uncertainty not faced by those in a 
heterosexual marriage, given it is a status recognised internationally. 
Though same-sex marriage has never featured within the incapacities explored by 
other academicians proposing dépeçage145, as was evident within the previous 
chapter, much of the literature pre-dates the CPA and inevitably the M(SSC)A. Given 
the developments that have occurred since, it is now impossible to simply cast it 
aside. As with all of the other incapacities discussed, the couples it effects deserve 
certainty and predictability when it comes to their marriage and its validity. Likewise, 
it is an incapacity that is susceptible to cross border conflict, and so the relevant public 
policy issues must be considered. As with the other incapacities, the relevant public 
policy considerations begin to highlight the most appropriate choice of law rule, and 
as set out, there are additional policy considerations that raise their head within the 
arena of same-sex marriage surrounding equality, citizenship and the symbolic status 
of marriage. It is only when all of these elements are explored that an appropriate 
choice of law rule can be selected.  
Same-sex relationships as an incapacity is about the protection of society and its 
established norms, as opposed to protecting the parties to the relationship. 
Consequently, the country most interested in having its law applied is that where the 
relationship will be based, as this will be the country most effected. For that reason 
the continued recognised relationship theory is the most appropriate choice of law 
rule. It means that where the couple intend to live will govern the validity of the 
marriage, but will also provide continued protection if, later in time, the couple move 
to a country that would not normally recognise such relationships. It is a rule that 
recognises the impact such relationships have on society and allows that society to 
govern, but balances this with the certainty couples deserve. The approach ensures 
that their relationship will not undergo a re-assessment should they later move 
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elsewhere, which not only provides a level of certainty, but also recognises the 
importance of the status in terms of citizenship and symbolism; it is the balanced 
approach the incapacity needs.  
A comparative analysis of the choice of law rules utilised in the EU and the US 
unveiled yet more potential rules. However, what was also apparent when exploring 
the US was the desire of academics to achieve certainty through the production of a 
uniform standard146. Similarly, with this research, academics were recognising the 
need to provide couples with certainty, and suggested the way this could be achieved 
was through a set choice of law rule. This, despite the more recent developments 
within the US as a result of Obergefell, is support for the argument that there should 
be a choice of law rule in place for same-sex relationships in England.  
Couples planning to move to England should, with a degree of certainty, be able to 
determine whether their relationship will be recognised and this statement applies 
equally regardless of the incapacity at issue. Therefore, under dépeçage based 
interest analysis, same-sex relationships also require a set choice of law rule. This 
rule, whilst wishing to provide certainty and predictability, must be sympathetic to the 
policy concerns the incapacity raises by considering the laws of the society where the 
couple will live. Though the dual domicile rule steps in to protect the individuals to the 
marriage it does not protect the society and is on that basis inappropriate here. 
Instead, the continued recognised relationship theory offers the approach that 
balances the needs of the individuals with those of the most impacted state. 
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Chapter 5 
Speak Now Or Forever Hold 
Your Peace: Is Harmonisation 
Across The EU The Key To 
Preventing Delayed Objections 
When Couples Relocate? 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of the previous chapters has been on achieving certainty in choice of law 
precepts vis-à-vis the recognition of marriages in England. This has included the 
exploration of same-sex marriages, to reflect the recent developments within the law. 
With the determination of the appropriate choice of law rules for the essential validity 
of marriage within England complete, this chapter seeks to expand on the parameters 
of the research in this field, by considering whether the reformulation of the choice of 
law rules on essential validity could be undertaken at an EU level.  In doing so, the 
largely unchartered territory of assessing how certainty could be achieved at an EU 
level will be explored.  
As a consequence of the ever increasing levels of migration, achieving certainty within 
England alone is insufficient. Under the current system of law there are differing 
choice of law rules for marriage validity across the EU, and the uncertainty eradicated 
at state level in the previous chapters has the potential to revive every time a couple 
cross a state border. Essential validity of marriage, and the quest to achieve certainty, 
has been explored over the years, but it has been on a much more restricted basis, 
with the position of the laws in England being the primary focus1. However, with the 
right to free movement2, employment opportunities, and increasing cross border 
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familial ties3, it is essential that the remit is widened.  This chapter will analyse and 
assess the choice of law rules at play in the EU, with the view to establishing set 
choice of law rules holistically across the board: “As long as Private International Law 
rules remain national, application of these rules could lead to decisional discord and 
limping relationships.”4 Thus, effectively eroding any certainty achieved, and must for 
that reason be tackled at the more pervasive and all encompassing EU level. 
In assessing the extent to which harmonisation of the choice of law rules is necessary 
to achieve certainty for couples, a persons’ rights to free movement will also be 
explored. In a marital relationship or civil partnership involving a non-EU national, the 
recognition or non-recognition as the case may be, of that status may determine the 
ability of that couple to relocate. To deny recognition could be to deny that EU national 
the fundamental freedom of free movement, and potentially the right to equality5; in 
turn, elevating the need for this matter to be addressed. Striving to accomplish a set 
of choice of law rules at an EU level does not guarantee the successive recognition 
of all relationships. Instead, it will provide couples with the tools to predict the 
recognition of their relationship if they anticipate crossing state borders. This will, 
therefore, give couples the opportunity to make an informed decision, which may be 
of particular importance if such a move would lead to the marriage or civil partnership 
being declared invalid. The predetermination of any consequential invalidity will also 
prove greatly important to couples where one of the parties is a non-EU national, who 
may, as a result of the relationship being declared invalid, be denied entry. The choice 
of law rules laid down in this chapter will, therefore, allow couples to plan their lives 
with a greater degree of certainty surrounding their marital status.  
The concept of Europeanisation of choice of law rules is not original, and has been 
utilised within areas such as tort6 and contract7 successfully. Albeit, on a somewhat 
                                                          
3 Statistics from the centre for social justice, “European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” 
(2009) 5, available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/pdf%20reports/CSJEuropeanFamilyLaw.pdf 
(last accessed 21/04/17) shows that of the annual 2.2 million EU marriages, 350,000 involve an 
international couple. 
4 Ian Curry-Sumner, ‘Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe’ (2009-2010) 13 The 
Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 59, 60. 
5 If we consider Ronald Dworkin’s emphasis on egalitarianism, and the need for the law to respect the 
individual’s rights, see for instance Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 
1977) 25, a denial of the right to free movement because of the type of relationships a person is in, 
could be viewed as a denial of equality within the law. 
6 Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40, hereafter referred to as Rome II, provides the applicable law 
in tortious cases. 
7 See for instance Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6, Art 4 which sets out the applicable law for various 
contractual relationships when one has not been agreed by the parties.  
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more limited scale, it has also been explored within family law, particularly within the 
field of divorce recognition. For instance in Brussels II and Brussels II bis8  unified 
jurisdictional rules for divorce proceedings were established, and subsequent 
attempts were made to harmonise the choice of law rules utilised within the 
jurisdictions9. These attempts to clarify the law came as a result of the potential 
invocation of several laws10  and the uncertainty this created, along with the risk of 
limping divorces.  With similar problems evident within the area of marriage validity, 
it would appear that amidst the problems with Rome III and achieving what was 
sought, marriage validity and its associated problems were left behind.  
This chapter will therefore explore the concept of Europeanisation and how it could 
be achieved within the essential validity of marriage categorisation. To ensure history 
does not repeat itself, this exploration will involve considering the criticisms of Rome 
III and why it was ultimately rejected. This will allow an assessment of whether such 
criticisms may apply within potential choice of law rules for marriage validity, and if 
so, to ensure they are not replicated within the proposal for Europeanisation. In 
establishing the most appropriate applicable law, the choice of law rules of a selection 
of Member States will be considered. This is a vital step in order to determine whether 
the dépeçage based interest analysis approach, designed for England, could be 
implemented at an EU level. The balance between certainty and flexibility such an 
approach offers, over the more rigid application of a universal choice of law rule, 
makes it an appropriate starting point where possible. The consideration of the current 
rules in place in some of the Member States, will therefore, act almost as a litmus 
test, to determine whether it is possible to proceed with dépeçage based interest 
analysis as the foundations for Europeanisation of this area. In addition, it will be 
assessed whether any existing EU family law precepts offer a more suitable 
alternative. This is important for both thoroughness and familiarity purposes, despite 
any preconceptions about dépeçage based interest analysis and its appropriateness. 
As this research is aimed at providing the most appropriate choice of law rule, a 
                                                          
8Council Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children 
of both spouses (Brussels II)  [2000] OJ L160/19 hereafter referred to as Brussels II, and Council 
Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition of 
enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation 1347/2000  (Brussels II bis) [2003] OJ L338/1, hereafter referred to as Brussels II bis.  
9 Commission, ‘Proposal for Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters’ COM (2006) 399 
final Hereafter referred to as Rome III. 
10 Commission, ‘on applicable law and jurisdiction in divorce matters’ COM (2005) 82 final (Green 
Paper) para 1.  
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holistic approach must be taken. Consequently, connecting factors already at play 
within EU law are noteworthy and must be explored for any merit they may hold, and 
their ease of application due to the Member States’ familiarity with them. 
The examination of harmonisation, followed by a detailed consideration of the 
appropriate choice of law rules, ensures that comprehensive conclusions are drawn. 
This approach highlights how dépeçage based interest analysis stands apart from the 
rest, in its ability to achieve certainty for couples throughout the EU in respect of the 
validity of their marriage. This is a status fought for11 and held dearly12 by many, and 
so in providing that certainty and predictability for couples, this chapter will provide a 
significant contribution to the much needed development of the law. 
5.2 Europeanisation a New Concept? 
Traditionally, it may have been suggested that EU law is not concerned with the 
regulation of family law, but in more recent years such a stance has been departed 
from13. The emergence of Brussels II, Brussels II bis, Rome III and the Commission 
on European Family Law, which was established in 2001, all highlight EU involvement 
within family law. While historically speaking these may be relatively new additions to 
the EU remit, Europeanisation is clearly not an alien concept within family law. 
In 1998 the Brussels II Convention was signed by EU Member States and Brussels II 
was brought into force in 2001. This was then amended and replaced by Brussels II 
bis which came into force in 2005. These regulations provide uniform jurisdictional 
rules throughout the EU to determine whether a court is able to hear a case in respect 
of divorce. In addition Brussels II bis provides for almost automatic recognition of all 
matrimonial judgments granted by the courts of Member States. This was an 
important step in the law in order to reduce the situations of limping divorces14 and 
                                                          
11 As can be seen by the continuous fights for equal rights to marriage by same-sex couples as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
12 As demonstrated in the case of Wilkinson and Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295 
in their desire to keep the status of married as opposed to having it recognised as a civil partnership. 
See also Estin v Estin 334 US 541, 553 (1948) (Robert Jackson J) “one thing that people are entitled 
to know from the law is whether they are formally married.” Which again demonstrates the importance 
attached to such a status for many. 
13 See Peter McEleavy, ‘The Communitarization of Divorce Rules: What Impact for English and 
Scottish Law?’ (2004) 53(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 605 and Kate Spencer, 
‘Same-Sex Couples and the Right to Marry – European Perspectives’ (2010) 6 Cambridge Student 
Law Review 155. 
14 Oliver Remien, ‘European Private International Law, the European Community and its Emerging 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 53, 56. 
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formed part of the aim to increase European integration and a single market15. An 
aim, it is submitted, that should be extended to marriage validity in order to prevent 
limping marriages and promote recognition through a single market.  This should 
include same-sex relations where multiple relationship statuses and rules as to 
recognition remain at large.  
Brussels II bis was only a step in producing Europeanisation. Though limping divorces 
would become less prevalent due to the recognition of other Member States’ 
judgments, it could lead to a dash to court, as Brussels II bis did not provide for 
harmonisation regarding the applicable law. Provided the Member State of the court 
first seised had a sufficient connection with the parties it would have jurisdiction and 
be able to apply its own laws. It would, therefore, be beneficial in some instances for 
one of the parties to rush to a court that would provide them with the most financially 
favourable outcome: 
“Where a marriage has a European element spouses will be told that if they do not 
strike first and commence proceedings, there will be a chance that the other party will 
seise the authorities of a different Member State with which one or both parties has a 
close connection”16. 
 
It is evident that without setting down choice of law rules, dictating the applicable law 
regardless of which court is seised the “regulation only addresses concerns of 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and unfairness in a minor way.”17 
In an attempt to remedy this, Rome III was proposed, and was designed to determine 
the applicable law in divorce proceedings by setting out the appropriate choice of law 
rules. Art 1(7) of the proposal sets out that chapter IIa is inserted into Brussels II bis, 
and in turn that chapter would include Art 20a which would allow the parties to choose 
the applicable law together, or in the absence of such a choice, provides a hierarchical 
set of choice of law rules. In drafting such a proposal the Commission were aiming to 
provide the certainty that was lacking under the position of Brussels II bis: “Apart from 
the lack of legal certainty and flexibility, the current situation may also lead to results 
that do not correspond to legitimate expectations of citizens.”18 The Commission 
                                                          
15CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 409-410 
referring to Clare McGlynn, ‘A Family Law for the European Union?’ in Jo Shaw (ed), Social Law and 
Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing 2000) 235. 
16 Peter McEleavy, ‘The Brussels II Regulation: How the European Community has Moved into Family 
Law’ (2002) 51(4) International and Comparative law Quarterly 883, 887. 
17 Teresa Henderson, ‘From Brussels to Rome: The Necessity of Resolving Divorce Law Conflicts 
Across the European Union’ (2010-2011) 28(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 768,780. 
18 Commission, ‘on applicable law and jurisdiction in divorce matters’ COM (2005) 82 final (Green 
Paper) para 2. 
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determined that with the increasing levels of migration, and the respective increase 
in international divorces, the ability for an array of choice of law rules to be invoked 
increased the need to clarify the law:  
“The increasing mobility of citizens within the European Union has resulted in an 
increasing number of “international” marriages where spouses are of different 
nationalities, or live in different Member States or live in a Member State of which they 
are not nationals. In the event that an international couple decide to divorce, several 
laws may be invoked.”19 
 
Such action was required in order to comply with and work towards the common 
judicial area of making life simpler for citizens as required by the European Council20. 
This same argument could also be made in relation to the recognition of marriages 
and their validity. Increased levels of migration and ‘international’ marriages, 
alongside a whole host of potentially applicable choice of law rules results in the 
same, yet undetected concerns within marriage validity.  The European Council 
expressed their aim was “to make life simpler for European citizens by improving and 
simplifying the rules … particularly in cases with important human dimensions, having 
an impact on the everyday life of citizens.”21 Consequently, it would seem that 
marriage and its recognition should be of primary importance. Marriage is a 
fundamental part of a person’s life, and there should be no doubt whether a couple’s 
marriage will be deemed valid or not; “one thing that people are entitled to know from 
the law is whether they are formally married.”22 It is for that reason essential that 
choice of law rules are established at a European level in order to keep the rules as 
simple as possible, and in turn provide that much needed certainty. Lest it be forgotten 
that certainty is one of the key tenets of the rule of law23, and the undeniably important 
role it plays. Joseph Raz states that the law should be stable so as to allow people to 
plan their lives and provide them with certainty, adding that “[T]he evils of uncertainty 
are in … restricting people’s ability to plan their future.”24 
In relying on Rome III to assert that similar choice of law rules should be created for 
marriage validity it must, of course, be mentioned that Rome III was unsuccessful in 
                                                          
19 Ibid para 1. 
20 Official Journal of the European Communities ‘Action plan of the Council and the Commission on 
how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and 
justice’ C19/1, 23/01/1999, para 39. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Estin v Estin 334 US 541, 553 (1948) (Robert Jackson J). 
23 “The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in 
meaning and apply equally to everyone.” Per Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’ (1998) 77 
Foreign Affairs 95, 96. 
24 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979). 
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becoming a regulation, and was in fact heavily criticised by the UK. However, it is 
important to assess why the proposal was criticised, in order to determine to what 
extent a proposal to Europeanise choice of law rules on marriage validity would too, 
be subject to such criticism. One of the key criticisms of Rome III  raised in the House 
of Lords European Union Committee Report on Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce25 
was that judges and other legal professionals would need to adopt and apply foreign 
law26, and it was their opinion that the only system that would offer simplicity and 
certainty was the lex fori27. It was also suggested that the European Commission were 
not competent to propose Rome III28. These criticisms will be considered in further 
detail to determine to what extent, if at all, they indicate a barrier to legislation 
providing choice of law rules for marriage validity in the EU. 
5.3 Criticisms of Rome III 
As outlined above, one of the key criticisms of Rome III as far as the UK was 
concerned, was the stepping away from the use of the lex fori which had traditionally 
been applied, and moving towards foreign law. The rules under Rome III would 
require the judiciary, and other legal professionals, to apply foreign law, and the 
committee were of the opinion that such adaptations by the profession were 
unnecessary: “We suggest that the only system which would provide a combination 
of simplicity and certainty is that of lex fori.”29 In addition they were also of the opinion 
that the application of foreign law to matters of divorce would be costly, as time would 
be spent determining the applicable law alongside the time and difficulties associated 
with the application of laws one is less familiar with30. It is evident that for the UK, the 
application of the lex fori in matters of divorce is to be preferred31, and that “the 
Europeanization in this area was clearly going too far.”32 
This criticism, becomes less relevant in relation to marriage validity and creating a 
system of choice of law rules at an EU level. The lex fori  is rarely used in relation to 
                                                          
25 House of Lords European Union Committee Report 52nd Report of Session 2005-06, Rome III – 
Choice of Law in Divorce HL paper 272 7th December 2006.  
26 Ibid para 11. 
27 Ibid, see written evidence 17. 
28 Ibid, see written evidence 34. 
29 Ibid, see written evidence 17. 
30 Ibid, see written evidence 24. 
31 Katharina Boele-Woelki, ‘To Be or Not to Be: Enhanced Cooperation in International Divorce Law 
within the European Union’ (2008-2009) 39 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 779, 784. 
32 Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family Law Going too 
Far?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178, 181. 
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marriage validity, rather it is often the domiciliary law of each of the parties that is 
applied, and therefore the courts and the professionals engaged in this area are 
familiar with the application of foreign law. For that reason the proposal of EU choice 
of law rules requiring Member States to apply laws other than their own is unlikely to 
be a cause for concern or objection. Though the costs associated with applying 
foreign law must be considered, this is a cost already incurred within the area, and 
costs would be reduced by the clarity in the applicable choice of law rules, as opposed 
to the current position which requires time spent deciphering the applicable law. 
There is also the suggestion that the EU is not competent to legislate on family law: 
“The lack of competence of the EC to regulate family law has been recognised by the 
ECJ”33. This stance also appears to have some support in the House of Lords report 
on Rome III, where it is expressed that those whom suggested Rome III did not fully 
understand the important concepts such as domicile in accordance with English law34. 
However, there has been an increase in EU involvement within family law35. The 
Brussels II legislation has been described as a “watershed in the evolution of EU 
family law”36, and with involvement in areas like succession37, it is possible to see the 
increasing involvement in other aspects of family law.  Albeit unsuccessful, there have 
also been proposals for regulations concerning other elements of family law38, and 
the Commission on European Family Law was also established in 2001. Each 
highlighting that there is indeed precedent for EU involvement within family law. It has 
also been argued that, “[O]nly an international solution from an international body (the 
EU) will suffice.”39 This type of argument is based on the need to achieve a common 
market within the EU, and that, whilst the demonstrated uncertainty as to jurisdiction 
and applicable law remains, a common market is unachievable. This is an argument 
that could also be applied to the choice of law rules on marriage validity, on the 
                                                          
33 Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family Law Going too 
Far?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178, 192. 
34 House of Lords European Union Committee Report 52nd Report of Session 2005-06, Rome III – 
Choice of Law in Divorce HL paper 272 7th December 2006, written evidence 34. 
35 Helen Stalford, ‘Regulating Family Life in Post-Amsterdam Europe’ (2003) 28(1) European Law 
Review 39, 52. 
36 Marie NI Shuilleabhain, “Ten Years of European Family Law: Retrospective Reflections From a 
Common Law Perspective” (2010) 59(4) International Comparative Law Quarterly 1021, 1022. 
37 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of 4 July 2012 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Decisions and Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in Matters of 
Succession and on the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession [2012] OJ L201/107. 
38 For instance; Commission ‘Less Bureaucracy for Citizens: Promoting Free movement of public 
Documents and the Recognition of the effect of Civil Status Records’ COM (2010) 747 final (Green 
Paper), and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on Promoting the Free Movement of Citizens’ 
COM (2013) 228.  
39 Teresa Henderson, ‘From Brussels to Rome: The Necessity of Resolving Divorce Law Conflicts 
Across the European Union’ (2010-2011) 28(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 768, 772.  
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premise that EU involvement is needed to ensure the imperative of free movement, 
and this is something that will be explored in further detail later in the chapter.  
Aside from criticisms raised in the House of Lords Committee Report, one of the 
concerns surrounding Rome III was that harmony would still not be achieved owing 
to the reliance on habitual residence as the default choice of law rule where a mutual 
decision is lacking40. Such scepticism is as a result of the autonomous nature of 
habitual residence as previously explored in chapter 2. This criticism relates directly 
to the use of habitual residence in Rome III and would only be a consideration if it 
were a potential connecting factor to be utilised in the choice of law rules suggested 
for marriage validity in the EU. The use of habitual residence as a potential connecting 
factor will be explored a little later in the chapter, and it will be determined whether 
this is a criticism likely to effect the proposal for the EU choice of law rules.   
5.4 Is Rome III all Bad? 
While it is evident that Rome III can, and has been criticised, support can be seen in 
the achievement of enhanced cooperation41 between certain Member States42, who 
saw the value in unified choice of law rules for divorce. This support is then echoed 
from academicians themselves, who recognise what the proposal was seeking to 
achieve: “[I]ntroducing uniform choice of law rules minimises the risk of limping 
situations, takes account of the reasonable expectations of the parties and enables 
the achievement of justice.”43 Fiorini is able to identify the benefits of harmonisation 
within divorce, it is how those aims are to be achieved that is problematic. Fiorini 
recognises that there is a distinction between agreeing on the final destination and 
agreeing on the route to getting there: “admitting that hostility against the idea of 
harmonizing choice of law rules is not deserved in the current context does not imply 
approving of the Rome III proposal as it currently stands.”44 What becomes evident is 
that, whilst Rome III may have been criticised, this does not mean that there has been 
                                                          
40 Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family Law Going too 
Far?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178, 197. 
41 The enhanced cooperation was introduced by Council Regulation (EC) 1259/2010 of 20 December 
2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation [2010] OJ L343/10. 
42 The contracting member states are: Spain, Italy Hungary, Luxembourg, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Belgium, Latvia, Malta and Portugal. 
43 Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family Law Going too 
Far?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178, 188. 
44 Ibid 190. 
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a rejection of harmonisation within family law, or even specifically within divorce, it 
means that the method adopted within Rome III has problems which must be 
addressed and learned from. 
Crucially, despite the rejection of Rome III, it has been recognised that without 
harmonised rules, there is a real lack of certainty for couples when determining the 
applicable law for their divorce, thereby making “the process more difficult for 
European citizens.”45 Further, it has been recognised  that certainty and predictability 
can only be achieved through community action, and that this is not an obstacle that 
can be tackled by Member States alone. The very root of the problem stems from the 
lack of uniform rules in Europe, consequently uniformity is the only long term cure46. 
With such similar aims of achieving certainty, predictability and the prevention of 
forum shopping it is argued that, as with divorce, community action is the only way of 
achieving those aims within marriage validity. On that premise, it is necessary to 
determine to what extent such uniform rules may receive support. Whilst Rome III 
may have been rejected, it has been highlighted that this may have been down to the 
pathway that was taken, rather than uniformity itself, thus it must be assessed to what 
extent, if at all, there is support for EU harmonisation.  
5.5 Supporting Harmonisation  
As previously outlined, a group of Member States entered into an enhanced 
cooperation regarding Rome III, which provided them with unified choice of law rules 
when dealing with divorce. This, in itself provides, support albeit limited, for the 
harmonisation of choice of law rules within the EU, as those Member States 
recognised the benefits of harmonisation. When determining to what extent there is 
any further support, it is important to note that in proposing harmonisation, this 
research remains strictly in the confines of choice of law rules in marriage validity, 
and it does not seek to harmonise substantive law. This is a crucial distinction. While 
there appears to be some support generally for the harmonisation of choice of law 
                                                          
45 Teresa Henderson, ‘From Brussels to Rome: The Necessity of Resolving Divorce Law Conflicts 
Across the European Union’ (2010-2011) 28(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 768, 776. 
46 See for instance Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family 
Law Going too Far?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178, 185 where it is 
stated that “It is clear that, of the four objectives identified by the Commission (increasing legal 
certainty and predictability, preventing “rush to court”, increasing flexibility and ensuring access to 
court) the first two can only be achieved by community action, no Member Stated acting alone being 
able to solve problems that the lack of uniform rules in Europe may give rise to.” 
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rules within family47, such support becomes limited when dealing with substantive 
law48.  There are fears that “European competence may soon spill over into the sphere 
of substantive family law.”49 The very use of the term “spill over” suggests that such 
unification would be unwelcome. This reluctance for harmonisation could be 
associated with concerns over the quashing of cultural identity. The cultural 
background of a Member State is likely to have had a major influence on its legal 
system over the years, and “[t]he legal system can thus be considered as a mirror of 
a state and of its culture.”50 Consequently, if the substantive law were to be unified it 
would eliminate the diversity51 and remove the history and cultural values, which are 
often considered of vital importance within the field of family law52.  The importance 
of such factors has, however, been brought into question: 
 “A variety of factors  facilitate the impression of domestic sources being unique and 
incompatible with a unification, including national customs, the incorporation of 
different views into laws, religious and emotional bonds, as well as the lack of foreign 
ties. Upon closer examination, these factors may be over-emphasised.”53  
 
Such factors need not be over analysed given Member States will not be required to 
change their substantive law on matters of marriage validity, and the general support 
attached to the unification of choice of law rules should apply. 
  
                                                          
47 See for instance David Hodson, ‘Rome III: Subsidiarity, Proportionality and the House of Lords’ 
(2007) 1 International Family Law Online 
http://onlineservices.jordanpublishing.co.uk/web/pub.xql?action=home&pub=FAMILYpa&lang=en#add
History=true&filename=Family_IFLONLINE_IFL_2007_03_12.dita.xml&docid=Family_IFLONLINE_IFL
_2007_03_12&inner_id=&tid=&query=&scope=&resource=&toc=false&eventType=lcContent.loadDocF
amily_IFLONLINE_IFL_2007_03_12 (last accessed 11/08/16) where he states: “As part of its 
harmonisation process in family law, the EU quite rightly decided that there should be a unified and 
harmonised approach to the choice of law principles.” See also Walter Pintens, ‘Europeanisation of 
Family Law’ and Nina Dethloff ‘Arguments for the Unificaton and Harmonisation of Family Law in 
Europe’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki (ed), Perspectives for the Unification of Harmonisation of Family 
Law in Europe (Volume 4, Intersentia 2003).  
48 See for instance Kate Spencer, ‘Same Sex Couples and the Right to marry – European 
Perspectives’ (2010) 6 Cambridge Student Law Review 155, 173-174. Who, in considering unification 
states how it may be beneficial to gain further rights for same-sex couples but that it is unnecessary to 
instigate a complete unification of family law. 
49 Marie NI Shuilleabhain, ‘Ten Years of European Family Law: Retrospective Reflections From a 
Common Law Perspective’ (2010) 59(4) International Comparative Law Quarterly 1021, 1026. 
50 NA Bararsma, The Europeanisation of International Family Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2011) 282. 
51 Fernanda G Nicola, ‘Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law’ (2010) 58 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 777, 781. 
52 NA Bararsma, The Europeanisation of International Family Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2011) 282. 
53 Dieter Martiny, ‘Is the Unification of Family Law Feasible or even Desirable?’ (2010) available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612157 last accessed 21/04/17. 
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5.5.1 Why Harmonisation is Essential for Free Movement 
Perhaps more significantly, is the support stemming from the contention that 
harmonisation of private international law is necessary for free movement54. With the 
ever increasing levels of migration and subsequent international marriages it has 
been propounded that the Member States alone are not capable of meeting the 
demands this brings: “The laws and courts of individual states are not always capable 
of dealing with the complexities of this new found mobility, and as such a body of 
international law is growing up to meet the challenges.” 55 Academics recognise the 
problems faced by families when they attempt to cross borders around the EU, and 
this is a problem that will continue for the remaining Member States and it’s citizens 
after England’s departure from the EU, and for that reason remains a priority in this 
thesis. As a result of the various choice of law rules within family law, and no 
requirement to recognise previous judgments a resistance to relocate is foreseeable. 
Couples may decide not to exercise their rights to free movement regardless of the 
opportunities such movements may bring, because of the problems they may face 
regarding the recognition of their familial status56. This then highlights how the, 
“Differences between certain national rules … hamper the free movement of persons 
and the sound operation of the internal market. There are accordingly grounds for 
enacting provisions to unify the rules.”57 Despite its origin being in a regulation 
regarding the recognition of divorce matters or parental responsibility, such a 
statement can certainly be applied to marriage validity. With the varying choice of law 
rules in operation across the Member States, it is possible to see why a couple may 
be reluctant to move, for fears that their relationship will not be recognised. This, in 
essence, places a bar on the free movement of persons, which is a fundamental 
freedom. A freedom, that can only “be ensured if the exercise of those freedoms does 
not involve the loss of legal positions that have already been acquired in another 
                                                          
54 See for instance Peter McEleavy, ‘The Communitarization of Divorce Rules: What Impact for English 
and Scottish Law?’ (2004) 53(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 605 and Nina Dethloff 
‘Arguments for the Unificaton and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki 
(ed) Perspectives for the Unification of Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe (Vol 4, Intersentia 
2003).  
55 The Centre for Social Justice, ‘European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreigm Law’ (2009) pg 5 
available at 
www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/userstorage/pdf/Pdf%20reports/CSJEuropeanFamilyLaw.pdf last 
accessed 21/04/17. 
56 Maria Tenreiro & Monika Ekstrom, ‘Unification of Private International Law in Family Law Matters 
Within the European Union’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki (ed), Perspectives for the Unification of 
Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe (vol. 4, Intersentia 2003) 187. 
57 Brussels II, Recital 4. 
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Member State.”58 At present, loss of legal position of this nature could be anticipated 
in relation to any of the incapacities to marry. For instance, when considering the 
incapacity of age, Member States are likely to have differing laws regarding the 
minimum age at which a person is able to marry, and upon moving from one Member 
State to another a spouse may find that in the host state they are below such minimum 
age, and, thus, it would need to be determined whether the host state would consider 
the marriage valid. This concern becomes particularly significant when looking at 
same-sex relationships as a result of the citizenship directive59. 
The Citizenship Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of Member States, is an 
important directive when considering the ability of those in a same-sex relationship to 
exercise their right to free movement.  Art 2(2)(a) provides that ’family member’ 
includes a spouse, however, as a consequence of each Member State being able to 
determine for themselves whether to recognise a same-sex marriage under the 
principle of subsidiarity, spouse is not deemed to include a same-sex spouse60. This 
is despite arguments that the term ‘spouse’ is gender neutral and should include 
same-sex marital partners61. Art 2(2)(b) on the other hand provides for same-sex 
couples in a registered partnership, but only if the host Member State treats the 
registered partnership as equivalent to marriage. As a result of this factorisation, a 
couple could find themselves in a situation whereby the non-recognition of their 
relationship impacts upon further rights such as their succession rights, where they 
feel discriminated against, or in the most extreme cases are prevented from relocating 
to a particular Member State at all. 
If one of the partner’s is a non-EU citizen they will not have independent rights to free 
movement to another Member State, and so would be reliant on their status as a 
registered partner. If the Member State in question does not consider a registered 
partnership as equivalent to marriage, that non-EU partner may be prevented from 
                                                          
58 N. A. Bararsma, The Europeanisation of International Family Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2011) 271. 
59 Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation 
EEC No 1612/68 OJ L158/77 (hereafter referred to as the Citizenship Directive). 
60 Frances Hamilton and Lauren Clayton-Helm, ‘Same-Sex Relationships, Choice of Law and the 
Continued Recognised Relationship Theory’ (2016) 3(1) Journal of International and Comparative Law 
1, 23. 
61 Dimitri Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European 
Federalism’ (2009) 3(1) Fordham International Law Review 156, 190 referring to , Mark Bell, ‘EU 
Directive on Free Movement and Same-Sex Families: Guidelines on the Implementation Process’, 
2005 ILGA Europe, and Gay Association, available at www.ilga-
europe.org/content/download/1448/9061/file/freedom.pdf last accessed 21/04/17. 
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moving there. This in turn creates a restriction on the free movement rights of same-
sex couples, as the EU citizen is unlikely to exercise their rights if they would be 
unable to take their loved one with them. The only remaining alternative for such a 
couple would be under Art 3(2)(b), which allows entry and residence for ‘the partner 
with whom the union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested.’ This is a 
relationship that the Member State concerned shall examine, and can, on providing 
justification, still deny entry. These provisions highlight the extra hurdles same-sex 
couples must jump in order to access their free movement rights when their partner 
is a third country national; a hurdle that would not be faced by those in a heterosexual 
marriage62, and could for that reason be considered an inequality in the morality of 
law63.  
 As a result of the directive it is clear how extreme the repercussions may be when 
Member States do not recognise same-sex partnerships as equivalent to marriage: 
“at stake are the fundamental human rights  of family members whose families do not 
receive legal recognition and protection in all European jurisdictions.”64 Recent 
developments in the case of Oilari v Italy65, has led to the requirement of all Member 
States to create some form of registered partnership or civil union for same-sex 
couples to enter into. The requirement has, however, fallen short of being extended 
to include the recognition of, or entering into, same-sex marriages. Instead, various 
relationships with their differing rights may be entered into whilst failing to address 
the problems then faced by a non-EU same-sex spouse or partner being unable to 
relocate due to non-recognition. Consequently, regardless of the decision in Oilari, 
the potential for same-sex couples to be denied the right to free movement continues, 
and the need for further reform remains.  
In the wake of considering the most extreme end of the spectrum, whereby the right 
to free movement may be denied to a couple as a result of their relationship status, 
the quote from Baarsma cited above, must not be forgotten; free movement is only 
ensured where the exercise of such freedom does not result in the loss of a legal 
position. Consequently, a couple who are able to relocate despite their relationship  
                                                          
62 Frances Hamilton and Lauren Clayton-Helm, ‘Same-Sex Relationships, Choice of Law and the 
Continued Recognised Relationship Theory’ (2016) 3(1) Journal of International and Comparative Law 
1, 26. 
63 It was stated in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press 1985) 205 that the 
government “must impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an argument that the 
citizen could not accept without abandoning his sense of equal worth.” 
64 Theresa Glennon, ‘An American Perspective on the Debate Over the Harmonisation or Unification of 
Family Law in Europe’ (2004-2005) 38(1) Family Law Quarterly 185, 201. 
65 Oliari and Others v Italy, Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015. 
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not being recognised still face a restriction on their right to free movement, as the 
exercise of the right effects their status and legal position lawfully acquired elsewhere. 
There are many differing laws in place across the Member States regarding same-
sex relationships. Some countries recognise a form of civil partnership66 which will 
have various levels of rights and responsibilities attached, and others recognise 
same-sex marriages67. With these diverging provisions for same-sex couples, 
alongside the various potential choice of law rules, a couple may be confused as to 
what extent their relationship is valid, and therefore which rights and responsibilities 
are, and are not, protected68. While Oliari v Italy may now mean some recognition is 
guaranteed in the Member States, it does not extend to same-sex marriage. A couple 
who have entered into a same-sex marriage could, therefore, find that their marriage 
is not recognised, and that instead minimal rights are offered. This creates the 
problem of limping marriages, whereby the relationship is recognised in one Member 
State but not in another. As a result of the differing choice of law rules that are applied, 
a couple’s marriage may flicker on and off like a light as they cross state borders. 
Therefore, while Member States maintain the right not to recognise same-sex 
marriages, some couples may find that the right to enter into a same-sex marriage is 
a “meagre right indeed.”69 On that basis it is evident that whilst free movement may 
not literally be denied, when taking into account the change in status it is clear that 
such denial in recognition could act as a deterrent to exercising the right to free 
movement70. For that reason, this must be tackled in the most effective way, and “[I]t 
is not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that the European Union is perhaps the 
most appropriate and effective forum in which to address some of the more complex 
issues that arise out of the operation of free movement.”71 
This exploration of problems surrounding access to the right to free movement 
demonstrates that harmonisation is needed throughout the EU on the choice of law 
rules to be applied in marriage validity cases. Rules of this nature could prevent the 
outright denial of the right to free movement, by requiring a particular choice of law 
                                                          
66 Such as Germany and Hungary. 
67 For instance; France, UK, Spain and Belgium. 
68 Prior to the case of Oliari and Others v Italy this doubt, depending on which Member State the 
couple had moved to could have extended to whether the relationship would be recognised at all. 
69 Barbara Cox, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If we Marry I Hawaii, Are we still Married 
when we Return Home?’ [1994] Wisconsin Law Review 1033, 1040. 
70 Much like the arguments made regarding the non-recognition of divorce in Mario Tenreiro and 
Monika Estrom, ‘Unification of Private International Law in Family Law Matters Within the European 
Union’  in Katharina Boele-Woelki (ed), Perspectives for the Unification of Harmonisation of Family 
Law in Europe (Vol 4, Intersentia 2003). 
71 Helen Stalford, ‘Regulating Family Life in Post-Amsterdam Europe’ (2003) 28(1) European Law 
Review 39, 52. 
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rule to be applied. The rules would also provide certainty in terms of recognition, all 
without seeking to harmonise substantive family law. Though other attempts at 
harmonisation, such as Rome III have been criticised, positive aspects have been 
drawn out and discussed.  The challenge, when determining what the appropriate 
choice of law rules are, is to offer that fine balance between certainty and flexibility. 
This challenge will now be embarked upon.  
5.6 The Most Appropriate Choice of Law Rules for the EU 
5.6.1 Member States and their Respective Choice of Law Rules 
In determining the most appropriate choice of law rules for marriage validity at an EU 
level, an appropriate starting point would be to consider the interest analysis based 
dépeçage rules outlined for England, to establish whether they could be utilised 
across the EU. In assessing this it is important to survey to what extent such choice 
of law rules are similar to other EU Member States. This could then be used to 
conclude whether such a suggestion would manifestly change the applicable rules in 
other Member States and, therefore, are more likely to be challenged, or whether the 
impact would be minimal.  
It is evident that many Member States apply a version of the dual domicile theory, but 
as opposed to referring to the parties’ domicile, it is the law of the country of 
nationality. For instance, Art 3 of the French Civil Code sets out that it is French law 
that is to be applied to French nationals in relation to status and capacity, even when 
living abroad. This is then further supported by Art 170 which states that the lex loci 
applies in relation to formalities, but also provides that French nationals must not 
breach any of the provisions set out in the code. The respective provisions essentially 
cover off the incapacities, again confirming that for French nationals, French law is 
applied; a stance that is mirrored in many Member States72. 
Amidst the highlighting of the similarities to the dual domicile approach, and the 
correlation with that aspect of the choice of law rules outlined as appropriate for 
                                                          
72 For example in Italy, Art 27 of Act 218 of 31st May 1995 sets out that capacity to marry and other 
conditions for marriage are governed by the national law of each betrothed at marriage. In Poland Art 
14 of the Private International Law Act sets out that capacity to contract marriage is evaluated 
separately for each of the spouses in accordance with their national laws. Finally, in Germany Art 13(1) 
of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code provides that the conditions governing each person to be 
married are the laws of the country of which he or she is a national.  
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England, it would be neglectful to fail to mention the problems with such an approach. 
Firstly, the use of nationality as a connecting factor, as opposed to domicile, could be 
criticised as there is no residence requirement to satisfy nationality. Residence carries 
with it a level of connection with a country, and with no such requirement there could 
be an increase in situations where the laws being applied have little, or no connection 
with the parties involved73. Secondly, the application of the law of each of the parties’ 
nationality in every case, would mark the return to the one rule fits all approach that 
was heavily criticised in chapter 3. Such a rigid and singular stance is not the answer, 
as it fails to consider the country which may be home to the marriage, and indeed the 
individuality of cases. 
Conversely, the purpose and policy objectives behind the application of each parties 
domiciliary or national law must be reflected upon.  In doing so, in chapter 3, it was 
determined that the use of nationality or domicile is usually about protecting the 
parties to the marriage. This is demonstrable when looking at the incapacity of age, 
where the law may step in to ensure that nationals of that country are not entering 
into a marriage at an age when they may not have matured enough in such a society 
to handle the related consequences. However, this is not true of every incapacity. Not 
every incapacity is about protecting the parties seeking to marry, alternatively some 
are concerned with the protection of society. It may be that a particular Member State 
does not wish to promote a type of relationship, and any rules governing such 
relationships are about shielding the general public. Examples include polygamy, and 
more recently, same-sex marriage. In such instances, it seems a nonsense to apply 
the law of the parties’ nationality, as this may not be the country which will be most 
effected by the marriage if the parties do not intend to live there.   
The errors in applying the dual domicile theory, or a close variant, when the aim is to 
protect societal concerns are further highlighted by the use of public policy 
exceptions. In instances where both parties to the marriage are able to marry under 
their domiciliary or national law, it is still possible for the host Member State to refuse 
recognition on public policy grounds. This can be demonstrated if we consider a 
scenario involving a polygamous marriage that has been validly entered into in 
accordance with the parties’ national laws. This couple then decide to move to Italy, 
and despite Italy’s laws setting out that the applicable law is the national law of both 
                                                          
73 This is one of the key criticisms recognised by the Law Commission; Law Commission and Scottish 
Law Commission, Private International Law: The Law of Domicile (Law Com No 88, 1985) para 2.7, as 
discussed in chapter 2.  
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the parties74, the marriage may still be denied recognition as Italy could invoke a 
public policy exception, as polygamy is not permitted in Italy75. The invocation of such 
exceptions adds to the uncertainty within the area as, regardless of researching the 
private international law rules, a couple may find themselves subject to an exception. 
Aside from the additional uncertainty caused, there is an important point to be made 
about how the use of such exceptions demonstrates errors in the choice of law rules. 
Returning to the scenario involving Italy, the very fact that Italy would need to invoke 
a public policy exception shows that the use of nationality is not always appropriate. 
Instead, it exhibits that there are occasions, potentially incapacities, where the country 
where the marriage will belong is more appropriate, thereby disencumbering the need 
to exploit public policy exceptions. 
Alongside demonstrating the problems with nationality as a universal choice of law 
rule, polygamy also uncovers the tolerance that is shown by some Member States. In 
spite of the ability to invoke public policy exceptions where the marriage would not be 
allowed in the host Member State, this is not a stance that is automatically adopted 
in every Member State. While the tolerance shown by England in relation to 
polygamous marriages was explored in chapter 3, it is by no means the only Member 
State to do so. Germany, like England, do not permit polygamous marriages in their 
borders, but they may nonetheless, recognise a polygamous marriage as valid if it 
was valid under the laws applicable to it at the time it was concluded76. Likewise, the 
Netherlands will show tolerance to polygamous marriages, and will recognise them 
where, parties who are allowed to, do so in accordance with their laws, and then 
subsequently decide they wish to move to the Netherlands. The basis for this 
recognition from the Netherlands is that the couple, “may expect that the rights and 
duties attaching to the marriage apply everywhere ... For those reasons, the marriage 
will have to be recognized."77 In defiance of the ability to deny recognition of the 
marriage, some Member States are more willing to consider the expectations of the 
parties to the marriage when it was validly entered into and has been legally 
                                                          
74 Art 27 of Act 218 of 31st May 1995. 
75 In addition to polygamous marriages, same-sex marriages could also be used to demonstrate this 
point. The recognition of same-sex marriages is decided by each of the Member States, and under the 
principle of subsidiarity there is no need to recognise a same-sex marriage permitted in another 
Member State.  
76 CF. Regional Court Frankfurt aM FamRZ 1976, P. 217 and Administrative Court of Appeals Kassel 
NVWZ. RR 1999, pp. 274,275. 
77 Government of Netherland, 2010 ‘Hirsch Ballin Restricts Recognition of Foreign Polygamous 
Marriages’, Press Release (27 January 2010) available at 
www.government.nl/latest/news/2010/01/27/hirsch-ballin-restricts-recogntion-of-foreign-polygamous-
marriages last accessed 21/04/17.  
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subsisting since. While this tolerance undoubtedly shows a level of acceptance and 
upholds the public policy objectives of the validity of marriage, it may leave couples 
in a greater state of confusion as to whether their marriage will be recognised. With 
the various choice of law rules at play across the EU along with the ability to invoke 
public policy exceptions which some member states may or may not utilise, it leaves 
couples in a realm of uncertainty with little hope of predicting the fate of their marriage. 
Instead, what should be sought are rules that balance all of these inculcations. 
Appropriately selected choice of law rules will not require the use of public policy 
exceptions, as each rule will be chosen with the nature of the incapacity and the 
relevant public policy considerations in mind. This type of approach caters for 
certainty amidst the flexibility and autonomous nature that is family life, as opposed 
to a one rule fits all rigid and confined approach. In stepping away from the universal 
choice of law rule of applying the law of both parties nationality or domicile, rules that 
go to the heart of the incapacities should be adopted. On this premise the combination 
of the dual domicile theory and the continued recognised relationship theory, 
suggested under the dépeçage based interest analysis approach for England, would 
also be the most appropriate for the EU. Admittedly, at first glance this may appear a 
dramatic shift from the universal application of nationality based rules that seem to 
dominate throughout the EU, however, in reality it may not cause as much of a stir as 
one may expect. With the problems caused by the application of exceptions, and the 
fact that some Member States are already showing the kind of tolerance required 
under the continued recognised relationship theory78, such a proposal may not be 
that controversial an option. For instance; if we look at a couple entering into a 
polygamous marriage in accordance with the law of their nationality, but intending to 
move to Italy, under the most popular approach of applying the law of both parties 
nationality, the marriage would be prima facie valid, and to find otherwise, Italy would 
have to invoke a public policy exception, bringing with it the uncertainty such 
exceptions carry. However, if under the system of dépeçage based interest analysis 
the continued recognised relationship theory was applied, the applicable law would 
be Italy as this is where they intended to live. As a result the marriage would not be 
valid under the known and accepted choice of law rules, rather than as a result of the 
ad hoc invocation of exceptions. Notwithstanding that the outcome would be the 
same, there is certainty and predictability for the parties, allowing them to make an 
informed decision about moving to Italy, and the law of the country most effected by 
                                                          
78 Such as England, Germany and the Netherlands as previously discussed.  
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the marriage is upheld. Philosophically, there is still an element of freedom, as 
although the constraints of the law may lead to  the same invalidity, freedom comes 
from this certainty and the ability to plan and work around the law79. 
Secondly, although the use of an alternative theory may be new when dealing with 
the capacity element of marriages, when looking at the law surrounding marriages 
more widely, alternative approaches are not uncommon. In reality, where the couple 
are living plays a part in the general effects of a marriage. Where the parties do not 
have a common nationality it may be that the Member State turns to where the couple 
are habitually resident or where they predominantly live80. 
Finally, while civil codes and EU databases81 suggest that nationality is generally the 
connecting factor when dealing with the essential validity of marriage, this may not 
always be accurate. This can be explored further when considering England and its 
conflict of laws rules. English conflicts of laws rules on marriage validity are not 
codified and it is often suggested that the most popular choice of law rule is the dual 
domicile theory, which is described as the most “orthodox view”82, and the one which 
“commands most support in English law”83.  It is also the only theory that is mentioned 
on the EU database84. In reality, other choice of law rules are in operation in England, 
and have received support within case law85. Whilst this can be identified when 
considering English law, such assertions as an outsider looking in are difficult to make 
in relation to other Member States.  In reality, with limited access to Member States’ 
case law, it cannot be said with any certainty that they too are not adopting other 
connecting factors that they are familiar with, such as habitual residence or where the 
couple predominantly live. If, in fact, such a practice is occurring, this would make the 
aforementioned suggestions less dramatic and likely to be objected to, as the Member 
State would be showing an approach somewhat more relaxed than a strict application 
                                                          
79 Jeremy Waldon, ‘Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law’ (2011) New York University Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Papers, paper 263, 4 available at http://Isr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/263 last 
accessed 21/04/17.  
80 See Art 14 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code for Germany; Art 29 of the 218 Act for Italy and 
Art 18 of the International Private Law Act (IPRG) for Austria. 
81 For instance, the Europa website sets out the conflicts rules on marriage for many of the Member 
States, see http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_eng_en.htm Last accessed 
21/04/17. 
82 David McClean and Kisch Beevers, Morris: The Conflicts of Laws (7th edn, Thomson Reuters (legal) 
Limited 2009) 211. 
83 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 355. 
84 http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_eng_en.htm see the tab for the UK, 
last accessed 21/04/17. 
85 See for example Radwan v Radwan (No 2) [1973] Fam 35 for support of the intended matrimonial 
home theory and Westminster City Council v C [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [2009] Fam 11 for support for 
the most real and substantial connection test. 
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of the law of nationality. In essence, the applicable law, as set out under the civil 
codes and EU databases, provides a worst case scenario from which to build on. 
Tackling the issue from this angle means that the existence of other choice of law 
rules and an element of flexibility in the approach taken, would only bolster the 
outlined approach. The application of both the dual domicile theory and the continued 
recognised relationship theory, dependent upon the incapacity at hand would,  look 
somewhat less of a stride forward and certainly more achievable at an EU level.  
5.6.2 Choice of Law Rules within the EU 
In assessing the most appropriate choice of law rules, in addition to exploring those 
used within England and other Member States, it is also important to consider the 
connecting factors used within the EU family law context. This is important as it may 
uncover a more appropriate solution to those previously outlined. Furthermore, it may 
point to a connecting factor that the Member States are already familiar with from 
other aspects of family law. This could be advantageous as it could lead to an easier 
transition, but it may also mean Member States are more willing to accept and apply 
it to marriage validity due to its familiarity.  
One such connecting factor is that of habitual residence. Although Rome III was 
unsuccessful, enhanced cooperation was entered into by select Member States86, 
and they maintained the use of habitual residence proposed in Rome III. In the first 
instance under the regulation it is determined whether the parties have agreed on the 
applicable law87 and, if this has not been agreed upon the regulation provides a 
checklist of potential choice of law rules88 which, when taken in order, sets out the 
most appropriate choice of law rule. The first option on said checklist is where the 
parties have their common habitual residence. In the absence of a mutual agreement 
between the parties, habitual residence is the default choice of law rule. Likewise in 
Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 on dealing with succession, Art 21(1) provides that the 
applicable law ‘to the succession as a whole shall be the law of the state in which the 
deceased had his habitual residence at the time of death.’ 
Irrespective of such familiarity, habitual residence may not provide the appropriate 
solution at an EU level. It is not a connecting factor with an established and certain 
                                                          
86Council Regulation (EC) 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] OJ L343/10. 
87 Ibid, Chapter 2, Art 5. 
88 Ibid, Chapter 2, Art 8. 
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definition, in contrast, it has an autonomous nature and “may have a different meaning 
in different statutes according to their context and purpose.”89 It is a nebulous notion, 
and for that reason does not provide the unity required in a set choice of law rule90. 
One Member State’s definition of habitual residence could differ to another, further 
adding to the uncertainty in its application. As outlined in chapter 2, under English 
law, habitual residence requires the concurrence of physical residence and the mental 
status of having a settled purpose of remaining91. While this may appear on the 
surface reasonably straightforward, with a little digging it is possible to see the 
uncertainty beneath the surface. The length of residence required to satisfy physical 
presence seems to vary widely, and most certainly appears to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. In the case of Re J (Abduction: Custody Rights)92Lord Brandon stated 
that habitual residence could only be acquired after an “appreciable period of time”93, 
and in Nessa v Chief Adjudication Officer94 four days was not considered long 
enough. When considering cases with slightly longer timescales, it can be seen in Re 
F (Child Abduction)95 one month was sufficient, similarly in Re S (A Child) (Habitual 
Residence)96  7 – 8 weeks was sufficient. Such cases can be contrasted  with that of 
A v A (Child Abduction)97 where eight months was considered insufficient. Each case 
is clearly assessed individually, and the period of residence is considered alongside 
the settled intention, and “the subjective element tends to lead to unpredictability”98. 
The second element of intention may also prove problematic. Though at first glance 
it may appear relatively easy to satisfy, as the propositus need only intend to remain 
for a fixed period of time, as opposed to indefinitely99, this is not without its challenges. 
As a result of only requiring there to be an intention to remain  for a fixed period of 
time, instances may arise where a person is deemed habitually resident in a country 
to which they have no, or very little connection. This is particularly foreseeable where 
a person has moved to a Member State for work purposes, they will have an intention 
to remain there for as long as the position taken up requires, and will be physically 
                                                          
89 Mark v Mark [2005] UKHL 42, [2006] 1 AC 98, 105 (Baroness Hale). 
90 Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family Law Going too 
Far?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178. 
91 Shah v Barnet London Borough Council [1983] 2 AC 309, 344. 
92 [1990] 2 AC 562. 
93 Ibid 578. 
94 [1999] 1 WLR 1937. 
95 [1992] 1 FLR 548. 
96 [2009] EWCA Civ 1021, [2010] 1 FLR 1146. 
97 [1993] 2 FLR 225. 
98 Pippa Rogerson, ‘Habitual Residence: The New Domicile’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 86, 90. 
99 For instance see Re R (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [2003] EWHC 1968, [2004] 1 FLR 216, 
Kapur v Kapur [1984] FLR 920 and Re B (No2) [1993] 1 FLR 993.  
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resident there100. A determination of habitual residence in these circumstances, could 
lead to the application of that Member State’s laws regardless of the wishes and 
expectations of the worker.  
Irrespective of the highlighted concerns pertaining to the English notion of habitual 
residence, and indeed the potential for various interpretations amongst the Member 
States, it is important to evaluate its meaning under EU law. Regardless of the 
contextual approach usually adopted when determining the interpretation of habitual 
residence, it has been given an autonomous and uniform meaning for EU purposes. 
Given its popularity as a connecting factor in many EU Regulations, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union considered its meaning and provided an interpretation. 
In Magdalena Fernández v Commission101, the ECJ held that ‘habitual residence’ was 
the place where the person has his permanent or habitual centre of interests. This 
interpretation has been reiterated and confirmed within subsequent case law102. As 
previously stated, Brussels II bis also utilises habitual residence for jurisdictional 
purposes, and whilst the Regulations themselves do not provide an interpretation, 
one can be seen in the Borras Report103, which is an explanatory report for Brussels 
II. The report sets out that habitual residence is “the place where the person has 
established, on a fixed basis, his permanent or habitual centre of interests, with all 
the relevant facts being taken into account for the purposes of determining such 
residence.”104 This same focus on habitual centre of interests is evident105, and 
should, in the exploration of connecting factors within the EU, also be considered as 
a potential solution. 
The undertaking of such consideration does, however, highlight that all is not what it 
may seem. As always, within any application of EU law, “habitual residence has to be 
ascertained ‘in light of the aim and scheme of the community legislation 
concerned’.”106 Therefore, if what is at issue is related to employment rights, the place 
of employment will be taken into consideration, likewise, if it is the habitual residence 
                                                          
100 Such an example can be seen in the case of Re R (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [2003] EWHC 
1968, [2004] 1 FLR 216, where the propositus had transferred to work in Germany for about 6 months, 
and was held to be habitually resident there. 
101 C452/93 [1994] ECR I-4295. 
102 C90/97 Swaddling v Adjudication Officer [1999] ECRI-1075, C372/02 Adanez-Vega [2004] ECR I-
10761 and the English case of Marinos v Marinos [2007] EWHC 2047, [2007] 2 FLR 1018. 
103 Alegria Borras, Explanatory report, ‘on the Convention, drawn up on the basis of Art K.3 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Matrimonial Matters’, [1998] OJ C221/27.  
104 Ibid para 32. 
105 Z v Z (Divorce Proceedings) [2009] EWHC 2626 (Fam), [2010] 1 FLR 694. 
106 Maebh Harding, Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Routledge 2014) 26. 
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of a child that is to be determined, the best interests of the child will be a relevant 
factor107. As a result, it is clear that the ‘habitual centre of interests’ may alter 
depending upon the circumstances and rights in issue: it is not a concept with a 
consistent application. This is clearly demonstrated within Brussels II bis itself, 
whereby “habitual residence is to be interpreted somewhat differently for adults … 
and for children”.108 When assessing a child’s habitual residence for the purposes of 
Art 8(1) an assessment will be made taking into account all of the relevant 
circumstances, particularly the duration and stability of residence and familial and 
social integration109. This alternative method of assessment of habitual residence 
comes as a result of the problems surrounding the transposition of the CJEU and 
Borras Report definition to children; “since it places too much emphasis on the 
intention of the person concerned. That may be possible in the case of adults. … At 
least in the case of younger children, however, it is not the child’s own will that is 
decisive but that of the parents, …”110.  
Arguably then, habitual residence does not have an autonomous and uniform 
meaning within Brussels II bis alone, never mind EU law as a whole. Whilst it may be 
stated that when dealing with adults uniformity can be seen through the definition 
regarding the propositus’ habitual centre of interests, this is to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, and what factors determine that centre of interests will vary from 
case to case. In essence, what we are left with is yet another connecting factor that 
does not in itself have a solid and uniform meaning. Without having a definitive 
formula or even a list of factors to be considered to determine one’s ‘habitual centre 
of interests’, there is the potential for the same levels of uncertainty, identified in the 
likes of the most real and substantial connection test discussed and discarded in 
chapter 3. 
These problems, combined with the earlier concern of a tenuous link which, may still 
be a cause for concern under EU law, demonstrates the limits of habitual residence. 
It is a connecting factor, “ideally suited for purposes such as divorce jurisdiction”111, 
but is inappropriate as the choice of law rule for the essential validity of marriage. It 
may create tenuous and unexpected links with countries, be a vehicle for evading the 
laws that would otherwise apply, and fails to offer the certainty and predictability 
                                                          
107 Ibid. 
108 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 338. 
109 C523/07 Re Proceedings Brought by A [2009] ECR I 2805. 
110 Ibid [36]. 
111 CMV Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 341. 
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needed within the choice of law rule in this area; consequently, habitual residence 
would not provide a suitable alternative to dépeçage based interest analysis for the 
essential validity of marriage. With this determination, it is also important to recognise 
that this is yet another criticism of Rome III’s attempts at harmonisation that would 
not apply to the unification sought by this author. 
Coinciding with the previous reference to Regulation (EU) No 650/2012, it is also 
interesting to note that the regulation provides an exception to the use of habitual 
residence which could also be explored. This exception arises when ‘it is clear from 
all the circumstances of the case that, at the time of death, the deceased was 
manifestly more closely connected’112 with another Member State. The choice of law 
rule of being ‘manifestly more closely connected’ in terms of its application within 
marriage validity offers no further certainty. There is no definition of a manifestly close 
connection, and would, like the most real and substantial connection test explored in 
chapter 3113, require case-by-case examination, thereby failing to achieve the 
certainty and predictability sought.  
A final option would be to assess the concept of ‘automatic recognition’ as was 
considered by the European Commission114, in their assessment of how free 
movement rights could be improved through the recognition of civil status records. 
Aware of the problems that could arise as a result of not recognising the effect of such 
documents, the Commission considered whether automatic recognition of civil status 
situations established in other Member States would provide a suitable solution.  If 
automatic recognition were to be utilised as the applicable choice of law rule within 
marriage validity it would put comity and mutual trust between Member States at the 
forefront in order to provide certainty for couples as they cross state borders. This 
would also be achieved without requiring any Member State, “to change its 
substantive law or modify its legal system.”115  This does not mean that such a solution 
would be without its problems. It may, like the application of the lex loci, bring with it 
risks of forum shopping, and therefore an increase in the level of public policy 
exceptions being applied, so as to allow other Member States to deny the marriage 
                                                          
112 Council Regulation (EC) 650/2012 of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of 
succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession [2012] OJ L201/107, Chapter 
III, Art 21(1). 
113 See section 3.5. 
114 Commission ‘Less Bureaucracy for Citizens: Promoting Free movement of public Documents and 
the Recognition of the effect of Civil Status Records’ COM (2010) 747 final (Green Paper). 
115 Ibid para 4.3. 
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when the likes of forum shopping and evasion of local laws has occurred. This was a 
risk recognised at a general level by the European Commission, who asserted that 
compensatory measures may be needed to prevent abuse of public order rules, but 
they also went on to recognise that “This might prove to be more complicated in other 
civil status situations such as marriage”116. For these reasons it is apparent that 
despite the potential for certainty on the face of the theory, such certainty would be 
lost due to the undoubtable use of public policy exceptions. For that reason mutual 
recognition does not provide an appropriate choice of law rule for marriage validity. 
This exploration of EU choice of law rules demonstrates that no such options would 
be appropriate for marriage validity purposes, and therefore it is necessary to return 
to the proposal of dépeçage based interest analysis set out for use in England in 
chapter 3.  
5.6.3 The Law Under Dépeçage and Interest Analysis 
The consideration of both existing choice of law rules in marriage validity, and 
connecting factors used within EU family law more widely, highlights that the most 
appropriate solution is that of dépeçage based interest analysis. Although such an 
approach requires the determination of the most appropriate choice of law rule for 
each incapacity, this has been considered in great lengths in chapters 3 and 4, and 
so for many of the incapacities this will be covered somewhat succinctly. 
Taking a consistent approach to the reform suggested for England it is proposed that 
for the incapacity of age, the appropriate choice of law rule should be that of the dual 
domicile theory. The requirement to attain a certain age in accordance with a 
particular country’s law is designed to allow the protection of those domicilaries from 
entering into a relationship, and commitment for which they are not yet mature enough 
to handle. It, therefore, follows that the country that would have the greatest concern 
in providing such protection, will be that of the propositus’ domicile. It is also 
recognised that as a result of the clear preference of most Member States in applying 
a version of the dual domicile theory, such a proposal is unlikely to face much 
objection.  
The application of the continued recognised relationship theory for consanguinity and 
affinity may, on the other hand, be subject to further debate. Member States must first 
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consider however, the fact that many EU Member States are going to have similar 
rules regarding these issues anyway. For instance, in exploring consanguinity, it is 
possible to identify a general prohibition on marriage between children and parents; 
children and grandparents; brothers and sisters; and also in some states aunts and 
uncles with nieces and nephews117. Therefore, unless it involves non-EU nationals, 
we are unlikely to see much difference on the ground as, regardless of the applicable 
law, the relationship is likely to be prohibited. The continued recognised relationship 
theory would just ensure that the applicable law is the one that can best take account 
of factors such as public policy concerns118. 
As with age, consent, given the nature of the incapacity is to protect the propositus, 
so it too should be governed by the dual domicile theory, which is unlikely to prove 
contentious across the Member States. Finally, before looking at polygamy and same-
sex relationships in more detail, it is submitted that re-marriage after divorce should 
be governed by the lex fori. The application of the lex fori  ensures that when the 
forum country recognises the propositus as single, they are then able to allow them 
to marry as a consequence. The application of an alternative law could produce very 
odd results indeed. For example, a country, may, by its laws, consider a person to be 
single, but on the application of the dual domicile theory  to the incidental question 
not be able to allow them to marry as the domiciliary law does not recognise their 
divorce119. 
It is argued that in relation to polygamous marriages the appropriate choice of law 
rule is, as stated in chapter 3, the continued recognised relationship theory. Though 
such an approach would require Member States to recognise a relationship they 
would not allow in their borders, it does not require any change in the substantive law. 
Instead, what is required is a level of tolerance, tolerance as previously outlined in 
this chapter as being shown by some Member States. One such state is England, 
who have recognised polygamous marriages involving their own domicilaries when 
they have set up matrimonial home elsewhere, as England were not effected by the 
relationship120. In addition, they have also recognised polygamous marriages in 
                                                          
117 In England the Marriage Act 1949 provides that a person cannot marry their parents, grandparents, 
siblings, their aunt or uncle by blood or nieces and nephews. Similarly, in France, Art 161 of the Civil 
Code prevents marriage of aunts and uncles with their nieces and nephews. Finally in the Netherlands 
according to the Marriage Conflicts of Laws Act, Art 3(1)(1b) a marriage cannot be contracted between 
prospective spouses related by blood or adoption in the direct line or by blood as brother and sister.  
118 For instance, the fact that any eugenic problems will be faced by the country in which the couple 
live as opposed to where they are domiciled at the time of the marriage, and therefore is the country 
most effected by the marriage. 
119 As discussed in more detail in section 3.7.4.5. 
120 Radwan v Radwan (No2) [1973] Fam 35. 
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England that have been validly entered into elsewhere121, and it is accepted that the 
law has now developed to recognise polygamous marriages concluded in a foreign 
country unless there are strong reasons for not doing so122. As previously referenced, 
similar acceptance is shown by Member States such as Germany and the 
Netherlands. Therefore, not only can a level of tolerance already be seen within the 
EU, which offers a foundation on which to build, but the justification for such tolerance 
outlined earlier by Hirsch Ballin, as being centred around a subsisting relationship 
and the parties expectations123, confirms that a choice of law rule such as the 
continued recognised relationship theory is the correct approach. While some 
Member States may be more reluctant than others, England is clearly not alone in its 
approach, and it would fulfil public policy arguments such as upholding the validity of 
marriage, fulfilling party expectations and international uniformity of decisions124. 
Finally, the incapacity of same-sex relationships must be considered. Even with the 
many Member States recognising a form of relationship for same-sex couples, its 
form is widely variable across the EU, as are the levels of rights and responsibilities 
attached.  Although some unity has been achieved in recent case law, so far as every 
Member State must now allow same-sex couples to enter into either a civil union or 
a registered partnership125, the extent to which they vary does not support the 
attainment of certainty and unity. In addition, regardless of the important step forward 
in the law Oliaria provides, it does not require that couples be able to enter into, or 
have, their same-sex marriage recognised. This could, nevertheless, mean that the 
recognition of a couple’s marriage or civil union could alter as they cross state 
borders126. This is problematic for many reasons which, have been further explored 
in chapter 4, where, in addition to the general public policy concerns relevant to all of 
the incapacities, it was also deemed that when considering same-sex marriage it is 
                                                          
121 Hussain v Hussain [1982] 3 WLR 679. 
122 Mohammed v Knott [1969] 1 QB 1. 
123 Government of Netherland, 2010 ‘Hirsch Ballin Restricts Recognition of Foreign Polygamous 
Marriages’, Press Release (27 January 2010) available at 
www.government.nl/latest/news/2010/01/27/hirsch-ballin-restricts-recogntion-of-foreign-polygamous-
marriages. Last accessed 21/04/17. 
124 All of which are supported by the Law Commission; Law Commission and Scottish Law 
Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) 2.35, 
but have also separately gained support for instance; Robert Leflar, ‘Choice Influencing Considerations 
in Conflicts Law’ (1966) 41 New York University Law Review 267, Michael Davie, The Breaking up of 
Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 23 Anglo-
American Law Review 32 and Barbara Cox, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If we Marry in 
Hawaii, Are we Still Married when we Return Home?’ [1994] Wisconsin Law Review 1033. 
125 Oliaria and Others v Italy, Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015. 
126 As was recognised by Ian Curry-Sumner, ‘Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in 
Europe’ (2009-2010) 13 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 59, 71 when he stated that “It is clear 
that the fate of same-sex couples travelling across international boundaries is somewhat precarious; 
the water should be tread with extreme trepidation.” 
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possible to anticipate other relevant public policy concerns such as; citizenship, the 
symbolic nature of marriage and equality.  
In assessing the need for certainty surrounding this incapacity at an EU level, it is 
also important to stress its relevance in relation to free movement. As evidenced in 
this chapter, the recognition of a couples’ status can have dramatic impacts upon their 
rights to free movement. This point becomes particularly significant in the context of 
same-sex couples as a consequence of the definition of ‘family’ within the citizenship 
directive127, as a spouse does not include a same-sex spouse due to the principles of 
subsidiarity128. While under Art 2(2)(b) family may also include those in a registered 
partnership, this need only be where the host Member State treats registered 
partnerships as equivalent to marriage. As a result of this, it may be that an EU citizen 
is denied access to their rights to free movement, as they are unable to be 
accompanied by their same-sex partner, or indeed spouse, who has no independent 
rights to free movement within the EU129. This, alongside the public policy concerns, 
highlights the need for a common choice of law rule regarding this incapacity at an 
EU level. It is imperative that couples understand their rights and are not frivolously 
denied  recognition of their relationship, or indeed, free movement, through the 
invocation of public policy exceptions needed only as a result of ill-fitting, generic 
choice of law rules.  
As a result of such aims it is promulgated that the most appropriate choice of law rule 
for this incapacity is the continued recognised relationship theory. This approach 
would allow couples who have been in their relationship for a reasonable period of 
time, to move around the EU without fears of their relationship being declared invalid, 
whilst not forcing Member States to change their substantive law130. It would require 
Member States to show that same level of tolerance that has been demonstrated by 
some of the other Member States in relation to polygamy, where years later a couple 
decide to move there. Meanwhile, it still gives the Member States the power not to 
                                                          
127 Citizenship Directive, Art 2(2). 
128 Commentary on Art 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that 
“There is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages. 
International courts and committees have so far hesitated to extend the application of the right to marry 
to same-sex couples.” 
129 For a discussion see Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual 
Legal Subject’ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 1023, 1026 referring to Anthony 
Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Stanford 
University Press, 1992). 
130 An important step that was recognised as unlikely to be achieved by the EU institutions themselves 
by Kate Spencer, ‘Same Sex Couples and the Right to marry – European Perspectives’ (2010) 6 
Cambridge Student Law Review 155, 175.  
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allow such marriage or partnership ceremonies to occur within their borders, or 
recognise the relationships between those couples who had always intended that 
Member State to be their home. The theory recognises the implications of such 
relationships on the community, in that such an incapacity is about societal views, 
rather than the protection of the individual, whilst also recognising the need for 
certainty and access to rights. It is the balancing act between providing certainty for 
couples and respect for Member States’ values. Though some may fear it is too big 
a leap for some Member States, it must be viewed as the stepping stone it really is; 
remembering it does not change substantive law surrounding same-sex marriage, but 
rather prevents couples losing a status they are accustomed to having. 
5.7 Conclusion 
It is clear that with the various potential choice of law rules at play across the EU, the 
only way to achieve certainty is to harmonise the choice of law rules for the essential 
validity of marriage at an EU level. This need has become more pertinent as a result 
of the increasing levels of migration and international marriages131. This increase in 
couples moving and marrying around the EU means there needs to be certainty within 
the law so a couple are able to determine whether their marriage will be recognised 
when they cross state borders. It has also become evident that, in refusing to 
recognise marriages, a couple may have restrictions placed on their rights of free 
movement. This, in its most extreme form, could prevent a couple from moving to a 
particular Member State, when one of the partners is a non-EU national, as to deny 
that partner their spousal status is to potentially deny them their only familial tie132 to 
an EU national, and therefore emphasises the importance of this chapter. The impact 
of non-recognition around the EU means that despite Brexit, and the fact that the 
choice of law rules may not be applicable to England, this Chapter remained central 
to the thesis. The potential problem caused by non-recognition is particularly apparent 
when considering same-sex couples, due to the principle of subsidiarity. Under the 
principle of subsidiarity each Member State is able to determine for themselves 
                                                          
131 Statistics from the centre for social justice, “European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” 
(2009) 5, available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/pdf%20reports/CSJEuropeanFamilyLaw.pdf  
(Last accessed 21/04/17) shows that of the annual 2.2 million EU marriages, 350,000 involve an 
international couple. 
132 Citizenship Directive, Art 2(2)(a) defines ‘family member’ and unless there is an alternative 
connection to that EU national under this definition or another EU national such as a child, the partner 
would not be able to exercise the  rights of  family members that are provided to EU nationals.  
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whether they recognise same-sex marriage, as the term ‘spouse’ is not deemed to 
include a same-sex spouse. 
Although putting in place clear and consistent choice of law rules may not lead to the 
guaranteed recognition of a marriage, or an ascertained protection of the right to free 
movement, it will certainly have a positive impact, and more importantly it will achieve 
the objective of providing certainty to couples regarding the recognition of their 
marriage. The requirement to recognise those relationships that have already been 
subsisting for a reasonable period of time, when the applicable choice of law rule is 
that of the continued recognised relationship theory, will consequently mean that 
more relationships are recognised. The rules proposed demand a greater level of 
tolerance surrounding relationships that the new host Member State may not permit, 
and eliminates the current option of applying public policy exceptions to negate 
validity.  Finally, as a result of the certainty and predictability accomplished for those 
couples otherwise facing the non-recognition of their marriage, they will have the 
ability to make an informed choice. Such an informed choice will mean they are 
aware, not only of the impact to their marital status, but also the ramifications in other 
areas such as tax, divorce and succession 
The suggested rules that provide this level of certainty, and require a degree of 
tolerance on behalf of the Member States, are those based on the system of 
dépeçage based interest analysis. In mirroring the approach suggested for England, 
the choice of law rules will be a mixture of the dual domicile theory and the continued 
recognised relationship theory, depending on what incapacity is at issue.  As with 
England, such a stance, would avoid the problems associated with the application of 
a universal choice of law rule133, whilst benefitting from a more tailored approach. The 
system of dépeçage, combined with interest analysis, allows for a more considered 
application of choice of law rules.  Each incapacity is allocated the choice of law rule 
which seeks to address the primary concerns of that incapacity, whether it be the 
parties to the marriage or society as a whole. This then circumvents the need for 
public policy exceptions that not only re-establish a level of uncertainty, but also 
provide the Member States with a loophole, or a gateway to invalidating a marriage. 
In assessing the appropriate rule for each of the incapacities a more stable system is 
                                                          
133 These problems have been highlighted throughout the research and include; inflexibility, a lack of 
concern for the specific issue at hand and also the public policy issues raised by the individual 
incapacities.  
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created for the EU, than one which is based on a universal choice of law rule that 
may or may not be set aside by the invocation of an exception. 
In spite of the certainty such choice of law rules would offer, whilst also providing a 
greater level of flexibility, it is anticipated that the theory may be criticised for going 
too far too fast. This line of argument would originate from the fact that many Member 
States apply a version of the dual domicile theory, and where this would validate a 
marriage which is contrary to their laws they apply a public policy exception. 
Essentially, they apply a much more conservative, and culturally protective theory, 
than that offered in the outlined approach. For that reason, it may be feared that 
requiring Member States to recognise marriages they do not allow, could be too 
forceful, and could in turn lead to a backlash, whereby that Member State runs in the 
opposite direction, moving us yet further away from achieving consistency within the 
recognition of relationships. An example of such a backlash can be seen in relation 
to same-sex marriage in the US, where, as a result of backlash to the more liberal 
views being introduced towards same-sex marriage, it took a great many years from 
the start of the recognition of same-sex marriage to get it declared as a fundamental 
right throughout the US134. However, the approach taken does not require Member 
States to change their substantive law. Rather, it requires a reflective equilibrium in 
respect of tolerating some marriages not permissible under their own laws. It is an 
incremental approach, which, is advocated as a more sensitive approach, and allows 
public opinion to adjust135. The choice of law rules proposed herein  ask that the 
Member States each take a step and meet in the middle, by affording couples marital 
recognition that they might not have previously. At times, such a compromise may be 
needed to ensure all those within the EU benefit through the provision of certainty 
and predictability.  
Marriage validity is an area of law that has been neglected, and has been in need of 
attention. Reed recognised in 2000 that “[T]he current parlous state of our law, 
confused and obscure in its treatment of essential validity, needs to be reformulated 
                                                          
134 The first states began recognising same-sex marriage in 2003 in Goodridge v Department of Public 
Health, 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass 2003) but it did not become a fundamental right until the judgment in 
Supreme Court case of Obergefell v Hodges 135 S Ct 2071 (2015). 
135 See for instance Kees Waaldijk, ‘Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in 
the Netherlands’ in Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes (eds) Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law (Hart Publishing 2001),  William 
Eskridge Jr., Equality Practices, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights (Routledge 2002) 119 and 
Kathryn Marshall ‘Strategic Pragmatism or Radical Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and the Civil 
Rights Movements Juxtaposed’ (2010) 2 William and Mary policy Review 194, 199-200. 
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for the next millennium.”136 Yet despite the time that has lapsed since this clarion call 
for reform no such development has occurred. A cathartic panacea is needed to cure 
current ills, and whilst Reed and the many others137 who have looked at the area of 
marriage validity may have focused primarily on the legal position in England, this is 
no longer enough. In aiming to provide certainty, combined with the required level of 
flexibility, the only true way to attack the ‘parlous’ state of the law in the modern day 
is to do so at an EU level. In order to achieve that aim this chapter has created 
appropriate choice of law rules that would in turn provide couples wishing to cross EU 
state borders with certainty regarding the recognition of their marriage: a right that 
that goes to the very heart of many people’s personal  lives, and, provides a significant 
development in the law.
                                                          
136 Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387, 450. 
137 See discussions in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 6 
A Unified Approach ‘From This 
Day Forward’? Providing The 
Optimal Choice Of Law Rules 
For Essential Validity Across 
The US 
6.1 Introduction 
The exploration of domicile and choice of law rules for marriage validity in the previous 
chapters has led to the formulation of an optimal de novo approach centred around 
dépeçage based interest analysis, which is propounded as the correct approach for 
marriage validity in both England, and the EU. This chapter now builds on those 
foundations in order to assess to what extent such an approach could be replicated 
in the US. There are clear differences between the legal systems of England, the EU 
and the US as a consequence of the various legal structures in place. For example, 
the UK parliament is sovereign in all matters of UK law except those it chooses to 
delegate, whilst the US is a federation, meaning there is a combination of state law 
and federal law with some aspects of law falling outside the remit of the federal 
government. However, there are clear similarities when it comes to the laws 
surrounding marriage validity, and these will be critically analysed to see what can be 
learned from looking at the respective jurisdictions in a comparative manner1. 
Though choice of law rules within personal conflict of laws, particularly marriage, have 
remained largely untouched in the US, development of approaches is evident in areas 
such as tort and contract. In fact, as will be discussed later in the chapter, it is those 
areas in which there has been a great deal of attention focused on theory progression, 
in order to achieve the most appropriate choice of law rules2. Meanwhile, marriage 
                                                          
1 As has been recognised by Symeon C Symeonides, ‘A New Conflict Restatement: Why Not?’ (2009) 
5(3) Journal of Private International Law 383, 384 “in an international field such as conflicts law, the 
drafters can and should draw from the experience of other countries, especially Europe.” 
2 This has involved for example, the development and refinement of what was interest analysis in 
accordance with Brainerd Currie. 
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validity appears to have been left behind somewhere in the shadows. However, the 
recent federal court pronouncement on same-sex marriage3 could be the catalyst in 
reemphasising the importance of achieving certainty within marriage validity across 
the states. Consequently, the developments within the likes of tort and contract may 
be of assistance. In these areas, theories have been reviewed and altered in order to 
rectify some of the criticisms of the earlier theories. They are also the areas where 
we can see an abandonment of the traditional lex loci rule within case law, and instead 
see interest analysis being developed in a way similar to that proposed in previous 
chapters, on an issue-by-issue basis. Therefore, by considering these developments 
within contract and tort, alongside the outlined approach in the previous chapters, the 
elements that are transcendent can be identified to ensure they are incorporated into 
the choice of law rule proposed for marriage validity in the US. This comparative 
approach will assist in ensuring that the proposed choice of law rules entail certainty 
brought by fixed rules, and an element of flexibility provided by the issue-by-issue 
analysis, as opposed to a one rule fits all approach.  
Under the current system there are various choice of law rules that could be applied 
by the courts when determining the essential validity of a marriage. This, combined 
with the differing substantive laws on aspects such as age and consanguinity across 
the states, has the potential to leave couples vulnerable to an unknown change in 
their marital status when they cross state borders. This risk is the by-product of state 
laws determining the applicable choice of law rule4, and while such a move may be 
uncommon within family law, as family law is traditionally dealt with at state level, this 
chapter will seek to establish certainty and unity by proposing set choice of law rules 
that are to be enacted at a federal level. The need for certainty is, as demonstrated 
in the previous chapters, vital for couples to ensure they understand any potential 
ramifications a move may have on their marital status. This is especially important in 
the US given that there are 50 states that couples are able to freely move around, 
and statistics show that many individuals do take up such opportunities5. With such 
large scale potential movement, multistate cases are inevitable and without federal 
                                                          
3 Obergefell v Hodges 135 S Ct 2071 (2015). 
4 “Because domestic relations belongs primarily to the localities of the states, America is a hotchpot of 
local and varying rules.” Walter Wadlington & Raymond C O’Brien, Family Law in Perspective (2nd edn, 
The Foundation Press 2007) 19. 
5 From 2008-2009 12.6%  of the population aged 1 year and over moved from a different state, David 
K Ihrke, Carol S Faber & William K Koerber, ‘Geographical Mobility 2008 to 2009’ (Issued November 
2011, Report No. P20-565, pg 2) available at www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/demo/p20-
565.html. Last accessed 01/08/2016. As provided at page 9 of the report this was a figure 7.2 million in 
2008 and 6.9 million in 2009. 
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choice of law rules, what we are left with is a guessing game surrounding which choice 
of law rule the judiciary will pick; “a veritable jungle, [in] which, if the law can be found 
out, leads not to a ‘rule of action’ but a reign of chaos dominated in each case by the 
judge’s ‘informed guess’.”6 
Selecting the appropriate choice of law rules will, of course, require consideration of 
the dominant approaches to marriage validity in the US. This chapter considers the 
primary contenders of the Restatement First, interest analysis and the Restatement 
Second in their original format in order to assess their appropriateness. Assessment 
will highlight any criticisms of the approaches, before moving on to analyse any 
developments. Developments are particularly apparent in relation to interest analysis. 
The chapter explores these in detail, with a view to demonstrating how interest 
analysis in the modern day has changed from the determination of a true conflict with 
a subsequent reliance on the lex fori7, to a more rules based approach8, similar to 
that promoted in the proceeding chapters. The application of such versions of interest 
analysis will be evidenced in the areas of tort and contract, alongside a comparison 
between interest analysis and the use of the state with the ‘most significant’ 
relationship in the Restatement Second, to illustrate its feasibility and suitability within 
marriage validity.   
Upon establishing the value of dépeçage based interest analysis as an approach, a 
selection of incapacities will be considered. The purpose of this is to ensure that the 
choice of law rules suggested for the incapacities in England and the EU, are able to 
be mirrored in the US. This analysis will also require the consideration of the relevant 
public policy concerns in the US, to guarantee alignment with the choice of law rule 
selected. It is important that the state most interested in advancing those policy 
concerns is able to do so, whether the policy be about protecting an individual or 
societal norms. In addition, such exploration of the incapacities will highlight the 
various laws in play across the states; further emphasising the need for set choice of 
law rules. The argument that such rules need to be actioned at a federal level will 
then be made. Although this may appear invasive and controversial when considering  
the current legal system in the US, there is in fact evidence of an increasing federal 
                                                          
6 See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F Supp 732, 739 (CD Cal 1975). 
7 In accordance with the works of Brainerd Currie in Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays of the Conflict of 
Law (Duke University Press 1963). 
8 As evidenced in the theories of David Cavers and Larry Krammer as discussed in Peter Hay, Conflict 
of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) and Herma Hill Kay, Larry Krammer 
& Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws Cases – Comments – Questions (9th edn, West Publishing Co 
2013) respectively. 
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role within the sphere of family law9, which, could offer some support for such a notion. 
The recognition of same-sex marriage is particularly noteworthy here, as it 
demonstrates an area traditionally associated with controversy, but having been 
handled at a federal level, is one of the few incapacities that offers certainty. This 
certainty will be drawn upon to show how it is both necessary and achievable for the 
remaining incapacities within the US. Furthermore, its success will act as support for 
the arguments made in the EU chapter surrounding a unified choice of law rule across 
the Member States, indicating that the certainty sought within this thesis for couples 
crossing state borders is indeed achievable.     
6.2 The Concept of Domicile in the US 
Domicile continues to play an important role within marriage validity in the US10, 
making it vital that the term is understood as it is meant across the states. Aside from 
this, if the choice of law rules proposed for England and the EU are to be considered 
as the potential solution for the US, it is necessary to explore domicile in order to 
understand how a rule such as the dual domicile rule would apply. Like England, there 
are three types of domicile that can be ascribed to an individual at any point in their 
life: domicile of origin; domicile of choice; and domicile by operation of the law. 
Domicile of choice appears to work much in the same way as extant English 
principles, in that, capacity permitting, a domicile of choice is obtained by arriving and 
therefore being physically present in the intended new domicile. This physical 
presence must also be combined with the intention to remain indefinitely, or at least 
no present intention to leave at a specified time11. In correlation to England, a mere 
wish to some day return to one’s homeland is not enough to overcome ties with the 
community, and lacks a real intent to leave12. The major difference between the two 
jurisdictions is in relation to the domicile of origin. Though, like England, domicile of 
origin is derived from an individual’s parents, the key difference is that, unlike 
England, there is no doctrine of revival.  Instead, the rule of continuance is employed, 
resulting in the continued application of the domicile of choice until a new one is 
                                                          
9 Such support comes in the form of both the United States Supreme Court pronouncements and 
enactments by congress, that will be discussed later in the chapter. 
10 This is as a result of the role in determining the validity of a marriage. For example it is evident in the 
comments accompanying the Restatement Second that the domicile of the parties prior to the marriage 
have an interest particularly when dealing with certain incapacities. 
11 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 42-43. 
12 Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Fields 81 F Supp 54 (SD Cal 1948). 
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acquired13. Therefore, having left the previous domicile of choice, it will remain the 
propositus’ domicile until a new one is acquired; the tenacity and hold of a domicile 
of origin is diminished.  
This variance in the law regarding the rule of continuance, as opposed to the doctrine 
of revival that has primordial significance in England, is particularly interesting given 
the problems and criticisms identified in chapter 2, surrounding the doctrine of revival.  
In chapter 2, a reform was suggested that centred around the rule of continuance, 
and thus the utilisation of the rule in the US provides comparative support for this 
optimised approach: it is yet another jurisdiction identifying it as the most appropriate 
method of allocating an interim domicile. It prevents the application of the laws of a 
country that has long since been abandoned by the propositus, and has no real 
interest in applying its laws. In addition, the rule of continuance satisfies the mutual 
requirement amongst both jurisdictions, that a person never be without a domicile. 
With or without the adoption of the rule of continuance in England, it is evident that 
domicile operates in much the same way, and aside from revival, would be worked 
out in the same way in each of the jurisdictions, therefore, it does not provide an 
obstacle in the assessment of choice of law rules.  
6.3 The Prevalent Choice of Law Rules 
As with England, a whole host of potential choice of law rules can be seen in the US. 
Whilst various developments, which, will be discussed later in the chapter have 
provided sub-theories, there are three main competing choice of law rules that will be 
propounded as supererogatory:  the Restatement First14; interest analysis15; and the 
Restatement Second16. 
Restatements of law are not binding in nature, but can be deontological in providing 
mechanistic bright-line choice determinations, and are consequently adopted in some 
states that promote practicality. The Restatement First was created by Joseph Beale 
and is often considered to be the traditional approach to conflict of laws in the US17, 
and the traditional rule for determining marriage validity18. Beale’s ‘vested rights’ 
                                                          
13 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 41-42. 
14 Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934), hereafter referred to as the Restatement First. 
15 As first propounded by Brainerd Currie in various articles which have been collated in, Brainerd 
Currie, Selected Essays and the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press 1963). 
16 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971). Hereafter referred to as the Restatement Second. 
17 Clyde Spillenger, Principles of Conflict of Laws (Thomson Reuters 2010) 4. 
18 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 68. 
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theory was centred around two key principles: territoriality; and vested rights19. 
Territoriality being the idea that there can be no law in a state other than the law of 
that state20, and consequently no foreign person may bring their personal law with 
them21. Vested rights is focused on where the issue arose, and if valid under those 
laws, it is valid everywhere22, on the premise that, “A right having being created by 
the appropriate [i.e. territorial] law, the recognition of its existence should follow 
everywhere.”23For instance, when considering Tort, it would be the lex loci deliciti24, 
for Contract it would be the lex loci contracti25 and for marriage it is the lex loci 
celebrationis26. The traditional approach provides that a marriage valid where 
celebrated is valid the world over27, unless it falls under one of the exceptions 
contained in s.132 of the Restatement First, which sets out that: 
“A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party, though the 
requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be 
invalid everywhere in the following cases: 
a) Polygamous marriage, 
b) Incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage 
is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil, 
c) Marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at the 
domicil regarded as odious, 
d) Marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even 
though celebrated in another state.” 
 
This will all be analysed later in terms of the effectiveness of the choice of law rule 
and any potential criticisms. At this stage the key element to be extracted is that the 
lex loci celebrationis28 is one of the main choice of law rules that may be applied to 
issues of marriage validity in the US, and indeed it has been recognised that it, 
“remains in force in most states in areas other than torts and contracts.”29 
Interest analysis, or governmental interest analysis as introduced by Brainerd Currie, 
is an approach based on determining the interest a state has in having its laws applied 
to the dispute. In setting out the approach Currie describes ‘interest’ as resulting from 
                                                          
19 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The First Conflicts Restatement Through the Eyes of Old: As Bad as it’s 
Reputation?’ (2007) 32 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 39, 57. 
20 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 68. 
21 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The First Conflicts Restatement Through the Eyes of Old: As Bad as it’s 
Reputation?’ (2007) 32 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 39, 57. 
22 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 68. 
23 Joseph Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Vol 3, Baker, Voorhis & Company 1935) 1969. 
24 The law of the place of the wrong. 
25 The law of the place of the contract. 
26 The law of the place where the marriage was celebrated, as set out in  s.121 of the Restatement 
First. 
27 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 68. 
28 Hereafter referred to as the lex loci. 
29 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 63. 
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“(1) a governmental policy and (2) the concurrent existence of an appropriate 
relationship between the state having the policy and the transaction, the parties or 
the litigation.”30 In essence, in any of these circumstances, Currie would recognise 
that the state or country in question may have an interest in the outcome of that case. 
Therefore, the first stage of Currie’s approach is to assess, “whether it is reasonable 
for each state to assert an interest in applying its respective law to effectuate its 
policies.”31 This has become known as determining whether there is a false conflict. 
A false conflict occurs where, on inspection, only one state has such an interest.  In 
the case of a false conflict the law that is to be applied is that of the only state to have 
an interest.  Where on the other hand there is a ‘true’ conflict, or there is no state that 
holds an interest, Currie provides that the applicable law is that of the lex fori32. In 
setting out interest analysis, Currie ended the analysis at the point of determining 
whether the case involved a true or false conflict, or was unprovided for. He did not, 
in the case of true conflict, propose a way in which the state’s interests could be 
weighed against one another. In fact he insisted that this was not the role of the courts, 
and was instead a “political function of a very high order”33. 
In 1971, the Restatement Second was introduced into the order, and was the work of 
Willis L. Reese. Although it carried similar aims of achieving certainty and 
predictability as the Restatement First, this was not to be achieved by the same 
territorially focused approach34. Instead, it was to be “a conscious compromise and 
synthesis between the old and the new schools”35.  S.283 deals with the validity of 
marriage, and provides under s.283(1) that: “The validity of a marriage will be 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, 
has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the 
principles stated in s.6.” S.283(2) also then goes on to state that: 
“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was 
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public 
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and 
the marriage at the time of the marriage.” 
 
Of course, what is evident in s.283(1) is the need to determine in relation to the 
particular issue, the state with the ‘most significant’ relationship. This is where s.6 
                                                          
30 Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Law (Duke University Press 1963) 621. 
31 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 98. 
32 Ibid 99. 
33 Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Law (Duke University Press 1963) 182. 
34 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 216. 
35 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 103. 
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comes into play. S.6 outlines the way in which this state is to be determined, and 
having set out in s.6(1) that they are to follow a statutory directive of its own state on 
choice of law, goes on in s.6(2) to provide the relevant factors when there is no such 
directive. These factors are: the needs of the interstate and international systems; the 
relevant policies of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested states; 
protection of justified expectations; basic policies underlying the particular field of law; 
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and finally, ease in the determination 
and application of the law to be applied.  
The current position is that any of the states may apply any of the above choice of 
law rules. Some states may have a preference towards certain approaches, which 
will be examined further later, but the reality is the ability to ‘cherry pick’, to ensure 
the desired outcome is achieved. The result of this is that there is no unified approach 
within marriage validity; we are left without a “dominate view of how to mediate among 
the interests of the celebrating state, the domiciliary state and other states.”36 As a 
result, couples will find themselves unable to predict which choice of law rule will apply 
to them, and, subsequently, whether their marriage will be considered valid in a 
particular state, bringing with it all of the concerns raised in the previous chapters 
regarding the potential legal consequences of a marriage being declared invalid. This 
uncertainty is further propagated when looking more closely at these approaches and 
how they have developed, and the criticisms of these which, will be explored in the 
next section.  There is the suggestion that the most popular choice of law rules within 
marriage validity are the two Restatements37.  What will become clear in the next 
section is that despite what appear to be quite distinct choice of law rules, elements 
of the approaches may merge and cross-over with one another, making definitive 
statements surrounding the dominance of the Restatements somewhat misleading.  
                                                          
36 William Baude, ‘Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law 
Review, 1371, 1387. 
37 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) shows 
support for the Restatement First, Walter Wadlington & Raymond C O’Brien, Domestic Relations cases 
& Materials (4th edn, The Foundation Press 1998) shows support for the Restatement Second and 
Robert L Felix and Ralph U Whitten, American Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials (6th edn, 
LexiNexis 2015) seems to suggest that there are 3 choice of law rules at play in relation to marriage, 
and they are the Restatement First, the Restatement Second and s.210 of the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act (as amended in 1971 and 1973). Linda J Silberman, “Rethinking Rules of Conflict of Laws 
in Marriage and Divorce in the United States: What Can we Learn from Europe?’ (2007-2008) 82 
Tulane Law Review 1999, 2000 recognises that whilst there is no uniform choice of law rule in relation 
to marriage validity, the traditional rules was the lex loci, and that the more modern approach is that of 
the state with the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the Restatement 
Second.  
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6.4 Does Prevalence Prevent Criticism?  
The aforementioned approaches may be the most prominent and popular choice of 
law rules, but they are not without criticism. The Restatement First provides a very 
clear general choice of law rule which allows for a level of certainty and predictability 
in its application. This arguably simple approach has been criticised for the 
assumption that all cases are black and white38, cases can be more complex and 
such a neat and tidy categorisation does not take account of this factorisation. Of 
greater significance, are the criticisms surrounding the exceptions, or escape clauses 
provided by s.132. Baude described the reliance on such exceptions as potentially 
consuming the initial rule39, and it has been suggested that the Restatement First’s 
continued success is as a result of such escape devices: “[M]ore often, these rules 
remain in place only because [a] court is able to find a way to evade them by using 
one of the traditional escapes, such as characterization, substance versus procedure, 
renvoi, or more often, the [public policy] exception.”40 As was suggested in a previous 
chapter41, the need to rely upon exceptions not only shrouds an arguably clear rule, 
bringing back the inherent uncertainty that is to be avoided, but also casts doubt on 
the effectiveness of the initial rule. The need for escape clauses such as public policy 
to be invoked by the judiciary casts doubt on the application of the Restatement First 
and the lex loci: “There is, however, a close correlation between the quality of a 
choice-of-law rule and the frequency with which judges seek to escape from it.”42 
As shall be demonstrated when looking at each of the incapacities, it is clear that 
public policy exceptions are indeed invoked by the courts. One such example is the 
contrasting outcomes in the cases of Wilkins v Zelichowski43 and In Re May’s 
Estate44. Both cases involved evasive action, as the couples travelled to alternative 
states in order to conduct a marriage that would not have been permitted by their 
home state. In Wilkins, the couple were avoiding the age requirement of their home 
state of New Jersey, which required them to be 18 to marry, and so travelled to 
Indiana where a female can marry from the age of 16 with parental consent. In In Re 
May’s Estate, an uncle and niece of half blood wished to marry and would not have 
                                                          
38 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 68. 
39 William Baude, ‘Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law 
Review, 1371, 1387. 
40 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998: Twelth Annual Survey’ 
(1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 327, 331. 
41 At section 5.6.1. 
42 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 75. 
43 140 A 2d 65, 26 NJ 370 (1958). 
44 144 NE 2d 4 (NY 1953). 
172 
 
been permitted to do so in their home state of New York, and so travelled to Rhode 
Island where such marriages were permitted in accordance with their Jewish faith.  
Both couples had valid marriages according to the lex loci and, therefore, de facto 
valid under the application of the Restatement First. However, in Wilkins an 
annulment was granted on the basis that the marriage was void due to non-age, 
whereas in In Re May’s Estate the marriage was declared valid in accordance with 
the lex loci. Not only does Wilkins demonstrate the utilisation of the public policy 
exception, when considering the cases side by side, an illustration is provided of how 
unpredictable outcome determinativeness may be via the utilisation of escape clause 
manipulation. Both were examples of evasion cases, and both potential grounds for 
invalidity fell within the exceptions provided by s.132, and yet a contrasting approach 
was taken by the judiciary. Not only does this appear to wipe away the supposed 
certainty and predictability offered by the Restatement First45, but it also hints at the 
level of discretion available to the judiciary when applying the Restatement First, and, 
the ability to’ cherry pick’ in order to reach the desired result. This assertion is yet 
further advanced upon a more detailed analysis of the judgments in each of the cases.  
In Re May’s Estate, is a case in which it can be envisaged that the will of the people 
would be to declare the marriage valid. Having celebrated their marriage, the couple 
lived together as man and wife for thirty two years, right up until the intestate’s death 
and had six children together. It would therefore seem that the application of the lex 
loci produced the ‘correct’ outcome. Alternatively, Wilkins portrays a less picture 
perfect marriage. Though the couple had also had a child together, the husband was 
convicted of multiple offences and was imprisoned, undoubtedly making finding the 
marriage valid, a less attractive option to the judiciary than that In Re May’s Estate. 
While this may appear to be limited evidence to support an assertion of judicial ‘cherry 
picking’, the argument gains momentum when exploring the judgment in Wilkins. The 
court openly considered what was in the best interests of the child and the plaintiff. In 
relation to the child, an annulment would not render him illegitimate, which would, at 
the time, have been an important consideration, and it was thought that in relation to 
the plaintiff, an annulment would go some way towards undoing mistakes made 
through immaturity: “The annulment will also serve to the plaintiff’s best interest for it 
will tend to reduce the tragic consequences of her immature conduct and unfortunate 
marriage.”46 The court had clearly made a decision on what they believed to be the 
                                                          
45 Which, Clyde Spillenger, Principles of Conflict of Laws (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 23 describes as a 
“major indictment” of the approach, if its main advantages are uniformity and predictability.  
46 140 A 2d 65, 26 NJ 370 (1958) 378. 
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‘right’ outcome, and therefore, it could be submitted that they used the Restatement 
First in a way that allowed them to achieve that outcome in both cases. 
Interest analysis on the other hand, offers no such escape clauses, and therefore 
avoids such criticism. With the tenet of the approach being based on the state having 
an interest in its laws being applied, public policy has already been factored into the 
determination of the applicable law, and so an exception is not needed. It has been 
stated that “in its basic core of making state interests the basis for resolving conflict 
of laws, Currie’s analysis was both new to American conflicts law and fundamentally 
correct.”47 This does not mean that as an approach it is without its problems. These 
problems rise to the surface when considering the way in which true conflicts are dealt 
with. Currie insists on the application of the lex fori, rather than the courts weighing 
the competing interests48. This reliance on the application of forum law leads to 
criticism of forum shopping49 and forum favouritism. The other main criticism of 
interest analysis under Currie stems from the case-by-case approach that he 
advocates. A case-by-case approach is highly unpredictable as each case is looked 
at separately, ultimately preventing uniformity of result50.  In addition, it is suggested 
that case-by-case analysis places a heavy burden on the courts when dealing with 
the cases51, as it is time consuming; any state with a potential connection would have 
to be considered by the courts to determine whether it has an interest. 
Alternatively, the Restatement Second has been praised for taking a middle ground 
between the two attempting to avoid the perils of them both as it: “rejects the rigidity 
of the First Restatement’s territorially – focused rule approach. At the same time, it 
also does not engage in open-ended interest analysis nor, for the most part, does it 
share the forum - bias of that approach.”52 In spite of this, and its apparent popularity, 
the Restatement Second it still subject to criticism53. The provisions of s.283(1) and 
                                                          
47 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 101. 
48 As mentioned, this stems from Currie’s belief that this is not the role of the courts, however, such a 
view can be criticised on the basis that “If judges are qualified and empowered to identify governmental 
interests, they neither lose or abdicate that power the moment they encounter a true conflict.” Symeon 
C Symeonides, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An End and a Beginning’ 
(2015) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1847, 1864. 
49 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 214. 
50 Herma Hill Kay, Larry Krammer & Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws Cases – Comments – 
Questions (9th edn, West Publishing Co 2013) 164-169. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 216. 
53“[P]opularity and qualitative success do not necessarily go together.”; Symeon C Symeonides, ‘A 
New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?’ (2009) 5(3) Journal of Private International Law 383, 394. 
Syemonides also goes on to suggest that some of the reasons for its popularity are not all that 
complimentary to the approach, for instance he states that it provides judges with virtually unlimited 
discretion. 
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s.283(2), as set out earlier, are the relevant sections when dealing with marriage 
validity. The provisions are read together, yet on inspection they are contradictory. 
S.283(1) suggests the application of the law of the state that has the most significant 
relationship, whilst s.283(2) appears to revert back to the application of the lex loci. 
These provisions, therefore, sit at odds with one another and are puzzling54. It is 
unclear which rule to apply, and it has been stated that s.283 “is really schizophrenic, 
and lays down two rules that are about as compatible with each other as Dr. Jekyll 
was with Mr. Hyde.”55 Dependent upon which provision is selected, the outcomes in 
respect of validity may completely contrast, and therefore they cannot be read 
together in the way the Act sets them out. For example, it may well be that if s.283(1) 
was applied the marriage would be deemed invalid because there was no capacity 
under the most interested state’s law, but if s.283(2) was applied, it may be valid, as 
the couple had the capacity in accordance with the lex loci. This potential scenario 
was recognised by Baude, who questions what would happen if the state with the 
most significant relationship under s.283(1) was different to the state where the 
marriage was contracted56. The route that would be taken is unclear:  
“if read literally, the Restatement (Second) adopts an alternative-reference type ‘rule 
of validation’ – a marriage is valid if it would be valid under the law of: (a) a state that 
had the most significant relationship, either at the time of the marriage or at a later 
time, (b) a state having a ‘substantial’ relation to the parties and the marriage, or (c) 
the state of contracting.”57  
 
Aside from the comment above, there is little guidance to determine whether the 
Restatement Second operates like the alternative reference test explored in chapter 
3, in that the courts can apply whichever option would hold the marriage valid. 
Regardless, the presence alone of the alternative options means it can be criticised 
in much the same way as the alternative reference test, as it means that the laws of 
various states may have to be considered, which is time consuming for the court and 
results in greater expense. In addition, if the courts do not use the options in order to 
find the marriage valid, the presence of the two options causes uncertainty and a lack 
of predictability. The two pronged approach means many couples would be unaware 
whether their marriage would be valid or not where the two tests would produce 
different results, and determinative legal advice could not be provided. Though not in 
                                                          
54 William Baude, ‘Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law 
Review, 1371, 1389. 
55 Hans W Baade, ‘Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis 
and the Restatement (Second)’ (1972) 72 Columbia Law Review 329, 358. 
56 William Baude, ‘Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law 
Review, 1371, 1389. 
57 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 235. 
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relation to marriage validity, a similar problem exists within Tort under the 
Restatement Second and Kay states that: “[T]he consumers of their hybrid product… 
may find it difficult to follow two separate paths at once.”58This could equally be true 
of couples trying to assess the validity of their marriage, and further highlights the 
uncertainty in the application of the Restatement Second. 
Briefly, it should also be mentioned that s.6 of the Restatement Second adds to this 
uncertainty, as a consequence of the open interpretation the courts are able to give 
in respect of the factors it considers to be  relevant, in determining the state with the 
most significant relationship.  These factors are not ranked in any order of priority, 
and the courts are able to shape and mould the factors they deem to be most 
relevant59. Some courts may consider factors such as party expectations, certainty 
and predictability to be most important, alternatively, others may be more interested 
in the forum’s policies, and the policies of other states who have an interest in having 
their law applied60. It will depend upon the angle which the courts take to the factors 
in the given case, and highlights again that despite suggestions of greater certainty 
and predictability such advancements are from the truth; in fact, “the Restatement 
(Second) is broad and imperfect.”61 With the alternative reference type approach, and 
the discretionary nature of the factors to be considered relevant under s.6, it is 
apparent why some accuse the approach of providing too much judicial discretion62, 
and of gaining popularity amongst the judiciary for reasons of selective outcome 
determinativeness:  
“The Second Restatement, vague and unprincipled as it was, had the distinct virtue 
of suggesting to the judges that they are not bound by any hard and fast rules… Its 
eclectic jumble of … near rules [and] norms… furnished courts with any number of 
plausible reasons to support whatever results they wished to reach. That, no doubt, 
is the principal reason why judges like it and academics detest it.”63  
                                                          
58 Herma Hill Kay, ‘Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts’ (1982-1983) 34 Mercer Law 
Review 521, 556. 
59 See Symeon C Symeonides, ‘A New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?’ (2009) 5(3) Journal of 
Private International Law 383, 394. 
60 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 218. 
61 Willis L M Reese, ‘Marriage in American Conflict of Law’ (2008) 26(4) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 952, 968. 
62 For instance, Symeon C Symeonides, ‘A New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?’ (2009) 5(3) Journal 
of Private International Law 383, 394. 
63 Friedrich K Jeunger, ‘A Third Conflicts Restatement?’ (2000) 75 Indiana Law Journal 403, 405-406. 
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6.5 The Developments within Interest Analysis 
Though the traditional approach to interest analysis, as propounded by Currie, has 
been criticised, there have been various modern developments that have seen 
interest analysis evolve. One of the key criticisms of Currie’s standpoint was forum 
favouritism, generated by the refusal to weigh competing state interests. This is an 
aspect in which significant developments can be identified, building on the core 
foundations of true and false conflicts, and the consideration of state interests that 
have been considered advantageous within the conflict of laws64. These 
developments to the approach of interest analysis will now be considered to provide 
a representation of what is meant by the term interest analysis in the modern day. 
Professor William F. Baxter introduced comparative impairment65. This approach is 
based on weighing the competing state interests and applying the law of the 
jurisdiction whose law would be most impaired by not having its law applied66. This is 
a clear departure from the application of the lex fori in cases of true conflict, and 
begins to show how the idea behind interest analysis was developed67. The ‘better 
law’ approach was then introduced by Professor Robert Leflar68. He sought to 
introduce a method by which true conflicts could be resolved, and so created a system 
of ‘choice influencing considerations’, these are; predictability of results, maintenance 
of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement 
of the forum’s governmental interest, and application of the better rule of law. The 
better rule of law is to be determined by reference to the problem at hand bearing in 
mind the present day conditions. Much like s.6 of the Restatement Second,  the 
considerations are not listed in priority order. As a result, courts utilising the approach 
have tended to focus on the better rule of law consideration, thus “[A]lmost invariably, 
when presented with a conflict between the policies of forum law and those of another 
state, the court concluded that forum law and policy reflected the “better rule of law”.”69 
                                                          
64 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 101. 
65 William F Baxter, ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’ (1963) 16 Stanford Law Review 1. 
66 See Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 215 and 
Herma Hill Kay, Larry Krammer & Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws Cases – Comments – Questions 
(9th edn, West Publishing Co 2013). 
67 In fact, most of the states that have adopted Currie’s analysis have rejected the idea of not weighing 
state interests. For discussion see Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years 
After Currie: An End and a Beginning’ (2015) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1847, 1864. 
68 See Robert Leflar, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’ (1966) 41 New York 
University Law Review 367 and Robert Leflar ‘Conflicts of Law: More on Choice Influencing 
Considerations’ (1966) 54(4) California Law Review 1584. 
69 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 224. 
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Therefore, despite Leflar’s attempts to move away from, Currie’s reliance on the lex 
fori, this is yet another approach that leads to forum favouritism.  
In addition to tackling over reliance on the lex fori, two further approaches aspired to 
also address the ad hoc case-by-case approach for which interest analysis is also 
criticised. Professor David Cavers created a set of rules to determine the applicable 
law in certain areas of tort70. His principles of preference  are rules that determine 
which state has the most interest in applying its law, though these rules are quite 
territorially-based71. Analysis of these rules could lead to the conclusion that they are 
likely to be avoided, as their application could return the law to a position of rigidity as 
seen under the Restatement First.  Finally, this idea of rules based interest analysis 
can also be seen in Larry Krammer’s policy selecting rules, which are based upon the 
application of the law that would uphold the shared policy72. Krammer appears to see 
the benefits behind a rules based approach rather than ad hoc case-by-case analysis, 
as it allows states to advance their most important interests, prevents  forum 
shopping, and achieves uniformity and predictability73.  Given the approach 
suggested for England and the EU, this development of rules, as opposed to case-
by-case analysis, is particularly interesting, and will be returned to later. 
Alongside the changes within the academic world, as discussed above, it is also 
possible to see the development of interest analysis as a core component in selecting 
choice of law rules within common law. The case of Babcock v Jackson74 was the first 
tort case to openly abandon the application of the lex loci. The case involved a 
husband and wife from New York who took a trip to Ontario with their friend Babcock. 
During the trip the three of them were involved in a car accident in Ontario whilst the 
husband was driving. Babcock sought to sue Mr Jackson and it had to be decided 
which state’s law applied, as New York would permit Babcock to sue as a passenger 
but Ontario would not. Under the traditional approach of the lex loci deliciti, Ontario, 
as the place of the accident, would have applied, but it was held that Ontario had very 
little to do with the case. Ontario was simply “the place of the fortuitous occurrence of 
the accident”75, and actually, New York was the most connected state to the case, on 
                                                          
70 As recognised by Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 
2014) 229, Cavers was working towards “the elaboration of rules rather than to ad hoc adjudication.” 
71 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th Edn, West Publishing Co. 2014)228-229. 
72 An example given by Spillinger is the general shared policy of enforcing contracts, and under 
Krammer’s policy selecting rules, in the event of a conflict, the law of the state that would enforce the 
contract would be applied: Clyde Spillinger, Principles of Conflict of Laws (West Academic 2015) 105. 
73 Herma Hill Kay, Larry Krammer & Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws Cases – Comments – 
Questions (9th edn, West Publishing Co 2013) 205. 
74 12 NY 2d 473 (1963). 
75 Babcock v Jackson 12 NY 2d 473 (1963) 483. 
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the basis of it being the place where the parties resided, and where the guest-host 
relationship arose, given Ontario was where the trip was to begin and end: 
“Comparison of the relative “contracts” and “interests” of New York and Ontario in this 
litigation, vis-à-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New 
York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is 
at best minimal.”76  
 
On this basis New York was the applicable choice of law, and Babcock was able to 
bring action against Mr Jackson. The court advocated an approach based on 
grouping of contacts, in order to determine the most interested state. The case 
encouraged issue-by-issue, dépeçage and policy analysis. This preference for 
interest analysis continued to be identifiable in the case of Neumeier v Kuehner77, in 
which the New York Court of Appeals adopted a rules based version of interest 
analysis. This case again involved a guest passenger in an automobile accident. The 
family of the deceased passenger wished to sue the family of the deceased driver. 
The passenger was from Ontario and the driver was from New York, and the choice 
of law needed to be determined. If New York Law were to apply the passenger’s 
estate would be able to make a claim against the driver’s estate, but if Ontario law 
was applicable the guest statute in operation in Ontario would immunise the driver. In 
accordance with the rules adopted in the case, Ontario was the applicable law and, 
provided a defence for the driver’s estate. These rules were not territorially based or 
designed in a similar vein of rigidity as the Restatement First78, they were reflective 
of the developments within interest analysis, and were designed to select the state 
with the greatest interest in a way that would have been achieved regardless of where 
the case was heard79. The rules were designed to provide a determination of the most 
interested state, resulting in the applicable law, rather than a methodology that, 
                                                          
76 Ibid 482. 
77 31 NY 2d 121 (1972). 
78 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 221. 
79 The rules were as follows: "1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the 
same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the 
standard of care which the host owes to his guest. 2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state 
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circumstances — be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defence. 3. In other situations, 
when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less 
categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident 
occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the 
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or 
producing great uncertainty for litigants.” (Neumeier v Kuehner 31 NY 2d 121 (1972) 128). 
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depending upon its application by the judiciary, may point towards a variety of choice 
of law rules80.  
Meanwhile, a similar occurrence could be seen within choice of law in contractual 
disputes. In the case of Auten v Auten81, involving an ex-husband and wife who had 
entered in to a separation agreement, the lex loci was again abandoned in favour of 
the ‘centre of gravity’ idea. The couple had married in England and lived there as 
husband and wife with their children until the husband deserted her some fourteen 
years later and moved to New York. They later entered into a separation agreement 
which entitled Mrs Auten to £50 a month. The agreement also required that neither 
party sue the other, and that Mrs Auten should not lodge a complaint against Mr 
Auten. Mr Auten failed to make regular payments, leaving Mrs Auten near destitute. 
Mrs Auten thereby took action in England: first for separation under English law; and 
when this did not result in payment, to sue Mr Auten for the monies owed under the 
initial agreement. As a consequence of these actions, Mr Auten argued that under 
New York Law, as the lex loci contracti, the contract had been repudiated and forfeited 
Mrs Auten’s right to payment. The court determined that by considering which state 
had the most interest in the problem, and where the ‘centre of gravity’ was predicated, 
that England was the applicable choice of law. Essentially, the ‘centre of gravity’ can 
be likened to the grouping of contacts in order to determine the most interested state. 
These developments further highlighted the changing perception of the applicable 
law. To this day, it is evident that a wide variety of choice of law rules are adopted by 
the US courts in relation to both tort and contract82. Whilst these areas are in no way 
connected to marriage validity, it is argued that they, along with the developing 
theories amidst the academicians, show what interest analysis means 
contemporarily. Interest analysis can mean determining the most interested state 
through tools like policy analysis and dépeçage. It can also mean creating rules that 
make it clear for all courts what law applies in a particular, and narrowly defined 
scenario83. This is the version of interest analysis promulgated throughout the 
                                                          
80 This problem with some of the previous approaches is recognised by Symeonides who described 
such approaches as “formulae that do not prescribe solutions in advance but simply enumerate the 
factors that one should take into account in the judicial fashioning of an ad hoc solution.” He also goes 
on to recognise that such ad hoc decisions leads to the dissimilar handling of like cases and therefore 
undermines legitimacy. (Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The American Revolution and the European 
Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons’ (2007-2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1741, 1795). 
81 308 NY 155, 124 NE 2d 99 (1954). 
82 See the list of state and choice of law methodologies followed compiled table in Symeon C 
Symeonides, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual Survey’ (2015) 
63(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 299, 351. 
83 This is recognised by Clyde Spillenger, Principles of Conflict of Laws (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 100 
who noted that “[B]oth courts and scholars, after some experience with interest analysis in a series of 
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proceeding chapters, and is indeed the approach suggested for marriage validity in 
the US.  
In recognising that the Restatement Second is one of the more popular choice of law 
rules, and is the leading choice of law rule for essential validity of marriage, 
crossovers between it and other choice of law rules will be considered. In particular, 
similarities between it and interest analysis will be unpicked, as it is argued that, 
“interest analysis is often heavily employed in states that generally follow the 
Restatement (Second)”84.  According to s.283(1) of the Restatement Second, the 
court is required to apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship. 
The state with the most significant relationship is determined by applying the factors 
set out in s.6. Concentrating on just s.283(1), a superficial resemblance can be seen 
in the requirement to determine the state with the most interest, and the state with the 
most significant relationships. These similarities are more apparent when exploring 
below the surface a little, by considering the s.6 factors. It has already been noted 
that there is a correlation between these factors, and those listed in the ‘better law’ 
sub-division of the interest analysis approach. It is argued that there is a clear overlap 
between the s.6 factors and the types of considerations that feature generally in the 
determination of the most interested state, thereby demonstrating that there is a 
commonality in the approaches of the Restatement Second and interest analysis, 
particularly when s.283(1) as opposed to s.283(2) is in operation:  
“A great many, however, will speak in both “most-significant relationship” and interest 
analysis terms. Since s.6 of the Restatement Second contains an amalgam of 
policies, interest analysis can also be an important or even the principal element in a 
decision purporting to apply the Restatement Second.”85 
 
On that basis it would seem fair to argue that, whether outwardly, or on a more 
discrete level, interest analysis plays a significant role in the choice of law process for 
marriage validity in the US. “Few states follow “pure” interest analysis, but many use 
policy analysis as part of their resolution of true conflicts, for instance, as a factor in 
the determination of the law of the “place of the most significant relationship” 
(Restatement Second).”86 Subsequently, this evidences that though it may not be 
                                                          
decisions, will be tempted to distil from these decisions a set of rules, for conflicts that are likely to 
arise with some frequency, that will obviate the need for a wholly case-by-case analysis.” 
84 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An End and a 
Beginning’ (2015) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1847, 1891. 
85 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 231. The use 
of interest analysis within s.6 of the Restatement Second was also discussed by Herma Hill Kay, 
‘Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts’ (1982-1983) 34 Mercer Law Review 521, 553-554. 
86 Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws Black Letter Outlines (7th edn, West Publishing Co. 2014) 214. 
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explicit, interest analysis plays a vital role. It has been argued that in its modified form, 
interest analysis has influenced much of the landscape of modern American conflict 
of laws87, and as a result, putting it at the epicentre of the approach for marriage 
validity does not seem too inappropriate. The system of dépeçage based interest 
analysis, designed around creating a rule for each of the incapacities, draws on the 
best elements of modern interest analysis. It focuses on determining the most 
interested state, as well as providing rules, which allows for the balance of certainty 
and flexibility.   
The crucial determination of the most interested state is achieved by considering 
relevant policy issues. Though developments within interest analysis have centred 
around selecting the most interested state, there has remained an almost fall back 
position of a territorial approach, despite attempts to avoid it. What is also apparent 
amongst these developments, and indeed the s.6 factors of the Restatement Second, 
is the role state policies play in the ascertainment of the most interested state. It is 
this role that dépeçage based interest analysis hones in on. The approach recognises 
that in order to understand which is the most interested state, it is first necessary to 
unpick the purpose behind any potentially applicable laws. Therefore, when looking 
specifically at the essential validity of marriage, determining the most interested state 
for each of the incapacities involves consideration of what the purpose behind the 
incapacity is truly addressing. Awareness of the purpose behind each of them will 
mean that it is possible to identify what policy concerns may be relevant, and, 
therefore, what choice of law rule should apply. For instance, some incapacities are 
centred around the protection of the individual parties to the marriage itself, and 
others are about social norms and the cultures of society, and so these will uncover 
very different policy issues which, thereby point towards the most applicable law. 
Meanwhile, tackling this through the creation of rules, as opposed to an ad hoc case-
by-case basis, continues to satisfy the overarching policy objectives of certainty and 
predictability88. The next section will focus on exploring some of the incapacities within 
marriage validity with the aim of selecting the most appropriate choice of law rule.  
                                                          
87 See for instance ibid, and  Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After 
Currie: An End and a Beginning’ (2015) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1847, 1891. 
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2134, 2138. Instead what is needed is new rules that provide the certainty without being broad rules 
that are applied to all incapacities. 
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6.6 The Incapacities  
Dépeçage based interest analysis choice of law rules have already been laid out in 
relation to England and the EU, and much of the same is proposed for the US. For 
this reason not all incapacities will be reconsidered in this chapter as this would be 
somewhat repetitive. The incapacities that are likely to prove contentious, and or, can 
be evidenced to have utilised various approaches before, will be explored to ensure 
that the same public policy concerns are relevant. Such examination will also 
reinforce why the current system and lack of certainty is failing, and is in need of 
reform.  
The specific incapacities that will now be considered are age, consanguinity and 
polygamy. Whilst same-sex marriage was dealt with as one of the incapacities in 
previous chapters, given the developments in this area in the US, this will be 
addressed separately later in the chapter. In addition, re-marriage after divorce will 
be analysed because of the apparent use of a dépeçage style system already in 
place, as this may add further weight to the argument that dépeçage based interest 
analysis should also be adopted within essential validity within the US. 
6.6.1 Age 
Age is an incapacity where, due to the various age requirements across the states, 
the potential for conflict is obvious. The minimum age at which a person can marry is 
determined by the individual state, and though many are in agreement that those 
ages are sixteen with parental consent and eighteen without, discrepancies across 
the US exist. For instance, Mississippi allows females to marry at the age of fifteen 
and males at seventeen with parental consent, yet they must each have attained the 
age of twenty-one to marry without89. In New Hampshire, females as young as 
thirteen and males as young as fourteen may marry with parental consent, and need 
be eighteen to do so without consent90. Finally, Washington requires a higher age 
than most states of seventeen to marry with parental consent and eighteen without91. 
Though just a small sample of state law, this demonstrates the differences that can 
be seen from one state to the next, and shows how conflict could arise. With these 
variances it is also possible to predict a problem with evasion of state law by couples 
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90 New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, s.457(4). 
91 Revised Code of Washington, 26.04.010. 
183 
 
wishing to marry younger than their state permits, if the choice of law rules are not 
designed to prevent it. 
The problem of uncertainty caused by the differing ages across the states is 
exacerbated  by the lack of consistency in the determination of the applicable law. 
Earlier in the chapter, the case of Wilkins v Zelichowki was discussed, and although 
the lex loci should have applied under the Restatement First, they cast that law aside 
on grounds of public policy and the annulment was granted. Yet in State of Arkansas 
v Graves92, the exact opposite approach was taken. State of Arkansas v Graves 
centred around the validity of the marriage between Sandra Spearman and Harold 
Graves aged thirteen and seventeen respectively. Though they had the consent of 
their parents, they were still too young to marry in Arkansas and so travelled to 
Mississippi, where they married before returning immediately to Arkansas. The 
majority decision in the case was that under the application of the lex loci in 
accordance with the Restatement First, the marriage was valid everywhere, including 
Arkansas. In assessing the validity, the court considered whether any of the 
exceptions in s.132 of the Restatement First applied, but held that they did not 
because the statute surrounding the minimum age to marry did not set out its 
application to marriages conducted outside the state. In reaching such a 
determination other evasion cases were considered93, however those cases 
suggested that evasion was not a reason to invalidate a marriage. It was also stated 
that strong public policy alone, in the absence of statute, was not sufficient to 
invalidate a marriage on grounds of age, unlike in cases involving polygamy, incest 
and miscegenation94. This is a striking contrast to the Wilkins case, in which the 
marriage was declared invalid, and subsequently annulled, despite its validity under 
the lex loci, stating, “it seems clear to us that if New Jersey’s public policy is to remain 
at all meaningful it must be considered equally applicable though their marriage took 
place in Indiana.”95 With these cases sitting at such odds with one another, what is 
left is undeniable uncertainty as to what choice of law rule will be applied.  
In the case of Graves, recognition of their marriage, despite their evasionary action, 
almost  permitted the couple to have total disregard for the laws, culture and social 
mores of the state to which they belonged, as all they had to do was hop across the 
border and find a state which would marry them. This could, as recognised by Harris 
                                                          
92  228 Arm 378, 307 SW 2d 545 (1957). 
93 See for instance In Re Perez’ Estate 98 Cal App 2d 121 (1950). 
94 State of Arkansas v Graves (1957) 228 Arm 378, 307 SW 2d 545, 554 (George Rose Smith J). 
95 Wilkins v Zelichowski 140 A 2d 65, 26 NJ 320 (1958) 376.  
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C.J., have acted as encouragement to other youngsters to employ similar tactics in 
order to evade stricter laws in their domiciliary state96, demonstrating that “referring 
all matters of essential validity to the law of the place of celebration seems the 
apotheosis of absurdity.” 97 At worst, the same unhappy result could have also been 
reached under the Restatement Second as a consequence of s.283(2)98, and would, 
at best, have resulted in uncertainty as to the applicable law given the contradictory 
nature of s.283 and the lack of certainty and clarity provided by the s.6 factors. 
Instead, relevant public policy concerns must be considered to identify the appropriate 
rule when dealing with the incapacity of age. This would then provide a rule that is 
tailored and policy sensitive, in combination with offering certainty regarding the 
applicable law.  
The prevalent policy issues discussed in relation to age for England centred around 
protection of young and immature domicilairies. It was feared that they may not fully 
understand the responsibilities that come with marriage, and the country best able to 
determine what that all important age is, was deemed to be the domicile of each of 
the parties. The domicile is, after all, the country that is able to suggest the rate at 
which maturity is developed within that particular society, given its knowledge of the 
educational system and how early it encourages maturity and indepedence, culture 
and societal norms. It is also the country that would have the most interest in 
protecting that particular individual, which is demonstrated in the provision of statutes 
declaring a minimum age in the first instance. These same policy concerns and 
arguments surrounding the law most appropriate to deal with them can be seen in the 
US. Harris C.J. in his dissenting opinion in State of Arkansas v Graves stated that: 
“Our own statute was undoubtedly passed because the legislature did not consider 
that boys and girls under the designated ages were normally or generally possessed 
of sufficient stability, logic or experience, to reasonably understand the full 
significance or responsibilities of the marital status.”99 
 
This clearly demonstrates that the policy concerns were, like England, about 
protecting potentially immature and unaware domicilairies. This is enhanced when 
turning back to the point discussed earlier in relation to Wilkins, in which the judiciary 
expressed that annulment would be in the best interests of the ‘girl’, and be a step 
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97 Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
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towards undoing some of the damage caused by her immaturity. The protective 
nature of these policy concerns, combined with the specific knowledge needed to 
determine the minimum ages, clearly exhibits that it is the pre-nuptial domiciliary law 
of the parties that must be applied, signifying that the most appropriate choice of law 
rule for age is the dual domicile theory 
6.6.2 Consanguinity  
As with age, consanguinity is an area in which there is great potential for diversity 
across the states. An examination of just a handful of states demonstrates the types 
of differences that can occur. In the State of New Hampshire, the Revised Status 
Annotated at 457:3 makes it clear that any marriages contracted outside that state 
that are prohibited under 457:2 will not be recognised. 457:2 includes the prohibited 
degrees of relationship, which for the purposes of New Hampshire includes a 
prohibition on marriage between cousins. Similar prohibitions on marriage between 
first cousins can be seen in the states of Mississippi100 and Washington101. Whereas, 
in the states of Georgia102 and Florida103 marriages between cousins appear to be 
permitted. As a result of these divergences it is important that the law is clear and 
predictable so that a couple would be able to establish whether their marriage would 
be recognised. At present the US is far from achieving such a position, and case law 
only highlights this problem due to the inconsistencies that litter the area: 
“inconsistencies which are illuminated in sharp focus by contrasting decisions on the 
validity of marriage between uncle/niece and first cousins.”104 
A great many of the cases appear to apply the lex loci, and therefore essentially the 
Restatement First105. However, with the Restatement First comes the escape 
clauses, which are then utilised by the courts. One such example is the case of 
Catalano v Catalano106, in which the couple, who were uncle and niece married in 
Italy where such marriages were valid, yet the marriage was not recognised in 
Connecticut where the husband was domiciled, and the wife later moved to reside, 
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on public policy grounds. This stands firstly in direct contrast to cases such as In Re 
May’s Estate, where no such public policy ground was invoked, but it also 
demonstrates the difficulty in predicting whether such policies will be invoked. In Re 
May’s Estate is an example of an evasion case where the couple were purposefully 
avoiding the laws of their state when they married and the marriage was still held 
valid, whereas,  Catalano does not appear to be an attempt at evasion as the wife 
continued to live in Italy where the marriage was permitted, for a further five years, 
yet public policy was invoked and the marriage denied. This appears to fly in the face 
of logic when considering which would be most likely to be deemed valid. In Re 
Mortenson’s Estate107, it was stated that “A marriage declared void by our statute 
cannot be purified or made valid by merely stepping across the state line for purposes 
of solemnization. We cannot permit the public policy of this state to be defeated by 
such tactics.”108 This is exactly what In Re May’s Estate allows, whilst denying a 
marriage which by all accounts does not fit the profile of a typical evasion case.  With 
such apparent lack of rationality, the use of the Restatement First, even if this were 
to be the sole choice of law rule, would not provide the levels of certainty and 
predictability sought, thereby leaving couples potentially unaware of problems with 
the validity of their marriage, and the legal consequences that may follow. 
It is also clear that the Restatement Second may be applied by the courts. The case 
of Cook v Cook109 is one such example. This case involved a marriage celebrated 
between two cousins in Virginia where such marriages were permitted. It was not until 
five years later that the couple decided to move to Arizona where such marriages 
were void, thus evasion was not their intention. Nevertheless, the law of Arizona was 
deemed to be applicable as a result of s.6(1) of the Restatement Second, regardless 
of the fact that the court recognised that Virginia had the most significant relationship 
to the parties at the time of the marriage110. This is an outcome that would have been 
difficult to predict given that Virginia was the state with the most significant 
relationship, and the lex loci. In his judgment Barker J sets out that “while Arizona 
invokes some principles from the Restatement, we do not follow it in certain significant 
regards.”111 As a result, not only is it difficult to know what choice of law rule will be 
applied, it is further complicated by the cherry picking, selective way in which the rule 
is applied. Like the Restatement First, even if the Restatement Second was 
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determined to be the appropriate choice of law rule, it is evident that certainty would 
still not be realised.  
Finally, some cases take different approaches altogether. In Ghassemi v Ghassemi112  
a marriage in Iran between two cousins came before the courts of Louisiana. In this 
case, despite Louisiana not permitting marriages of this nature, a hybrid approach 
was taken by the court, as it was held that the marriage would be recognised if it were 
valid under the lex loci  or the parties pre-nuptial domiciliary law unless, it violated a 
strong public policy of the state. This utilisation of domiciliary law can also be seen in 
the case of Meisenholder v Chicago & NW Ry. Co. 113 and, Schutt v Siems114.  In 
Meisenholder, the parties to the alleged marriage were cousins and both domiciled in 
Illinois. Given such a degree of relationship was prohibited in Illinois, the parties 
married in Kentucky, before immediately returning to their home state. Sometime 
later,  the ‘husband’ died in the course of his employment and so the ‘wife’ brought a 
suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. However, the marriage was declared 
invalid based on the domiciliary law of the parties. Likewise, in Schutt v Siems, a 
marriage between two cousins, one of whom was domiciled in Illinois, and the other 
in Minesotta (where the marriage took place, and where the couple then settled) was 
declared void when the couple sought to adopt a child, as the courts of Illinois applied 
the law of the pre-nuptial domicile of the party domiciled therein. These cases 
effectively demonstrate the important role domicile may take, even in cases such as 
Schutt, where the marriage does not offend the community where the couple actually 
live. 
What all of the aforementioned cases on this incapacity demonstrate is that there is 
a lack of consistency over what choice of law rule will be applied. Across the few 
cases mentioned, the courts have adopted: the lex loci under the Restatement 
First115; the exceptions under s.132 of the Restatement First, to invalidate a marriage 
that would have been recognised had the lex loci been applied116; the Restatement 
Second117; a hybrid of the lex loci and the parties pre-nuptial domicile118; and the 
parties pre-nuptial domicile itself119. In essence, “they reveal a beguiling Hobson’s 
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choice for the legal adviser”120. Instead, what is needed is a choice of law rule that is 
designed to cope with the specific policy issues of importance within consanguinity. 
Such a rule would avoid the lack of consistency demonstrated above, and would 
provide couples with certainty and predictability.  
The policy concerns surrounding consanguinity are predominantly related to society 
and what it considers acceptable. This involves protecting society from a relationship 
it would find abhorrent, but also preventing the promotion of such relationships within 
that society. This is apparent when considering the case of Etheridge v Shaddock121 
that involved a marriage between two cousins. Though such marriages were not 
permitted in the host state, it was valid in accordance with the lex loci, and given such 
a marriage would not “create much social alarm”122 it was deemed valid. It is evident 
that how society would react to the marriage was of primary importance to the 
judiciary in this case, as opposed to the protective nature with regards to the 
individuals involved. A mirrored thought process can also be seen in the case of 
Devine v Rodgers123. The case involved an uncle and niece who had married in 
Russia where such a marriage was permitted, however, when attempting to enter 
Pennsylvania as his wife, the marriage was declared invalid and entry was denied on 
the basis that their marriage would be offensive to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania: 
“Whatever may be the standard of conduct in another country, the moral sense of this 
community would undoubtedly be shocked at the spectacle of an uncle and niece 
living together as husband and wife; I am, of course, bound to regard the standard 
that prevails here, and to see that such an objectionable example is not presented to 
the public.”124  
 
Alongside these concerns, it has also been suggested that religion and eugenics play 
a part125. Whether it is one or all of these factors that the court considers, it is the 
country that the couple intend to live in that will be impacted. It is that society that 
need be accepting of the relationship along with any predominant religious cultures, 
just as it is that society that will be impacted by any negative genetic predispositions. 
It is, therefore, that society that should determine the validity of the marriage; it is a 
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public interest rather than a private interest at stake126, and the choice of law rule 
should reflect this. On that basis it is suggested that like England, the continued 
recognised relationship theory would be the most appropriate rule for this incapacity. 
It would mean that the law of the country where the couple intend to live, and therefore 
the impacted state will apply. This is the most policy sensitive option, and although 
the continued recognised relationship theory comes with the caveat that, should a 
couple later decide to move, the marriage will continue to be recognised if it has been 
subsisting for a reasonable period of time, there has to be some protection for couples 
who had not attempted to evade any laws. It is the rule that considers the relevant 
policies, but adds a little flexibility to ensure overarching aims such as marriage 
validity, stability, certainty and predictability are not lost when couples cross state 
borders.   
6.6.3 Polygamy 
Thirdly, if we look at the incapacity of polygamy, despite the fact that polygamous 
marriages are prohibited in all the US states127, there are still divergences in treatment 
within the common law. In cases such as Estate of Bir128 and Re Estate of Shippy129, 
polygamous marriages were recognised for the purpose of inheritance. Likewise, in 
Estate of Fallou Diba130 a polygamous marriage was recognised to allow wrongful 
death proceeds to be split between the deceased’s two wives. Thereby, highlighting 
that while the law in the US prohibits polygamous marriages, they may still be 
recognised for certain purposes. On the other hand, in Moustafa v Moustafa131, a 
foreign bigamous marriage was refused recognition by the courts of Maryland, on the 
basis that it contravened public policy, showing that comity will not always mean a 
polygamous marriage is recognised. These opposing results mean that for couples 
who may have validly entered into a polygamous marriage, there is no certainty that 
it will be recognised in the US. Polygamy is still permitted and practiced in countries 
in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, and so, for the couples migrating to the US 
from such countries the position surrounding the validity of their marriage is unclear. 
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This problem is exacerbated when one considers the fact that the US has seen high 
levels of immigration from said countries132; and it is, for that reason, vital that 
certainty of the applicable law is accomplished in the area.    
In order to best determine the most appropriate law, it is important to understand the 
policy behind the non-recognition of polygamous relationships in the US. This denial 
stems from the desire to protect cultural, societal and religious norms as, “the Anglo-
American tradition is the aim to universally prescribe the institution of monogamy.”133 
This aim, whilst now embedded within US culture may very well stem from a religious 
‘undercurrent’134. As a Christian country, monogamy is a pre-requisite of marriage, 
and so has become quite matter of fact. However, in some of the countries mentioned 
above, different religions are prevelant, and polygamy may be accepted. For instance, 
under Islamic faith, polygamy is permitted in the Qur’an, and polygamous marriages 
are allowed in accordance with Shari’ah law135. On this premise it would seem that 
the purpose behind the denial and non-recognition of such marriages is about 
protecting US society, as opposed to the individuals that are party to the marriage. 
This is further supported by Lines’ discussion of anti-polygamy laws within American 
immigration law136. He stated that those  celebrating polygamous marriages were kept 
out of the US for fear that such practices and “its taint would challenge ‘Christian 
monogamous marriage’ and corrupt white civilized society.”137 It was thought that 
such marriages were repugnant to the laws of nature of Christian nations138. 
Therefore, like England, it is suggested that the appropriate choice of law rule is the 
continued recognised relationship theory. The application of the continued recognised 
relationship theory would provide recognition and show comity where couples have 
been subsisting in the relationship for a reasonable period of time, whilst not requiring 
the US to permit polygamous marriages in their territory. The application of the 
continued recognised relationship theory, would mean that in relation to couples who 
had intended to move to the US when they married, or did so quite quickly thereafter, 
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the US, as the country with the greatest concern in the status and the validity of the 
marriage, would be able to deny recognition, just as they can prevent such marriages 
from occurring in their borders. Similarly, polygamous marriages celebrated in states 
such as Utah, in line with the Mormon faith, would continue to be legally invalid. It is 
suggested that the continued recognised relationship theory would carefully tred the 
line of providing certainty, recognition, comity and tolerance whilst also recognising 
and protecting the relevant public policy issues. As outlined above there are cases in 
which the US have been willing to recognise polygamous marriages, thus it is not 
absurd to think that the suggested approach could be achieved; “ Given the United 
States’ previous, limited recognition of polygamous marriages the idea of giving some 
degree of recognition to these relations is not entirely unsupported and the absolute 
ban is not entirely necessary.”139 
It is proposed that the choice of law rules created and advocated for England and the 
EU should also apply in the US. Although each incapacity has not been individually 
considered, it is evident that similar public policy concerns exist. While the continued 
recognised relationship theory may appear quite a shift from some of the existing 
choice of law rules, given there is no intended matrimonial home theory in the US, 
this can be likened to the most interested state, or the state with the most significant 
relationship. It is argued that the continued recognised relationship theory takes 
account of factors such as: party expectations; policies of the interested state; 
certainty and predictability of result; and the validation of marriages, and for that 
reason can be assimilated to what was sought to be achieved by the likes of the 
Restatement Second and the developing theory of interest analysis140. As with the 
position in England, it is also argued that no one rule, whether that be the Restatement 
First or the Restatement Second should be applied to marriage validity, as they do 
not take account of the varying public policy issues concerned141. Likewise, nor can 
the states continue to assess each case individually, as this causes problems for 
certainty, predictability and, of course, court time. Instead, the rules set out here, and 
in the previous chapters, provide the appropriate middle ground.  
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6.6.4 Re-Marriage After Divorce 
The incapacity of re-marriage after divorce offers an interesting insight into how 
dépeçage could work within marriage validity. While family law is on the whole dealt 
with at a state level, divorce recognition rules exist at a federal level. There are three 
firmly established rules of constitutional magnitude governing divorce recognition as 
laid out by Baade142. Firstly, the domiciliary state of either of the parties has the power 
to dissolve the marriage ex parte without the need to establish personal jurisdiction 
over the other spouse143. Second, a divorce obtained ex parte remains vulnerable to 
collateral attack in the domiciliary state of the respondent spouse, on the basis that 
domicile was incorrectly adjudged to prevail in the original set of proceedings144. 
Finally, if the other spouse appears in the proceedings, meaning the divorce is inter 
partes,  then any divorce based on the jurisdictional requirement of domicile is binding 
on sister states to the same extent as it is in the issuing state145. Forum law is then 
applied by the court that has jurisdiction to grant the divorce, and as “”domicile” is the 
nexus for jurisdiction, application of forum law really means application of the law of 
the “domicile””146. This divorce must then be recognised by all sister- states under full 
faith and credit. Full faith and credit is a clause within s.1 of the US Constitution, and 
ensures that states honour the court judgments of other states.  This, however, is not 
necessarily the case when dealing with foreign divorces. While no distinction is made 
in the Restatement Second between sister-state and international conflicts in the 
divorce sphere, meaning the rule could equally apply, this relies on comity. Some 
states may apply comity but there is no certainty of this unlike with the sister-states 
and, as was recognised by Reed, there has been some creativity employed by the 
judiciary in finding a marriage subsequent to a divorce valid for one purpose, and 
invalid for another147. 
It is an area where they have stepped away from the idea that one choice of law rule 
applies to all matters of essential validity, and replaced it with issue specific 
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consideration; thereby providing yet further support for the proposed approach148. 
What Reed discusses is dépeçage already being utilised within one of the 
incapacities. In the case of Estate of Borax v Commissioner of Internal Revenue149 
the husband had obtained a divorce from his first wife in Mexico and re-married, but 
his first wife challenged the subsequent marriage in the New York courts on the 
premise that the divorce would not be recognised by the New York courts as a 
consequence of the somewhat liberal approach of Mexico, meaning the second 
marriage was not valid. The courts agreed and the second marriage was declared 
invalid. However, the husband and second wife were living together as husband and 
wife and claiming married person’s allowance in respect of taxation benefits. As a 
result of the initial decision the Internal Revenue sought to claim for underpaid tax, 
but the United States Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) held that despite the decision 
in New York, the divorce in Mexico was valid and the second marriage also valid for 
tax purposes. What we see is a distinction being made between the issue of marital 
status and that of tax law. The courts used dépeçage to ensure that the most 
appropriate choice of law rule was used for each of the issues and that is, in essence, 
what is being proposed for the essential validity of marriage. Each of the incapacities 
should be dealt with as separate issues under dépeçage, with a choice of law rule in 
place for each of them and re-marriage after divorce should be viewed as an example 
of how this can be achieved; “[I]t should form a catalyst for policy-orientated reform 
of other impediment grounds to marital validity.”150 
6.7 Rules at a Federal Level 
The identification of the appropriate choice of law rule for each of the incapacities also 
signals the need for these rules to be adopted at a federal level. The current position 
is that the states are able to determine the applicable law, not only does this cause a 
difference in treatment from one state to the next, but as we have also seen, there is 
a lack of consistency within the states and the incapacities: 
“Courts tend to be less interested in theoretical purity and more interested in reaching 
what they perceive to be the proper result. The majority of cases that have abandoned 
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the traditional approach tend to use modern approaches interchangeably and often 
as a posteriori  rationalizations for results reached on other grounds.”151 
 
The dépeçage based interest analysis approach works on the premise that it is 
adopted by every state so as to produce the certainty it seeks to offer. Though this 
may appear to be a dramatic shift from the current position in the US, as has already 
been identified, there are some similarities and support for such an approach. Reese 
also recognised some time ago that, “The ideal solution, as would also be true in 
many other areas of choice of law, would be to develop a considerable number of 
relatively narrow rules of choice of law, each tailored to fit a particular or a number of 
specific issues.”152 He then went on to recognise that the current knowledge was not 
adequate for such a task, and that it might have to wait until more experience has 
been gathered. This author propounds that, in the approximate forty years that have 
passed, such knowledge and experience has been gathered, and the time has come 
to put these rules into place and satisfy such aspirations153.  
The suggestion of the adaptation of federal rules may, on the surface, appear 
controversial, and unlikely. Indeed in addition to marriage validity, much of family law 
is governed by the states. This has begun to evolve, and there is an expanding federal 
role within family law. The United States Supreme Court has made pronouncements 
which has led to federal law supervision of family law practices, such as 
pronouncements on interracial marriage154, a right to privacy in marital 
relationships155, and more recently, the ruling on same-sex marriage, requiring all 
member states to permit and recognise same-sex marriages156. Alongside the 
Supreme Court providing a federal backbone, so too has Congress, with enactments 
such as DOMA and the Violence Against Women Act. These Acts provide evidence 
that it is possible to regulate aspects of family law at a federal level, and there seems 
no obvious reason why this could not be achieved in relation to choice of law rules for 
marriage validity. This argument is further supported by the highly controversial 
outcome in Obergefell v Hodges. Despite the fact that same-sex marriage had begun 
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to be permitted in many states157, it remained subject to strong objection in others158, 
and so it is argued that if a federal rule can be achieved in such a highly controversial 
area, it can be achieved within marriage validity. Baude, in this sphere, argues that 
“Congress should decide what law governs marriage for federal purposes, such a 
provision could cut across all of the regulatory and statutory definitions and provide a 
uniform and predictable approach.”159 
Finally, if such a proposal can be made for uniformity at an EU level, it can also be 
achieved at a federal level across the US160. Fundamentally, the EU is made up of 
Member States who each have their own laws, and primarily deal with areas 
pertaining to family law. Likewise the US is made up of multiple states that have many 
areas upon which they tend to govern at a state level, one of which being family law. 
What both jurisdictions also have in common is their submission to a system which, 
on certain matters, has overarching control. Thus, it might be “possible to come 
gradually to at least a degree of “rapprochement” between European and American 
systems”161. The similarities between the two legal systems are, it is argued, 
substantial enough to allow such arguments around rapprochement to be made. 
Silberman discusses how the United States can learn from Europe in relation to 
conflict of laws in marriage and divorce162, and notes that there could be a basis for 
achieving a national federal standard163. She recognises the importance of domicile 
or nationality within the EU164, however, unlike Silberman the focus of this research, 
when considering domicile, is not about the prevention of evasion cases, but about 
recognising that the domiciliary state is the best state at advancing certain policy 
concerns. For that reason, unlike Silberman, it is not considered that the law of the 
domicile is of importance when dealing with same-sex marriages. As highlighted in 
chapter 4, same-sex marriage and the recognition of them is about societal norms, 
and the continued recognised relationship theory was as a result, identified as the 
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appropriate rule. What Silberman does show is recognition of the importance of 
domiciliary law, which does feature within the choice of law rules proposed to be 
adopted at a federal level, and so this understanding of its importance, and the role it 
has to play within marriage validity, is key.   More importantly, Silberman notes that 
the US are able to learn from the EU, and that a federal approach could be developed. 
She also notes that there has been no movement within Europe to create a unified 
approach for marriage recognition165, again implying that, if such uniformity can be 
achieved in one, it can be achieved in both. 
6.8 Same-Sex Marriage in the US: Paving the Way for Choice of 
Law Success? 
Until the recent decision in Obergefell v Hodges, the law on same-sex marriages in 
the US was plagued with uncertainty, and was somewhat of a “legislative Gordian 
knot for almost three decades”166. As with England, for a long time same-sex marriage 
was widely denied in the US, however, as set out in chapter 4, the case of Baehr v 
Lewin167 in Hawaii looked set to change this, with a planned change to the definition 
of marriage applying the Loving Principle168. While the case was not fruitful in creating 
rights for same-sex couples to marry, it did lead to the status of reciprocal 
beneficiaries169. Simultaneously, such attempts to recognise same-sex marriage were 
subject to resistance and hostility: “met with countervailing efforts to undo the 
decisions that created them.”170 Congress created the Defence of Marriage Act171 in 
1996 which, as previously outlined, limited the definition of marriage to those of the 
opposite sex, and prevented those in a same-sex marriage from receiving federal 
economic benefits.  Some states also went on to create mini-DOMAs, but as time 
passed more states began to allow same-sex marriage, which in turn lead to 
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uncertainty of recognition when couples cross state borders. This uncertainty is 
heightened by the various choice of law rules at play in the US and the escape clauses 
provided by the public policy exception for the state with the most significant 
relationship. On this premise, the position prior to Obergefell appears to mirror the 
uncertainty spanning the EU when determining to what extent, if at all, a same-sex 
marriage would be considered valid when crossing state borders.  
Regardless of the controversy in the US, and the fact that not all states had come 
around to allowing same-sex marriage172, the judgment in Obergefell was 
transformatively determined. This judgment requires that all states recognise and 
permit same-sex marriage. This has, on the whole, been successful as every state 
now permits and recognises validly performed same-sex marriages. Though a few 
counties within the states of Alabama, Kentucky and Texas were still, as of the 21st 
August 2015 not issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and as of the 21st 
June 2017 Alabama has seven counties that refuse to issue any marriage licenses, 
and one county in Texas that refuses to confirm whether marriage licenses would be 
issued to same-sex couples173, this is not a state wide issue174.  Thus, regardless of 
these issues, same-sex couples in the US now have certainty regarding their 
marriage and its validity, they need not fear that a move to an alternate state will see 
their marriage declared invalid.  
This is such a dramatic shift, and one that has only been achieved as a result of it 
being dealt with at a federal level. The successful adaptation of such a controversial 
rule intensifies the belief that this can in some way be reflected across marriage 
validity in the US. The desired result can be achieved by implementing the 
aforementioned choice of law rules for each of the incapacities at a federal level in 
order to create the much needed unity, certainty and predictability.  
Earlier in the chapter, it was considered what the US could learn from the EU in terms 
of choice of law rules, however, in relation to same-sex marriage the tables have been 
turned. As demonstrated, much of American conflict of laws, particularly in relation to 
family law, can be criticised for its lack of certainty. This is not something the EU 
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would wish to replicate, but credit must be given when it is due and “European 
scholars should attempt to evaluate what is useful about American precedents and 
ideas.”175 Obergefell clearly represents a precedent that has changed the law for the 
better, it has created a unified position in relation to marriage validity, and this should 
encourage the EU to do the same. Although the US and the EU are far from carbon 
copies of each other’s legal systems, the earlier similarities must be echoed. They 
are a group of states with differing, and at times controversial laws, however, if these 
hurdles can be overcome across the fifty states of the US they can across the current 
twenty eight Member States of the EU.  
The US should act as an inspiration for the EU, lighting the way to certainty and 
predictability in an area bedevilled by conflict and uncertainty.  Concerns regarding 
some Member States, and how far away they seem from accepting same-sex 
marriage, must be balanced against the more limited proposal advocated for the EU. 
The US have achieved a position allowing same-sex couples to marry in all states, 
whereas the aim of this research in relation to the EU is to achieve the policy aims of 
certainty, and predictability. Though the goal posts may shift in the future, the first 
step, and the one sought in this research, is to achieve the already discussed policy 
objectives of certainty and predictability for same-sex couples. These policy 
objectives have been the primary concern throughout this research, and in chapter 5 
it was thought that they could be accomplished throughout the EU in relation to 
marriage validity through harmonisation. Obergefell, and the unified position it 
created, is yet further support that harmonisation, even if on a more limited choice of 
law basis, is the way forward. In previous chapters other public policy issues have 
been discussed that are relevant to same-sex marriage, such as equality and the 
symbolic status of marriage. These are issues that were also tackled in the Obergefell 
ruling, and is, therefore, additional evidence that the EU should seek to replicate this 
by a unified choice of law rule, as proposed in chapter 5.  
6.9 Conclusion 
One of the key facts that has been evident throughout this chapter is the abundance 
of possible approaches to choice of law the judiciary could, and do, take across the 
individuated US states. Though there are three primary choice of law rules that are 
                                                          
175 Edorado Vitta, ‘The Impact in Europe of the American “Conflicts Revolution”’ (1982) 30 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 14. 
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favoured, there appears to be little by way of consensus when examining previous 
case law, to determine which will be utilised176. There is simply “no dominant view of 
how to mediate among the interests of the celebrating state, the domiciliary state and 
other states.”177 With the potential to create entirely different outcomes, the disparate 
approaches bring with them uncertainty and a lack of predictability. This is 
exacerbated by the various ways in which interest analysis has been developed, with 
some approaches remaining focused on a case-by-case analysis such as the better 
law approach, and others opting for a more rules based approach; for instance, Larry 
Krammer’s policy selecting rules. All of this, combined with the fact that each state is 
able to implement its own choice of law rule, means that the ease of crossing state 
lines around the US, may be complicated by ramifications to a couple’s marital status.  
In assessing the choice of law rules it was apparent that each could be criticised. The 
Restatement First leads to a heavy reliance on exceptions and escape clauses which, 
are recognised as merely prolonging the life of bad choice of law rules178. The 
Restatement Second causes uncertainty due to its alternative reference style 
approach179, and interest analysis under Currie has the potential to lead to forum 
shopping and forum favouritism. However, the academic and common law 
developments within interest analysis highlight that it has progressed to be more 
reflective of the approach laid out in the previous chapters. Attempts to determine the 
most interested state in true conflicts, and a move towards rules based analysis as 
opposed to case-by-case, indicates that  dépeçage based interest analysis could too 
be the optimal solution in the US.  
The proposed implementation of a dépeçage based interest analysis approach in the 
US required consideration of at least some of the incapacities. This was essential to 
ensure that relevant public policy concerns were borne in mind before replicating the 
rules proposed for England and the EU. The incapacities that were considered were, 
age, consanguinity and polygamy. In exploring age it was apparent that the 
associated policy concerns were about the protection of the parties entering into the 
marriage, and whether they were mature enough to handle all that comes with such 
a status. Consequently, it was determined that the state most concerned with 
                                                          
176 See for instance In Re May’s Estate 144 NE 2d 4 (NY 1953) that applied the Restatement First, 
Cook v Cook (2005) 209 Ariz 487 in which the Restatement Second was applied, and Ghassemi v 
Ghassemi 998 SO 2d 731 (2008) where a hybrid of the lex loci and where the parties were first 
domiciled as husband and wife was applied.  
177 William Baude, ‘Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law 
Review 1371, 1387. 
178 Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwar Law International 2008) 75.  
179 Ibid 235. 
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protecting the individuals would be the domiciliary state, and it would also be the state 
best able to asses the age at which such maturity is achieved, given the impact of its 
social and educational system. In contrast when exploring consanguinity and 
polygamy it was found that the policy concerns are more about how society would 
view such a marriage. The policies are about protecting society from a marriage it 
would find abhorrent, and preventing the promotion of such relationships. For these 
reasons a choice of law rule whereby the society within which the couple plan on 
living, and, so, the one needing to be accepting of the relationship is more 
appropriate. On this basis the continued recognised relationship theory was 
suggested for these incapacities. Finally, re-marriage after divorce was considered, 
albeit, from a different angle to the aforementioned incapacities. While under Federal 
law all sister state divorces must be recognised as a result of full faith and credit, this 
is not necessarily the case for foreign divorces, and in some cases the courts have 
taken a compartmentalised perspective that is issue specific180, and therefore 
supportive of the policy orientated reform of dépeçage based interest analysis 
promulgated for essential validity throughout this chapter.  
The detailed exploration of these incapacities also highlighted the need for a federal 
choice of law rule. The combination of unknown, state determined choice of law rules, 
and differing substantive law, means that under the current system a couple could 
move from one state to another, and not have their relationships status follow them. 
This could be as a result of differing laws on age or consanguinity between the states, 
but without knowing the choice of law rule in operation in the new state, the couple 
could be completely unaware that their marriage is no longer recognised. A federal 
rule would at least mean the couple were aware of the applicable law. This knowledge 
would then provide them with an informed choice, and if the move would result in their 
marriage not being recognised, the couple is able to determine their next step 
accordingly. Federal choice of law rules for marriage validity would offer couples the 
certainty and predictability they deserve surrounding their marital status, and are both 
possible and desirable181.  
The decision in Obergefell v Hodges exemplifies exactly how this can be achieved. 
Despite the existing controversy at the time, a federal rule was created requiring all 
states to permit and recognise same-sex marriages. This ruling in turn provides same-
                                                          
180 Peter North, Private International Law Problems in Common Law Jurisdictions (Springer 
Netherlands 1993) 38. 
181 William Baude, ‘Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law 
Review 1371, 1401. 
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sex couples with the certainty they deserve surrounding their marital status, certainty 
that needs establishing across the marriage validity spectrum. Subsequently, it is 
submitted that if such a monumental step can be achieved in an area fraught with 
contention, it can be accomplished for each of the incapacities. It is this same step 
towards unity and certainty that the EU should take note of. This research focuses on 
achieving the most favourable choice of law rule for the essential validity of marriage, 
and does so through a comparative lens. This approach to the research was designed 
to ensure that lessons could be learned between the comparators, and clearly the 
united stance achieved across the US in relation to the same-sex marriage incapacity, 
is not only a lesson for the US in relation to the remaining incapacities, but is a lesson 
to the EU, that a unified approach can be achieved across the Member States.  
With the same lack of certainty and predictability as England and the EU, it was 
palpable that the issue of marriage validity also needed to be explored in the US. 
Essential validity within marriage is “a choice of law matter that has been appallingly 
neglected on both sides of the Atlantic and is certainly ripe for a fresh 
reconsideration.”182 It is that reconsideration that this chapter set out to achieve, and 
in selecting dépeçage based interest analysis, that is exactly what it has done. 
Creating a rule for each of the incapacities under such an approach, provides the 
parties with the ability to determine the validity of their marriage, whilst also being 
sensitive to the public policy issues relevant to that incapacity. Like England and the 
EU, the adoption of the proposed approach would provide a significant development 
within the law, and is undeniably an important step in achieving the aim of this thesis, 
of providing couples with certainty regarding their marital status when they cross state 
borders.
                                                          
182 Alan Reed ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387, 414. 
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Chapter 7 
Overall Conclusions 
7.1 Achieving the Aim 
This thesis set out to analyse the choice of law rules within the essential validity of 
marriage, in order to suggest reforms to the law through the creation of optimal choice 
of law rules. The purpose of these rules was to provide couples with certainty 
regarding their marital status whilst maintaining some of the flexibility needed to 
accommodate the various familial setups including, but not limited to, children of 
same-sex partners and single parent families. This quest for certainty has primarily, 
from this author’s perspective, been about the legal consequences of finding a 
marriage invalid, however the reasons why people marry, and the subsequent 
emotional impact of invalidity has also been borne in mind. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of increased migration and mobility, this study then sought to extend 
this certainty beyond the borders of England by examining how this system could be 
replicated, and the law harmonised across the EU and the US. As a result of its multi-
dimensional nature, the aim was framed into a series of objectives, which will now be 
explored to determine whether the research has been successful in attaining its aim.  
 
1) To explore and suggest reforms to the law on domicile, to ensure the 
connecting factor is developed to make it more reflective of modern society. 
Analysis of the law on domicile in chapter 2 unveiled a concept that appeared 
outdated and unfit for purpose. At present there are three distinct categories of 
domicile: domicile of origin; domicile of choice; and domicile of dependency, and each 
were examined in turn to establish the aspects in need of reform. In doing so, 
difficulties were identified with the tenacity of the domicile of origin, the intention 
element of the domicile of choice, and the rules surrounding how a domicile of origin, 
or a domicile of dependency are acquired. Reform was therefore suggested in each 
of these areas. Firstly, in relation to the tenacity of the domicile of origin, this research 
proposed the abolition of the doctrine of revival and suggested it be replaced by the 
continuance rule that is evident in other jurisdictions. Secondly, having identified the 
difficulties associated with satisfying the intention element of the domicile of choice, 
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a rebuttable presumption based on a propositus  having made their home there, and 
thus having the intention to remain indefinitely was suggested. Finally, in regards to 
the outdated gender specific roles of mother and father, that feature within the 
provision of a domicile of origin and a domicile of dependency, this study instead 
promulgates a reform based on the place which the child is most closely connected 
to, and in order to determine this, proposes a rebuttable presumption centred around 
where the parent or parents they live with are domiciled.  
These reforms, along with other amendments set out within the chapter, evidence 
how domicile could be developed so as to become a connecting factor that 
appropriately determines which country a person is connected to, and should 
therefore be governed by. In implementing these reformulations the determination of 
a person’s domicile could be done with certainty regardless of their familial situation, 
which, would, finally, bring the law on domicile in line with the various legal 
developments and modern society. Chapter 2 sets out how domicile could, once 
again be fit for purpose, and able to serve its general function, and importantly for this 
research, serve its role within marriage validity.  
 
2) To evaluate and analyse the various choice of law rules and policy objectives 
within essential validity, to begin working towards a reformulation of the law. 
Within this reformulation, a new and original choice of law rule will be created 
that will be instrumental in establishing a policy sensitive selection, within a 
dépeçage based system, that looks at the incapacities of; age, consanguinity 
and affinity, polygamy, consent and re-marriage after divorce as separate 
issues to allow for a tailored, and therefore more flexible approach, whilst also 
achieving the certainty desired.  
Chapter 3 evaluates the various choice of law rules within the essential validity of 
marriage and notes that despite recommendations from the Law Commission1, no 
single choice of law rule does, nor is able to, operate universally. To do so would 
mean that the policy concerns relevant to each of the incapacities were not 
considered. On that basis this research analyses the concept of interest analysis. This 
begins with Brainerd Currie and his idea of true and false conflicts that are to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, before exploring what has now developed into 
                                                          
1 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in 
Marriage (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36. 
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issue by issue analysis on a dépeçage basis. It is the latter that this author then 
focuses on to show how dépeçage based interest analysis would allow for the 
creation of policy sensitive optimal choice of law rules, by providing each of the 
incapacities with its own rule. It was recognised that such an approach would not only 
allow for a policy sensitive application of the law, but would also provide couples with 
certainty as to what law would be applied, whilst offering a level of flexibility not 
possible within a universal choice of law rule.  
In order to establish the appropriate choice of law rule for each of the incapacities, a 
new and original choice of law rule was needed. This rule needed to uphold the 
sentiment of the intended matrimonial home theory, in its protection of the cultural 
and societal norms of the impacted state, whilst eradicating the favouritism of the 
husband’s domicile, and the need to reassess validity upon each relocation, and so 
the continued recognised relationship theory was created. This theory applies the law 
of the country where the couple intend to live or that of the country where they have 
lived if their relationship has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time. This 
theory is then combined with the dual domicile theory, to form the choice of law 
framework promulgated as appropriate throughout this research under dépeçage 
based interest analysis. When looking at each of the incapacities, age and consent 
were deemed to be primarily concerned with the protection of the parties’ to the 
marriage and so the dual domicile theory was selected as the most appropriate choice 
of law rule. In contrast, consanguinity and affinity, and polygamy were held to raise 
concerns that involved the society within which they planned to live and their 
acceptance of their marriage, and so the continued recognised relationship theory 
was considered to be the most appropriate choice of law rule. Lastly, the incidental 
question within re-marriage after divorce was thought to raise entirely different 
concerns, surrounding how their status is viewed in the country they wished to marry 
in, and so the lex fori was considered vital. In looking at each of these in turn, the 
chapter provided a detailed reformulation of the law that allowed for the most 
appropriate law to be applied based on the incapacity at hand, whilst also attaining 
the necessary balance between certainty and flexibility.  
 
3) To tackle essential validity as a whole by considering same-sex couples and 
the choice of law rule that should govern their relationships. 
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The literature around essential validity and the various incapacities therein pre-dates 
the legal developments concerning same-sex couples contained in the CPA and the 
M(SSC)A, and therefore fails to address what choice of law rule should apply. Chapter 
4 therefore analyses the law on the area with the intention of creating a set choice of 
law rule, that like the other incapacities explored within chapter 3, is policy sensitive 
and provides couples with certainty regarding whether their relationship will be 
recognised in England. In addition to the policy concerns highlighted in chapter 3, it 
was also recognised that additional policy concerns surrounding equality, citizenship 
and the symbolic status of marriage were also relevant to same-sex relationships, 
and so were also considered in determining the appropriate choice of law rule. In 
making the final determination the various potential rules identified in chapter 3 were 
considered, however, it was recognised that same-sex relationships as an incapacity 
was about the protection of society and its established norms, as opposed to 
protecting the parties to the relationship, and consequently, the continued recognised 
relationship theory was selected as the most appropriate choice of law rule. A set 
choice of law  rule is particularly important within same-sex relationships, as they lack 
international recognition. Not every country recognises same-sex marriage and there 
are a variety of relationship statuses similar to a civil partnership but with various 
rights and obligations. For that reason, the protection from having the status 
reassessed if a couple later move is an important aspect of the continued recognised 
relationship theory in providing same-sex couples certainty, and recognising the 
importance of the status in terms of citizenship and symbolism.  
The chapter also undertook a comparative analysis of the choice of law rules utilised 
within the EU and the US. While this unveiled a whole host of potential choice of law 
rules, the reference to the host state in article 2 of Directive 2004/38 made for an 
interesting comparison. Similarly, while the law in the US regarding same-sex 
marriage has recently changed, it was apparent that prior to this change, academics 
across the Atlantic were also striving to achieve certainty through a uniform standard2, 
and therefore offers support for a set choice of law rule as promoted within chapter 4.  
 
                                                          
2 Linda J Silberman, ‘Same-Sex Marriage Refining the Conflict of laws Analysis’ (2004-2005) 153 
University of Pennslyvania Law Review, 2195 and Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: 
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale University Press 2006). 
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4) Critically evaluate the concept of harmonisation to see how the certainty 
sought in England could, through the application of unified choice of law rules, 
be replicated at an EU level.  
As a result of the increase in the number of couples moving and marrying around the 
EU3, it is important that they are able to determine the status of their marriage as they 
move across state borders, and where possible avoid limping marriages. This is 
important regardless of Brexit for the many couples moving around the EU. With this 
as its motive, chapter 5 analysed the concept of harmonisation, to assess whether 
the choice of law rules on essential validity could be harmonised across the EU. 
Historically, the EU has not been concerned with the regulation of family law, 
however, with the emergence of the likes of Brussels II and Brussels II bis it is 
apparent that this is changing, in a bid to prevent limping relationships4 and to make 
life simpler for citizens5 . With this in mind chapter 5 argued that the same approach 
should be taken with the essential validity of marriage by creating a harmonised 
approach to choice of law, as was attempted within divorce by Rome III. Aside from 
the arguments made above in relation to certainty, it was also deemed necessary for 
the purpose of free movement. Under the current position couples may feel unable to 
exercise their right to free movement for fear of their relationship not being 
recognised6, or worse, may, as a consequence of their relationship not being 
recognised, be unable to relocate to the desired state with their family7. The solution 
of harmonisation is also Art 8 compliant, and could be argued to be the next logical 
step following the judgment in Oliari v Italy8.  
Having established that the route to reform is in harmonisation, the chapter then 
focused on determining what choice of law rules should be put in place. Despite the 
apparent use of nationality in some of the member states, it was proposed that the 
dépeçage based interest analysis approach suggested for England should be 
mirrored across the EU. At first sight this may appear controversial, but like England, 
                                                          
3 Commission of the European Communities, on applicable law and jurisdiction in divorce matters 
(Green paper COM (2005) 82) Para 1. 
4 See section 5.2. 
5 Official Journal of the European Communities ‘Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how 
best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and 
justice’ C19/1, 23/01/1999, para 39. 
6 Maria Tenreiro & Monika Ekstrom, ‘Unification of Private International Law in Family Law Matters 
Within the European Union’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki (ed) Perspectives for the Unification of 
Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe (Vol. 4, Intersentia 2003) 187. 
7 This was recognised as a potential risk in section 5.5.1 in relation to same-sex couples where one of 
the parties is a non-EU national as a consequence of Art 2 of the Citizenship Directive. 
8 Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015. 
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some of the member states were identified as showing tolerance to polygamous 
marriages when they have been validly entered into, and the couple have later 
decided to relocate. This not only shows signs that the continued recognised 
relationship theory may not be too drastic a change, it also highlights the exceptions 
at play across the member states that make the policy sensitive dépeçage based 
choice of law rules vital in providing certainty for couples. A couple cannot be  
expected to rely on a state voluntarily showing tolerance and favouring the public 
policy of upholding the validity of their marriage, they should be able to predict with a 
degree of certainty the applicable law, and thus the status of their relationship. It is 
argued that the dépeçage based system proposed for England, should also be 
applied at an EU level as it offers the balance between state interests and certainty 
for couples, whilst removing the need for the invocation of public policy exceptions 
due to its policy sensitive nature. While its implementation may require some member 
states to recognise marriages it would not permit, it does not seek to change their 
substantive laws. It is an incremental approach that will at times require member 
states to show tolerance, but will in turn provide certainty and predictability to all those 
within the EU. It is also noteworthy, that such a solution would, regardless of 
England’s position in the EU, continue to provide English domicilaries with certainty 
across the EU, as they would be subject to the same choice of law rules in operation 
in England. 
 
5) Reflect on the rules proposed for England and the EU and assess whether 
they could be of assistance, or an example to the US on how certainty and 
unification of optimal solutions could be achieved across the states, to 
alleviate the problems caused by high levels of state migration and various 
substantive laws. Of course, whilst looking at the US, it will also be considered 
what England and the EU is able to learn from the US approach to marriage 
recognition, particularly same-sex marriage.  
As with the EU, family law within the US is an area that has traditionally been dealt 
with at a state level as opposed to federally. This has included the determination of 
whether a marriage is valid. As a consequence of this, it has been open to the states 
themselves to select the applicable choice of law rule. Chapter 6 began by exploring 
the main competing choice of law rules, and it was apparent that there was no general 
consensus on which the states would apply, and so couples were left in a position of 
uncertainty and unpredictability. In addition to this, each of the competing rules were 
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open to criticism. However, the chapter then went on to explore how the concept of 
interest analysis had developed both amongst academics, and within other areas of 
law such as Tort and Contract, and it became apparent that with such developments, 
it appeared, at least on some level, to reflect the dépeçage based approach discussed 
in the earlier chapters, indicating that dépeçage based interest analysis could also be 
the optimal approach in the US. With this in mind, the chapter analysed to what extent 
the same approach that had been designed for England and advocated for the EU, 
could also be adopted across the US. In looking at the incapacities it was apparent 
that much of the same policy issues were relevant, and could therefore be mirrored, 
and so focus was moved on to assessing whether the choice of law rules could be 
adopted at a federal level. Although at first glance this may have appeared a step too 
far, support for such an argument can be seen in the form of Supreme Court 
pronouncements9 and enactments from Congress10. Owing to the clear precedent for 
federal involvement within family law, and the obvious need for unification as a result 
of the various substantive laws, and choice of law rules across the states, it was 
considered that the US was in stark need of reform in the area, and the dépeçage 
based interest analysis approach promulgated for England and the EU appeared 
entirely appropriate.  
Having suggested how the US might be able to learn from England and the EU, 
Chapter 6 then considered how this might be reciprocated. Aside from offering 
support of harmonisation at a federal level, it was felt that Obergefell could also be of 
assistance in demonstrating how a unified approach to choice of law, particularly in 
respect of same-sex relationships, could be achieved across the EU. Undeterred by 
the controversy surrounding the topic of same-sex marriage in the US,  a unified law 
was created, thereby offering support to the suggestion that the choice of law rules 
for same-sex marriage could be harmonised across the EU. Obergefell went further 
than requiring the states to recognise validly entered into same-sex marriages, it 
actually required all states to permit same-sex marriage within their borders. This 
subsequently demonstrates the  extent of what can be achieved even amidst 
conflicting states, and should certainty be an example to the EU that a more 
conservative harmonisation of only the choice of law rules, as opposed to substantive 
law, can certainly be accomplished under the reform proposed.  
                                                          
9 For instance in Obergefell v Hodges 135 S Ct 2071 (2015). 
10 Such as the Defence of Marriage Act 1996. 
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7.2 Concluding Remarks 
In adopting a dépeçage based interest analysis approach to the essential validity of 
marriage, this thesis provides a reformulation of the law by setting out the optimal 
choice of law rules for each of the incapacities. In doing so, same-sex relationships 
were treated the same as any of the other incapacities, to ensure that the proposed 
reform encapsulated all marital relationships so as to provide certainty for all couples 
in England regarding their marital status. The selection of each of these rules was 
done on a policy sensitive basis, and consequently a new choice of law rule was 
created to ensure that where appropriate, the state and society most effected by the 
relationship could have its laws and policies taken into consideration without raising 
some of the problems caused by the intended matrimonial home theory. Therefore, 
despite previous assertions by scholars such as Reed11 and Davie12 that an issue by 
issue approach should be taken, this thesis further develops this point by moving 
away from the traditional use of the intended matrimonial home theory, within a 
dépeçage based approach as promulgated by these academics, and instead creates 
a more optimal choice of law rule. 
The aim in creating these rules was to provide couples with certainty, and so the 
research then turned its attention to looking at how such an approach could be 
replicated across the EU and the US, to ensure the certainty was extended to couples 
crossing state borders. In considering both of these jurisdictions it was felt that a 
process of harmonisation  was needed to ensure that couples have the certainty 
desired, but are also able  to avoid the current risk of limping marriages. Exploration 
of the legal landscape in respect of essential validity of marriage in both of the 
jurisdictions, lead to the conclusion that the optimal choice of law rules established 
for England should form the basis of this harmonisation. 
In suggesting this reform this thesis achieves its aim of providing certainty for couples 
regarding their marital status in England and when they cross state borders. Though 
it is recognised that the approach suggested may be criticised for going too far in 
respect of expecting states to recognise relationships it would not permit, or that a 
universal choice of law rule for essential validity in England could have produced 
                                                          
11 Alan Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Dépeçage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387. 
12 Michael Davie, ‘The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English 
Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 32. 
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certainty, these points have been addressed throughout. The research does not seek 
to change the substantive laws of any state, and instead urges tolerance already 
shown by many, and while a universal choice of law rule may have produced certainty 
it would never have allowed for the policy sensitive approach this area needs as a 
result of the, different policy concerns that the various incapacities raise. For these 
reasons it is submitted that while a ‘perfect’ solution has not been achieved, such a 
solution does not exist. Instead, this author asserts that the optimal solution is 
achieved, and although this is not accomplished on a worldwide scale, despite its 
attractiveness, this was not within the ambit of this study, and would far exceed the 
limitations of such a thesis. 
7.3 Future Works 
The thesis has propounded that significant reforms are required to the marriage 
validity aspect of the conflict of laws, and in so doing, has highlighted avenues for 
further discussion. As mentioned in chapter 6, a federal rule has been created in 
relation to same-sex marriage that requires all states to recognise and permit same-
sex marriages. While this was briefly explored within the chapter in terms of this being 
an example to the US for other aspects of unification, and indeed the EU, this 
argument could be further analysed and expanded upon. While the article I co-
authored with Frances Hamilton13 (available in the appendix) analysed the need for a 
set choice of law rule for same-sex relationships at an EU level, the position of the 
law in the US regarding harmonisation of marriage validity more generally, and the 
role the developments in same-sex marriage can play, still awaits a more detailed 
exploration. Greater analysis of the Obergefell decision would allow for further 
discussion as to whether the case has lit the bluetouch paper for harmonisation of the 
laws on marriage validity across the US. The research in chapter 6 focuses on the 
need for reform due to the uncertainty caused by the differing laws across the states, 
and the most appropriate reform option, as this is the focus of the thesis as a whole. 
However the focal point of future study could be on supporting the implementation of 
such reform, through the analysis of the developments within same-sex marriage to 
demonstrate how the federal rule has not only provided authorisation for federal rules 
                                                          
13 Frances Hamilton and Lauren Clayton-Helm, ‘Same-Sex Relationships, Choice of Law and the 
Continued Recognised Relationship Theory’ (2016) 3(1) Journal of International and Comparative Law 
1. 
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on marriage, but has accentuated its necessity to prevent limping marriages and 
uncertainty for couples. 
In addition, the law on domicile in England has not undergone fresh academic scrutiny 
for a considerable period of time. Despite the rules on determining one’s domicile of 
origin being out of date in failing to reflect modern families, particularly children of 
same-sex relationships, de novo reform has not been suggested. The area is 
therefore ripe for academic commentary, and in addition to the reforms suggested 
within chapter 2, further research would provide an opportunity for a more detailed 
analysis of the most appropriate rules for the provision of domicile of 
origin/dependency. This research could also further explore the human rights aspect 
of the need for reform, and the extent to which reform is necessary to ensure 
Convention compliance.  
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SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS, CHOICE OF 
LAW AND THE CONTINUED RECOGNISED 
RELATIONSHIP THEORY
Frances Hamilton and Lauren Clayton-Helm*
Abstract: A clear choice of law rule should be applied to all same-sex 
relationships in terms of essential validity. Interest analysis allows us to look at 
the public policy reasons behind why a choice of law rule may be appropriate 
or inapposite. This technique can lead to unpredictable results. When coupled 
with depecage, a delineated splitting of competing policy inculcations, this 
allows for a more certain rules-based system. Each incapacity to marry 
should have its own appropriate choice of law rule. This article argues that 
additional public policy reasons apply to the choice of law appropriate to 
same-sex relationships. These include citizenship, equality and symbolism, 
and together require a more extended choice of law rule. It is recommended 
that a new theory, the continued recognised relationship theory, is suitable for 
same-sex relationships. This choice of law rule would apply the law where 
the couple is intending to live, or the law of the country where they have 
lived, if their relationship has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time. 
This article advocates that action at the European Union level will lead to 
more consistent results in this sphere.
Keywords: same-sex relationships; choice of law; interest analysis; 
depecage; European Union
I. Introduction
International marriages, comprising a marriage between individuals of different 
nationalities, are a large proportion of the nuptials which take place in the European 
Union (EU) every year. Of the annual 2.2 million EU marriages, 350,000 involve an 
international couple.1 “[R]elational mobility”2 results in a greater variety of family 
types. There is a still greater variety of family types given the advent of same-sex 
* Frances Hamilton is a Senior Lecturer in Law. Lauren Clayton-Helm is a graduate tutor and PhD
candidate. Both are based at Northumbria University Law School, UK.
1 The Centre for Social Justice, “European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” (2009) 5, available 
at http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/Pdf%20reports/CSJEuropeanFamilyLaw.
pdf (visited 27 May 2016).
2 Michele Grigolo, “Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject” 
(2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 1023, 1026 referring to Anthony Giddens, The 
Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1992).
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marriage and civil partnership. Different states across Europe have had a diversity 
of legal responses across Europe to these new statuses.3 This article responds to 
this relatively new type of relationship and suggests how it should be treated by 
private international law. It is essential for a couple to know whether they are 
legally married.4 The need to settle this question is underlined by the “unparalleled 
importance of marriage”.5 Many international cases stress this factorisation.6 In 
2015 US Supreme Court judgment of Obergefell v Hodges,7 which licensed same-
sex marriage across all states of the US, the majority opinion stressed that the right 
to marry was “fundamental”.8 The reasons why marriage was given this status 
included an emphasis upon “individual autonomy”,9 the unique support which 
marriage gives to a two-person union,10 the safeguarding which marriage gives to 
children11 and the fact that marriage is regarded as a “keystone of …social order”.12
Marriage is often connected to citizenship13 and is necessary for “full 
membership of society”.14 Some authors stress the public nature of marriage.15 As 
well as being considered a fundamental right16 marriage also has strong symbolical 
importance. For many in the Western world it is seen as the “gold standard”17 or 
having a privileged status.18 Gay rights groups were initially reluctant to embrace 
marriage as a goal.19 However, after fully understanding the rights associated with 
 3 Within Europe, the following states recognise same-sex marriage: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, England and Wales, Scotland and 
Finland (effective from 2017). Following Oliari all other contracting states to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) will have to recognise some form of civil partnership.
 4 In Estin v Estin, 334 US 541, 553 (1948) Robert Jackson J commented that “one thing that people are 
entitled to know from the law is whether they are formally married”. See also Barbara Stark, “When 
Globalization Hits Home: International Family Law Comes of Age” (2006) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1551.
 5 P St J Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage” (1985) 14 Anglo-
American Law Review 225, 225.
 6 See eg Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass 2003); Loving v Virginia, 388 
US 1 (1967) and Obergefell v Hodges 576 US __ (2015).
 7 See Obergefell v Hodges (n.6).
 8 Ibid., 11
 9 Ibid., 12.
10 Ibid., 13.
11 Ibid., 14.
12 Ibid., 16.
13 A full discussion as to what is meant by the concept of citizenship in this context is included in Section 
IV(A) of this article.
14 Richard Frimston, “Marriage and Non-Marital Registered Partnerships: Gold, Silver and Bronze in 
Private International Law” (2006) 6 Private Client Business 352.
15 See Erez Aloni, ‘‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage” 
(2010–2011) 18 Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 105.
16 See Obergefell v Hodges (n.6); Elizabeth Scott, “A World Without Marriage” (2007–2008) 41 Family 
Law Quarterly 537, 541.
17 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2007] 1 FLR 295, [6].
18 See Aloni, ‘‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage” (n.15), p.110.
19 See Yvonne Zylan, States of Passion: Law, Identity and Social Construction of Desire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) which comments on the changing positions of Stonewall in the UK and Lambda 
Legal in the US to favour same-sex marriage as a goal.
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marriage and its symbolical status, these groups have engaged with marriage as 
a desirable status to be achieved. Marriage does undoubtedly provide the most 
expansive and generous recognition of rights.20 Under EU free movement law, it 
is essential to fall within the defi nition of “family member” in order to access EU 
benefi ts and move across the EU as citizens. There is a need for clear rules in 
this area. Despite this, the law currently stresses subsidiarity and allows individual 
countries in the EU to determine whether or not to recognise same-sex marriage.21 
Following the recent European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decision of 
Oliari v Italy all contracting states will need to introduce some form of protection 
for same-sex couples to enter into a registered partnership or civil union.22 There 
continues to be no right to same-sex marriage. This will affect all members of the 
EU who are also all contracting members to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Yet there is no requirement as to what type of status need be 
enacted, leading to a wide variation in the rights granted to same-sex partners. This 
restrictive approach may mean that a non-EU same-sex spouse or registered partner 
cannot relocate to the new EU state, or will not have access to all the rights granted 
in their state of origin. It also represents a failure of the application of the freedom 
of movement.23 Non-recognition of a foreign marriage means that the right to same-
sex marriage is a “meagre right indeed”.24
Where several different jurisdictions are involved in a case it is necessary to 
determine which country’s law applies. The laws of several different countries may 
be relevant where the case involves a couple of different nationalities or where 
the couple relocates. The choice of law rule is the mechanism which selects the 
appropriate law to be applied. In domestic law, there is disagreement about which 
choice of law rule should be employed in relation to the validity of a marriage (both 
heterosexual and same-sex). Recognition of a foreign marriage is broken down into 
two elements: formal validity and essential validity. Formal validity on the one 
hand looks at the rules and requirements surrounding the actual ceremony, such as 
the requirement of witnesses and the vows that must be undertaken. This is usually 
uncontroversial and depends upon the lex loci celebratioinis.25 Essential validity 
on the other hand covers all aspects of a marriage which are not associated with 
formalities, the primary example being the capacity to marry. Here, there is much 
controversy and different theories compete for attention. These are examined in 
20 See Aloni, ‘‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage” 
(n.15), p.110 referring to Yuval Merin, Equality for Same-Sex Couples: The Legal Recognition of Gay 
Partnerships in Europe and the United States (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2002) 
pp.55–56.
21 See Directive 2004/38 art.2(2).
22 (Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015).
23 Helen Stalford, “Regulating Family Life in Post-Amsterdam Europe” (2003) 28 European Law Review 39.
24 Barbara Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married 
When We Return Home?” (1994) Wisconsin Law Review 1033, 1040.
25 Place of celebration.
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the next section. Most commentators agree that the current law is “baffl ing”26 and 
in need of “reformulat[ion] …”27 Perhaps the necessity of dealing with same-sex 
relationships28 can be the “new momentum required to re-examine the subject …”.29
This article considers different choice of law rules and recommends that none 
of the commonly suggested choice of law rules can be applied universally. The 
focus of this article is to determine which choice of law rule is appropriate to 
same-sex relationships. Interest analysis30 coupled with a system of rules-based 
depecage31 allows us to give each incapacity to marry an appropriate choice of 
law rule.32 It is necessary to consider further public policy arguments in relation 
to same-sex relationships. We consider arguments based on citizenship, equality 
and symbolism which call for a more extended choice of law rule for same-sex 
relationships. We recommend a novel choice of law for same-sex relationships, the 
continued recognised relationships theory, which is then explained. The applicable 
choice of law rule should be that of the country where the couple intends to reside, 
or if their marriage has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time, it should be 
the law of the country where they previously lived. Consideration is also given as to 
why it is necessary to engage with this issue at an EU level before fi nally examining 
some anticipated objections of our recommendations.
II. Choice of Law Rules
Examination of the most commonly used choice of law rules allows us to consider 
which is appropriate to apply to same-sex relationships. Whilst the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 (CPA) sets out that essential validity is to be determined in accordance 
26 Friedrich Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” (1984) 32 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1, 1 referring to Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1928) 67.
27 Alan Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules” (2000) 20 New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 387, 450. See also Michael Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage 
Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict of Laws” (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 32.
28 We use this term to refer to both same-sex marriages and all types of civil partnerships and registered 
unions.
29 See Reed “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.450.
30 Interest analysis is the idea that the most applicable law is the one that has the most interest in being 
applied after consideration of public policy reasons and was originally founded in the US and applied 
on a case-by-case basis. Interest analysis was founded by Brainerd Currie. See Brainerd Currie, Selected 
Essays on the Confl ict of Laws (1963) 62 Michigan Law Review.
31 Depecage moves away from having a completely ad hoc-based approach. Here, rules-based depecage is 
used to determine that each incapacity to marry can be governed by its own choice of law rule.
32 Interest analysis on a depecage basis is something that has been explored and promoted for other 
incapacities within marriage validity by Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage 
Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict of Laws” (n.27) and Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The 
Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27).
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with the lex loci registrationis,33 the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 
(M(SSC)A) provides no such rules. The position is left open for debate, leaving 
couples uncertain as to which of the choice of law rules will prevail. In this article, 
we recommend, for the sake of consistency, that the same choice of law theory is 
needed for all types of same-sex relationships.
A. Dual domicile theory and the intended 
matrimonial home theory
The two primary contending theories within essential validity of heterosexual 
marriage are the dual domicile theory and the intended matrimonial home theory.34 
The dual domicile theory35 is backward looking; if either of the parties’ pre-
nuptial domiciles would invalidate the marriage, then the consequential impact is 
abjuration of recognition. Essentially, the rule is based on treating each party’s 
domiciliary law with equal respect and recognition, but, the intended matrimonial 
home theory36 turns to the law of the husband’s domicile unless, the couple intend 
to set up a matrimonial home in another country. Where this intention is satisfi ed 
within a reasonable time, that law will prevail. The dual domicile theory seeks to 
protect the individual. The intended matrimonial home theory seeks to protect the 
society of the country where the couple intend to live.
Despite these opposing aims, it is evident that both theories receive common 
law37 and academic38 support. The dual domicile theory is propounded by the Law 
Commission as the most appropriate policy construct.39 The advantages include: 
the potential to fulfi l party expectations; allowing each party’s country to be 
considered in terms of validity and that it is relatively easy to apply prospectively.40 
Conversely, the intended matrimonial home theory considers the society that the 
marriage will impact upon and may also uphold party expectations.41 In addition, as 
33 Similar to the lex loci celebrationis for hetereosexual marriage, s.215(1) of the CPA sets out that formal 
validity and essential validity must still be satisfi ed in accordance with the relevant law which, is defi ned 
in s.212(2) as the place where the relationship is registered including its rules of private international law.
34 Geoffrey Cheshire, Peter North and James Fawcett, Private International Law (14th ed., by James 
Fawcett and Janeen M Carruthers, 2008) p.895.
35 Albert Venn Dicey, Dicey Morris and Collins on the Confl ict of Laws (8th ed., by JHC Morris and Others, 
1967) r.31, pp.254–255.
36 Geoffrey Cheshire, Private International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th ed., 1965) pp.227–228.
37 Cases such as Re Paine [1940] Ch 46 and Szechter v Szechter [1971] P 286 show support for the dual 
domicile theory, whilst support for the intended matrimonial home theory can be seen, albeit obiter in 
Kenwood v Kenwood [1951] P 124 and Radwan v Radwan (No 2) [1973] Fam 35.
38 Alan Reed recognises the advantages of both the dual domicile theory and the intended matrimonial home 
theory whilst setting out that neither works as a universal test in Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: 
The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27).
39 Law Commission Report, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules (Law Com No 89, 1985) para 3.36.
40 Ibid., p.93.
41 For instance, in Radwan v Radwan (No 2) (n.37) where the couple had been living together as man 
and wife for nearly 20 years and the application of the intended matrimonial home theory upheld their 
expectations.
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only one law need be applied, more marriages are likely to be held valid. Therefore, 
this satisfi es the policy aim attached to upholding the validity of marriage.42
Regardless of the aforementioned positives, neither theory can be applied 
universally. The dual domicile theory leads to more marriages being found invalid, 
which is caused by potentially having to satisfy the law of two countries.43 Another 
demerit is that the theory fails to consider the law of the country to which the 
marriage will belong.44 Finally, a major criticism is the foundation of the theory on 
the concept of domicile, which has many of its own challenges.45 Domicile may not 
always refl ect the country to which the parties belong,46 as a result of the diffi culties 
in obtaining a domicile of choice. Such criticisms go to the very root of the theory 
as it is clear that domicile itself is in need of reform and has been for some time.47
There are also many criticisms of the intended matrimonial home theory. Unless 
alternative intentions can be proven, it is the law of the husband’s domicile that 
applies. In the modern day this is recognised as sexist and “totally out of touch with 
modern etymologies of gender equality”.48 It fails to refl ect developments within 
the law, such as the abolition of the married women’s domicile of dependency rule.49 
This rule meant that prior to its abolition, upon marriage a woman was stripped of 
her personal domicile and was instead deemed to take that of her husband. This 
would only change in accordance with his domicile much like the domicile of a 
minor. As the theory is founded on the parties’ particular intentions at the time 
of marriage this can also be problematic,50 application in the prospective may be 
diffi cult particularly if intentions are unclear, and it is uncertain what would happen 
if the couple move. It can also be argued that on occasion it is the parties’ domiciliary 
law that has the most interest in being applied,51 which may stem from an interest to 
protect the particular party involved from factors such as duress, undue infl uence 
42 See Law Commission Report, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules (n.39), pp.88–89.
43 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27).
44 Charles Taintor, “Marriage in the Confl ict of Laws” (1955–1956) 9 Vanderbilt Law Review 607, 611–
612.
45 The law surrounding domicile itself is recognised as problematic by academicians; PB Carter, “Domicil: 
The Case for Radical Reform in the United Kingdom” (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 713; Richard Fentiman, “Domicile Revisited” (1991) 50(3) Cambridge Law Journal 445 
and indeed by the Law Commission; Law Commission Report, Private International Law: The Law of 
Domicile (Law Com No 88, 1985).
46 Trevor C Hartley, “The Policy Basis of the English Confl ict of Laws of Marriage” (1972) 53 Modern Law 
Review 571, 576.
47 See for instance, suggestions for reform dating back to 1954 and 1985; Private International Law 
Committee, First Report of the Private International Law Committee (Cmnd No 9068, 1954) and Law 
Commission Report, Private International Law: The Law of Domicile (n.45).
48 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.397.
49 It was abolished by s.1(1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.
50 Radwan v Radwan (No 2) (n.37).
51 For example the domiciliary law may be trying to protect one of the parties, for instance, as a result of 
their age.
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or exploitation. The exploration of these two theories shows that neither should 
constitute a universal theory. Further alternatives are now considered.
B. Competing choice of law theories
Another option is the most real and substantial connection test. In a similar vein 
to the intended matrimonial home theory it focuses on the country which will be 
most affected by the marriage as opposed to the people.52 The primary distinction 
between the two theories is the way in which this country is selected. There is no 
longer a sole focus on the intended matrimonial home. Instead, this test draws 
on this categorisation along with other factors including domicile and nationality. 
Whilst this may create a well-rounded determination of what law should apply and 
attract support for the theory,53 it lacks certainty and predictability, and can thus be 
criticised.54 Criticism comes as a result of the lack of defi nition and clarity of the 
term “most real and substantial connection”. Its application would inevitably lead 
to the courtroom for matters to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.55 Consequently, 
this theory is not the most practical of options.
The alternative reference test is another option. The test is based on applying 
either the dual domicile rule or the intended matrimonial home theory depending 
on which one would recognise the marriage. It allows the courts to select the rule 
that will result in the marriage being recognised as valid and therefore upholds 
the policy of the validity of marriage. However, diffi culties remain. The test is 
based on the court’s ability to cherry pick in order to get the desired result and is 
for that reason diffi cult to promote. In essence, it endorses both the dual domicile 
theory and the intended matrimonial home theory, but is then able to cast aside 
either theory if it would result in the invalidity of marriage, which appears contrary 
to principle.56 It is also a time-consuming method. It may require the courts to 
consider up to three different laws before selecting the appropriate route.
The elective dual domicile test would apply the domiciliary law of either party.57 
If either party’s domiciliary law holds the marriage valid, the law relating to the 
other party becomes irrelevant and the marriage is upheld. Aside from validating 
52 Chris MV Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Confl ict of Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 
2011) p.359.
53 It can be seen in cases such as Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145; Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam 
106 (at fi rst instance) and Westminster City Council v C [2009] Fam 11. Academic support can also be 
seen in Richard Fentiman, “Activity in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law Commission” 
(1986) 6(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353 and Richard Fentiman, “The Validity of Marriage and 
the Proper Law” (1985) 44(2) Cambridge Law Journal 256.
54 See Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict 
of Laws” (n.27) and the Law Commission Report, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules (n.39), 
para 3.2.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., Law Commission Report, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules (n.39), para 3.37.
57 Cheshire, North and Fawcett, Private International Law (n.34), p.913.
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marriages, there is little else to be commended.58 It is a controversial option, as 
it recognises the importance that domiciliary law plays in marriage validity, but 
rejects the law that may cause a problem, regardless of the motive behind the law. 
Not only does this appear to fl y in the face of applying the law of the domicile, but 
it could also lead to limping marriages59 and the ability to evade domiciliary laws. 
It is understandable that this theory has been subject to criticism.60
Finally, it is also important to consider the precedent already set within same-
sex relationships. The CPA dictates that the lex loci celebrationis61 is the applicable 
law for essential validity, making it a viable option for same-sex marriage. Its 
application may bring certainty and continuity of the law for the interested parties,62 
but it may also encourage forum shopping. If all that is required for same-sex couples 
to marry is to travel across the border, it may lead to an increased enforcement of 
public policy rules by the countries in which the parties are domiciled and resident, 
on the basis that attempts are being made to evade their laws. This could in turn 
produce more limping marriages.63 Greater application of public policy exceptions 
would counteract any potential certainty and continuity such a rule could offer.
The law in this area is uncertain. While it is apparent that the dual domicile 
theory and the intended matrimonial home theory are the two main contenders, 
any one of the aforementioned theories could be applied by the courts to same-sex 
relationships. No one rule is suffi ciently sophisticated enough to apply universally.64 
Exceptions also exist, allowing the courts in certain circumstances to deviate from 
these rules in order to produce the desired result.65 It is, therefore, important to 
consider the ideas of interest analysis66 and depecage67 which we consider in the 
next section.
Interestingly, amidst all of the ambiguity of the applicable choice of law rule, it 
has been suggested by Stuart Davis that the absence of any direction in the M(SSC)A 
is a nod in favour of the dual domicile theory.68 Davis’ justifi cation for this 
suggestion is that it will ensure that same-sex marriages are dealt with in the same 
58 See Clarkson and Hill, The Confl ict of Laws (n.52), p.360.
59 For example, where a marriage is recognised in one country but not another, which, in the case of the 
elective dual domicile test could easily occur in relation to the parties and the country in which they are 
domiciled.
60 See Law Commission Report, Private International Law Choice of Law Rules (n.39), para 3.38.
61 See works referred to in note 25.
62 Martina Melcher “(Mutual) Recognition of Registered Relationships via EU Private International Law” 
(2013) 9(1) Journal of Private International Law 149, 161–162.
63 A potential problem that was also recognised by Martina Melcher.
64 See eg Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage” (n.5), p.231 
in which he discusses that the failings of the theories stem from trying to apply them universally, when 
instead it is a degree of fl exibility that is required.
65 These exceptions are the rule in Sottomayor v De Barros (1879) 5 PD 94, the rule where England is the 
lex loci and public policy grounds.
66 See works referred to in note 30.
67 See works referred to in note 31.
68 Stuart Davis, Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill Memorandum (2013) 2, para 3.3.
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vein as heterosexual marriages.69 This justifi cation is tentative, given it has been 
recognised by judges for decades that the dual domicile theory is not always the 
most appropriate choice of law rule.70 This dissent from the dual domicile theory 
continued even after the Law Commission confi rmed it as their preferred template.71 
It, therefore, appears rudimentary to declare its application as a mere continuation 
of the norm.72 In fact, despite the Law Commission report, it is possible that any 
of the theories previously outlined may be adopted by the courts. In view of their 
application in other marriage validity cases, it is not diffi cult to comprehend any 
of the theories being applied by the judiciary. Indeed, theories surrounding interest 
analysis and depecage also show how developments, since the Law Commission 
Report, may replace a universal choice of law rule.73
C. Choice of law rules considered in EU law
The concept of “automatic recognition” is considered by the European 
Commission74 in their assessment of how free movement rights could be improved 
through the recognition of civil status records. The Commission observe that the 
failure to recognise such records raises the alarming “question of quite a different 
magnitude concerning not the actual documents themselves, but their effects”.75 In 
an attempt to fi nd a pathway through the problem, they consider whether automatic 
recognition of civil status situations established in other member states could be an 
appropriate solution. Applying this rule to same-sex relationships would put mutual 
trust between Member States at the heart of the solution and would provide much 
needed certainty. It would reassure same-sex couples that crossing state borders 
would not be a cause for concern in respect of recognition of their relationship; nor 
would it require the other Member State “to change its substantive law or modify 
its legal system”.76 A problem arises in that it may, like the application of the lex 
loci, also bring with it risks of forum shopping and increased enforcement of public 
69 Ibid.
70 For instance, Kenwood v Kenwood (n.37) and Radwan v Radwan (No 2) (n.37) provide support for the 
intended matrimonial home theory and Vervaeke v Smith (n.53) provides support for the most real and 
substantial connection test.
71 Examples include Westminster City Council v C (n.53) and Minister of Employment and Immigration v 
Narwal [1990] 2 FC 385.
72 This is further supported by the fact that many academics are now looking at the idea of depecage and 
a move away from a one rule fi ts all approach; see for instance, Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential 
Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict of Laws” (n.27), Reed, “Essential Validity 
of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law 
Rules” (n.27) and Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage” (n.5).
73 See Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict 
of Laws” (n.27) and Reed, Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and 
Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27).
74 COM(2010) 747, “Less Bureaucracy for Citizens Promoting Free Movement of Public Documents and 
Recognition of the Effect of Civil Status Records” 14 December 2010.
75 Ibid., para.1.
76 Ibid., para.4.3.
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policy exceptions, which, prevent the other member states having to recognise the 
relationship. The European Commission recognise, when considering automatic 
recognition more generally, that compensatory measures to prevent abuse of public 
order rules may be necessary, and more importantly state that “[t]his might prove to 
be more complicated in other civil status situations such as a marriage”.77
Alternate options also emerge in EU law. In the area of enforcement of 
matrimonial judgments, Rome III78 was proposed to bring in choice of law rules. 
The earlier convention (Brussels II bis)79 only provided rules on jurisdiction. 
Rome III was not agreed by all Member States. It was rejected by many, including 
the United Kingdom (UK), and was for that reason unsuccessful. Instead some 
Member States proceeded to establish enhanced cooperation between contracting 
parties only. This was introduced by Council Regulation EU No 1259/2010.80 The 
regulation provided that the parties could choose the applicable law on divorce,81 or 
failing that, set down a checklist of choice of law rules, which determines the most 
appropriate law when following the order in which they are set out in the checklist.82 
Chapter 2, art.8, provides that the fi rst choice would be where the parties have their 
common habitual residence, thus making habitual residence the primary default 
choice of law rule in the absence of a mutual agreement by the parties.
When considering the appropriateness of habitual residence as the applicable 
law, it is important to note its autonomous nature.83 It is an amorphous notion and 
therefore does not provide the unity required in a set choice of law rule.84 Habitual 
residence requires concurrence of physical residence and a mental status of having 
a settled purpose of remaining.85 The length of residence required to satisfy physical 
presence is diffi cult to determine.86 It is based on the facts of the individual case and, 
therefore, “the subjective element tends to lead to unpredictability”.87 The intention 
77 Ibid.
78 COM(2006) 399, “Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as 
regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters” 17 July 
2006.
79 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003.
80 The countries involved with the enhanced cooperation are: Spain, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Belgium, Latvia, Malta and Portugal.
81 Chapter 2, art.5.
82 Chapter 2, art.8.
83 As per Baroness Hale of Richmond, “habitual residence may have a different meaning in different statutes 
according to their context and purpose”. (Mark v Mark [2006] 1 AC 98, 105 [15]).
84 Aude Fiorini, “Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization of Family Law Going Too 
Far?” (2008) 22(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178.
85 R v Barnet London Borough Council, ex p Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, 344.
86 For instance, in Re J (Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, 578 it was stated that it 
would not be achieved in a day “but an appreciable period of time”. In Re F (Minor) (Child Abduction) 
[1992] 1 FLR 548 it was suggested that a month could be an appreciable period of time, and in Marinos v 
Marinos [2007] 2 FLR 1018 it was said that it could be measured in weeks not months, and in appropriate 
cases, days. However, in A v A (Child Abduction) (Habitual Residence) [1993] 2 FLR 225 eight months 
was considered insuffi cient.
87 Pippa Rogerson, “Habitual Residence: The New Domicile” (2000) 49 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 86, 90.
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element on the other hand, may appear easier to satisfy, as it need only be for a fi xed 
period of time, as opposed to indefi nitely.88 This in itself is problematic as it does 
not take into account the connection a person may or may not have with the country. 
A person resident for work purposes could still be deemed habitually resident there, 
which would in turn make that countries’ law applicable. The concept is, therefore, 
“unsuitable for general choice of law purposes as it generates a link with a country 
that may be tenuous”.89
Similarly, habitual residence is also used in regulation (EU) No 650/2012 
on dealing with succession and should be explored further as it also provides an 
exception to this rule, where there is a country to which the accused was manifestly 
more closely connected at the time of death.90 This provides no further certainty. 
What would be considered a manifestly close connection? Like the most real and 
substantial connection test, it is likely to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and 
would lack certainty and predictability. On the assessment of the laws created 
above, it would seem that EU law brings no greater choice of law rules into the mix, 
as they too have problems surrounding certainty and predictability. The problem of 
determining the most appropriate choice of law rule remains.
D. Loophole created by the M(SSC)A
Another issue with the M(SSC)A is the loophole that has been created in the 
recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. Prior to the M(SSC)A, the CPA 
recognised foreign same-sex marriages as civil partnerships.91 This recognition 
was achieved by specifying foreign same-sex marriage as a form of “overseas 
relationships”.92 Whilst foreign same-sex marriages were downgraded to civil 
partnerships, they were recognised as long as the lex loci had been satisfi ed. 
This has been amended by the M(SSC)A.93 Foreign same-sex marriages can no 
longer be recognised as civil partnerships under the CPA. Instead they would need 
to be recognised as a marriage in accordance with the M(SSC)A. One positive 
aspect is that foreign marriages are no longer downgraded to civil partnerships94 
88 For instance, see  Re R (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [2004] 1 FLR 216 and Kapur v Kapur [1984] 
FLR 920.
89 See Clarkson and Hill, The Confl ict of Laws (n.52), p.341.This problem was also recognised by the 
Law Commission, along with the fact that it is under developed (Law Commission Report, Private 
International Law: The Law of Domicile (n.45) para 2.4).
90 Chapter III, art.21.
91 See Wilkinson v Kitzinger (n.17).
92 See ss.212(1)(a), 213 and Sch.20 M(SSC)A.
93 Schedule 2 Pt.3 s.5(2) of M(SSC)A inserts s.213(1A) into the CPA which states: “But, for the purposes of 
the application of this Act to England and Wales, marriage is not an overseas relationship”.
94 Such a change in Status from same-sex marriage to civil partnership was often considered as a downgrade 
in Wilkinson v Kitzinger (n.17) where the couple argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that it was a violation 
of their rights not to have their relationship recognised in the capacity of marriage into which they had 
entered.
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which were perceived by many as a lesser status.95 The CPA and M(SSC)A apply 
different choice of law rules, creating a gap in the law that engulf some marriages. 
This loophole within the law means that a foreign same-sex marriage may not 
be recognised. Under the CPA, a foreign same-sex marriage would have been 
recognised as a civil partnership, if it satisfi ed the lex loci. Now the foreign same-
sex marriage would need to be recognised as a marriage under the M(SSC)A. It 
is the subject of debate as to which choice of law theory would apply. If it is the 
dual domicile theory as Davis asserts, the domiciliary laws of both parties would 
need to be satisfi ed, otherwise the marriage would not be recognised.96 Although 
s.10(1)(b) of M(SSC)A allows a discretion for the courts to recognise a marriage, 
Davis argues that they may not go so far.97 This could mean that the foreign same-
sex marriage is not recognised. Amidst the emotional stress and anguish such a 
scenario would impact upon some couples,98 signifi cant legal implications may 
also follow. Such implications may arise from couples not fully understanding 
their legal position until a matter arises and it has become too late, for instance, 
upon the death of one of the parties when matters of inheritance and intestacy 
arise. This is another example of why clarity is needed. The same choice of law 
should be applied to all types of same-sex relationships in order to avoid such 
problems. The diffi culty to be faced is that of selecting the appropriate choice of 
law rule.
III. Interest Analysis, Depecage and Public Policy Factors
Theorists, such as Michael Davie, suggest that the very fact that none of the choice 
of law theories have assumed dominance of essential validity of marriage, suggests 
that there are fl aws with each of the competing theories.99 Using any of them as a 
universal choice of law rule is inappropriate.100 Having one infl exible choice of law 
rule would mean that rules are selected “without regard to the underlying specifi c 
 95 This concept of it being considered as a lesser status, a form of second-class citizenship is an area that 
many academics have considered, see for instance, Kerry Abrams, “Citizen Spouse” (2013) 101(2) 
California Law Review, 407; Michael Dorf, “Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s 
Social Meanings” (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review 1267 and Angela Harris, “Loving Before and After 
the Law” (2007–2008) 76 Fordham International Law Review 2821.
 96 A problem that was also considered by Stuart Davis in his memorandum, which he explored through 
setting out a scenario which could potentially unfold; see Davis, Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill 
Memorandum (n.68), pp.3-4.
 97 Ibid., p.4.
 98 See Wilkinson v Kitzinger (n.17).
 99 See Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict 
of Laws” (n.27), p.32.
100 See Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage” (n.5), p.231.
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issue at hand”.101 In other words, one infl exible choice of law rule means that the 
rule is applied without looking at the public policy interests behind the rule, which 
may of course be crucial to the outcome of the case itself. Interest analysis seeks to 
remedy this by enabling us to look at the “purposes for which the law was created”.102 
It is the idea that the most applicable law is the one that has the most interest in being 
applied, based upon public policy considerations. Interest analysis was originally 
founded in the US for tort law selectivity and applied on a case-by-case basis.103
Interest analysis is seen as benefi cial as it analyses the public policy reasons 
behind the choice of law rule, allowing courts to select the rule that results in the 
fairest overall result to the case. Friedrich Juenger explains that, in choosing the 
applicable law, the court is “determining a controversy”, and needs to understand 
how the choice made will refl ect the overall outcome of the case.104 In the US 
interest analysis has been used in the fi elds of contract and tort. However, it is 
has not been commonly applied to family law.105 It has been suggested that it is 
appropriate to apply this to the incapacities of marriage.106 Supporters of interest 
analysis argue that it produces fair solutions in each of the different cases it is used 
in because of its fl exibility.107 Richard Fentiman outlines the importance of having 
a test which can respond to the needs of particular cases.108 This is demonstrated 
by a case where the commonly used choice of law rules provide no consistently 
accepted answers. An example is a couple who have separate domiciles and no 
intended matrimonial home,109 or a couple who move around Europe for work 
reasons. The fact that courts have not been able to respond to these problems in a 
uniform fashion110 demonstrates the need for fl exibility in a test. Interest analysis, 
in contrast to endorsing just one choice of law rule which may be unsuitable to 
certain cases, has suffi cient fl exibility as the public policy reasons behind each 
choice of law rule can be examined.
101 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.390. See also Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of 
Interest Analysis” (n.26).
102 See Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When 
We Return Home?” (n.24), p.1090 referring to Gregory Smith, “Choice of Law in the United States” 
(1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 1041, 1047. See also Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the 
Essential Validity of Marriage” (n.5).
103 See Currie, Selected Essays on the Confl ict of Laws (n.30).
104 See Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” (n.26), p.4.
105 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.390.
106 See Radwan v Radwan (No 2) (n.37), Cummings-Bruce J 51.
107 See Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” (n.26), p.48 states that this is what 
supporters of interest analysis claim, although he strongly disagrees with interest analysis arguing 
that: “[t]hus Currie’s methodology supplies a subterfuge to promote the very result-orientation that he 
deplored” (p.49).
108 See Fentiman, “Activity in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law Commission” (n.53).
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
JICL-3(1)-04.Same-Sex Relationships.indd   13 08/06/16   2:13 pm
224
14 Journal of International and Comparative Law
Criticisms of interest analysis remain. Critics argue that if applied alone 
it could lead to confusion, lack of consistency and limited predictability.111 The 
US experience of interest analysis in the fi eld of contract and tort is illustrative, 
as a separate analysis was potentially required for each given set of facts. It has 
therefore been criticised as resulting in an “ad hoc case-by-case approach”.112 
Interest analysis can therefore lead to confusion.113 US judges acknowledge the 
lack of consistency.114 Other writers have also commented upon diffi culties with 
certainty and being unable to predict the conclusion of a case, where each case is 
essentially determined by its particular factual circumstances.115 Critics of the US 
experience therefore conclude that other jurisdictions should not follow the same 
approach, especially in the fi eld of marriage where it is so necessary to know how 
each case will be treated.116 A further criticism of interest analysis is that it can 
result in a balance towards the forum determining the case. 117 These criticisms 
show that interest analysis alone cannot be a solution. Instead a system of rules-
based depecage118 balances the competing interests of fl exibility and certainty.119
A. Rules-based depecage
Depecage applies interest analysis not on a case-by-case basis, but on an issue-
by-issue basis. When applied to the incapacities to marry, each of the incapacities 
to marry would be governed by its own choice of law rule. The advantages of 
interest analysis are therefore maintained as the public policy reasons remain 
crucial to the choice of law rule. At the same time there is certainty as to the result 
to be achieved as each incapacity to marry has its own fi rm choice of law rule. 
Critics argue that this further complicates an already “complex methodology” 
by further “issue splitting”,120 but we argue that this approach offers the right 
111 See Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” (n.26), p.27 refers to comments from 
Chief Judge Fuld in Neumeier v Kuehner 31 NY 2d 121, 127 (1972) who explains that in a US context 
“our decisions … it must be acknowledged, lacked consistency”. See also Lea Brilmayer, “Interest 
Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent” (1980) 78 Michigan Law Review 392 and J Skelly Wright, 
“The Federal Courts and Nature and Quality of State Law” (1967) 13 Wayne Law Review 317, 334.
112 Tooker v Lopez 24 NY 2d 569, 584 (1969).
113 See Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” (n.26).
114 See works referred to in note 111; see also Tooker v Lopez (n.112).
115 See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent” (n.111); see also Reed, “Essential 
Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of 
Law Rules” (n.27), p.390.
116 See Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict 
of Laws” (n.27), p.43. See also Scott Fruehwald, “Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage” (1999) 51 
Florida Law Review 799.
117 Courtland Peterson, “Proposals of Marriage between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law” (1980–1981) 14 
UC Davis Law Review 869, 871. See also Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” 
(n.26), p.29.
118 See works referred to in note 31.
119 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27) and Fruehwald, “Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage” (n.116).
120 See Juenger, “Confl ict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis” (n.26), p.41.
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balance between the competing concerns. Reed suggests that a rules-based theory 
should avoid “excessive judicial particularistic intuitionism”.121 Theorists have 
suggested looking at each incapacity to marry in turn.122 Age, consanguinity 
and affi nity, polygamy, consent and marriage after divorce are each examined. 
An appropriate choice of law is assigned by determining what the law in each 
of these areas is designed for in terms of apposite utilisation. We consider here 
which choice of law rule should be applied to same-sex relationships. It is useful 
fi rst to look at existing precedents as to which public policy factors have been 
deemed important.
B. Public policy factors
When considering which public policy factors would be relevant to apply to the 
choice of law for same-sex relationships, it should fi rst of all be pointed out that 
some types of public policy factors apply in relation to all the incapacities to marry. 
The parties to a marriage have a legitimate expectation that they have entered into 
a valid marriage. For this reason, several authors comment on the importance of 
validating a marriage.123 A marriage should therefore not be easily invalidated. 
Simplicity is also essential as non-lawyers, such as marriage registrars, immigration 
offi cers and social security staff are involved with important tasks concerning the 
validity of a marriage.124 Another important issue, which is of particular relevance 
to the EU is to have uniformity internationally as to the validity of a marriage.125 
The parties to the marriage should also be protected. This can be shown from the 
purpose of a minimum age restriction or where there are concerns about a lack 
of consent as a result of some fraud, duress or mistake.126 Objections to different 
types of marriage based on “sociological, religious and moral grounds” can also 
be relevant.127 These can be seen from the rules prohibiting consanguinity128 and 
121 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.390.
122 See Ibid., and Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in 
English Confl ict of Laws” (n.27).
123 See Ibid. and Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still 
Married When We Return Home?” (n.24).
124 See Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict 
of Laws” (n.27), p.47.
125 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to 
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.391. See also Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice 
of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?” (n.24) and Robert 
Lefl ar, “Choice Infl uencing Considerations in Confl icts Law” (1966) 41 New York University Law 
Review 267.
126 Eg Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict 
of Laws” (n.27), p.54 stated that in relation to lack of consent that the “purpose behind the law will 
generally be to protect the person form the consequences of their misapprehension or weakness”.
127 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.430.
128 Where there is a blood relationship between the parties, for example uncle and niece.
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affi nity.129 In relation to consanguinity there is another relevant concern about 
preventing marriage between those who are too closely related, in order to prevent 
the increased risk of the birth of disabled children.
C. Polygamous marriages
When selecting a choice of law rule for same-sex relationships, a review of how 
polygamous marriages have been treated by the courts is particularly interesting. 
This is because the justifi cations for prohibiting such unions are often similar to 
reasons given by courts and governments who prohibit same-sex relationships. 
The prohibition on polygamous marriage, it is argued, is supported by religion 
and society as a whole.130 Despite this line of argument, these have not been the 
determining factors as to how polygamous marriages are treated by English courts. 
Simon J in Cheni v Cheni explained that “common sense” and a “reasonable 
tolerance”131 were also relevant. The prohibition on a polygamous marriage under 
English law remains in place. However, the law has now developed to recognise 
a polygamous marriage conducted in a foreign jurisdiction unless there are strong 
reasons against doing so.132 Arguably this can be justifi ed on the basis that while 
the object of English law is to protect monogamous marriage it does not mean that 
there is any “justifi cation for invalidating a polygamous marriage”.133 In taking a 
tolerant approach that English courts respect the traditions of other countries rather 
than imposing their own view as to what constitutes a valid marriage. This can 
be demonstrated from the polygamous marriage which was under consideration 
in Hussain v Hussain.134 The husband was a domiciled Englishman and the wife 
was domiciled in Pakistan. Ormrod LJ recognised the validity of the marriage. The 
reasons for his decision included concerns about “repercussions on the Muslim 
community” and the fact that we are now “an increasingly pluralistic society”.135
Several authorities state that the choice of law theory in relation to polygamous 
marriages is that of the intended matrimonial home of the couple.136 In practice, 
case law137 has extended the choice of law beyond that of the intended matrimonial 
129 Where the parties to the marriage are already related through marriage, for example step-mother and 
step-son.
130 See eg in Hyde v Hyde (1865–1869) LR 1 P & D 130, Lord Penzance described “[m]arriage as 
understood in Christendom, may be defi ned as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman 
to the exclusion of all others”.
131 Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85, 99 (Simon J).
132 Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1969] 1 QB 1.
133 See Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage” (n.5), p.234.
134 Hussain v Hussain [1983] Fam 26.
135 Ibid., 32 (Ormrod LJ).
136 See Radwan v Radwan (No 2) (n.37). This is supported by Davie, “The Breaking-Up of Essential 
Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Confl ict of Laws” (n.27) and Reed, “Essential 
Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of 
Law Rules” (n.27).
137 See Hussain v Hussain (n.134).
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home. This means that a polygamous marriage conducted abroad is recognised in 
England even though the couple now reside here. Smart explains that whilst the 
intended domicile as “a connecting factor serves its purpose well, … in exceptional 
cases it may have to yield to other circumstances”.138 English courts therefore do 
not apply a simple intended matrimonial home test to polygamous marriages. 
Instead they also consider other factors as well and apply a tolerant approach to 
how polygamous marriages are treated. This leads to the validation of polygamous 
marriages conducted abroad, even where the couple are residing in this jurisdiction. 
The English courts are applying in practice an extended intended matrimonial 
home test. This makes an interesting precedent of a country recognising a form of 
marriage which cannot be conducted in their own jurisdiction. In this article we 
make the case for an extended choice of law in relation to same-sex relationships.
IV. Choice of Law in Relation to Same-Sex Relationships
The main focus of this article is to determine which choice of law provision should 
be applied in relation to same-sex relationships. Any law preventing same-sex 
relationships is usually justifi ed on the grounds of protection of society,139 religion140 
and public morality. In determining the choice of law to be applied to same-sex 
relationships, we suggest a novel and more extensive suggested choice of law rule 
which we term the continued recognised relationship theory. The applicable rule 
to be applied would be the law where the couple are intending to live, or the law 
of the country where they have lived, if their relationship has been subsisting for a 
reasonable period of time. This goes beyond the intended matrimonial home test as 
the intended place of domicile is not the only relevant factor; instead consideration 
is also given to where the couple have already resided. Equally, the dual domicile 
theory is not being utilised as we consider that past factors are not the only relevant 
ones; the couples’ future intentions also being equally valid. There is nothing in this 
rule which requires individual countries to allow same-sex marriage to take place 
within their own jurisdiction. This more extensive choice of law rule can be justifi ed 
because of concerns surrounding upholding marriage validity, consideration of the 
view of the parties to the marriage and the example of how polygamous marriages 
have been treated. We also argue that additional public policy issues apply when 
138 Smart, “Interest Analysis, False Confl icts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage” (n.5), p.237 referring 
to Ibid. (Ormrod LJ).
139 See eg Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married 
When We Return Home?” (n.24) and Brian Bix, “Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal” (2002–
2003) 36 Family Law Quarterly 255.
140 Eg Kathryn Marshall “Strategic Pragmatism or Radical Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and the Civil 
Rights Movements Juxtaposed” (2010) 2 William and Mary Policy Review 194, 225 argues that “[r]
eligiosity is also an ‘exceptionally strong determinant’ of opposition to gay marriage”. In Bellinger v 
Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 Lord Nicholls described “[m]arriage … as an institution, or a relationship 
deeply embedded in the religious and social culture of this country”.
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considering same-sex relationships, which all argue in favour of a more extended 
choice of law rule. In turn, we will discuss each of the public policy concerns 
of citizenship, symbolism and equality. Although these arguments are often most 
appropriate to recognition of same-sex marriage, for the sake of consistency we 
argue that the same choice of law should be applied to all same-sex relationships, 
including civil partnerships.
A. Citizenship
Citizenship is one of the public policy concerns which argue strongly in favour of a 
more extensive choice of law rule in relation to same-sex couples. It is important to 
understand what is meant by citizenship in this context. There are clear connections 
between citizenship and equality. All citizens who have the status are regarded 
as equals.141 Equal citizenship involves inclusion, enfranchisement and equity and 
justice.142 “Sexual citizenship” has been recognised by a number of authors, who 
see the right to enter into marriage for same-sex couples as having a “constitutional 
character”.143 Marriage involves not only the personal relationship between the 
two individuals involved but also puts the relationship on a public footing. This 
is because of the number of public rights it involves and it “participates in the 
public order” concerned. 144 In turn because of the public nature of marriage this has 
constitutional importance. The right to marriage is given protection by international 
conventions145 and leading cases,146 and many countries have legalised same-sex 
marriage.147 Same-sex couples who cannot access the status of marriage will not 
141 Nicholas Bamforth, “Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument” (2012) 10(2) 
Int’l J Const L 477, 478 referring to Thomas H Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class” in Thomas H 
Marshall and Tom Bottomore (eds), Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1992) p.18. See 
also Michael Rosenfeld, “Introduction: Gender, Sexual Orientation and Equal Citizenship” (2012) 10(2) 
IJCL 340; Conor O’Mahoney, “There Is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity” (2012) 10(2) IJCL 551, 
555 and Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 [132] (Baroness Hale of Richmond).
142 See Bamforth, “Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument” (n.141), p.483 
referring to Jeffrey Weeks, “The Sexual Citizen” (1998) 15 Theory, Culture and Society 38, 39.
143 Ibid., p.478 referring to Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex 
and Belonging (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) p.27.
144 Ibid., p.481 referring to Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000) pp.2, 1.
145 See eg art.12 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that “Men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing 
the exercise of this right.” Another example is art.23(2) of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which states that “the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall 
be recognized”.
146 See eg Goodridge v Department of Public Health (n.6) and Loving v Virginia (n.6).
147 The following list shows which countries and US states currently recognise same-sex marriage. 
Netherlands (2001), Belgium (2003), Massachusetts (2003), Spain (2004), Canada (2005), South Africa 
(2006), Norway (2009), Sweden (2009), Portugal (2010), Iceland (2010), Argentina (2010), Mexico 
(2010), Denmark (2011), Brazil (2013), France (2013), Uruguay (2013), New Zealand (2013), England 
and Wales (2013), Scotland (2014), Luxembourg (2015), US nationwide (2015) and Finland (effective 
from 2017).
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have the full level of constitutional protections and can therefore be regarded as 
partial citizens only.148
This article argues for a solution with regards to having a uniform choice of 
law for same-sex relationships at an EU level. The EU has embraced the concept 
of citizenship. This can be seen from the extensive rights granted to citizens under 
the Citizenship Directive 2004/38. For example, citizens and family members 
of citizens are given extensive rights of residence,149 access to Member State’s 
social assistance scheme150 and equality in relation to employment151 and self-
employment.152 Alison O’Neil argues that the EU’s free movement provisions 
entail the right of same-sex couples to move around Europe.153 If an EU citizens’ 
family cannot move along with the EU citizen, it is going to deter and may prevent 
an EU citizen moving entirely. Citizenship is therefore a strong public policy factor 
in favour of having a more extensive choice of law rule.
B. Symbolic status of marriage
Marriage also has a symbolic status. Zvi Triger argues that marriage has been used 
as a weapon against gays.154 Marriage is viewed by many as the preferred status 
which gives many legal privileges in countries across Europe as well as the United 
States.155 To be denied recognition of this status is to be demoted to a second-class 
status. Michael Dorf discusses the “symbolic impact” that results.156 The strength 
of the symbolism argument can also be seen in same-sex couples continuing to 
fi ght for same-sex marriage, even after being given many of the legal rights of 
civil partnership. France, England and Wales and Denmark are all examples of 
jurisdictions that went on to introduce same-sex marriage legislation even after the 
prior introduction of civil partnership. This was despite the fact that in England 
civil partnerships were given almost equivalent legal protections to that of married 
148 See Bamforth, “Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument” (n.141), p.483 
referring to Diane Richardson, “Sexuality and Citizenship” (1998) 32 Sociology 83, 88.
149 Citizenship Directive 2004/38 art.14(1).
150 Ibid., art.14(3).
151 Ibid., art.24.
152 Ibid., art.23.
153 Alisson O’Neill, “Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European Community: The European Court 
of Justice’s Ability to Dictate Social Policy” (2004) 37 Cornell Int’l L J 199, 201.
154 Zvi Triger, “Fear of the Wandering Gay: Some Refl ections on Citizenship, Nationalism and Recognition 
in Same-Sex Relationships” (2012) 8(2) International Journal of Law in Context 268.
155 See Aloni, ‘‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage” (n.15), 
p.110. See also the Equality Network, “Equal Marriage: Report of the Equality Network Survey of 
LGBT People’s Views on Marriage Equality” (2011), available at http://www.equality-network.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Equal-Marriage-Report-26.1.11.pdf (visited 27 May 2016).
156 See Dorf, “Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings” (n.95), p.1275. 
See also Aloni, ‘‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage” 
(n.15), p.150 and Misha Isaak, “What’s in a Name? Civil Unions and the Constitutional Signifi cance of 
Marriage” (2008) 10 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 607.
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couples. Symbolism is therefore another strong public policy argument which 
favours a more extensive choice of law rule.
C. Equality arguments
Equality arguments are vital in relation to success of the recognition of same-sex 
marriage.157 In many international cases where arguments in relation to same-
sex marriage have been made successfully, equality has often been the deciding 
argument.158 This can be seen from the latest cases in the US Supreme Court159 
as well as leading decisions from Canada160 and South Africa.161 Recognition of 
same-sex marriage is seen by many as the latest in the chapter of historical debates 
regarding marriage laws, following the abolition of miscegenation and Nazi anti-
Jewish legislation.162 Other marriage reforms which demonstrate the changing 
nature of marriage163 concern the reversal of laws which did not allow women to own 
property during marriage and recognition of transsexuals in their new sex.164 Some 
authors argue that public policy factors should be weighed, and that some factors 
such as equality concerns should be given greater weight on the scales.165 Barbara 
157 See eg Marshall, “Strategic Pragmatism or Radical Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and the Civil 
Rights Movements Juxtaposed” (n.140) and Mary Dunlap, “The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A 
Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties” (1991) 1 Law and Sexuality Review Lesbian 
and Gay Legal Issues 63.
158 See eg Goodridge v Department of Public Health (n.6) as discussed by Jonah Crane, “Legislative and 
Constitutional Responses to Goodridge v Department of Public Health” (2003–2004) 7 New York 
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 465. See also Obergefell v Hodges (n.6).
159 United States v Windsor, 570 US ___, 133 S Ct 786 (2013) and the US Supreme Court decision of 
6 October 2014 denying certiorari in appeals from fi ve states. The cases were Bogan v Baskin (Indiana) 
No 14-277 (7th Cir); Walker v Wolf (Wisconsin) No 14-178 (7th Cir); Herbert v Kitchen (Utah) No 14-124 
(10th Cir); McQuigg v Bostic (Virginia) No 14-251 (4th Cir); Rainey v Bostic (Virginia) No 14-153 
(4th Cir); Schaefer v Bostic (Virginia) No 14-225 (4th Cir) and Smith v Bishop (Oklahoma) No 14-136 
(10th Cir).
160 Halpern v Toronto 65 OR (3d) 161 (CA) (2003). For discussion, see Claire L’Heureux-Dube, “Realizing 
Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in Comparative 
Perspective” (2003) 1(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 35.
161 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie [2006] (1) SA 524 (CC).
162 See eg David Richards, “Carl F Stychin Book Review: Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of 
Citizenship and Law Reform: Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon” (2004) 2(3) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 727; Dorf, “Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s 
Social Meanings” (n.95); Scott, “A World Without Marriage” (n.16); Marshall, “Strategic Pragmatism 
or Radical Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and the Civil Rights Movements Juxtaposed” (n.140) and 
Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We 
Return Home?” (n.24).
163 See eg Cindy Tobisman, “Marriage vs Domestic Partnership: Will We Ever Protect Lesbians’ Families” 
(1997) 12 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 112 on the changing nature of marriage.
164 See eg, Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18.
165 See eg Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married 
When We Return Home?” (n.24) referring to Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman, The Law of 
Multistate Problems: Cases and Materials on Confl icts of Laws (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown 
and Co, 1965) pp.342–375 and Arthur von Mehren, “Recent Trends in Choice-of Methodology” (1975) 
60 Cornell Law Review 927.
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Cox is one such author. She considers that equality should be given greater weight 
on the scale and that there should be recognition of same-sex marriage because 
this would end “age-old discrimination and prejudice and misunderstanding”.166 
It also demonstrates the importance of equality as a public policy factor tending 
towards a more extensive choice of law rule. This argument has received much 
criticism with Scott Fruehwald arguing that there are no “substantively neutral” 
or “objective criteria” to weigh the competing public policy concerns.167 As this 
article is proposing that the choice of law should be determined at an EU level, 
there is an interesting point to make about how these public policy issues may be 
weighted. The EU is committed to join the ECHR.168 The ECtHR has long had a 
policy of weighing competing arguments.169 Human rights arguments are given 
greater weight than those of commercial interests, for example.170 An argument 
could therefore be made that equality-based human rights concerns should be given 
greater weight than other competing public policy arguments. This argument has 
been given a considerable boost by the July 2015 decision of the ECtHR in Oliari v 
Italy.171 All ECtHR contracting states have to introduce either civil partnership/
registered partnership although it remains open to their discretion as to the exact 
form this will take. There is no requirement to introduce same-sex marriage where 
the ECtHR continues to be bound by the margin of appreciation172 (as will be 
explored further in the next section), currently allowing Member States discretion 
on this policy. The important public policy concerns of citizenship, symbolism and 
equality do have to be born in mind when determining which choice of law should 
be applied to same-sex relationships. We argue that the more extensive continued 
recognised relationship theory is appropriate. The next section looks further at why 
it is necessary to tackle this matter at an EU level.
166 See Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When 
We Return Home?” (n.24), p.1033.
167 See Fruehwald, “Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage” (n.116), p.838. He also refers to Douglas 
Laycock, “Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States; The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of 
Law” (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 249.
168 EU states make up 28 of the Council of Europe’s 47 member states. Following the Lisbon Treaty the EU 
has also agreed to accede to the ECtHR. Treaty on European Union (TEU) art.6(2) provides that “The 
Union shall access to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms”.
169 This is known as the doctrine of proportionality. See Steve Foster, Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
(Cambridge: Pearson, 3rd ed., 2011) 65 who explains that “Restrictions should be strictly proportionate 
to the legitimate aim being pursued and the authorities must show that the restriction in question does 
not go beyond what is strictly required to achieve that purpose.”
170 For example, in the area of freedom of expression, the ECtHR has given less protection to commercial 
free speech. Eg in Hachette Filipacchi Associates v France (2009) 49 EHRR 23 there was no violation 
of art.10 when the applicant companies were prosecuted for advertising cigarettes contrary to French 
law. In contrast, press free speech is given much greater protection as being essential to democracy. See 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979–80) 2 EHRR 245.
171 See Oliari v Italy (n.22).
172 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20.
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V. European Union
The right to free movement across the EU, and the need to avoid limping 
marriages,173 advocates in favour of EU involvement. Problems are caused by 
“divergences between Member States”,174 and this is particularly acute in the area of 
same-sex relationships. Many Member States now have some legal form of same-
sex relationship, but there is wide diversity on how this has been introduced.175 
Even following Oliari v Italy176 this will not change as Member States will be able 
to determine what form of same-sex relationship they introduce.
It remains controversial as to whether the EU should be involved. Some authors 
stress what can be learnt from other regimes,177 but others argue that international 
comparisons are not appropriate in family law.178 This is because of the heavy 
infl uence which religious and other racial and political considerations have had on 
the shaping of family law.179 There are legitimate concerns that a single European 
approach would result in unnecessary homogeneity.180 Political reality also has to 
be faced. It remains controversial as to whether Member States will support further 
expansion of free movement laws.181
173 See works referred to in note 59.
174 Gordon Moir and Paul Beaumont, “Brussels Convention II: A New Private International Law Instrument 
in Family Matters for the European Union or the European Community” (1995) 20(3) European Law 
Review 268, 269.
175 See works referred to in note 3. For discussion, see also Kate Spencer, “Same-Sex Couples and the Right 
to Marry: European Perspectives” (2010) 6(1) Cambridge Student Law Review 155.
176 See Oliari v Italy (n.22).
177 See eg Richards, “Carl F Stychin Book Review: Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of 
Citizenship and Law Reform: Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon” (n.162) and William 
Eskridge Jr, Equality Practices, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights (Oxon: Routledge, 2002).
178 See eg Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1998) and David Bradley, “Comparative Law, Family Law and Common Law” (2003) 33(1) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 127.
179 See Bradley, “Comparative Law, Family Law and Common Law” (n.178) referring to HC Gutteridge, 
Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1946) pp.31–32. See also the Centre for Social Justice, “European Family 
Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” (n.1); Niamh Nic Shuibhne, “Margins of Appreciation: National 
Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law” (2009) 34(2) European Law Review 230 and 
Aloni, ‘‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage” (n.15).
180 See Moir and Beaumont, “Brussels Convention II: A New Private International Law Instrument in Family 
Matters for the European Union or the European Community” (n.174), p.280. Shuibhne, “Margins 
of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law” (n.179), p.238 
states that “constitutional differences remind us that they ‘are often that part of social identity about 
which people care a great deal …” referring to Joseph Weiler, “Fundamental Rights and Fundamental 
Boundaries: On the Confl ict of Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European 
Legal Space” in his The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
181 See for discussion, Spencer, “Same-Sex Couples and the Right to Marry: European Perspectives” 
(n.175). This problem is particularly controversial following the re-election of the Conservative 
government in 2015.
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A. EU emphasis on subsidiarity
The EU recognises the strength of these arguments and continues to emphasise 
subsidiarity.182 The EU has to act within and cannot exceed the bounds of its 
competency.183 Both the EU and the ECtHR have followed a policy of subsidiarity 
or margin of appreciation in this area. Although the ECtHR has now recognised 
the right of same-sex couples to some form of civil partnership, or registered 
partnership,184 these policies allow a “degree of discretion” afforded to Member 
States185 who can continue to determine the extent of rights given to same-sex 
couples. There is no requirement to enact same-sex marriage. This was refused in 
Schalk and Kopf v Austria where the right to same-sex marriage was denied due 
to a lack of consensus between contracting states.186 The EU’s traditional position 
which determined that gender discrimination did not cover sexual orientation187 
has been reformed, but the EU Citizenship Directive188 continues to have a narrow 
interpretation of family members.189 Spouses are included within the category of 
family members,190 but this does not include same-sex spouse. The term is gender-
neutral and some argue that it should include same-sex partners,191 yet it remains 
182 The Commentary on art.9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides 
that “There is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages. 
International courts and committees have so far hesitated to extend the application of the right to marry to 
same-sex couples.” Also art.2(2) of Directive 2004/38 provides that ‘‘family member means (a) spouse, 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the 
legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships 
as equivalent to marriage in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the 
host Member State”. 
183 Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Union shall act “only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein”. For discussion, see Stalford, “Regulating Family Life in Post-Amsterdam Europe” (n.23).
184 See Oliari v Italy (n.22).
185 For discussion, see Emily Wada, “A Pretty Picture. The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to 
Assisted Suicide” (2005) 27 Loyola Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 275 and 
Petra Butler, “Margin of Appreciation: A Note towards a Solution for the Pacifi c” (2008–2009) Victoria 
University Wellington Law Review 687.
186 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n.172), [105].
187 Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] 1 CMLR 993. See also the domestic decision of R v Ministry 
of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 which applied the same interpretation of the EU directive. 
See also Advocate-General v MacDonald  2003 SC (HL) 35; Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfi eld 
Secondary School [2000] ICR 920 decided under the then existing Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment.
188 Directive 2004/38.
189 For discussion, see Stalford, “Regulating Family Life in Post-Amsterdam Europe” (n.23) and Spencer, 
“Same-Sex Couples and the Right to Marry: European Perspectives” (n.175).
190 See Directive 2004/38 art.2(2)(a). Determined by Netherlands v Reed [1987] 2 CMLR 448 to be genuine 
marital relationships only.
191 Dimitry Kochenov, “On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European 
Federalism” (2009) 33(1) Fordham International Law Review 156, 190 referring to Mark Bell, “EU 
Directive on Free Movement and Same-Sex Families: Guidelines on the Implementation Process”, 2005 
ILGA Europe, available at www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/fi les/Attachments/eu_directive_free_
movement_guidelines_2005.pdf (visited 27 May 2016).
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clear that the EU system of subsidiarity does not require member states to recognise 
same-sex marriages conducted in other states.192 The principle of subsidiarity is made 
explicit in relation to registered partnership where Citizenship Directive 2004/38 
expressly includes registered partners as family members under art.2(2), but this is 
only “if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as 
equivalent to marriage”.193 As all EU Member States are also contracting members 
of the ECHR they will be bound by the ruling of Oliari v Italy and will need to 
introduce some form of same-sex relationship, although they have discretion as to 
what form this takes.194 The likelihood of marked differences between the varying 
statuses granted to same-sex partners is a clear restriction on the ability of a non EU 
same-sex spouse or partner to relocate to another EU country.195
Many authors believe that the margin of appreciation is necessary in 
international law.196 A negative result of this approach is that the matter is left to 
the individual states’ discretion. Critics have argued that this may not adequately 
safeguard the position of minority groups in society.197 Action at an EU level may 
improve this position. It is argued here that the EU is the appropriate forum within 
which to bring forward the proposed choice of law rule. This is because of the 
already existing and growing area of European family law. The EU, as compared to 
other sources of European family law, allows for greater co-ordinated action. There 
is also a necessity of the EU to act according to the imperative of its free movement 
provisions. In the past the EU and the ECtHR have taken differing approaches to 
their treatment of same-sex couples but over time the two organisations are growing 
closer. Each of these points is dealt with in turn.
B. European family law
Peter McEleavy reports on the “rapidly emerg[ing]” area of EU family law.198 
The area where the EU has been most active in terms of family law includes 
that of enforcement of matrimonial judgments on divorce between different EU 
192 See works referred to in note 182.
193 Directive 2004/38 art.2(2)(b).
194 See Oliari v Italy (n.22).
195 For discussion, see Grigolo, “Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal 
Subject” (n.2).
196 See eg Yuval Shany, “Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?”(2005) 
16(5) European Journal of International Law 907 and Eyal Benvenisti, “Margin of Appreciation, 
Consensus and Universal Standards” (1998–1999) 31 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Policy 843.
197 See Shany, “Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?” (n.196), 
pp.920–921.
198 Peter McEleavy, “The Communitarization of Divorce Rules: What Impact for English and Scottish 
Law?” (2004) 53(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 605. See also Spencer, “Same-Sex 
Couples and the Right to Marry: European Perspectives” (n.175).
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countries.199 The Brussels II legislation has been referred to as a “watershed in the 
evolution of EU law”.200 Other developments include those concerning succession 
laws.201 The Commission on European Family Law was also established in 2001, 
with funding in part from the EU to consider laws on the basis of voluntary 
harmonisation. There have also been proposals for Regulations concerning the 
property consequences for unmarried couples, and registered partnerships, but 
these have not been introduced.202 Further proposals concerning recognition of 
public documents,203 and on the free movement of citizens,204 have not progressed. 
Any further EU conventions will need to be carefully negotiated. This is because of 
the current political climate and criticisms about the way Brussels II and successors 
were negotiated.205 There are clear precedents for EU involvement in family law.
C. EU allows for greatest coordinated action
It is also argued that the EU as compared to other sources of European family 
law allows for greatest co-ordinated action. Other bodies such as the Council of 
Europe, Hague Conference and the United Nations have all done important work, 
but the EU system offers the easiest approach to bringing forward legislation in 
this area. This is because of the closer level of involvement between Member 
States meaning that the EU can “secure a deeper form of agreement, relatively 
unscarred by compromise”.206 This advantage is less since the growth in size of 
the EU, other bodies often struggle to secure agreement to conventions. This can 
199 See eg Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
matters, 26 September 1968; Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 on Jurisdiction and Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility 
for Children of both Spouses of 29 May 2000 (known as Brussels II); Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial 
Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility (known as Brussels II bis).
200 Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, “Ten Years of European Family Law: Retrospective Refl ections from a 
Common Law Perspective” (2010) 59(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1021, 1022.
201 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decisions and Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in Matters of Succession and on 
the Creation of a European Certifi cate of Succession will apply from 17 August 2015, to the succession 
of persons who die on or after that date. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom did not take part in 
the adoption of the instrument.
202 The European Commission proposed in COM(2011) 127,“Bringing Legal Clarity to Property Rights 
for International Couples”, 16 March 2011 and two further regulations; COM(2011) 125, a Council 
Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in Matters 
of Matrimonial Property Regimes, 16 March 2011 and COM(2011) 126, a Council Regulation 
on Applicable Law and the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Regarding the Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnerships, 16 March 2011.
203 COM(2010) 747, “Less Bureaucracy for Citizens Promoting Free Movement of Public Documents and 
Recognition of the Effect of Civil Status Records” (n.74).
204 COM(2013) 228, “Proposal for a Regulation on Promoting the Free Movement of Citizens”, 24 April 2013.
205 For discussion, see McEleavy, “The Communitarization of Divorce Rules: What Impact for English and 
Scottish Law?” (n.198).
206 See Moir and Beaumont, “Brussels Convention II: A New Private International Law Instrument in 
Family Matters for the European Union or the European Community” (n.174), p.288.
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be demonstrated by the lack of progress of the International Commission on Civil 
Status’ Convention on the Recognition of Registered Partnerships. Despite being 
opened for signature in 2007 this has only attracted two signatories, resulting in a 
limited level of success.207
D. EU free movement imperative
EU free movement provisions are also another reason for the EU to act in this 
area.208 The reality is that many European citizens will exercise their right of 
free movement to take up work in other countries, or marry nationals from other 
countries.209 European integration is, therefore, “no longer purely economic”.210 
Some commentators view harmonisation of private international laws as essential 
in order to guarantee free movement.211 This is because an EU citizen is unlikely to 
move country to take up work elsewhere in Europe if their family members cannot 
move with them. As the rules of private international law determine (amongst 
other important roles) if a marriage is valid, these are a key ingredient to ensure 
free movement of persons. The Centre for Social Justice also argues that there is a 
need for international involvement as individual states are not capable of dealing 
with increased mobility of persons between states by themselves.212 Allowing each 
individual country in Europe to determine their own choice of law rules only adds 
to complexities for couples who may move several times across different European 
borders. There is a key role for the EU to play in this area.
E. Growing closeness between EU and ECtHR
A further important argument surrounding EU involvement is despite past 
divergences, there is a growing closeness between the EU and the ECtHR. The EU 
is now concerned with the “protection of fundamental rights” within the European 
legal order.213 Some writers argue that the EU is engaging in a “rights revolution”214 
207 Portugal in 2008 and Spain in 2009.
208 For discussion, see Stalford, “Regulating Family Life in Post-Amsterdam Europe” (n.23).
209 See Ibid., and also Spencer, “Same-Sex Couples and the Right to Marry: European Perspectives” 
(n.175).
210 Alegria Borras, “Explanatory Report on the Brussels II Convention … on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters” (16 July 1998) Offi cial Journal C 
221 para.1.
211 See McEleavy, “The Communitarization of Divorce Rules: What Impact for English and Scottish Law?” 
(n.198).
212 The Centre for Social Justice, “European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” (n.1).
213 See Shuibhne, “Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement 
Law” (n.179), p.230.
214 Mark Dawson, Elise Muir and Monica Claes, “Enforcing the EU’s Rights Revolution: The Case of 
Equality” (2012) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 276. See also Shuibhne, “Margins of 
Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law” (n.179), p.233 
referring to S Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Essex: Longman, 2002) p.431.
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but it remains important to avoid over generalisations215 as the EU is continuing 
to carry out and develop key economic functions. The growing closeness between 
the ECtHR and the EU is demonstrated by the enactment of the EU Charter on 
human rights, the fact that all EU states are also members of the ECHR and that 
under the Lisbon Treaty the EU has agreed to accede to the ECHR.216 The EU 
and the ECtHR also work together217 and cross-refer to each other’s judgments.218 
These points draw us to conclude that the EU is the appropriate institution to bring 
forward a new choice of law mechanism in relation to recognition of same-sex 
relationships. The continued recognised relationship theory would mean that a 
same-sex relationship would be valid where this is recognised in the new state 
where the couple intend to reside, or where the relationship has been subsisting 
for a reasonable period of time. There is no requirement for individual countries to 
allow same-sex relationships to be enacted within their own jurisdiction. The fi nal 
section deals with some anticipated criticisms of this proposed choice of law.
VI. Anticipated Criticisms of the Continued Recognised 
Relationship Theory
Firstly, an anticipated criticism of the continued recognised relationship theory is 
that it is going too far too fast. Secondly, is that it would be diffi cult to operate in 
practice due to diffi culties in defi ning what is meant by the relationship having 
been subsisting for a reasonable period of time. Thirdly, is its application to the 
varying types of civil partnerships across the EU and fi nally is the recognition of a 
relationship that a member state would not allow its own domicilaries or nationals 
to enter into. Turning to the fi rst point, there is a concern that recognising a same-
sex relationship in a country which does not allow domestic same-sex couples 
to marry could lead to a backlash in public opinion. It was suggested that this 
was a matter that should be handled with thoughtful consideration and that there 
should be “patience in reform”.219 There are examples of backlash occurring within 
the recognition of same-sex marriages. In the US although the fi rst states began 
215 See Shuibhne, “Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement 
Law” (n.179), p.236 referring to Oliver and Roth, “The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms” (2004) 
41 Common Market Law Review 407, 408.
216 TEU art. 6(2) provides that “The Union shall access to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.
217 See eg CM(2007)74, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European 
Union” prepared at the 117th Session of the Committee of Ministers (Strasbourg, 10–11 May 2007), 
available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2007)74&Language=lanEnglish (visited 27 
May 2016).
218 See eg Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, Selma Kadiman v Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR I-2133 
and Safet Eyüp v Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Vorarlberg [2000] 3 CMLR 1049.
219 Dale Carpenter, “A Traditionalist Case for Gay Marriage” (2008–2009) 50 South Texas Law Review 93 
referring to Edmund Burke, Refl ections on the Revolution in France (London: James Dodsley, 1790).
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recognising same-sex marriage in 2003,220 this led to a backlash and within six 
months, eleven states amended their constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage.221 
It was not until 2014 that public opinion in the US could be seen to have developed 
suffi ciently, to declare in United States v Windsor222 that s.3 of the Defence of 
Marriage Act 1996 was unconstitutional in its restriction of the terms “marriage” 
and “spouse” to heterosexual couples, and recognition of same-sex marriages had 
extended to 36 states. These developments were further added to when, in 2015, it 
was held by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell v Hodges,223 that the fundamental 
right to marry is also guaranteed to same-sex couples and thus required all states 
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognise those marriages 
validly entered into in other states. It is, therefore, argued that enacting legislation 
too far in advance of public opinion delayed action in favour of same-sex marriage.
Fears of a backlash would, however, be minimalised as progress would be 
made on an incremental basis. This involves making change on a step-by-step 
approach224 in order to secure “real and sustainable equality”.225 Incremental steps 
promote public opinion to change and become desensitised.226 Civil partnerships 
encouraged public opinion to adjust, before moving on to strive for same-sex 
marriage. Experience demonstrates that countries that fi rst recognised civil 
partnership, before introducing same-sex marriage managed to reach sustainable 
solutions, without experiencing any backlash.227 Equally the suggested choice of 
law rule would be another incremental step, allowing public opinion to become 
desensitised. Nothing in our theory requires EU states to introduce domestic 
legislation to conduct same-sex relationships.
Turning to the second issue, the continued recognised relationship theory 
requires a new Member State to recognise the relationship when it has been 
subsisting for a reasonable period of time. Without a defi nition of “reasonable 
period of time” the theory is open to criticism. However, this is something that 
220 See Goodridge v Department of Public Health (n.6).
221 For further discussion see Robert Verchick, “Same-Sex and the City” (2005) 37 Urban Law 191.
222 See United States v Windsor (n.159).
223 See Obergefell v Hodges (n.6).
224 This follows the theory of small change. This was fi rst advanced by Kees Waaldijk, “Small Change: 
How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands” in Robert Wintemute and Mads 
Andenaes (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A study of National, European and 
International Law (North America, US: Hart Publishing, 2001) pp.437–464 and later advanced by 
Eskridge, Equality Practices, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights (n.177) and Merin, Equality 
for Same-Sex Couples: The Legal Recognition of Gay Partnerships in Europe and the United States 
(n.20) who advocated recognition of same-sex marriage on a step-by-step approach.
225 See Marshall, “Strategic Pragmatism or Radical Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and the Civil Rights 
Movements Juxtaposed” (n.140), p.199.
226 See Eskridge, Equality Practices, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights (n.177), p.119. See also 
Marshall, “Strategic Pragmatism or Radical Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and the Civil Rights 
Movements Juxtaposed” (n.140), pp.199–200 who explains that such slow change, although frustrating 
at the time, allows “public opinion to adjust gradually to the changes sought by social movement”.
227 England and Wales, France and Denmark are examples of this experience.
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would be negotiated between EU Member States. We do not advocate setting 
a particular time scale, such as a fi xed number of years, as there is no way of 
making such a determination. A fi xed period of time would also fail to recognise 
the individuality in relationships, or provide the necessary fl exibility to take into 
account the many differing familial arrangements. Instead, we would recommend 
that reasonable time be based upon a series of factors including; duration of civil 
status, duration of relationship prior to obtaining the status in question, whether 
there are children involved, and type of property and joint commitments entered 
into. This test should not prove diffi cult, as in many of the straightforward instances 
it will be obvious to the Member States involved that the relationship is one of a 
solid and durable nature due to some of the above-mentioned factors. In respect of 
the more challenging cases, it should be remembered that the EU already uses the 
durable relationship test for heterosexual co-habitees.228 Similarly, this criticism 
could be applied to many of the other choice of law rules. For instance, the intended 
matrimonial home requires that the couple move to the intended matrimonial home 
within a reasonable time, without defi ning reasonable time. Likewise the most real 
and substantial connection test does not defi ne how the most real and substantial 
connection is determined. The list of factors would at least provide clarity in many 
of the straightforward cases.
Thirdly, criticism could be directed at the theory when considering its 
application to civil partnership type relationships as opposed to same-sex 
marriages. A marriage is a universally recognised status and, thus would not 
produce diffi culties when expecting a fellow Member State to recognise it: “[T]
he major international difference between marriage and civil partnerships is the 
territorial limitations of the latter”.229 Civil unions come in many different forms 
around the EU, and there must be some consideration of whether the new Member 
State would be required to recognise the version attached to the couple from their 
previous Member State or their own version. This is important as it could lead to 
an upgrade or downgrade in the relationship status and the legal consequences 
that come with it.230 It is our suggestion that the general rule should be to apply 
the status which is most similar to that which the couple are in.231 Alternatively, if 
that is not possible, the relationship should be upgraded. Even though this could 
mean couples are left with greater obligations than they had intended,232 it would 
228 In EU law, co-habitees are not directly included as family members under Citizenship Directive 2004/38 
art.3(2). They have to prove a “durable relationship duly attested”.
229 Kenneth Mck Norrie, “Recognition of Foreign Relationships Under the Civil Partnership Act 2004” 
(2006) 2(1) Journal of Private International Law 137, 166.
230 For instance, if a couple from France with a French Pacte Civil De Solidarite were to move to England 
and have their relationship recognised as an English civil partnership their status and legal obligations 
would be upgraded.
231 This idea of equivalence was explored by Hillel Y Levin, “Resolving Interstate Confl icts Over Same-
Sex Non-Marriage” (2011) 63 Florida Law Review 47 in respect of same-sex relationships.
232 This point was considered by M Harper and K Landells, “The Civil Partnership Act 2004 in Force” 
[2005] Family Law 963.
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at least provide them with the same, if not better minimum levels of protection and 
recognition. Downgrading a couple’s status may lead to problems surrounding 
second-class citizenship if couples feel they are being stripped of their elected 
relationship status.233
Finally, the choice of law rule could be criticised as it would require Member 
States to recognise existing same-sex relationships if a couple move there, that 
they would not permit their own dommicilaries or nationals to enter into. It may be 
argued that it is creating one rule for one but not for another. This criticism could 
be levelled at other incapacities. When considering age in England, in accordance 
with s.2 of the Marriage Act 1949 the parties must be at least 16, and any marriage 
involving a party below that age is void. Regardless of this, as it is the dual domicile 
rule that often applies to the incapacity, marriages between parties not domiciled 
in England are still held valid in England, despite English domicilaries being 
prevented from entering such marriages.234 Likewise, as previously mentioned 
within the article, similar respect is shown to foreign polygamous marriages even 
upon moving to England.235 It is, therefore, argued that this is something the courts 
are already accustomed to, and could require similar application and tolerance 
demonstrated within other incapacities.
VII. Conclusion
The law surrounding same-sex relationships, and the appropriate choice of law 
rule, is evidently unclear. Despite the need for clear choice of law rules, as a 
result of subsidiarity, countries in the EU are able to determine to what extent 
to recognise same-sex relationships. The examination of the choice of law rules 
within marriage validity highlighted the competition amidst the theories. It is 
apparent that no one theory is appropriate for universal application. Instead, it is 
our suggestion that a rules-based approach to interest analysis would provide a 
more appropriate option. By applying depecage, a rule could be chosen to apply 
to all same-sex relationships. Our recommendation is that this rule should be the 
continued recognised relationship theory, which provides that the applicable law 
is that of the country where the couple intend to reside, or if their relationship has 
been subsisting for a reasonable period of time, it should be the law of the country 
where they previously lived.
For the purposes of free movement and the prevention of limping marriages236 
it is essential that this matter is dealt with at an EU level. With the high volume 
233 See for instance  Wilkinson v Kitzinger (n.17) where the couple felt that being demoted to the status of 
civil partners was like being offered a “consolation prize”.
234 Alhaji Mohamed v Knott (n.132).
235 Radwan v Radwan (No 2) (n.37).
236 See works referred to in note 59.
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of migration and marriages involving international couples,237 it is not diffi cult to 
see the benefi ts that would be gained from the harmonisation of this matter.238 It is 
argued here that the EU is the appropriate place within which to bring forward the 
proposed choice of law rule. This is because of the already existing and growing 
area of European family law. The EU as compared to other sources of European 
family law allows for greater co-ordinated action. There is also a necessity of the 
EU to act due to the imperative of its free movement provisions. Irrespective of the 
fact that the EU and the ECtHR have taken divergent approaches in this area, over 
time the two organisations converge.
The continued recognised relationship is a choice of law rule which could 
lead to a more extensive protection of same-sex relationships. This more extensive 
choice of law rule can be justifi ed because of concerns surrounding upholding 
marriage validity, consideration of the view of the parties to the marriage and the 
example of how polygamous marriages have been treated in England and Wales. 
We also argue that additional public policy concerns of citizenship, symbolism 
and equality apply. All of these are compelling arguments in favour of a more 
extensive choice of law rule. While these arguments are often most appropriate to 
recognition of same-sex marriage, for the sake of consistency we argue that the 
same choice of law should be applied to all same-sex relationships, including civil 
partnerships.
We have also dealt with anticipated criticisms of the continued recognised 
relationship theory. Firstly, these include objections that this theory is receiving 
accelerated promotion. Secondly, is that it would be diffi cult to operate in 
practice due to diffi culties in defi ning what is meant by the relationship having 
been subsisting for a reasonable period of time. Thirdly, is its application to 
the varying types of civil partnerships across the EU, and fi nally that Member 
States would be required to recognise a relationship that it would not permit its 
own domicilaries to enter into. We have suggested how these criticisms can be 
best dealt with. There is no requirement for Member States to legalise same-sex 
marriage in their own jurisdiction. A marriage subsisting for a reasonable period 
of time can be defi ned by looking at all factors, not just the length of marriage. 
The relationship to be recognised is that which is most similar to the one where 
the parties originated. If that is not possible the relationship should be upgraded. 
This tolerance and acceptance of existing relationships already occurs within 
other incapacities.
237 The Centre for Social Justice, “European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” (n.1).
238 For instance, certainty and predictability can be achieved through community action, as was identifi ed 
in relation to divorce by Fiorini, “Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization of 
Family Law Going too Far?”(n.84), p.185 in stating: “It is clear that, of the four objectives identifi ed 
by the Commission (increasing legal certainty and predictability, preventing ‘rush to court’, increasing 
fl exibility and ensuring access to court) the fi rst two can only be achieved by community action, no 
Member States acting alone being able to solves problems that the lack of uniform rules in Europe give 
rise to.”
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There is no perfect solution. The aim is not to achieve the unachievable, but to 
identify and advance the best possible answer. This needs to be subject to further 
debate amongst EU nations. This article also develops an area of law that has been 
neglected. Marriage validity and the choice of law rules therein is an area of law in 
need of attention.239 There is only space to tackle same-sex relationships within this 
work, but, this could be the starting point for a consideration of the choice of law 
rules applicable to other incapacities to marriage.
239 See Reed, “Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-
American Choice of Law Rules” (n.27), p.450.
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